fix(scan): a catch-all function's parameters are not attacker input; field reads need the same field

Two classes the traced PMPro survivors named after 1f91c0b:

- The mapper records every named PHP function as an entry of kind
  `function` (3,507 of PMPro's 4,412), and every entry's parameters were
  sources, so internal helpers became injections: sendCancelAdminEmail's
  $user, a gateway hook callback's $user_id/$morder fired by do_action.
  Regions now carry the entry kind; parameters are input only for request
  entries (route, parser, privileged surface). Call depth is unchanged, so
  such a region is still followed into its callees. JavaScript and Python
  emit no `function` entries.
- The object rule is general: a field read continues a flow through the
  bare object only if the taint came through the SAME field, or was
  assigned to the variable or passed in as a parameter. It now also cuts
  $this->Gateway -> this -> $this->user_id (memberorder.php:705).

plausible() memoises the sink test per node and skips the object walk for
paths with no field access (the filter had cost one outlier 101 s -> 160 s).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo

src/openultrasast/model/scan.py

@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ def _scan_repository_impl(
                 # A repository's parameters are not all attacker input -- but an ENTRY POINT's are, by
                 # definition. That is the trust boundary, and it is the one place both halves of the old
                 # objection stop applying.
-                parameter_sources=_is_entry_point(region),
+                parameter_sources=_parameters_are_input(region),
                 call_depth=ENTRY_POINT_CALL_DEPTH if _is_entry_point(region) else 0,
             )
         except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 -- one bad region must not end the scan
@@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ def _grouped(
                     spec,
                     function=function,
                     file=region.path,
-                    parameter_sources=entry,
+                    parameter_sources=_parameters_are_input(region),
                     call_depth=ENTRY_POINT_CALL_DEPTH if entry else 0,
                     hook_callbacks=hook_callbacks,
                 ),
@@ -1502,6 +1502,20 @@ def _is_entry_point(region: ScanRegion) -> bool:
     return region.source == "entry_point" and bool(region.function) and region.function != MODULE_SCOPE and region.shipped
 
 
+def _parameters_are_input(region: ScanRegion) -> bool:
+    """Are this region's own parameters attacker input? Only where the mapper saw a request arrive.
+
+    `function` is the mapper's catch-all: every named function it found, with no evidence of a request. On a
+    WordPress plugin that is 3,507 of 4,412 entries, and treating their parameters as input made every internal
+    helper a source -- `sendCancelAdminEmail($user, $old_level_id)`, a gateway's
+    `pmpro_checkout_before_change_membership_level($user_id, $morder)` fired by `do_action` with internal ids.
+    Adjudicated on PMPro 2026-09-23, those were false SQL injections. Routes, parsers and privileged surfaces
+    keep the rule; JavaScript and Python emit no `function` entries at all. The region is still followed into
+    its callees -- call depth stays with `_is_entry_point` -- only its parameters stop being sources.
+    """
+    return _is_entry_point(region) and region.entry_kind != "function"
+
+
 def _spec_for(family: str, language: str) -> ArbiterSpec | None:
     """The spec whose arbiter can decide this family. Routing stays a lookup; dispatch stays in `_arbitrate`."""
     if family == "access_control":