2026-09-05 09:27:22 +02:00
|
|
|
# agent-vfc slice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Security-fix commits carrying an AI coding agent co-author trailer or generation marker
|
|
|
|
|
(Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, Devin), in JavaScript, TypeScript, or Python.
|
2026-09-05 10:37:53 +02:00
|
|
|
`provenance = "agent"`. Only repositories with a stated license are vendored; fixes in
|
|
|
|
|
unlicensed repositories are `vendored = false` pointer rows (`build_recipes.py --from ... --pointers`,
|
|
|
|
|
function label derived from the cached excerpt) scored by `ousast pairs --slice agent-vfc --pointers`.
|
2026-09-05 09:27:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Review checklist (Req 5.3)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-09-05 09:55:18 +02:00
|
|
|
A recipe with `reviewer = "pending"` loads at `review_tier = "title"`: scored and reported by `pairs`; the improve loop's
|
|
|
|
|
profile gate uses only `seeded` and `reviewed` pairs (Req 9.3, task 8.2). Setting `reviewer` to your name promotes it to `reviewed`. Before doing so:
|
2026-09-05 09:27:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. The parent excerpt really contains the vulnerability the title claims (not a refactor).
|
|
|
|
|
2. One mechanism from `benchmarks/pairs/mechanisms.toml` explains it; adjust `mechanism` and `cwe`.
|
|
|
|
|
3. The fixed excerpt removes it and the change is inside the vendored function.
|
|
|
|
|
4. No secret, token, or personal data is in either excerpt (run the redaction check).
|
|
|
|
|
5. The license header is present and matches the repository license.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rebuild: `python benchmarks/pairs/agent-vfc/build_recipes.py --search /tmp/agents.jsonl` then
|
|
|
|
|
`--from /tmp/agents.jsonl`, `harvest.py --slice agent-vfc --all --fetch`, `catalog_gen.py --slice agent-vfc`.
|
