feat(ruleset): Phase 2 (task 3) — rules as governed data, severity from policy

Externalize detection rules to versioned TOML and remove rule-local severity, so
rules detect and the central CWE policy decides severity — fixing "rules too
influential / not centrally managed". Zero-dependency; detection is byte-identical
(benchmark recall 44/47 = 93.6%, FP 0% unchanged) and the 90/10 gate holds.

- RulesetStore (ruleset/store.py + ruleset/<lang>/rules.toml): PatternRule as data
  (rule_id, title, languages, cwe, tags, pattern, status, min_evidence_level,
  precision_estimate, version) with NO severity; load_ruleset (sorted, with
  optional rule_policy.json ledger overlay) and a stdlib TOML write_ruleset. The
  32 rules were generated from the prior PATTERN_RULES with a verified exact
  round-trip (pattern/cwe/languages/tags/title).
- findings.py: drop the hardcoded PatternRule class + PATTERN_RULES tuple; load the
  default ruleset from TOML; quick_scan_findings(root, targets, rankings, ruleset,
  policy) resolves each finding's severity from policy via resolve_severity
  (SEVERITY_LABEL maps 0-5 -> string) and tags findings with their rule status.
- Three-status volume control: StaticFinding gains status (default "enabled");
  disabled rules never fire; shadow findings are partitioned out of the report and
  score in the CLI (written to shadow_findings.json) — no shadow rules by default.
- Emission floors (RulesetConfig.min_emit_priority / min_emit_precision, default
  0.0 = emit all) replace "every match is a finding".
- CLI loads the ruleset as a stage and uses it for the fail-loud policy check,
  detection, hunter pool, and the score CWE map. Wheel ships the ruleset TOML.

85 tests pass; ruff + mypy clean. Spec tasks 3.1-3.4 checked off.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Marius Ciepluch
2026-06-22 15:27:16 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent fb7594a3ed
commit 444d8c9490
15 changed files with 645 additions and 347 deletions
+32 -330
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,10 @@ import re
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from .policy import CwePolicy, load_policy, resolve_severity
from .preprocess import FileTarget
from .rank import RankingScore
from .ruleset import DEFAULT_RULESET_DIR, PatternRule, load_ruleset
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -25,348 +27,45 @@ class StaticFinding:
reachability_conditions: list[str]
tags: list[str]
ranking_priority: float
status: str = "enabled"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PatternRule:
rule_id: str
title: str
severity: str
tags: tuple[str, ...]
pattern: re.Pattern[str]
cwe: str
languages: tuple[str, ...]
SEVERITY_LABEL = {5: "critical", 4: "high", 3: "medium", 2: "low", 1: "low", 0: "info"}
# Default ruleset loaded from versioned TOML data (rules-as-data).
PATTERN_RULES = load_ruleset(DEFAULT_RULESET_DIR)
C_LANGUAGES = ("c", "cpp")
PYTHON_LANGUAGES = ("python",)
JS_LANGUAGES = ("javascript", "typescript")
JAVA_LANGUAGES = ("java",)
GROOVY_LANGUAGES = ("groovy",)
PATTERN_RULES = (
# --- C / C++ -----------------------------------------------------------------
PatternRule(
rule_id="c-unsafe-copy",
title="Unsafe C string copy needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("memory_unsafe",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(gets|strcpy|strcat|sprintf)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-121",
languages=C_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="c-unsafe-memory-copy",
title="Unsafe C memory copy needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("memory_unsafe",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(memcpy|memmove|bcopy)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-121",
languages=C_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="c-unsafe-format",
title="Unsafe C format string needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("memory_unsafe",),
# Flag format functions that receive a variable format string.
# Calls with string literals, such as printf("..."), are ignored.
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(printf|vprintf|vsprintf|vsnprintf|vfprintf|syslog)\s*\(\s*[A-Za-z_]"),
cwe="CWE-134",
languages=C_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="c-unsafe-scanf",
title="Unbounded C scanf needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("memory_unsafe",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(scanf|fscanf|sscanf)\s*\([^\n]*%s"),
cwe="CWE-121",
languages=C_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="c-shell-exec",
title="C shell execution needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(system|popen)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=C_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="c-exec-family",
title="C exec command execution needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(execl|execlp|execle|execv|execvp|execvpe)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=C_LANGUAGES,
),
# --- Python ------------------------------------------------------------------
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-unsafe-eval",
title="Dynamic Python execution needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(eval|exec)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-95",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-os-command",
title="Python OS command execution needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(os\.system|os\.popen|os\.execl|os\.execlp|os\.execv|os\.execvp)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-shell-true",
title="Subprocess shell execution needs review",
severity="medium",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"subprocess\.[a-zA-Z_]+\s*\([^\n]*shell\s*=\s*True"),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-unsafe-deserialization",
title="Unsafe Python deserialization needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("deserialization",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(pickle\.loads|pickle\.load|cPickle\.loads|yaml\.load|marshal\.loads)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-502",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-sql-injection",
title="Python SQL string composition needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
# Flag .execute(...) calls built with %-formatting, .format(), string
# concatenation, or an f-string. Parameterised %s placeholders pass.
pattern=re.compile(r"(\.execute)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*(?:[\"']\s*%\s*[(A-Za-z_]|\.format\s*\(|[\"']\s*\+|\bf[\"'])"),
cwe="CWE-89",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-path-traversal",
title="Python file open with external input needs review",
severity="medium",
tags=("filesystem_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(open)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*(?:request\.|req\.|argv|input\s*\(|params\[|GET\[|POST\[)"),
cwe="CWE-22",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-ssrf",
title="Python outbound request with external input needs review",
severity="medium",
tags=("network_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(
r"\b(requests\.(?:get|post|put|delete|head|patch)|urllib\.request\.urlopen|urlopen)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*(?:request\.|req\.|argv|input\s*\()"
),
cwe="CWE-918",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-weak-hash",
title="Python weak hash needs review",
severity="low",
tags=("crypto",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\bhashlib\.(md5|sha1)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-327",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-ssti",
title="Python server-side template injection needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(render_template_string)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-94",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-flask-debug",
title="Flask debug mode enabled needs review",
severity="low",
tags=("insecure_default",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\.run\s*\([^\n]*(debug)\s*=\s*True"),
cwe="CWE-489",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
# --- JavaScript / TypeScript -------------------------------------------------
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-command-exec",
title="Node child_process command execution needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
# exec and execSync invoke a shell. execFile and spawn with an argv array
# do not, so this rule leaves them alone.
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(exec|execSync)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-spawn-shell",
title="Node spawn with shell needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(spawn|spawnSync)\s*\([^\n]*shell\s*:\s*true"),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-eval",
title="Dynamic JavaScript evaluation needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(eval)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-95",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-function-constructor",
title="JavaScript Function constructor needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"new\s+(Function)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-95",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-xss-response",
title="Unsanitized HTTP response reflection needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\.(send|write|end)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*\b(?:req|request)\.(?:query|params|body)"),
cwe="CWE-79",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-dom-xss",
title="DOM sink with untrusted input needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\.(innerHTML|outerHTML)\s*=\s*[^\n]*\b(?:req|request|location|document\.location)"),
cwe="CWE-79",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-sql-injection",
title="JavaScript SQL string composition needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\.(query|execute)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*(?:\$\{|\+\s*[A-Za-z_$])"),
cwe="CWE-89",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-path-traversal",
title="Node filesystem access with external input needs review",
severity="medium",
tags=("filesystem_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(
r"\bfs\.(readFile|readFileSync|writeFile|writeFileSync|createReadStream|unlink|unlinkSync)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*\b(?:req|request)\."
),
cwe="CWE-22",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-ssrf",
title="JavaScript outbound request with external input needs review",
severity="medium",
tags=("network_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(axios|fetch|got)\s*[.(][^\n]*\b(?:req|request)\."),
cwe="CWE-918",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-weak-hash",
title="JavaScript weak hash needs review",
severity="low",
tags=("crypto",),
pattern=re.compile(r"createHash\s*\(\s*[\"'](md5|sha1)[\"']"),
cwe="CWE-327",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-deserialize",
title="JavaScript unsafe deserialization needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("deserialization",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(unserialize)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-502",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
# --- Java --------------------------------------------------------------------
PatternRule(
rule_id="java-command-exec",
title="Java runtime command execution needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(exec)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=JAVA_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="java-sql-injection",
title="Java SQL string composition needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
# Flag SQL strings that start with a statement keyword and then concatenate
# more data. Parameterised queries with placeholders are ignored.
pattern=re.compile(r"(?i)\"\s*(select|insert|update|delete)\b[^\"]*\"\s*\+"),
cwe="CWE-89",
languages=JAVA_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="java-weak-hash",
title="Java weak hash needs review",
severity="low",
tags=("crypto",),
pattern=re.compile(r"MessageDigest\.getInstance\s*\(\s*\"(MD5|SHA-1)\""),
cwe="CWE-327",
languages=JAVA_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="java-deserialization",
title="Java unsafe deserialization needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("deserialization",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\.(readObject)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-502",
languages=JAVA_LANGUAGES,
),
# --- Groovy server-side templates -------------------------------------------
PatternRule(
rule_id="groovy-xss-unescaped",
title="Groovy template unescaped output needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
# Flag unescaped bound variables. String literals are ignored.
pattern=re.compile(r"(yieldUnescaped)\s+[A-Za-z_]"),
cwe="CWE-79",
languages=GROOVY_LANGUAGES,
),
)
def quick_scan_findings(root: Path, targets: list[FileTarget], rankings: list[RankingScore]) -> list[StaticFinding]:
def quick_scan_findings(
root: Path,
targets: list[FileTarget],
rankings: list[RankingScore],
ruleset: tuple[PatternRule, ...] | None = None,
policy: dict[str, CwePolicy] | None = None,
*,
min_emit_priority: float = 0.0,
min_emit_precision: float = 0.0,
) -> list[StaticFinding]:
ruleset = PATTERN_RULES if ruleset is None else ruleset
policy = load_policy() if policy is None else policy
ranking_by_path = {ranking.path: ranking for ranking in rankings}
# Compile once; disabled rules and rules below the precision floor never fire.
compiled = [
(rule, re.compile(rule.pattern)) for rule in ruleset if rule.status != "disabled" and rule.precision_estimate >= min_emit_precision
]
findings: list[StaticFinding] = []
for target in targets:
text = _read_text(root / target.path)
for rule in PATTERN_RULES:
for rule, pattern in compiled:
if rule.languages and target.language not in rule.languages:
continue
ranking = ranking_by_path.get(target.path)
for match in rule.pattern.finditer(text):
for match in pattern.finditer(text):
if _match_is_in_comment(text, match.start(), target.language):
continue
findings.append(_finding_from_match(target, rule, text, match, ranking))
finding = _finding_from_match(target, rule, text, match, ranking, policy)
if finding.ranking_priority >= min_emit_priority:
findings.append(finding)
return sorted(findings, key=lambda item: (_severity_sort(item.severity), -item.ranking_priority, item.path))
@@ -393,17 +92,19 @@ def _finding_from_match(
text: str,
match: re.Match[str],
ranking: RankingScore | None,
policy: dict[str, CwePolicy],
) -> StaticFinding:
offset = match.start()
line = text.count("\n", 0, offset) + 1
reachability_status, function_name, reachability_evidence = _reachability_for_line(target, line)
priority = ranking.priority if ranking is not None else 1.0
matched_token = match.group(1) if match.groups() else match.group(0).split("(", 1)[0].strip()
severity = SEVERITY_LABEL.get(resolve_severity(policy, rule.cwe), "info")
return StaticFinding(
finding_id=f"{rule.rule_id}:{target.path}:{line}",
path=target.path,
title=rule.title,
severity=rule.severity,
severity=severity,
confidence="medium",
evidence_level="static_corroboration",
rationale=(
@@ -416,6 +117,7 @@ def _finding_from_match(
reachability_conditions=_reachability_conditions(reachability_evidence),
tags=sorted(set(target.tags) | set(rule.tags)),
ranking_priority=_finding_priority(priority, reachability_status),
status=rule.status,
)