fix(learn): withhold label-tracking signals from the v1 classifier; leak audit

Maintainer decision "Neutralise both for v1".

1. Phantom candidates. A pair side's candidates are now only the functions that
   side declares (plane/harvest.py `declares`, the excerpt builder's
   function_bounds); a labelled function absent from a side is listed under
   `absent_on_side` and never asked, and a side declaring none of its verify
   family's functions is no verify unit. The recorded harvest units held 58
   phantom verify candidates (53 fixed, 5 vulnerable sides). build_features.py
   skips label rows whose side does not declare the function and drops their
   earlier rows (MemoryStore.drop_rows); rebuilt the pair records from the
   recorded signals, no model call: 126 label rows absent_on_side (117 fixed,
   9 vulnerable) -- access_control 13, config_secrets 4, deserialization 20,
   injection 28, memory 4, output_encoding 16, path 15, untrusted_destination
   26 -- so 252 feature rows dropped (1712 -> 1460); no other row changed.

2. Engine withheld. Input profiles in learn/schema.py (`v1` withholds the
   engine instrument, `full` withholds nothing); ProgramSpec.inputs defaults to
   v1 and compile.toml records it. Neither the engine's state nor its values
   reach the candidate, examples, demonstrations or the instruction proposer's
   error summary, and the Gower retrieval distance leaves the engine block out.
   Stored records are unchanged. design.md Risks records the decision and that
   the engine returns only through a pre-registered A/B on assumed-benign and
   benign-control negatives.

3. `ousast learn audit-leaks` (learn/leaks.py): per feature and per instrument
   state, separation = (pairs the signal alone puts on the right side - on the
   wrong side) / pairs, over all pairs and per family; flagged at >= 0.20 over
   >= 10 pairs. Counts under
   benchmarks/measurements/2026-10-01-decision-engine-leak-audit/ (before and
   after the rebuild). After: facts.function_lines (0.80 untrusted_destination,
   0.75 config_secrets, 0.26 injection; higher on fixed), verify.turns_mean
   0.67 config_secrets, eng.* 0.35-0.40 output_encoding, verify.flag_a/votes/
   site_offset and agree.final 0.20-0.30 on 10-12 pair families. Before the
   rebuild the phantom fixed sides drove state.source/state.roles/ms.flagged
   to 1.0 and state.engine to 0.95 on deserialization.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
This commit is contained in:
Marius Ciepluch
2026-10-01 19:40:58 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 4c96a59f8f
commit 9e3c83cfdc
20 changed files with 12062 additions and 35 deletions
+25 -11
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ sentences citing at least one line of the code. The **modules** are ``Retrieve -
``not_vulnerable``, 0.5 for ``unsure``); the verdict is the majority (ties are ``unsure``), and a majority
``unsure`` can never BLOCK.
Signals reach the prompt only through :func:`.schema.validate_x` (no ``EXCLUDED_FIELDS``, no free text); a missing
Signals reach the prompt only through :func:`.schema.validate_x` (no ``EXCLUDED_FIELDS``, no free text) and the input
profile (``ProgramSpec.inputs``, default ``v1``: the engine instrument is withheld from prompts and from the retrieval
distance, see :data:`.schema.INPUT_PROFILES`); a missing
instrument is shown in words. Every model call goes through :class:`Caller`: a response cache keyed by
``sha256(model, Model parameters digest, messages, temperature, sample, json_object)`` stored as
``responses/<sha>.json``, so a rerun on the same inputs replays at $0 and reproduces byte for byte. Before a call the
@@ -35,7 +37,7 @@ from ..plane.memory import MemoryStore
from .examples import Example
from .folds import Fold
from .retrieve import Retrieval, Target, assert_boundary, demonstrations_for, retrieve
from .schema import features_for, instruments_for, validate_x
from .schema import DEFAULT_INPUTS, features_for, instruments_for, validate_x, withheld
VERDICTS = ("vulnerable", "not_vulnerable", "unsure")
UNSURE = "unsure"
@@ -70,7 +72,12 @@ class Signature:
SIGNATURE = Signature(
(
Field("code", "in", "excerpt", "numbered lines, <= 80 lines and 4,000 characters; a delta adds the diff (<= 40 lines)"),
Field("signals", "in", "record", "the allow-listed features as name: value lines; a missing instrument in words"),
Field(
"signals",
"in",
"record",
"the allow-listed features the input profile shows, as name: value lines; a missing instrument in words",
),
Field("roles", "in", "roles", "inferred roles of the function: role, operation, line, origin"),
Field("family", "in", "family", "the candidate's family, or unknown"),
Field("verdict", "out", "enum", "vulnerable | not_vulnerable | unsure"),
@@ -95,13 +102,16 @@ BASELINE_INSTRUCTION = (
# --- rendering ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
def render_signals(x: Mapping[str, Any], instruments: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, Any]], profile: str) -> str:
def render_signals(x: Mapping[str, Any], instruments: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, Any]], profile: str, inputs: str = DEFAULT_INPUTS) -> str:
"""``name: value`` per feature of an instrument that ran; ``<instrument>: no coverage | failed | not applicable``
otherwise. The record is validated first: an unknown, label or identity field never reaches a prompt."""
otherwise. The record is validated first: an unknown, label or identity field never reaches a prompt. An
instrument the input profile withholds (:data:`.schema.INPUT_PROFILES`; v1: the engine) is not rendered at all --
neither its state nor its values -- though the stored record keeps it."""
validate_x(x, instruments, profile)
hidden = withheld(inputs)
lines: list[str] = []
for name in instruments_for(profile):
if name == "language":
if name == "language" or name in hidden:
continue
state = str(instruments[name]["state"])
if state != "ran":
@@ -129,8 +139,9 @@ def _case(
family: str,
profile: str,
language: str,
inputs: str = DEFAULT_INPUTS,
) -> str:
signals = render_signals(x, instruments, profile)
signals = render_signals(x, instruments, profile, inputs)
return f"Family: {family}\nLanguage: {language}\nCode:\n{code.rstrip()}\nSignals:\n{signals}\nRoles:\n{render_roles(roles)}"
@@ -181,6 +192,7 @@ class ProgramSpec:
lam: float = 0.5
n1: int = 40
priors: str = "off"
inputs: str = DEFAULT_INPUTS # the input profile: which instruments the classifier never sees (v1: the engine)
max_output_tokens: int = MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS
@@ -228,7 +240,7 @@ def render_prefix(spec: ProgramSpec, demos: Sequence[Demo], examples: Mapping[st
"cited_lines": list(demo.cited_lines)} # fmt: skip
parts.append(
f"Demonstration {number}:\n"
+ _case(code, example.x, example.instruments, example.roles, example.family, spec.profile, example.language)
+ _case(code, example.x, example.instruments, example.roles, example.family, spec.profile, example.language, spec.inputs)
+ f"\nAnswer: {json.dumps(answer, sort_keys=True)}"
)
return "\n\n".join(parts)
@@ -249,10 +261,12 @@ def render(
code = excerpt_text(example.excerpt_sha) or ""
blocks.append(
f"Example {number} (label: {label_word(example.label)}):\n"
+ _case(code, example.x, example.instruments, example.roles, example.family, spec.profile, example.language)
+ _case(code, example.x, example.instruments, example.roles, example.family, spec.profile, example.language, spec.inputs)
)
t = candidate.target
blocks.append("Candidate:\n" + _case(candidate.code, t.x, t.instruments, candidate.roles, t.family, spec.profile, candidate.language))
blocks.append(
"Candidate:\n" + _case(candidate.code, t.x, t.instruments, candidate.roles, t.family, spec.profile, candidate.language, spec.inputs)
)
messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
{"role": "system", "content": render_prefix(spec, demos, examples, excerpt_text)},
{"role": "user", "content": "\n\n".join(blocks)},
@@ -454,7 +468,7 @@ class Program:
def prepare(self, candidate: Candidate, fold: Fold, *, seed: int = 0) -> tuple[Prompt, Retrieval]:
target = candidate.target
got = retrieve(target, self.memory, fold, vectors=self.vectors, n1=self.spec.n1, k=self.spec.k_ret, lam=self.spec.lam, seed=seed,
priors=self.spec.priors) # fmt: skip
priors=self.spec.priors, inputs=self.spec.inputs) # fmt: skip
usable = [Demo.from_dict(d) for d in demonstrations_for([d.as_dict() for d in self.spec.demos], self.index, target, fold)]
prompt = render(self.spec, candidate, got.examples, usable, self.index, self.excerpt_text)
assert_boundary([*prompt.example_ids, *prompt.demo_ids], self.index, target, fold, vectors=self.vectors)