feat(access-control): carry the obligation across the route-and-DAO split

The census measured this family completing 35 questions on NodeGoat with no obligation raised
anywhere: every modelled data operation lives in app/data/*-dao.js, none in a route handler
file, and operations were scoped to the region's own file. The family had nothing to be right or
wrong about.

The obligation now follows the one named call the handler writes, out of the region's file and
no further. How it is followed is the point. jssrc2cpg does not resolve
allocationsDAO.getByUserIdAndThreshold(...) to the DAO body: the callee is an external stub with
no code. That stub's fullName records where the member was written, so the implementation is
reached by the graph's own provenance rather than by a repository-wide name guess, which is the
false positive the file scope was closed against. A control asserts it: a third module defining
a member of the same name that nothing imports is not attributed.

A row is attributed to the region's DECLARED function, which is what lets a question about
displayAllocations match a graph that holds a <lambda>. A carried row is also checked for a guard
at the CALL, because that is where a handler establishes who is asking. The method holding a
carried operation joins the question's context scope, so the module holding the query cannot
change under a claim that depends on it without the change being attributed. The witness names
both sites and the finding is located at the call, which is the line a contributor changed.

A carried obligation corroborates, it does not entail, and that was measured rather than
assumed. Entailing it reported handleSignup, which looks a user up by name to check the name is
free during registration and is public by design, because two authenticated siblings in the same
file pass req.session.userId into the same module. The entailed rung's justification is that one
FILE contradicts itself, same file and same trust context; carried, the compared operations live
in a data-access module that handlers of different trust contexts share. The corroborated band
already asks the right residual: does this operation require a check, or is the route
legitimately public?

Measured on NodeGoat: 15 handlers asked, obligations raised at zero before and six now, three
reaching a verdict, all corroborated, none reported without a judge. VAmPI unchanged at two
entailed findings, because it keeps handler and query in one file and carries nothing.

What this does not reach is recorded, not implied. NodeGoat's documented insecure direct object
reference still raises nothing, because its module reads with allocationsCol.find(...) and find
is not a modelled operation: Array.prototype.find and jQuery's .find are everywhere, so it needs
an argument-shape discriminator and its own measurement (task 14.8). Two of the three corroborated
claims are correct code whose identity read a destructuring spelled away, and the cross-file
contradiction that would entail the real defect needs a sibling-scope decision (task 14.7).

1,415 tests pass, fifteen skipped; eleven Joern-gated query tests pass in the image.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
This commit is contained in:
Marius Ciepluch
2026-09-20 08:57:32 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent f31ef862a7
commit 102a21fc4e
6 changed files with 502 additions and 16 deletions
+50 -5
View File
@@ -71,18 +71,54 @@ def verdict(cpg: CpgResult, spec: DominanceSpec, *, function: str = "", file: st
guarded_methods = sorted({str(row["opMethod"]) for row in siblings if row["guards"]})
target = min(unguarded, key=lambda row: (row["opMethod"], row["opLine"]))
if guarded_methods:
where = _where(target)
# A carried obligation does not ENTAIL, however clean the asymmetry looks.
#
# The rung's justification is that one FILE contradicts itself: same file, same trust context, so an
# unguarded operation beside a guarded one is evidence. Once the obligation is carried across a module
# boundary, the operations being compared live in a data-access module that handlers of DIFFERENT trust
# contexts share, and a route file mixing public with authenticated handlers is the normal shape -- so the
# asymmetry stops implying inconsistency.
#
# Measured on NodeGoat, where this was not hypothetical: `handleSignup` looks a user up by name to check
# the name is free, which is public by design, and two authenticated siblings in the same file pass
# `req.session.userId` into the same module. The asymmetry is real and the defect is not. That question --
# does this operation require a check, or is the route legitimately public? -- is exactly what the
# corroborated band's residual asks, so a carried row is capped there and the judge decides it.
if guarded_methods and not target.get("viaLine"):
witness = (
f"{target['opMethod']} line {target['opLine']}: no discharging guard, "
f"while {len(guarded_methods)} sibling handler(s) are guarded "
f"({', '.join(guarded_methods[:3])})"
f"{where}: no discharging guard, while {len(guarded_methods)} sibling handler(s) are guarded ({', '.join(guarded_methods[:3])})"
)
return Verdict(rung=Rung.ENTAILED, family=spec.family, witness=witness, location=_location(target))
witness = f"{target['opMethod']} line {target['opLine']}: obligated operation with no discharging guard, and no guarded sibling"
if guarded_methods:
witness = (
f"{where}: no discharging guard, while {len(guarded_methods)} sibling handler(s) reaching the same "
f"module are guarded ({', '.join(guarded_methods[:3])}); the obligation was carried across a module "
f"boundary, so those siblings need not share this route's trust context"
)
return Verdict(rung=Rung.CORROBORATED, family=spec.family, witness=witness, location=_location(target))
witness = f"{where}: obligated operation with no discharging guard, and no guarded sibling"
return Verdict(rung=Rung.CORROBORATED, family=spec.family, witness=witness, location=_location(target))
def _where(row: Mapping[str, object]) -> str:
"""The sites a reader has to open. Two of them when the obligation crossed a module boundary.
An application that puts its route in one file and its query in another raised no obligation at all until
the query followed the call, and a witness that named only the operation would send a contributor to a
data-access module that is not where the decision was made. Naming only the handler would hide what the
claim is about. So a carried row names both, in the order a reader needs them.
"""
method = str(row["opMethod"])
via_line = str(row.get("viaLine") or "")
if not via_line:
return f"{method} line {row['opLine']}"
call = str(row.get("viaCall") or "").strip()
return f"{method} line {via_line} calls {call}, whose operation at {row.get('opFile')}:{row['opLine']}"
def _location(row: Mapping[str, object]) -> str:
"""``path:line:function`` of the obligated operation, when the engine reported a file.
@@ -90,6 +126,12 @@ def _location(row: Mapping[str, object]) -> str:
reached a contributor as `api_views/users.py:?:update_password` -- the right file by accident, because
the region was asked about that file, and no line at all.
"""
# A carried obligation is located at the CALL, not at the operation: that is the line the contributor
# changed and the line an admission decision has to be attributable to. The operation's own site travels
# in the witness.
carried_line = str(row.get("viaLine") or "")
if carried_line.lstrip("-").isdigit() and int(carried_line) >= 0 and row.get("viaFile"):
return f"{row['viaFile']}:{carried_line}:{row.get('opMethod') or '?'}"
where = str(row.get("opFile") or "")
line = str(row.get("opLine") or "")
if not where or not line.lstrip("-").isdigit() or int(line) < 0:
@@ -112,6 +154,9 @@ def _operations(rows: object) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
"opLine": str(row.get("opLine", "")),
"opMethod": str(row.get("opMethod", "")),
"opFile": str(row.get("opFile", "")),
"viaCall": str(row.get("viaCall", "")),
"viaLine": str(row.get("viaLine", "")),
"viaFile": str(row.get("viaFile", "")),
"guards": [str(g) for g in guards] if isinstance(guards, Sequence) and not isinstance(guards, str) else [],
}
)