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https://github.com/norandom/OpenUltraSAST.git
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feat(real-world-vfc-slice): add labeled OpenSSL/Firefox/Chromium/curl pair corpus
Harvest 176 isolated vuln-vs-fix functions (109 CVEs, 352 training rows) into benchmarks/pairs/vfc with provenance and a JSONL training manifest. Score the slice as an honesty dashboard (ousast pairs --slice vfc); keep the pair gate on the local fixtures only.
This commit is contained in:
Marius Ciepluch
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
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/* Provenance: openssl/openssl check_chain_extensions (fixed).
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* repo: openssl/openssl
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* commit: 2a40b7bc7b94dd7de897a74571e7024f0cf0d63b
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* parent: cfd74383d9b06f85cb1e166180346115a3f9a452
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* commit_url: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2a40b7bc7b94dd7de897a74571e7024f0cf0d63b
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* cve: CVE-2021-3450
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* license: OpenSSL License
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* function: check_chain_extensions
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* relpath: crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
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*/
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static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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{
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int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
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X509 *x;
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int proxy_path_length = 0;
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int purpose;
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int allow_proxy_certs;
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int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
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/*-
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* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
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* -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
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* use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
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* 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
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* used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
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* 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
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* all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
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*/
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must_be_ca = -1;
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/* CRL path validation */
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if (ctx->parent) {
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allow_proxy_certs = 0;
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purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
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} else {
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allow_proxy_certs =
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! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
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purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
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int ret;
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x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
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if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
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&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
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if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
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X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION))
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return 0;
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}
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if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
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if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
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X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED))
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return 0;
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}
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ret = X509_check_ca(x);
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switch (must_be_ca) {
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case -1:
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if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
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&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
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ret = 0;
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
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} else
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ret = 1;
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break;
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case 0:
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if (ret != 0) {
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ret = 0;
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
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} else
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ret = 1;
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break;
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default:
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/* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
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if ((ret == 0)
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|| ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
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&& (ret != 1))) {
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ret = 0;
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
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} else
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ret = 1;
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break;
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}
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if (ret > 0
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&& (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) {
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/* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
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ret = check_curve(x);
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if (ret < 0) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
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ret = 0;
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} else if (ret == 0) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS;
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}
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}
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if (ret > 0
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&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
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&& x->ex_pathlen != -1
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&& (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
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ret = 0;
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}
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if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
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return 0;
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/* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
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if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
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return 0;
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/* Check pathlen */
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if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
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&& (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length))) {
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if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
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return 0;
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}
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/* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */
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if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0)
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plen++;
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/*
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* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
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* must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
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* the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
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*/
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if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
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/*
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* RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
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* is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
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* the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
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* should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
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*
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* Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
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* with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
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* and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
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* increment proxy_path_length.
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*/
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if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
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if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
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if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
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X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
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return 0;
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}
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proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
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}
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proxy_path_length++;
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must_be_ca = 0;
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} else
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must_be_ca = 1;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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