feat(learning-harness): absence rows travel with their registration

Eight of the ten vendored access-control rows had no named handler at all,
so every one of them would have scored `missing_context` forever rather
than as a detector miss. After the re-harvest nine are named and the tenth
states its reason.

The handler-context mode now carries the class its framework registers,
multi-line decorators, and commented-out guards -- `#@token_required`
above a ThreatByte handler is the entire bug. Where the registration lives
in another document (connexion's `operationId`, an express router), a
recipe names `context = [...]`, the harvester writes that stanza per side,
and the pair materializes both files at their repository-relative paths so
the entry-point mapper sees the layout the project has. `harvest_recipe`
fetches every blob before the first write and the driver takes `--report`,
so a failed fetch leaves a reviewed excerpt exactly as it was.

Two defects the re-harvest exposed: `.mjs` was not a known suffix, so the
one pair vendored as an ES module had no file target at all; and
`_python_route_access` matched auth words inside decorator prose, reading
`@ns.doc(description='... without proper authorization checks')` as a
guard. Recorded in the hygiene artifact: nine of the ten duplicate groups
sit on both sides of the split, which the repository-level split cannot
see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG

benchmarks/pairs/vibe-py/catalog.toml

@@ -3272,6 +3272,7 @@ class = "broken_access_control"
 path = "server/api/v1/api_v1.py"
 function = "delete"
 mechanism = "missing_auth_guard"
+family = "access_control"
 evidence = "BFLA (Broken Function Level Authorization) on the delete-user API endpoint. The @token_required decorator is commented out (lines 221-222), so DELETE /api/v1/delete-user/<user_id> can be called by anyone without authentication to delete any"
 
 [[pair]]
@@ -3301,6 +3302,7 @@ class = "broken_access_control"
 path = "server/api/v1/api_v1.py"
 function = "get"
 mechanism = "missing_auth_guard"
+family = "access_control"
 evidence = "BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization) on the API profile endpoint. The @token_required decorator is commented out (line 152-153), so /api/v1/profile?user_id=X returns any user's profile (username, email, country, role, permissions, team)"
 
 [[pair]]
@@ -3353,12 +3355,18 @@ provenance = "human"
 split = "holdout"
 review_tier = "seeded"
 
+[[pair.context]]
+relpath = "openapi_specs/openapi3.yml"
+vuln = "vampi-books-get-by-title/context/vuln/openapi_specs/openapi3.yml"
+fixed = "vampi-books-get-by-title/context/fixed/openapi_specs/openapi3.yml"
+
 [[pair.expected]]
 cwe = "CWE-639"
 class = "broken_access_control"
 path = "api_views/books.py"
 function = "get_by_title"
 mechanism = "missing_auth_guard"
+family = "access_control"
 evidence = "Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA). When vuln=1, get_by_title queries the book by title only (Book.query.filter_by(book_title=str(book_title)).first()) without verifying the authenticated user is the owner. Any authenticated user can "
 
 [[pair]]
@@ -3411,12 +3419,18 @@ provenance = "human"
 split = "holdout"
 review_tier = "seeded"
 
+[[pair.context]]
+relpath = "openapi_specs/openapi3.yml"
+vuln = "vampi-users-update-password/context/vuln/openapi_specs/openapi3.yml"
+fixed = "vampi-users-update-password/context/fixed/openapi_specs/openapi3.yml"
+
 [[pair.expected]]
 cwe = "CWE-639"
 class = "broken_access_control"
 path = "api_views/users.py"
 function = "update_password"
 mechanism = "missing_auth_guard"
+family = "access_control"
 evidence = "Unauthorized password change (IDOR). When vuln=1, the update_password function uses the username from the URL path parameter to look up the user whose password to change, instead of using the authenticated user from the JWT token (resp['sub"
 
 [[pair]]