search-with-proof group 2: verifier with owned oracles and differential

The verifier, not the artefact, observes the effect: SQL, path, command and SSRF
oracles owned by the verifier (XSS needs a browser executor, else no_oracle);
artefact exit code and output ignored; immutable checkout and dependencies;
3 runs per side; one-sided build or readiness failure is inconclusive. An
isolation failure raises IsolationUnavailable instead of reading as
could_not_build (the NPROC limit now applies inside the user namespace).
35 tests, including gaming attempts and 300 host processes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Marius Ciepluch
2026-10-05 14:09:48 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 9d70ef9257
commit 742469d671
8 changed files with 1089 additions and 7 deletions
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"""Offline differential verification through an isolated, batch CLI interface.
Side.command and readiness_args are trusted integration configuration, not demo
contents. TARGET is an executable CLI bridge: each invocation queues arguments
for the app. It deliberately has no synchronous response channel. Alternatively
request.json contains one argument vector. HTTP apps need a trusted CLI adapter;
this lane never treats an artefact's stdout, exit status, or claimed result as
proof. Build scripts validate the immutable checkout and may write scratch only;
only Side.build_command (trusted integration config) can produce /build runtime outputs.
Run: python -m openultrasast.search.verify vulnerable fixed demo path --entry app.py
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
import shutil
import stat
import tempfile
import time
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from ..sandbox import SandboxJob
from . import _sandbox
from .oracles import BrowserExecutor, Canary, oracle_for
_BRIDGE = """#!/usr/bin/python3 -I
import json, sys
with open('/scratch/requests.jsonl', 'a') as stream:
stream.write(json.dumps(sys.argv[1:]) + '\\n')
"""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Side:
checkout: Path
command: tuple[str, ...]
readiness_args: tuple[str, ...] = ("--ready",)
dependencies: tuple[Path, ...] = ()
build_command: tuple[str, ...] = ()
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RunObservation:
observed: bool
evidence: str
elapsed_seconds: float
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SideRecord:
outcome: str
runs: tuple[RunObservation, ...]
elapsed_seconds: float
reason: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class VerificationRecord:
outcome: str
sides: tuple[SideRecord, ...]
elapsed_seconds: float
reason: str
def _tree(root: Path) -> str:
"""Read every file; hash names, modes and bytes, refusing links/devices."""
digest = hashlib.sha256()
if not root.is_dir() or root.is_symlink():
raise ValueError("input must be a real directory")
for path in [root, *sorted(root.rglob("*"))]:
mode = path.lstat().st_mode
if not (stat.S_ISREG(mode) or stat.S_ISDIR(mode)):
raise ValueError(f"links and special files refused: {path.name}")
digest.update(str(path.relative_to(root)).encode())
digest.update(str(mode).encode())
if path.is_file():
digest.update(path.read_bytes())
return digest.hexdigest()
def _requests(scratch: Path, demo: Path) -> list[list[str]]:
path = demo / "request.json"
if path.is_file():
values = [json.loads(path.read_text())]
else:
queue = scratch / "requests.jsonl"
if not queue.exists():
return []
if queue.is_symlink() or not queue.is_file() or queue.stat().st_size > 65536:
raise ValueError("invalid request queue")
values = [json.loads(line) for line in queue.read_text().splitlines()]
if len(values) > 32 or any(
not isinstance(v, list) or not all(isinstance(a, str) and "\0" not in a for a in v) or sum(map(len, v)) > 16384 for v in values
):
raise ValueError("invalid or excessive CLI requests")
return values
def _side(side: Side, demo: Path, family: str, timeout: int, browser: BrowserExecutor | None) -> SideRecord:
started = time.monotonic()
observations: list[RunObservation] = []
def record(outcome: str, reason: str) -> SideRecord:
return SideRecord(outcome, tuple(observations), time.monotonic() - started, reason)
try:
originals = (side.checkout, *side.dependencies, demo)
initial = tuple(_tree(p) for p in originals)
for _ in range(3):
tick = time.monotonic()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="ousast-proof-") as temporary:
root = Path(temporary)
checkout = shutil.copytree(side.checkout, root / "checkout")
artefact = shutil.copytree(demo, root / "demo")
dependencies = [shutil.copytree(p, root / f"dep-{i}") for i, p in enumerate(side.dependencies)]
immutable = (checkout, *dependencies, artefact)
before = tuple(_tree(p) for p in immutable)
mounts = {f"/deps/{i}": p for i, p in enumerate(dependencies)}
def job(command: tuple[str, ...], checkout: Path = checkout) -> SandboxJob:
return SandboxJob("", command, checkout, {}, timeout, 256, 128)
products = root / "products"
products.mkdir()
if side.build_command:
compiled = _sandbox.run(job(side.build_command), scratch=products, mounts=mounts)
if compiled.exit_code or compiled.timed_out:
return record("could_not_build", "trusted build failed: " + compiled.stderr[:300])
product_hash = _tree(products)
mounts["/build"] = products
build_scratch = root / "build"
build_scratch.mkdir()
built = _sandbox.run(job(("/bin/sh", "/demo/build.sh")), scratch=build_scratch, mounts={**mounts, "/demo": artefact})
if built.exit_code or built.timed_out:
return record("could_not_build", "build failed: " + built.stderr[:300])
if tuple(_tree(p) for p in immutable) != before or _tree(products) != product_hash:
return record("inconclusive", "build changed immutable inputs")
oracle = oracle_for(family, browser)
assert oracle is not None
try:
canary = Canary.fresh(root / "fixture")
app_env = oracle.prepare(canary)
app_scratch = canary.root if family == "command" else root / "app"
app_scratch.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
app_mounts = {**mounts, "/fixture": canary.root}
ready = _sandbox.run(
job((*side.command, *side.readiness_args)),
scratch=app_scratch,
mounts=app_mounts,
env=app_env,
namespace_pid=oracle.namespace_pid,
)
if ready.exit_code or ready.timed_out:
return record("could_not_run", "app readiness failed: " + ready.stderr[:300])
if family == "ssrf" and oracle.observe()[0]:
return record("inconclusive", "readiness triggered the SSRF oracle")
# Readiness cannot supply the attack's evidence or leave a command marker.
if family == "command" and any(canary.root.iterdir()):
return record("inconclusive", "readiness modified command fixture")
attack_scratch = root / "attack"
attack_scratch.mkdir()
if (artefact / "attack.sh").is_file():
bridge = root / "target"
bridge.write_text(_BRIDGE)
bridge.chmod(0o555)
attacker_input = root / "attacker-input"
attacker_input.mkdir()
attack = _sandbox.run(
job(("/bin/sh", "/demo/attack.sh"), checkout=attacker_input),
scratch=attack_scratch,
mounts={"/demo": artefact, "/target": bridge},
env={"TARGET": "/target", "SCRATCH": "/scratch"},
)
# Output/status are never evidence. Timeout and explicit filesystem
# denials veto verification; read-only mounts enforce the boundary.
if attack.timed_out:
return record("inconclusive", "attack timed out")
if "Read-only file system" in attack.stderr or "Permission denied" in attack.stderr:
return record("inconclusive", "attacker boundary refused")
for arguments in _requests(attack_scratch, artefact):
result = _sandbox.run(
job((*side.command, *arguments)),
scratch=app_scratch,
mounts=app_mounts,
env=app_env,
namespace_pid=oracle.namespace_pid,
)
if result.timed_out:
return record("inconclusive", "app attack timed out")
oracle.capture(result.stdout)
observed, evidence = oracle.observe()
if (
tuple(_tree(p) for p in immutable) != before
or tuple(_tree(p) for p in originals) != initial
or _tree(products) != product_hash
):
return record("inconclusive", "immutable input or dependency changed")
observations.append(RunObservation(observed, evidence, time.monotonic() - tick))
finally:
oracle.close()
return record("observed", "three fresh runs completed")
except (OSError, ValueError, AssertionError) as exc:
return record("could_not_run", f"verification unavailable or refused: {exc}")
def verify(
affected: Side,
safe: Side,
artefact: Path,
family: str,
*,
timeout_seconds: int = 5,
browser: BrowserExecutor | None = None,
) -> VerificationRecord:
"""Affected is vulnerable/head; safe is fixed/base. No negative verdict exists."""
started = time.monotonic()
if oracle_for(family, browser) is None:
return VerificationRecord("no_oracle", (), time.monotonic() - started, "no configured owned oracle for " + family)
if timeout_seconds < 1:
raise ValueError("timeout must be positive")
_sandbox.isolation_check(timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds)
sides = tuple(_side(s, artefact, family, timeout_seconds, browser) for s in (affected, safe))
if sides[1].outcome != "observed":
outcome, reason = "inconclusive", "safe side did not complete build/readiness/verification"
elif sides[0].outcome != "observed":
outcome, reason = sides[0].outcome, sides[0].reason
elif all(r.observed for r in sides[0].runs) and not any(r.observed for r in sides[1].runs):
outcome, reason = "demonstrated", "owned effect in 3/3 affected runs and 0/3 safe runs"
else:
outcome, reason = "inconclusive", "no consistent differential effect"
return VerificationRecord(outcome, sides, time.monotonic() - started, reason)
def main() -> None:
import argparse
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("affected", type=Path)
parser.add_argument("safe", type=Path)
parser.add_argument("artefact", type=Path)
parser.add_argument("family")
parser.add_argument("--entry", required=True, help="trusted Python CLI entry relative to checkout")
args = parser.parse_args()
entry = Path(args.entry)
if entry.is_absolute() or ".." in entry.parts:
parser.error("entry must stay inside checkout")
command = ("/usr/bin/python3", "-I", "/workspace/" + str(entry))
result = verify(Side(args.affected, command), Side(args.safe, command), args.artefact, args.family)
print(json.dumps(asdict(result), indent=2))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()