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Open_Ultra_SAST/tests/test_model_taint.py
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"""model-grounded-detection task 2.2: the taint verdict, and what separates entailed from corroborated.
An `ENTAILED` verdict is the static analogue of a reproduced crash: the CPG establishes the flow on its own and
the LLM's assertion is no longer load-bearing. `CORROBORATED` means a path exists but a sanitizer may break it,
so the judgement of sufficiency is the LLM's residual — checked against the graph, never averaged over runs.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from pathlib import Path
def _cpg(rows: list[dict[str, object]]): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
return CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=lambda query, params: rows)
def _spec(): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
from openultrasast.model.specs import TaintSpec
return TaintSpec(
family="injection",
language="python",
sources=("request.args",),
sinks=("os.system", "execute"),
sanitizers=("escape", "quote"),
)
def test_an_unsanitized_source_to_sink_path_is_entailed() -> None:
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [
{"sink": "os.system(cmd)", "sinkLine": "4", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['x']", "sanitized": False, "length": 3}
]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
assert answer.family == "injection"
assert "request.args" in answer.witness and "os.system" in answer.witness, "the witness names the flow it found"
def test_a_path_through_a_sanitizer_is_corroborated_not_entailed() -> None:
"""The model saw the flow but cannot judge whether the sanitizer is sufficient. That residual is the LLM's."""
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{"sink": "execute(q)", "sinkLine": "9", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['q']", "sanitized": True, "length": 4}]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.CORROBORATED
def test_no_path_yields_no_verdict_so_the_caller_reports_suspicion() -> None:
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
assert verdict(_cpg([]), _spec(), function="run") is None
def test_a_query_that_failed_is_not_read_as_an_absence_of_flow() -> None:
"""`None` from the engine means "could not decide", which is not the same as "no path" — Req 4.3."""
from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
broken = CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=lambda query, params: None)
assert verdict(broken, _spec(), function="run") is None
def test_the_verdict_is_restricted_to_the_labeled_function() -> None:
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [
{
"sink": "os.system(x)", "sinkLine": "40", "sinkMethod": "elsewhere",
"source": "request.args['x']", "sanitized": False, "length": 2,
}
]
assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run") is None, "a flow in another function does not judge this one"
def test_the_shortest_unsanitized_flow_wins_and_the_sequence_is_deterministic() -> None:
"""Req 6.4: two runs over one CPG give an identical verdict sequence, so there is nothing to average."""
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [
{"sink": "os.system(a)", "sinkLine": "7", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['b']", "sanitized": True, "length": 9},
{"sink": "os.system(a)", "sinkLine": "7", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['a']", "sanitized": False, "length": 2},
]
first = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
second = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
assert first == second
assert first is not None and first.rung is Rung.ENTAILED and "request.args['a']" in first.witness
def test_the_spec_drives_the_query_parameters() -> None:
"""The security modelling is ours; the traversal is the engine's. The spec is what crosses the seam."""
from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
seen: dict[str, object] = {}
def run(query: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> object:
seen["query"] = query
seen.update(params)
return []
verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run")
assert seen["query"] == "taint"
assert seen["sources"] == ("request.args",)
assert seen["sinks"] == ("os.system", "execute")
assert seen["sanitizers"] == ("escape", "quote")
assert seen["function"] == "run"
# --- the safe-shape test (task 2.3 finding) ------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Taint reachability alone does not distinguish a parameterised fix from an interpolated bug: the flow
# `request.args["name"] -> name -> execute` exists on BOTH sides of the canonical SQL pair.
#
# vuln db.execute("select ... '" + name + "'") one argument, interpolated
# fixed db.execute("select ... = %s", (name,)) two arguments, bound
#
# What separates them is the SHAPE of the sink call, which is exactly what `TaintSpec.safe_shape_sinks`
# preserves. Without this test the model entails both sides and arbitrates nothing.
def _shape_spec(): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
from openultrasast.model.specs import TaintSpec
return TaintSpec(
family="injection",
language="python",
sources=("request.args",),
sinks=("execute",),
sanitizers=(),
safe_shape_sinks=("execute",),
)
def test_a_parameterised_sink_call_is_not_a_vulnerability_even_though_the_flow_reaches_it() -> None:
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{
"sink": 'db.execute("select ... = %s", (name,))', "sinkLine": "5", "sinkMethod": "run",
"source": "request.args['name']", "sanitized": False, "length": 4, "sinkArity": 2, "sinkArg0Literal": True,
}]
assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run") is None, "a bound query is the fix, not the bug"
def test_an_interpolated_sink_call_of_the_same_name_is_entailed() -> None:
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{
"sink": 'db.execute("select ... \'" + name + "\'")', "sinkLine": "5", "sinkMethod": "run",
"source": "request.args['name']", "sanitized": False, "length": 4, "sinkArity": 1, "sinkArg0Literal": False,
}]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run")
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
def test_the_shape_test_only_applies_to_sinks_declared_safe_in_that_shape() -> None:
"""`os.system(x)` with one argument is not "safe because it has one argument" -- the rule is per sink."""
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{
"sink": "os.system(full)", "sinkLine": "7", "sinkMethod": "run",
"source": "request.args['cmd']", "sanitized": False, "length": 5, "sinkArity": 1, "sinkArg0Literal": False,
}]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run") # os.system is not in safe_shape_sinks
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
def test_a_row_without_shape_fields_is_judged_on_the_flow_alone() -> None:
"""Older rows, or an engine that could not report arity, must not be silently treated as safe."""
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{"sink": "db.execute(q)", "sinkLine": "5", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['n']",
"sanitized": False, "length": 3}]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run")
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
def test_parameter_sources_are_opt_in_and_reach_the_query() -> None:
"""A function-level pair's parameters are its trust boundary; a whole repository's are not.
39 of the 50 injection pairs carry no framework source token at all — their untrusted input arrives as a
function parameter — and the flat-IR baseline this feature is measured against counted those as sources.
So the flag must exist and must default to off.
"""
from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
seen: dict[str, object] = {}
def run(query: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> object:
seen.update(params)
return []
verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("c.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run")
assert seen["parameterSources"] == "false", "treating every parameter as untrusted is not the default"
verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("c.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run", parameter_sources=True)
assert seen["parameterSources"] == "true"
# --- closure scoping (group 4 finding) -----------------------------------------------------------------
#
# JavaScript is callback-heavy, so the method containing a sink routinely is not the labeled function:
#
# function requestListener(req, res) { // labeled
# fs.stat(possibleFilename, function(err, stats) {
# fs.readFileSync(possibleFilename) // sink, enclosing method is <lambda>0
# })
# }
#
# Filtering on `sinkMethod == function` dropped every such sink -- the whole `path` family measured 0/8.
# The query now decides scope by line-range containment and reports it; the Python side trusts that flag and
# keeps the name comparison only as a fallback for rows that carry no flag.
def test_a_sink_in_a_nested_closure_is_in_scope_when_the_query_says_so() -> None:
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{
"sink": "fs.readFileSync(possibleFilename)", "sinkLine": "6", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
"source": "req", "sanitized": False, "length": 4, "inLabeledScope": True,
}]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener")
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
assert "<lambda>0" not in answer.witness, "the witness names the flow, not the synthetic closure name"
def test_a_sink_in_an_unrelated_function_stays_out_of_scope() -> None:
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{
"sink": "fs.readFileSync('/etc/' + name)", "sinkLine": "11", "sinkMethod": "unrelated",
"source": "name", "sanitized": False, "length": 2, "inLabeledScope": False,
}]
assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener") is None
def test_rows_without_the_scope_flag_fall_back_to_the_method_name() -> None:
"""A row from an engine that cannot report scope must not silently become in-scope."""
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{"sink": "os.system(x)", "sinkLine": "9", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
"source": "request.args['x']", "sanitized": False, "length": 2}]
assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run") is None
def test_a_flow_from_a_real_source_outranks_a_shorter_one_from_a_bare_parameter() -> None:
"""Shortest-wins alone picks the wrong witness once closures are in scope.
In the angular-http-server shape the closure yields three unsanitized flows to one sink:
`req.url.split('?')[0]` (11 steps, the actual vulnerability), `res` (3 steps) and `this` (7). Shortest
would report `res -> fs.readFileSync(...)`, which names no attacker input and is simply untrue. A flow
whose source matches the spec's source model outranks one from a bare captured name; shortest still
breaks ties, so the order stays total and the verdict deterministic.
"""
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [
{"sink": "fs.readFileSync(p)", "sinkLine": "6", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0", "source": "res",
"sanitized": False, "length": 3, "inLabeledScope": True},
{"sink": "fs.readFileSync(p)", "sinkLine": "6", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0", "source": "this",
"sanitized": False, "length": 7, "inLabeledScope": True},
{"sink": "fs.readFileSync(p)", "sinkLine": "6", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
"source": "request.args['f']", "sanitized": False, "length": 11, "inLabeledScope": True},
]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener")
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
assert "request.args['f']" in answer.witness, f"witness named no real source: {answer.witness}"
assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener") == answer # still deterministic
def test_a_modelled_source_flow_decides_even_when_a_parameter_flow_is_unsanitized() -> None:
"""Parameter sources are a fallback, never an override.
On the fixed angular-http-server side the real flow `req.url -> ... -> readFileSync` IS sanitized by
path.normalize, but the captured `res` parameter also reaches the sink unsanitized. Judging on the union
reports the fix as still vulnerable, on the strength of a flow that names no attacker input. When any
modelled source reaches the sink, those flows are the evidence and the bare-parameter ones are ignored.
"""
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [
{"sink": "fs.readFileSync(safe)", "sinkLine": "41", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0", "source": "res",
"sanitized": False, "length": 3, "inLabeledScope": True},
{"sink": "fs.readFileSync(safe)", "sinkLine": "41", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
"source": "request.args['f']", "sanitized": True, "length": 22, "inLabeledScope": True},
]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener")
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.CORROBORATED, "a sanitized real flow is not an entailment"
assert "request.args['f']" in answer.witness
def test_parameter_flows_still_decide_when_no_modelled_source_reaches_the_sink() -> None:
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{"sink": "os.system(cmd)", "sinkLine": "4", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "username",
"sanitized": False, "length": 2, "inLabeledScope": True}]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED