feat(learning-harness): absence rows travel with their registration

Eight of the ten vendored access-control rows had no named handler at all,
so every one of them would have scored `missing_context` forever rather
than as a detector miss. After the re-harvest nine are named and the tenth
states its reason.

The handler-context mode now carries the class its framework registers,
multi-line decorators, and commented-out guards -- `#@token_required`
above a ThreatByte handler is the entire bug. Where the registration lives
in another document (connexion's `operationId`, an express router), a
recipe names `context = [...]`, the harvester writes that stanza per side,
and the pair materializes both files at their repository-relative paths so
the entry-point mapper sees the layout the project has. `harvest_recipe`
fetches every blob before the first write and the driver takes `--report`,
so a failed fetch leaves a reviewed excerpt exactly as it was.

Two defects the re-harvest exposed: `.mjs` was not a known suffix, so the
one pair vendored as an ES module had no file target at all; and
`_python_route_access` matched auth words inside decorator prose, reading
`@ns.doc(description='... without proper authorization checks')` as a
guard. Recorded in the hygiene artifact: nine of the ten duplicate groups
sit on both sides of the split, which the repository-level split cannot
see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
This commit is contained in:
Marius Ciepluch
2026-09-06 12:39:55 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 7a33756a7e
commit c2d9c4ad01
48 changed files with 1613 additions and 11776 deletions
+13 -4
View File
@@ -3208,7 +3208,7 @@ parent = "c4db46f72586c4ecb65859051ea037018dbf0e5e"
commit = "c4db46f72586c4ecb65859051ea037018dbf0e5e"
path = "server/api/v1/api_v1.py"
fix_path = "server/api/v1/api_v1.py"
mode = "enclosing"
mode = "handler_context"
line = 223
fix_line = 123
function = "delete"
@@ -3229,6 +3229,8 @@ trap_id = "threatbyte-fp-004"
acceptable_cwes = ["CWE-862", "CWE-306", "CWE-284", "CWE-287"]
evidence = "BFLA (Broken Function Level Authorization) on the delete-user API endpoint. The @token_required decorator is commented out (lines 221-222), so DELETE /api/v1/delete-user/<user_id> can be called by anyone without authentication to delete any"
commit_url = "https://github.com/anotherik/ThreatByte/blob/c4db46f72586c4ecb65859051ea037018dbf0e5e/server/api/v1/api_v1.py#L223"
family = "access_control"
fix_function = "post"
split = "train"
[[recipe]]
@@ -3239,7 +3241,7 @@ parent = "c4db46f72586c4ecb65859051ea037018dbf0e5e"
commit = "c4db46f72586c4ecb65859051ea037018dbf0e5e"
path = "server/api/v1/api_v1.py"
fix_path = "server/api/v1/api_v1.py"
mode = "enclosing"
mode = "handler_context"
line = 154
fix_line = 123
function = "get"
@@ -3260,6 +3262,8 @@ trap_id = "threatbyte-fp-004"
acceptable_cwes = ["CWE-639", "CWE-284", "CWE-862", "CWE-863"]
evidence = "BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization) on the API profile endpoint. The @token_required decorator is commented out (line 152-153), so /api/v1/profile?user_id=X returns any user's profile (username, email, country, role, permissions, team)"
commit_url = "https://github.com/anotherik/ThreatByte/blob/c4db46f72586c4ecb65859051ea037018dbf0e5e/server/api/v1/api_v1.py#L154"
family = "access_control"
fix_function = "post"
split = "holdout"
[[recipe]]
@@ -3301,7 +3305,7 @@ parent = "1713b54b601ad29582581eeda4b31fceb1319874"
commit = "1713b54b601ad29582581eeda4b31fceb1319874"
path = "api_views/books.py"
fix_path = "api_views/books.py"
mode = "enclosing"
mode = "handler_context"
line = 51
fix_line = 62
function = "get_by_title"
@@ -3322,6 +3326,8 @@ trap_id = "vampi-fp-003"
acceptable_cwes = ["CWE-639", "CWE-284", "CWE-285", "CWE-862"]
evidence = "Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA). When vuln=1, get_by_title queries the book by title only (Book.query.filter_by(book_title=str(book_title)).first()) without verifying the authenticated user is the owner. Any authenticated user can "
commit_url = "https://github.com/erev0s/VAmPI/blob/1713b54b601ad29582581eeda4b31fceb1319874/api_views/books.py#L51"
family = "access_control"
context = ["openapi_specs/openapi3.yml"]
split = "holdout"
[[recipe]]
@@ -3363,7 +3369,7 @@ parent = "1713b54b601ad29582581eeda4b31fceb1319874"
commit = "1713b54b601ad29582581eeda4b31fceb1319874"
path = "api_views/users.py"
fix_path = "api_views/users.py"
mode = "enclosing"
mode = "handler_context"
line = 187
fix_line = 55
function = "update_password"
@@ -3384,6 +3390,9 @@ trap_id = "vampi-fp-001"
acceptable_cwes = ["CWE-639", "CWE-284", "CWE-285", "CWE-862"]
evidence = "Unauthorized password change (IDOR). When vuln=1, the update_password function uses the username from the URL path parameter to look up the user whose password to change, instead of using the authenticated user from the JWT token (resp['sub"
commit_url = "https://github.com/erev0s/VAmPI/blob/1713b54b601ad29582581eeda4b31fceb1319874/api_views/users.py#L187"
family = "access_control"
fix_function = "register_user"
context = ["openapi_specs/openapi3.yml"]
split = "holdout"
[[recipe]]