fix(rules): Node vm is an eval sink; a package name is not a sink token

mongo-express CVE-2019-10758 passes the request body to vm.runInNewContext. No
injection sink named that call, so the flow was answered and missed. runInNewContext,
runInContext, runInThisContext and compileFunction are now CWE-95 sinks.

Once the file's questions completed, the fixed pin showed a second defect. Every call
on `require('mongodb-query-parser')` has that package name as its full name. The
bounded-token match treats `-` as a boundary, so the name matched the SQL sink
`query`. In a full name, `-` belongs to a package name, so it no longer separates
tokens.

Exploratory (retune after protocol-v1): mongo-express vulnerable pin now detected at
lib/bson.js:60.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo

src/openultrasast/cpg/queries/taint.sc

@@ -121,6 +121,12 @@
   def mentionsToken(code: String, tokens: List[String]): Boolean =
     tokens.exists(t => boundedPattern(t).matcher(code).find())
 
+  // A full name is not source text: a `-` in it is part of an npm package's name, never an operator.
+  // `require('mongodb-query-parser')` gives every call on the parser the full name `mongodb-query-parser...`,
+  // and read as code that mentions the SQL sink `query` -- mongo-express's fixed pin was reported twice for
+  // parsing a string with the very library its fix switched to.
+  def fullNameMentions(fullName: String, token: String): Boolean = mentionsToken(fullName.replace('-', '_'), List(token))
+
   val sourcePatterns = split(sourcesS)
   val sinkNames      = split(sinksS)
   val sanitizerNames = split(sanitizersS)
@@ -314,7 +320,7 @@
   def familySinkCall(node: io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.AstNode): Boolean = node match {
     case c: io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.Call if !c.name.startsWith("<operator") =>
       val callee = c.code.takeWhile(_ != '(')
-      sinkNames.exists(n => c.name == n || mentionsToken(callee, List(n)) || mentionsToken(c.methodFullName, List(n)))
+      sinkNames.exists(n => c.name == n || mentionsToken(callee, List(n)) || fullNameMentions(c.methodFullName, n))
     case _ => false
   }
 
@@ -701,7 +707,7 @@
 
   def sinkMatches(c: io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.Call, n: String): Boolean = {
     val operator = c.name.startsWith("<operator")
-    c.name == n || (!operator && (mentionsToken(calleeText(c.code), List(n)) || mentionsToken(c.methodFullName, List(n))))
+    c.name == n || (!operator && (mentionsToken(calleeText(c.code), List(n)) || fullNameMentions(c.methodFullName, n)))
   }
 
   // Does THIS path element cleanse the value flowing through it?

src/openultrasast/ruleset/semantic/javascript.toml

@@ -11,6 +11,15 @@ cwe = "CWE-95"
 calls = ["eval"]
 rule_ids = ["js-eval"]
 
+[[sink]]
+# CWE-95. Node's `vm` module compiles and runs a string exactly as `eval` does -- its own documentation says
+# it is not a security mechanism. mongo-express CVE-2019-10758 is `vm.runInNewContext('doc = eval((' +
+# string + '));')` over a request body, and with only `eval` listed the flow ended at a sink nobody named.
+id = "vm.eval"
+cwe = "CWE-95"
+calls = ["runInNewContext", "runInContext", "runInThisContext", "compileFunction"]
+rule_ids = []
+
 [[sink]]
 id = "exec"
 cwe = "CWE-78"