The HTTP verifier could not distinguish a mis-wired or non-serving app from a
genuine no-effect: both yielded `inconclusive`. This adds a positive control for
the path oracle.
- PathOracle plants a benign in-root marker file (random token from os.urandom,
distinct from the secret canary) and exposes it via a new Oracle.control()
hook (default None; only the path oracle implements it today).
- On the first run of an HTTP side, _side runs a benign GET for that marker as
its own fully-guarded app start. The marker returning proves the interface
serves the fixture; its absence — or any control failure — is recorded in the
new SideRecord.control_observed field but never changes the verdict, since a
valid app may answer only its own routes. A crash is still caught by the
existing could_not_run path.
A 2xx-based "nothing served" block was rejected: the verifier deliberately
treats any HTTP status as the app being alive (a 503-only app is a valid
observed side), so status-based blocking would false-fail valid apps. Soundly
converting a mis-wired-but-responding app into could_not_run requires a
demo-declared control, which is a separate follow-up.
Tests: new tests/test_search_control.py covers marker observed, absent marker
not blocking, control failure not blocking a working attack, and crash still
could_not_run. Full search-verify/probe/worker suites pass; ruff clean; mypy
unchanged (only the pre-existing file_bindings lambda note).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Demos may reference ${served_root}, ${database_path}, ${marker_dir} or
${callback_url}; the verifier substitutes them per side, so apps that take a
directory or database argument can be wired to the oracle. Python apps start
under the verifier interpreter (the one pip built the products for): the image
carries a second system Python whose ABI tag broke compiled extensions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Demos are data the verifier executes (fixed build recipes, runtime+path start,
HTTP/CLI steps with captures; the canary is never referable). The agent loop with
the key never runs repository code: executor tasks without a key exchange commands
and results through presigned objects. AX capacity errors are back-pressure with at
most 2 tasks in flight; caches and builds under /workspace with a 2 GiB guard;
verifiers take one presigned archive per side. Launcher fix: private /dev in bwrap.
190 tests on the host; probe 5/5 demonstrated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
The kube-ax probe showed bwrap cannot map uids in gVisor as an unprivileged user.
As root (gVisor is the outer boundary) the sandbox uses pid/ipc/uts/net/mount
namespaces without a user namespace and drops the artefact to its own uid via
setpriv; the mode is recorded. The probe reports each namespace kind separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Board as immutable versioned blobs (coordinator sole writer); budget reserve/settle
before model calls; per-task and run caps; coordinator loop over an injected
executor; batch.py accepts a fixed allow-list of search variables; XSS browser
oracle; ousast-search-task image (Python, Node/TypeScript, PHP, Java 17, sqlite,
bwrap, chromium) built by CI. 103 tests on the host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
The verifier, not the artefact, observes the effect: SQL, path, command and SSRF
oracles owned by the verifier (XSS needs a browser executor, else no_oracle);
artefact exit code and output ignored; immutable checkout and dependencies;
3 runs per side; one-sided build or readiness failure is inconclusive. An
isolation failure raises IsolationUnavailable instead of reading as
could_not_build (the NPROC limit now applies inside the user namespace).
35 tests, including gaming attempts and 300 host processes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
