feat(pre-push-safety-net): census the declared families and fix a sink matched in a comment

Seven vulnerability families are declared and two had been proven. The census asks each of
them, on whole checkouts of NodeGoat and VAmPI, whether it establishes anything at all, and
reports a family that answered and found nothing separately from one that was never asked.

Four establish findings: injection, access_control, config_secrets and untrusted_destination.
Output encoding, path, prototype and deserialization establish nothing on either subject. All
299 NodeGoat and 35 VAmPI questions completed, so the silences are answers.

Three of those silences are diagnosed gaps, not clean code. NodeGoat's documented SSRF calls
needle.get, which the sink vocabulary does not hold. Its XSS is server-rendered, and output
encoding declares only DOM sinks, so no question it can ask could have found it. Its two
access-control defects raise no obligation at all: measured with the real dominance query,
every modelled data operation lives in app/data/*-dao.js and none in a route handler file,
while the family scopes operations to the region's own file. Tasks 14.2 to 14.5 carry each
gap; none is fixed here.

The census also found a false positive and it is fixed. NodeGoat's only prototype report was
the word `set` inside `// set these up in case we have an error case`: the matched node is the
<operator>.assignment holding the entire 1,000-character signup handler, and sinkMatches
searched a node's whole text. It now confines the text clause to the callee and excludes
operator nodes. Fourth instance of this bug class after fgets/gets, resolve/resolveUrl and
user/users. Measured on NodeGoat's non-vendor calls, injection sinks fall 28 to 3, prototype
13 to 2 and untrusted destination 26 to 7, with no true positive lost; req.query had been an
injection sink because `query` is word-bounded inside it. Witnesses now name the sink call
rather than the assignment that contained it.

1,411 tests pass, ten skipped; the six Joern-gated query tests pass in the image, including a
new one that fails on the shape this fixed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo

.kiro/specs/pre-push-safety-net/status.md

@@ -134,3 +134,22 @@ next implementation prerequisites, not completed fixes or changed acceptance gat
 An isolated Joern session probe matched the full Node census with four warm requests in
 0.221–0.467s and verified cancellation/reaping in 0.043s. It identifies a promising engine
 lifecycle change; full-query equivalence and changed-code performance remain unverified.
+
+## Family detection census, 2026-09-19
+
+Four of seven declared families establish findings on the two development subjects:
+injection, access_control, config_secrets and untrusted_destination. Output encoding, path,
+prototype and deserialization have established nothing anywhere. Every question completed on
+both subjects, 299 of 299 on NodeGoat and 35 of 35 on VAmPI, so the silences are answers
+rather than failures — but three of them are diagnosed gaps rather than clean code:
+NodeGoat's documented SSRF is invisible because `needle.get` is not in the sink vocabulary,
+its XSS is invisible because output encoding declares only DOM sinks, and its two
+access-control defects raise no obligation because the modelled data operations live in DAO
+files while the family's scope is the handler's own file.
+
+The census also found and fixed one false positive: NodeGoat's only prototype report was
+the word `set` in a code comment, matched because the sink text clause searched a whole
+assignment node. Nothing about this changes the release gates. No capability is qualified by
+these subjects.
+
+Evidence: [family detection census](../../../benchmarks/measurements/2026-09-19-family-detection-census.json).