Files

79 lines
4.0 KiB
JSON
Raw Permalink Normal View History

{
"ceilings_web_logic_taxonomy": {
"candidate_enumerable": {
"meaning": "for comparison: a candidate SITE exists inside the labeled function (constrained-detector group 1)",
"rate": 0.966
},
"model_corroborated_one_hop": {
"meaning": "derive_shape resolves a source at the sink argument (one-hop) even when the fix mechanism is opaque",
"n": "22/92",
"rate": 0.239
},
"model_entailed_today": {
"meaning": "the model alone establishes the vuln differential: a source->sink with the fix's guard recognised, or an obligation undischarged on vuln and discharged on fixed, or a permissive literal changed",
"n": "2/92",
"rate": 0.022
},
"taint_reachable_multi_hop": {
"meaning": "sink argument's binding chain (depth 6) reaches a source token; the achievable corroboration band once the taint is deepened",
"n": "26/74 flow families",
"rate": 0.351
}
},
"command": "offline abstract interpretation over the vendored corpus, no LLM",
"generated": "2026-09-08",
"memory_slice": "176 pairs deferred to the execution/SMT tier; not a static gap",
"modeling": "abstract interpretation (taint reachability + guard dominance + constant abstraction). SMT reserved for the deferred memory/C tier; concolic avoided by design (no interpreter, un-runnable targets).",
"note": "The analogue of the candidate ceiling, one rung up: not 'can a site be enumerated' (96.6%) but 'can a deterministic model DECIDE the vulnerability without trusting the LLM'. An entailment witness is the static analogue of a reproduced crash.",
"per_family_entailed": {
"access_control": {
"entailed": 0,
"one_hop_corrob": 3,
"pairs": 8
},
"config_secrets": {
"entailed": 0,
"one_hop_corrob": 1,
"pairs": 10
},
"deserialization": {
"entailed": 0,
"one_hop_corrob": 1,
"pairs": 3
},
"injection": {
"entailed": 2,
"one_hop_corrob": 17,
"pairs": 50
},
"output_encoding": {
"entailed": 0,
"one_hop_corrob": 0,
"pairs": 1
},
"path": {
"entailed": 0,
"one_hop_corrob": 0,
"pairs": 8
},
"prototype": {
"entailed": 0,
"one_hop_corrob": 0,
"pairs": 7
},
"untrusted_destination": {
"entailed": 0,
"one_hop_corrob": 0,
"pairs": 5
}
},
"verdict": "The model cannot be a PURE arbiter at v1: deterministic abstract interpretation decides ~2% at entailment and ~24-35% at corroboration, far below the 96.6% at which a site can be handed to an LLM. The architecture the numbers support is a LAYERED arbiter: report model_entailed where the model proves it (deterministic, no LLM); let the LLM judge but CHECK its claim against the resolved taint on the corroboration band (noise removed there); honest `suspicion` for the rest, which is where the future execution/differential tier earns its place. The near-term work is deepening the abstract interpretation -- function naming, per-family sink/sanitizer tables, multi-hop taint reused from the candidate enumerator's depth-4 chain -- each measurable, the first knob already moved injection 24% -> 48%.",
"why_the_gap": [
"one-hop source resolution at the sink argument: real bugs put the taint 1-3 binds upstream (q = '...'+id; execute(q)) and the shallow resolver stops at `q`",
"closed literal sink table: misses project wrappers (run_sql_query) and per-family sinks (path: open/join/send_file; xss: render/innerHTML; prototype: Object.assign/[key]=)",
"function-naming gap: 20/50 injection pairs report no_function because the CST names the labeled handler `<anon>` or a wrapper name -- the same defect that caps vfc-js candidate coverage",
"fix-mechanism recognition only fires when the guard lands inside the labeled function; decorator/middleware/config fixes are invisible to the in-function guard classifier",
"absence model finds no operation in 5/8 access_control: thin operation detection and cross-file decorators"
]
}