Commit Graph
8 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1 03b114cbeb feat(prover): delivery D: control flow decides dominance; the trace carries each guard's relation, effect and the operation's control context
Opus agent delivery under spec access-control-prover, requirement 10. `semantic/cfg.py` builds a control-flow
graph per function from the syntax tree (if/else, switch arms, loops, try/catch/finally, return, throw, break,
continue, exit, assert) with dominators and a per-line control context, and leaves a function without a graph
rather than a wrong one. `obligations/cfg_dominance.py::CfgDominance` discharges a statement guard only when it
lies on every path to the operation and the operation is unreachable from its failing arm; a predicate whose
result nothing consumes is `value_only` and never discharges; router, decorator and earlier-hop witnesses behave
as before; without a graph the order rule applies and `cfg_unavailable` is recorded. The trace's guards carry
`relation` and `effect`, the trace carries `operation_context`; Java parameter lists carry names only; a
handler-named operation's arguments are the handler's parameters. The checker's default stays order-based.

Smoke on the 23 fix changes: 15 caught, 55 of 93 locations, precision 15 of 15, no failure, no change over
120 s (unchanged from delivery B). Gate: 3575 tests pass; the reserved-repository guard passes on the export.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 19:01:07 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1 6c3d4a7d72 spec(access-control-prover): a guard whose passing branch alone holds the operation discharges it (effect branches)
Raised by the implementing agent: the design named only exits on the failing arm; if (can(x)) { op(); } is the
common shape and the operation is unreachable from the failing arm there too.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 18:28:10 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1 52ecbb76ab spec(access-control-prover): control flow decides dominance; the trace carries each guard's relation, effect and the operation's control context
Requirement 10, the structural control-flow graph per function and CfgDominance behind the existing protocol,
tasks 4.4 and 4.5. Textual order stays the checker's default; the prover selects control flow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 18:07:09 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1 12d09faeed spec(access-control-prover): the ordered trace with argument provenance is the prover's output for every examined pair
The maintainer's correction: counts over a function, language or framework carry nothing about safety; the
object a decision model may see is the path from an attacker-reachable entry to a protected operation, with the
checks on it in control-flow order and the provenance of the operation's arguments. Requirement 9, the trace
contract and tasks 4.2 and 4.3.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 17:56:50 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1 17e07b36c4 feat(prover): delivery B: handler-named operations, Symfony, Livewire, Remix and Tornado entries, enforcement witnesses, memoised path walk
Codex delivery under spec access-control-prover plus one fix of mine. Operation rows may now name a handler by
name pattern and framework (Jenkins form validation and list filling, Tornado request methods, Remix actions);
the mapper recognises Symfony, Livewire and Laravel controllers, Remix exports and Tornado handlers;
`obligations/enforcement.py` turns Laravel route middleware, Symfony attributes and security.yaml rules and
Tornado's authenticated decorator into router and decorator witnesses. The path walk looks each node's callers
up once per change and does not walk a tree with no recognised entry: one seatunnel change fell from 670 s to
35 s. One name Codex could not source (Tornado get_current_user) is left out and said so in the facts header.

Smoke on the 23 fix changes: 15 pushes caught (65 percent, Wilson 45 to 81), 55 of 93 locations, precision
15 of 15 flagged, no instrument failure, no change over 120 s. Delivery A caught 7.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 17:31:07 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1 beb272a5ec feat(prover): access-control prover, delivery A: path records, Stapler and Jetty entries, Java operation rows, the prover and its scoring arm
Codex delivery under spec access-control-prover. `semantic/obligations/paths.py` builds entry-to-function path
records from the cached caller index; `mapping.py` names Stapler web methods and Jetty handlers as entries;
`check_obligations` gains the opt-in premise `assume_entries_protected` with the label `unguarded_path`;
`hunt/prover.py` proves a change with no model call and states its coverage; `benchmarks/valid/prover_arm.py`
scores it with the valid-benchmark metrics. Two fixes after the first smoke run: a product file git holds empty
is read, not unread (four changes failed on `__init__.py` and empty assets), and absent-input reasons are
counted by name.

Smoke on the 23 fix changes of the training pool: 7 pushes caught (30 percent, Wilson 16 to 51), 28 of 93
locations, precision 7 of 8 flagged, no instrument failure; three changes over the 120 second bound. Twelve of
the 17 Jenkins fixes reach the fixed method but check no operation because the method is the operation;
the spec now carries handler-named operations for delivery B.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 16:50:04 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1 e514551cb6 spec(access-control-prover): the checker gains an opt-in premise and the unguarded_path label
Codex stopped on a real conflict: with path records and no clause or sibling norm the checker returns no finding
by design. The prover's premise (a recognised entry is protected unless declared public) is now an opt-in keyword
with its own label and evidence, default off, existing behaviour and tests unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 15:54:29 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1 74a529825d spec: access-control prover (requirements, gap analysis, design, tasks)
A deterministic check that a protected operation is reachable from an entry point without a check dominating
the path, per framework, built on the existing obligations checker, caller index and entry mapper; scored as a
rule arm on the access-control training pool. Follows the maintainer's finding that the hunter's features
describe shape and cannot decide unsafety.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 15:51:25 +02:00