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docs(detection-core): approve v2 implementation plan
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@@ -2,139 +2,301 @@
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## Project Description (Input)
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**Who has the problem:** the maintainer of OpenUltraSAST. Every detection arm built so far
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(prover, hunter, push hook, proof arm) is corrected link by link, and corrections do not
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compose — v1→v2 retunes transferred 0/17 on untouched cases, and the 2026-10-30 admission
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run on the untouched pilot population returned NO-GO (0/12 pairs, in-family 0/3, 9/12
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repositories with zero framework recognition).
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**Who has the problem:** the maintainer of OpenUltraSAST. The intended detection loop is
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to augment family-specific model programs with deterministic program-analysis evidence.
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Today that loop cannot be extended safely because the shared core embeds authorization
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vocabulary, semantic gaps surface only during repository admission, and a clean-looking
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zero can still hide a failure before the model receives useful evidence.
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**Current situation:** detection is specified as per-family, per-arm runners around an
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implicit core. The ordered trace exists for one family (access-control-prover), learned
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components fit pool shortcuts (deletion count separates reversed fixes at 0.90), and
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misses concentrate in unmeasured links: entry recognition, call resolution (11.9%
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complete), guard dominance, and the 120s pre-push budget.
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**Current situation:** the instrument-verified 2026-10-31 authorization diagnosis showed
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two different failures. Framework-mediated reachability stopped before protected
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operations, and paths that survived still lacked the constraint semantics needed to
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distinguish vulnerable and fixed code. These are useful limits of the deterministic
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evidence producer, not a reason to require it to become a complete vulnerability prover.
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The core must expose such limits early and give each vulnerability family a stable way to
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interpret the evidence without translating its semantics into authorization terms.
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**What should change:** one specified core object — the security trace — with a contract
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every arm, fact pack, and consumer reuses: given a push (base, head) within a fixed budget,
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output proven defect claims (each with its witness) plus explicit coverage of what was not
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decided, on repositories never seen. Models are bounded to residuals; admission on an
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untouched population gates the trace itself; no fitted component ever sees pool labels.
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**What should change:** the detection core shall provide a family-neutral evidence and
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verdict envelope. Deterministic analysis shall contribute typed transitions, effects,
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provenance, and explicit completeness. Each vulnerability family shall define its security
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object and decision vocabulary and may use a bounded model program to answer residual
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questions over that evidence. A staged readiness contract shall stop a family at the first
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failing semantic layer, before population-level admission is attempted.
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## Boundary Context
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- **In scope**: the family-neutral evidence, outcome, trace, coverage, provenance, budget,
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staged-readiness, admission, measurement, fact-pack, model-handoff, and consumer
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contracts; family conformance requirements; failure-visible semantic-stage accounting.
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- **Out of scope**: vulnerability-family detection algorithms and prompt content;
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framework-specific fact content; model optimization; analysis of vendored dependency
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source; the pre-push transaction and rollout policy; proof execution; enabling a new
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vulnerability family for users.
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- **Adjacent expectations**: the existing deterministic analysis is an evidence producer,
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not a required complete prover; family-specific DSPy programs may consume the evidence
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packet under the model-handoff contract; proof-based blocking remains a separate
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consumer. A parked arm remains parked unless a separately reviewed strategy creates a
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new arm, baseline, and admission population.
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## Requirements
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### Requirement 1: Canonical trace object
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The detection core shall define one canonical trace object per analyzed change as the
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shared security object for all detection arms.
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1. When a change is analyzed, the detection core shall produce a canonical trace carrying
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entry identity, ordered hops with call-target completeness, operation kind with resource
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and authority, witnesses with provenance and match relations, guard effects, completeness
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reasons, a final judgment, and the input digests of the analysis.
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2. The detection core shall serialize every trace deterministically, so that identical
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inputs produce byte-identical traces.
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### Requirement 1: Family-neutral evidence record
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The detection core shall define one canonical evidence record for every examined security
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question within an analyzed change.
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1. When a security question is analyzed, the detection core shall produce a canonical
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evidence record carrying the family identity, security-object identity, analyzed scope,
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ordered semantic transitions, observations with provenance, completeness reasons,
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family decision, neutral outcome, evidence basis, and input digests.
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2. When a transition or observation is derived from product code or reviewed semantic
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knowledge, the detection core shall record its semantic role, source location,
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provenance, and completeness independently of every other transition or observation.
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3. When a family supplies family-specific evidence fields, the detection core shall
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preserve those fields under the declared family schema without requiring them to use
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another family's vocabulary.
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4. The detection core shall serialize every evidence record deterministically, so that
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identical inputs produce byte-identical records.
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### Requirement 2: Three-way judgment vocabulary
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The detection core shall judge every analyzed operation as exactly one of unguarded,
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discharged, or indeterminate.
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1. The detection core shall never convert an indeterminate judgment into a clean
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(discharged or unguarded-free) result.
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2. When evidence for a judgment is incomplete, the detection core shall return
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indeterminate with the named incompleteness reasons.
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### Requirement 2: Neutral outcome and evidence basis
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The detection core shall separate a family-specific decision from the neutral outcome and
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the basis supporting that outcome.
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1. When a family reaches a decision, the detection core shall record exactly one neutral
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outcome of violation, satisfied, or indeterminate and shall retain the family's own
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decision code separately.
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2. When an outcome is satisfied, the detection core shall report the exact bounded scope
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over which satisfaction was established and shall not present it as repository-wide
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safety.
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3. When evidence is incomplete for the family decision, the detection core shall return
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indeterminate with every named incompleteness reason.
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4. If a required semantic relation is unavailable or ambiguous, the detection core shall
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prevent that missing relation from creating a violation or satisfied outcome.
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5. When an outcome is reported, the detection core shall identify whether its basis is
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deterministic analysis, model corroboration, or execution-backed proof.
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### Requirement 3: Coverage accounting
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The detection core shall account for every input it did or did not use, so a zero result is
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never indistinguishable from an unread input.
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1. When a change is analyzed, the detection core shall report entry-recognition coverage,
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per-call resolution outcomes with exactly one outcome bucket per call, and named
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reasons for every unchecked operation.
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2. If any input file is read as zero bytes, the detection core shall fail the run as an
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instrument failure rather than reporting a clean result.
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### Requirement 3: Vulnerability-family conformance contract
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The detection core shall require every vulnerability family to declare the meaning and
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limits of the evidence it consumes and the decisions it produces.
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1. When a family is registered, the detection core shall require its family and schema
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versions, claimed ecosystems, security-object definition, accepted semantic roles,
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decision vocabulary, neutral-outcome mapping, completeness conditions, and named
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indeterminate reasons.
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2. When a family claims a violation or satisfied outcome, the detection core shall require
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the family contract to identify the minimum evidence and completeness conditions for
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that outcome.
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3. When a family receives evidence outside its declared ecosystem or schema scope, the
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detection core shall report the question as unsupported rather than applying a
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different family's interpretation.
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4. If a family decision code, evidence field, or semantic role is not declared by the
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family contract, the detection core shall refuse the result.
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5. The detection core shall demonstrate conformance with at least two reference families
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that use materially different security objects before the family-neutral contract is
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declared ready for downstream family specifications.
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### Requirement 4: Measured budget and change scoping
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### Requirement 4: Typed semantic transitions and effects
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The detection core shall preserve reviewed semantic knowledge needed to connect product
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code across framework and dependency boundaries without analyzing vendored source.
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1. When reviewed semantic knowledge supplies a registration, invocation, call, return,
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value transformation, operation effect, or constraint effect, the detection core shall
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record the typed relation and the supplying fact identity in the evidence record.
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2. When a typed relation is complete only under stated conditions, the detection core shall
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retain those conditions and shall mark the relation incomplete when they are not met.
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3. If multiple reviewed relations conflict or match ambiguously, the detection core shall
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report the ambiguity and shall not choose a complete relation silently.
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4. When vendored source is excluded, the detection core shall require a reviewed semantic
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relation for any dependency behavior needed by a determinate family decision.
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### Requirement 5: Coverage and instrument accounting
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The detection core shall account for every input and semantic stage it did or did not use,
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so a zero result is never indistinguishable from unread or unmodeled input.
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1. When a change is analyzed, the detection core shall report counts for inputs read,
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security questions formed, semantic sites recognized, transitions materialized,
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security objects constructed, constraints evaluated, determinate outcomes, and findings
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emitted.
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2. When product-code or fact-derived relations are considered, the detection core shall
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assign each relation exactly one complete, incomplete, or unresolved outcome.
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3. If a semantic site, transition, security object, or constraint cannot be modeled, the
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detection core shall report the specific missing relation rather than interpreting its
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absence as safe.
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4. If any tracked input file is read as zero bytes or cannot be opened, the detection core
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shall fail the run as an instrument failure rather than reporting a clean result.
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5. When a stage produces zero outputs, the detection core shall identify the last stage
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with verified nonzero input and the first stage that failed to produce its expected
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output.
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### Requirement 6: Measured budget and change scoping
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The detection core shall derive its time budget from measurement, not from a fixed constant.
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1. When a change is analyzed, the detection core shall measure and record reply time and
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change complexity (changed regions, call count, changed size) for every change.
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2. The detection core shall derive the per-change budget from the measured distribution
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(sample count, percentile, reference workload and hardware disclosed) and shall publish
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that derivation under the fixed measurement schema; the budget shall be configurable per
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workload class, never a single static constant.
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3. When a change exceeds the measured budget, the detection core shall fail the budget gate
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naming the change, the elapsed time, and the budget derivation exceeded.
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4. While a push is analyzed, the detection core shall limit analysis to regions affected by
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the change and shall record the scope it used.
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change complexity, including changed regions, transition count, and changed size.
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2. When a workload-class budget is published, the detection core shall disclose the sample
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count, percentile, reference workload, reference hardware, and derived budget.
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3. When a change exceeds its measured workload-class budget, the detection core shall fail
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the budget gate naming the change, elapsed time, and budget derivation exceeded.
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4. While a push is analyzed, the detection core shall limit analysis to regions affected
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by the change and shall record the scope it used.
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### Requirement 5: Verdict contract
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The detection core shall distinguish proven defect claims from bounded silence.
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1. When the detection core reports a defect, the claim shall carry its witness evidence and
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an exact location tied to the change.
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2. When the detection core cannot decide a site, it shall report that site as undecided
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with its coverage reason, and shall never present an undecided site as a clean result.
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### Requirement 7: Verdict contract
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The detection core shall distinguish supported defect claims, bounded satisfaction, and
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bounded silence.
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1. When the detection core reports a defect, the claim shall carry its evidence basis, an
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exact location tied to the change, and the complete evidence record supporting the
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claim.
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2. When the detection core reports satisfaction, the claim shall carry the completed
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security questions and the bounded scope over which they were decided.
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3. When the detection core cannot decide a question, it shall report that question as
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indeterminate with its coverage reasons and shall never present it as clean.
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4. If a claim depends on an incomplete or unresolved semantic relation, the detection core
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shall expose the affected question as bounded silence unless another complete path
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independently supports the claim.
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### Requirement 6: Provenance and digests
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The detection core shall stamp every trace and verdict with the identities of its inputs.
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1. The detection core shall record, for every analysis, the analyzer revision, fact-set
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digest, acquisition-record digest, configuration digest, population digest, and
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per-change input digest.
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2. If any recorded digest cannot be re-derived from the named inputs, the detection core
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shall refuse the result rather than accept it.
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### Requirement 8: Staged readiness and promotion
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The detection core shall require a vulnerability-family arm to pass each semantic readiness
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stage before it can advance to broader evaluation.
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1. When an arm begins development, the detection core shall require separate readiness
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results for instrument validity, semantic recognition, transition construction,
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security-object and constraint evaluation, vulnerable/fixed pair behavior, development
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population behavior, fresh admission, and consumer integration.
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2. When a readiness stage is evaluated, the detection core shall require a positive case,
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a negative case, and an ambiguity or missing-evidence case appropriate to that stage.
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3. If a readiness stage fails, the detection core shall stop promotion at that stage and
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shall report the failing semantic layer and named correction lever.
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4. If any prerequisite readiness result is missing, stale, or failed, the detection core
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shall refuse to run a later population or integration gate as evidence of readiness.
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5. When a semantic change invalidates an earlier readiness result, the detection core shall
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mark every dependent later result stale.
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6. When a family passes a stage, the detection core shall preserve the fixtures and results
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as regression evidence without treating them as fresh admission evidence.
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### Requirement 7: Admission gate contract
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The detection core shall gate any generalization claim on an untouched population.
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1. When an arm is proposed for pre-push use, the detection core shall require a reviewed
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manifest naming the frozen analyzer, facts, acquisition, configuration, and an untouched
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admission population before any admission label is opened.
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### Requirement 9: Model-augmentation contract
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The detection core shall support bounded family-specific model reasoning over deterministic
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evidence without allowing model output to rewrite that evidence.
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1. Where a family uses a model program, the detection core shall present the canonical
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evidence record, its completeness state, the family contract, and the residual question
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to be answered.
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2. When a model program returns a family decision, the detection core shall preserve the
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model response, program and configuration identities, evidence-record digest, and
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declared decision mapping.
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3. If deterministic evidence is incomplete, the detection core shall prevent a model
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response from converting the affected question into a satisfied outcome or a
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proof-backed violation.
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4. When model output supports an advisory claim, the detection core shall label the claim
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as model-corroborated and shall keep it distinct from deterministic and execution-backed
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claims.
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5. The detection core shall not allow a model to propose and independently adjudicate the
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same claim within one evidence path.
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6. The detection core shall reserve blocking verdicts for execution-backed proof with a
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differential witness.
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### Requirement 10: Provenance and digests
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The detection core shall stamp every evidence record and verdict with the identities of its
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inputs.
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1. When an analysis is recorded, the detection core shall include the analyzer revision,
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family-contract digest, fact-set digest, acquisition-record digest, configuration
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digest, population digest, and per-change input digest.
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2. When an evidence record uses reviewed semantic knowledge, the detection core shall
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include the semantic pack and fact identities needed to reproduce each derived relation
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or effect.
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3. When a model program contributes a decision, the detection core shall include the model,
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program, prompt, and configuration identities needed to reproduce the call.
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4. If any recorded digest or semantic fact identity cannot be re-derived from the named
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inputs, the detection core shall refuse the result rather than accept it.
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### Requirement 11: Reviewed semantic fact packs as the extension point
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The detection core shall admit family and ecosystem knowledge only through reviewed,
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versioned semantic fact packs over the family-neutral contract.
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1. When a semantic fact pack is admitted, the detection core shall validate its schema
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version, claimed family and ecosystem scope, stable fact identities, declared semantic
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roles, and review evidence.
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2. When a semantic fact matches analyzed product code, the detection core shall permit the
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consuming family to record the corresponding transition or effect only with the matching
|
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evidence and fact provenance attached.
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3. The detection core shall not allow a name-only match without the fact's required
|
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structural evidence to create a complete semantic relation or determinate outcome.
|
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4. If a semantic fact has an undeclared role, unknown field, invalid scope, missing review
|
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evidence, or inconsistent digest, the detection core shall refuse the pack.
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5. When admitted knowledge is insufficient to resolve a semantic relation, the detection
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core shall preserve the partial evidence record and report the relation as incomplete or
|
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unresolved.
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6. The detection core shall report, per arm, the vulnerability families and ecosystems the
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arm claims, so admission and rollout numbers are never read across unsupported scopes.
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### Requirement 12: Admission gate contract
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The detection core shall gate every generalization claim on completed readiness stages and
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a reviewed untouched population whose denominator matches the arm's declared scope.
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1. When an arm is proposed for consumer use, the detection core shall require a reviewed
|
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manifest naming the frozen analyzer, family contract, model program where applicable,
|
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facts, acquisition, configuration, claimed families, claimed ecosystems, denominator
|
||||
policy, readiness results, and untouched admission population before any admission
|
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label is opened.
|
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2. The detection core shall consume admission manifests without producing, mutating, or
|
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re-labeling them, and shall refuse manifests that are unreviewed, label-exposing,
|
||||
re-labeling them and shall refuse manifests that are unreviewed, label-exposing,
|
||||
acquisition-changed, or spent.
|
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3. When admission evidence is scored, the detection core shall report paired
|
||||
vulnerable/fixed behavior, ordinary false alarms, and every gate (budget, instrument,
|
||||
pre-registered criteria) as an evidence-backed GO or NO-GO.
|
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3. When an admission manifest is validated before label opening, the detection core shall
|
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verify that every pre-registered success threshold is arithmetically reachable under the
|
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declared family, ecosystem, and denominator policy.
|
||||
4. If a threshold cannot be reached even when every in-scope case succeeds, the detection
|
||||
core shall refuse the admission configuration rather than run or report a misleading
|
||||
no-go result.
|
||||
5. When a population contains cases outside an arm's declared scope, the detection core
|
||||
shall score quality gates on the pre-registered in-scope denominator and shall report
|
||||
whole-population coverage separately.
|
||||
6. When admission evidence is scored, the detection core shall report paired
|
||||
vulnerable/fixed behavior, ordinary false alarms, semantic-stage coverage, model-call
|
||||
outcomes where applicable, and every budget, instrument, and quality gate as an
|
||||
evidence-backed go or no-go result.
|
||||
|
||||
### Requirement 8: No fitting on evaluation labels
|
||||
The detection core shall not allow any fitted component to train on evaluation labels.
|
||||
1. The detection core shall prohibit tuned prompts, thresholds, or fitted models whose
|
||||
training data includes pool or admission labels.
|
||||
2. When a fitted component is proposed, the detection core shall require it to pass
|
||||
reversed-pair probes (a fix and its reversed fix shall not be separable by the
|
||||
component's decision features), per-repository holdout, and admission on an untouched
|
||||
population before any claim is made.
|
||||
### Requirement 13: Separation of development and evaluation
|
||||
The detection core shall prevent evaluation labels from influencing an arm before its
|
||||
generalization claim is scored.
|
||||
1. The detection core shall prohibit prompts, examples, thresholds, fitted models, semantic
|
||||
facts, or decision mappings whose preparation data includes admission labels.
|
||||
2. When a fitted component is proposed, the detection core shall require reversed-pair
|
||||
probes, repository-held-out development evaluation, and admission on an untouched
|
||||
population before any generalization claim is made.
|
||||
3. When semantic knowledge is acquired, the detection core shall require source,
|
||||
documentation, or independently reviewed behavioral evidence that is isolated from
|
||||
vulnerability, fix-location, and ordinary-change labels.
|
||||
4. If evaluation labels influence semantic fact content, matching behavior, prompt
|
||||
content, examples, thresholds, or promotion, the detection core shall mark the affected
|
||||
population spent and shall refuse it for admission.
|
||||
|
||||
### Requirement 9: Bounded role for models
|
||||
The detection core shall bound every model to residual questions over the trace.
|
||||
1. Where a model judges a trace, the detection core shall present the deterministic trace
|
||||
and require the judgment to be zero-shot over that trace.
|
||||
2. The detection core shall not allow a model to propose-and-adjudicate the same claim, and
|
||||
shall reserve blocking verdicts for demonstrated proofs with a differential witness.
|
||||
|
||||
### Requirement 10: Family fact packs as the extension point
|
||||
The detection core shall admit new vulnerability families only as fact packs over the core
|
||||
trace contract.
|
||||
1. When a new family is added, the detection core shall require the family's entry,
|
||||
operation, and guard knowledge as reviewed fact packs stamped into the trace's
|
||||
provenance, without changing the trace schema or judgment vocabulary.
|
||||
2. The detection core shall report, per arm, the vulnerability families the arm claims, so
|
||||
admission and rollout numbers are never read across families the arm does not cover.
|
||||
|
||||
### Requirement 11: Consumer and re-parenting contract
|
||||
The detection core shall be the single contract that existing detection specs reuse.
|
||||
### Requirement 14: Consumer and re-parenting contract
|
||||
The detection core shall be the single contract that existing and future detection specs
|
||||
reuse.
|
||||
1. The detection core shall define the interface through which the pre-push transaction
|
||||
consumes traces and verdicts within its deadline.
|
||||
2. The detection core shall define the interface through which proof-based blocking evidence
|
||||
attaches to a trace verdict.
|
||||
consumes evidence records and verdicts within its deadline.
|
||||
2. The detection core shall define the interface through which proof-based blocking
|
||||
evidence attaches to an existing claim.
|
||||
3. When an existing arm's behavior is described, the detection core shall require that
|
||||
description to be expressed over the core contract rather than as a separate runner
|
||||
contract.
|
||||
description to be expressed over the family-neutral contract rather than as a separate
|
||||
runner contract.
|
||||
4. When a consumer receives bounded silence caused by missing semantic knowledge, the
|
||||
detection core shall require the consumer to preserve the named coverage reasons.
|
||||
5. When a family specification is created, the detection core shall require it to identify
|
||||
its family contract, readiness fixtures, development population, and admission boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
### Requirement 12: Fixed measurement schema
|
||||
### Requirement 15: Fixed measurement schema
|
||||
The detection core shall require one fixed measurement schema for every detection number.
|
||||
1. When any detection result is reported, the detection core shall require population and
|
||||
freeze digests, judgment vocabulary, every rate with its sample count and uncertainty
|
||||
interval, coverage, instrument failures, and runtime.
|
||||
2. When a measurement changes population or judgment vocabulary, the detection core shall
|
||||
treat the result as a new baseline and shall not present it as a trend against the
|
||||
previous baseline.
|
||||
freeze digests, claimed family and ecosystem scope, denominator policy, family decision
|
||||
vocabulary, neutral outcomes, evidence bases, every rate with its sample count and
|
||||
uncertainty interval, coverage, instrument failures, model-call failures, and runtime.
|
||||
2. When semantic relations participate in an arm, the detection core shall require the
|
||||
report to include sites considered, sites recognized, transitions completed, security
|
||||
objects constructed, constraints evaluated, determinate outcomes, and unresolved counts
|
||||
by named reason.
|
||||
3. When a measurement changes population, denominator policy, claimed scope, family
|
||||
contract, fact schema, model program, or outcome mapping, the detection core shall treat
|
||||
the result as a new baseline and shall not present it as a trend against the previous
|
||||
baseline.
|
||||
4. When a zero or clean-looking result is reported, the detection core shall require proof
|
||||
that every tracked input was read and that every prerequisite semantic stage executed.
|
||||
5. When a later-stage metric is reported, the detection core shall include the results and
|
||||
digests of every prerequisite readiness stage.
|
||||
|
||||
## Out of Scope
|
||||
- The pre-push hook transaction, rollout policy, and capability registry (pre-push-safety-net).
|
||||
- New vulnerability families and their fact content (fact-pack specs).
|
||||
- Fitted models of any kind in the core path.
|
||||
- Engine and graph internals (contributor-scan).
|
||||
- The pre-push hook transaction, rollout policy, and capability registry.
|
||||
- Vulnerability-family algorithms, prompts, examples, and optimization programs.
|
||||
- Framework- or repository-specific semantic fact content.
|
||||
- Analysis or indexing of vendored dependency source.
|
||||
- Proof execution and sandbox orchestration.
|
||||
- Enabling a vulnerability family for advisory or blocking use.
|
||||
- Analysis-engine, frontend, graph, and family-internal implementation details.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user