The standard scan now runs run_hunter_pool, verify_findings and the
deterministic fuse_findings directly; the HarnessX hunter orchestrator,
the LLM judge dispatcher (verify_judge.py, deleted with its test) and the
LLM fusion panels are gone, and so are their extra-absent degradations.
host_under_harnessx is dropped from stage_processors.
config: [models] verifier and [fusion] panel_model/decider_model raise
RetiredConfigError naming the plane replacement (the CLI prints it and
exits 2); a [harnessx] section loads with one warning and is otherwise
ignored. harness.json keeps "verifier": null. Tests that asserted the
fallback are renamed to the behaviour they assert; the module-audit
manifest drops verify_judge. Nothing outside the two modules deleted in
task 6 imports harness_ext or hunter_harness.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
`ousast plane workspaces --validation-set ... --loop` appends the loop to a Run:
per case `alerts` (plane/tasks/alerts.py: the quick-mode scan on the vulnerable
and the fixed pin, a fixed-pin Workspace per case, alerts attributed to their
enclosing function by the repo-facts patterns, `in_fix_range` from the fix's
old-side and new-side ranges, failing on an unread tree) feeding `remember`,
then `memory-snapshot` -> `loop-measure` -> `loop-propose` -> `loop-improve`
(plane/tasks/loop.py). Every new task binds no Model and has budget
{usd: 0, calls: 0}. The snapshot is the store's rows after the train-on-test
guard, written on the host by memory.seed (a sandboxed run of it fails loudly);
propose runs M1/M2 against this repository at the commit under test; improve
runs one unchanged evolve.run_round and delivers gate.json, journal.json, the
sidecar, rule_policy.json only when accepted, and proposal_outcome rows that
the host ingests. Adoption stays a maintainer commit.
`remember` is now a Run entry per case (the image contains it), with the facts
row keyed by the image the facts were computed on (repo-facts records it in
its summary; unknown -> the row is omitted, never guessed). Alert rows carry
their own pin; improve/memory.py counts a repeated alert once.
Runner image rebuilt (+0.39 MB: only the new modules; the quick scan needs no
extra and the rulesets were already in the package), pushed, plane/ re-pinned
and regenerated (validation-46: 105 entries). Fixture test runs the whole loop
graph through the fake ax, whose new `exec` mode runs the real task modules.
Live: one loop Run over three validation-46 cases on the local ax, recorded in
benchmarks/measurements/2026-09-30-harnessx-removal-loop/ (all done, $0 new
spend, 0 proposals, gate verdict no_proposals).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
improve/memory.py: rules M1 (enabled->shadow on repeated false alerts across
>=2 repositories, no agreed or site_match hit) and M2 (shadow->enabled on
>=2 agreed declared sites no enabled rule catches); M3 disputed families are
advisory (signals.json) and never reach the validator. The train-on-test
guard drops rows of --qualify-population, gated benchmark cases and holdout
pair repositories before any rule sees a row. run_round(proposals=...) adds
memory edits after the benchmark's through the unchanged validator and gate;
provenance (row ids, object keys and versions, counts, exclusions, index
digest) goes to memory_proposals.jsonl and the journal's evidence field;
proposal_outcome rows are written back after a non-dry run.
ousast improve --memory is opt-in; default improve output is byte-identical
to the task-1 baseline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
plane/memory.py: the MemoryStore interface with FileStore (index.jsonl, facts by
content hash, repos/<host>__<owner>__<name>/<pin>.jsonl, idempotent ingest,
deterministic row ids, refusal below 1 GiB free naming the path) and MinioStore
(object metadata and tags, S3 Select pushdown probed once per process with a
logged local fallback, object version ids on every row read, versioning and
runs/ lifecycle helper, presigned URLs). OUSAST_MEMORY selects the backend;
MINIO_* settings come from .env; the minio SDK is the optional extra `minio`.
plane/tasks/remember.py: model-free rows (facts, verdict, unit_cost, alert)
from a case's artifacts; remember_run computes them on the host for a recorded
run without writing into it. reconciler.mark_done (477 lines total), seed
before and ingest after `ousast plane run`, `ousast plane remember <run>`.
The generator annotates each repo-facts Task with openultrasast.io/memory-key
(repo, pin, candidates digest, image digest) and the Run with its population
and split; plane/ regenerated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Equality script (design section 3) records suite outcomes, `ousast pairs --json`,
the python-vulnerable quick benchmark, one standard scan and `improve --dry-run`
from a frozen export with the harnessx extra absent and no model reachable.
Two independent records are byte-identical (determinism.json).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
The design revisit after plane-increment-1.json (14/20 agreed, 19/20 in either
pass): a third verify pass on the candidates passes a and b dispute, and agree
decides 2-of-3 where pass c asked (the a/b rule elsewhere; c alone never decides).
- verify: optional OUSAST_INPUT_ONLY restricts the hunt to the named candidates
(agree's disputed.json); an empty list is done with 0 units and no model client.
- agree: optional OUSAST_INPUT_PASS_C; metrics keep every key and add tiebreak
{asked, flipped_to_agreed, flipped_to_rejected, rule}; usd_total, hunts and
declared-site metrics are on the final decision.
- generate: per case <case>-vc and <case>-final appended to validation-46; the
first 60 entries stay byte-identical, so a rerun keeps their done state.
- Offline replay over the recorded outputs with an empty pass c reproduces the
recorded agree summaries exactly (14/20 agreed, 23 agreed, 10 disputed).
- Spec: Requirement 6.4, design Measurement, task 8.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
ax names a task's ActorTemplate <task>-tmpl-<8 hex> and Substrate caps names at
63 bytes; validation-46's first task (51 characters) fell back to a missing
default template on the live cluster. Task names are capped at 49 with a
stable hash suffix when longer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
A producer's artifact rendered as spec.files of a generated <task>-inputs
Workspace ends up in ax's AX_WORKSPACES_YAML env value; Agent Substrate
rejects values over 32768 characters, so a 182 KB facts.json broke ax apply
on the live cluster. The reconciler now passes OUSAST_INPUTS instead, the
receiver serves a running task its declared inputs over GET /inputs/..., and
the runner fetches them after the start (failed fetch -> failed summary).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
On the live cluster the case clone ran at boot: the golden boot had no egress
policy, and the real actor was still being restored, so both TLS handshakes to
GitHub were cut. After the start the actor is RUNNING under its policy (the
delivery the same minute went through). Adds the one-case check Run (a subset
of validation-46) and re-pins the task manifests to the current runner digest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Agent Substrate's egress gateway denies an actor without an EgressPolicy, so
no task could deliver its artifacts or reach a model. egress.py grants each
task exactly: http/80 to ousast-receiver.ax-system.svc.cluster.local, and
TLS passthrough/443 to the bound Workspaces' https Git hosts and the bound
Model's openultrasast.io/egress-hosts (api.deepseek.com for deepseek-flash).
No IPs, no wildcards, no https (MITM) rules.
The reconciler writes the policy with kubectl-ate between ax apply and
resume, reads it back, waits OUSAST_EGRESS_SETTLE (11 s, the gateway's
cached deny), and after ax delete task confirms the policy went with its
actor (kubectl-ate has no delete verb; the store cascades).
The receiver is a selector-less Service (ops/ax/receiver-service.yaml.tmpl,
applied by up.sh together with the no-build agentgateway egress gateway)
on port 18090 of the host. Measured live: the gateway checks the policy on
Host but connects to the address the actor dialled, so the runner dials the
Service's ClusterIP (OUSAST_ARTIFACT_DIAL) with the receiver's name as Host.
The runner now labels its delivery with the Run's task name (OUSAST_TASK),
which is what the receiver accepts; the ax Task name was refused with 403.
The Receiver moved to egress.py to keep reconciler.py at 460 lines.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
On the live cluster ax created the Task before its Workspace in the same apply
and the runner saw an empty AX_WORKSPACES_YAML. Tests now find rendered
documents by kind and name, not position. ops/ax/smoke-run.sh renders a
model-free repo-facts Run with the current runner digest and executes it
through the reconciler.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
agree matched declared sites through benchmarks/independent/evaluate.py,
which the runner image does not carry, so site matching would have been
"not assessed". The generator now resolves the fix's old-side ranges
(evaluate.hunks, line for line) into case.json, with the declared sites in
the set and the reference's cost, and agree.matches_declared reproduces
matches_v2; a parity test runs both over the recorded outputs of the 15
validation cases (200 probes, identical verdicts) and agree on those outputs
returns the reference's 16 of 20 and $0.022.
agree reports cost_per_candidate (plane spend) and
cost_per_candidate_with_recorded_triage; Requirement 6.2 is judged on the
latter (design.md). --runner-image re-pins the templates from ops/ax/up.sh's
pin file; the committed manifests are regenerated at the current digest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Agent Substrate's golden-snapshot boot runs the same image with the same task env,
so the runner no longer starts its command by itself: after the workspaces are
ready it waits for POST /ousast/v1/start (run/task checked, once per boot, refused
after a delivered run). The reconciler sends it through svc/atenet-router with
ate-target-actor, which never addresses the golden actor (plane/router.py), and the
bound Model's secretKey variable travels only in that body, into the child's env.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
On the live cluster ax hands AX_TASK_YAML with metadata.creationTimestamp and a
status block; the strict authoring schema rejected it, readiness never turned
green and every resume timed out. Other unknown fields still fail. up.sh retries
the first resume while the golden snapshot builds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
The first live run on the local ax cluster and ax's source (docs/runner.md,
docs/sandbox.md, internal/controller/reconciler.go, internal/server/server.go)
showed a lifecycle the task-3/4 code did not model:
- `ax apply` creates a Task Suspended (Ready=False, TaskSuspended); it runs only
after `ax resume task`. The first resume of a new image can fail with
DeadlineExceeded while Agent Substrate builds the golden snapshot, and ax's
server then stores phase Failed; a later resume succeeds.
- ax has no Completed phase and never reads a command's exit back.
- The runner is PID 1 and must keep serving after the command exits; stop and
suspend deliver SIGTERM, to be forwarded to the command's process group.
Our runner imported the task in-process and exited, which stopped the
container ("Container guest is stopped") and made every resume time out.
- ax's controller probes /readyz?check=workspace; the query string made our
handler answer 404.
Runner (Req 4.1-4.4): spec.command runs as a child
`python -m openultrasast.plane.tasks.<name>` in its own process group, cwd the
first workspace, AX_METADATA_URL set; ax's metadata paths are served. After the
child exits the runner reads summary.json (a crash without one becomes failed
with the exit code and stderr tail), delivers the output directory, writes
/workspace/.ousast-state/<task>.done.json and serves until SIGTERM (forwarded
to the group, SIGKILL after OUSAST_TERM_GRACE, exit 0). A boot with the marker
never reruns the command; a failed delivery is retried alone. Workspaces are
prepared on the first boot only. AX_RUNNER_EXIT_AFTER_COMMAND=1 is the
unit-test escape.
Reconciler (Req 2.2, 2.3, 3.1-3.3): `ax resume task` after apply, retrying
DeadlineExceeded/Unavailable with backoff up to OUSAST_RESUME_TIMEOUT (900 s);
completion is the artifact delivery; Failed after a resume went through, a
vanished task, or no delivery within OUSAST_TASK_TIMEOUT (7200 s) fail the
task with ax's condition message; `ax delete task` follows. Ax gains resume()
and phase() returns the condition message. doctor moves to plane/doctor.py
(tasks.md task 0 allows the sibling) to keep reconciler.py under 500 lines.
Tests: the fake ax follows the real lifecycle (Suspended, a failing first
resume that leaves Failed, Running forever, delivery only after a resume went
through), plus Failed-with-message, vanish, resume-timeout and task-timeout
scenarios; runner tests cover the child's cwd/group/metadata URL, stay-up and
SIGTERM in a real subprocess, SIGKILL of a SIGTERM-ignoring group, and the
marker. The opt-in live test now checks resume, Running, suspend and a second
resume instead of a Completed phase. design.md and tasks.md state the
lifecycle; the module audit manifest counts plane.doctor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Model deepseek-flash (declared provider extension, endpoint prices in
parameters, secretKey naming the DEEPSEEK_API_KEY secret), digest-pinned
Task templates repo-facts / verify / agree, and a generator
(plane/generate.py, `ousast plane workspaces --validation-set ...`) that
emits per case the vulnerable-pin Workspace, a files-only inputs Workspace
(recorded candidates after the recorded triage, declared sites, triage),
per-case Tasks and one Run validation-46: facts -> verify a, verify b ->
agree for the 15 cases, 46 candidates (43 kept), budgets 1.5x the recorded
per-pass share. A Run entry cannot add a binding or env, and Run.inputs
names only task artifacts, so the case is fixed by per-case Tasks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Requirement 1.1 (Task/Workspace/Model use only fields ax documents) and
Requirement 1.4 (no ax field repurposed) were violated: manifests accepted
metadata.namespace and a Workspace git `commit`, and the reconciler dumped
every git field into what `ax apply` receives.
Facts from ax's source (pkg/apis/v1alpha1/ax.proto, internal/workspace/setup.go):
- ObjectMeta is `name` and `atespace` (plus server-set creation_timestamp);
no `namespace`, no `annotations`.
- GitRepo is `name`, `repo`, `branch`, `dir`, `depth`; no `commit`.
- The API server decodes with protojson.UnmarshalOptions{}: an unknown field
is an error at `ax apply` (confirmed on the live cluster: a rendered
Workspace+Model applied cleanly; the same Workspace with `commit` was
refused with `unknown field "commit"`).
- ValidateModel checks only metadata; any spec.provider string is accepted.
Changes:
- manifests: metadata takes `name`, `atespace`, `annotations` (our extension,
never sent to ax); git entries take exactly ax's five fields (depth int);
`commit` in spec.git is rejected with a pointer to the new Workspace
annotation `openultrasast.io/git-commits: "<git name>=<40-hex>,..."`,
validated for unknown git names and non-hex shas.
- reconciler: rendered docs carry only ax fields; each bound Workspace's pins
reach the Task as env OUSAST_GIT_PINS = {"<workspace>/<git name>": "<sha>"}.
A test walks every rendered doc against ax's field lists.
- runner: pins come from OUSAST_GIT_PINS; git is fetched as setup.go does
(init/remote/fetch with --depth when depth > 0/checkout FETCH_HEAD, default
branch main, cloneDestination's dir and placeholder-name rules), then the
pin is checked out. A pinned entry without a branch fetches the commit.
- workspaces: emits the annotation, `dir: repo` and `depth: 1` instead of
`commit`, so generated case workspaces keep <path>/repo at depth 1.
- design.md: ax field names verbatim; pins and model binding as stripped
openultrasast.io/* annotations carried to the task by env.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
kubectl prints the sentence as one whitespace-split row, which passed the
ready check and reported an absent ax controller as "1 pods ready". Rows must
carry a READY column; an empty namespace fails. Regression test added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
ai-service-plane task 3, Requirements 4.1-4.4 (with 2.2 and 2.3 honoured by the
exit-code contract):
- src/openultrasast/plane/runner.py: the ax-task-runner entrypoint. Reads the Task
from AX_TASK_YAML and the bound Workspaces from AX_WORKSPACES_YAML (task-1 loaders),
serves /healthz and /readyz on port 80 (AX_RUNNER_PORT; 0 picks a free port,
AX_RUNNER_HTTP=0 disables it for unit tests), materialises each workspace at its
bound path (spec.files verbatim; spec.git at <path>/<name>, exported from the
OUSAST_CASE_CACHE checkout whose origin matches, else a shallow clone at the pin;
a repo already present on a resumed volume is kept) and only then answers 200 on
/readyz. Runs spec.command by importing openultrasast.plane.tasks.<name> with the
remaining elements as argv; sets OUSAST_WORKSPACE_DIR from the first binding when
the Task's env leaves it unset. A crash writes summary.json with status failed and
the traceback. When OUSAST_ARTIFACT_URL is set, the whole OUSAST_OUTPUT_DIR is
POSTed as an uncompressed tar (Content-Type application/x-tar, X-Ousast-Task,
X-Ousast-Run) with three attempts and backoff; a failed delivery rewrites
summary.json to failed and exits 2. Exit codes: done 0, failed 2, unfinished 3.
- plane/Dockerfile.runner: python:3.12-slim + git, `pip install .` (no extras), a
shell wrapper at /usr/local/bin/ax-task-runner exec'ing the module; built and
loaded into kind by ops/ax/up.sh, not by the tests.
- tests/test_plane_runner.py (+ tests/plane_stub_task.py registered as the task
module): env contract on a files workspace, readyz 503 then 200, delivery to a
local receiver with the headers and tar checked, delivery failure -> failed and
exit 2 after three attempts, crash -> failed with traceback, exit codes per
status, case-cache export at the pin, shallow-clone fallback, resume keeps the
checkout.
- model/audit.py: SPEC_OWNED row for plane.runner; module-audit measurement
regenerated (122 modules, no orphans, note kept).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Requirements 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 2.2, 7.1, 7.3 of ai-service-plane.
- plane/reconciler.py (492 lines, test-counted): a Run's tasks submitted to ax
in dependency order through the injectable `ax` CLI (apply / get task /
delete task), serialize labels never overlapping, --workers, state.json with
pending|running|suspended|done|failed|unfinished, a PID lock per run, done
tasks skipped on rerun, unfinished tasks holding their dependants, a failed
task halting the run. Budgets, inputs, output dir, artifact URL and the bound
Model (annotation openultrasast.io/model; identity and priced parameters) go
to the task as env in the rendered Task; consumed artifacts travel as files
of a generated Workspace bound under /workspace. A threaded HTTP receiver
takes each task's tar delivery, validating run/task and rejecting traversal.
Outcome comes from the delivered summary.json (done only when every unit
finished), never from ax's phase alone. status prints the token attribution
table per task and Model from the summaries' usage fields (n/a, never an
estimate) and writes attribution.json; doctor runs the four host checks.
- plane/workspaces.py: one Workspace manifest per case pin of a population.
- CLI: ousast plane run|status|doctor|workspaces.
- tests/test_plane_reconciler.py: a fake ax executable drives the DAG;
tests/test_plane_ax_live.py (marker ax) applies ops/ax/smoke-task.yaml on a
live cluster and skips unless doctor passes.
- Module audit rows and regenerated manifest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Requirements 5.3, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 7.2 of ai-service-plane.
- plane/tasks/verify.py: the batched hunt of verify_batched.py moved into
the package (system prompt, one hunt per file, up to 6 candidates, 6
steps, candidate-anchored sites). New against the reference: each
candidate's known callers from facts.json in the prompt (capped at 8),
tool turns and usage per hunt in units.jsonl, per-unit resume (rows
with "error" are re-asked), pass label from env, MeteredClient wrapper:
BudgetExhausted -> unfinished (exit 3), AccountError -> failed with the
provider message (exit 2); summary.json is written last, names the bound
Model and the summed usage, and is done only when every unit finished.
- plane/tasks/agree.py: verify_batched.agreement over two pass outputs,
agreed.json / disputed.json, per-candidate cost and turns, declared-site
match via benchmarks/independent/evaluate.matches_v2 loaded by file;
metrics block in summary.json; no model calls.
- tests/test_plane_verify.py: a scripted usage-recording hunter client;
callers line, resume, 402, budget stop and resume, model and summed
usage, unpriced usd None, both main() env contracts, agreement metrics.
- model/audit.py + module-audit manifest: SPEC_OWNED rows for plane.tasks,
plane.tasks.verify, plane.tasks.agree; manifest regenerated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
plane/tasks/repo_facts.py computes, from source text only and without a
model or git, the product files of a workspace (tests, vendored trees,
node_modules, dist/build, minified bundles and dot-directories excluded via
the layout facts plus the model_sinks.py filter), the functions each file
declares (Python, PHP, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Go, Ruby declaration
patterns extended from sink_candidates.py) and, per candidate function, the
call sites in other product files with path, 1-based line and enclosing
function, capped at 40 and sorted (Requirement 5.1). Output is byte-identical
across runs over the same tree (Requirement 5.2).
Under the task contract the unit is one file: a row goes to units.jsonl as
each file finishes and a restart reuses the rows computed for the same
candidate set (Requirement 2.2); facts.json is assembled from the rows and
summary.json is written last, refusing `done` unless every unit finished.
The entrypoint reads OUSAST_WORKSPACE_DIR, OUSAST_OUTPUT_DIR and optional
OUSAST_INPUT_CANDIDATES only (Requirement 2.1) and exits 0 on done, 2 on
failed with the traceback recorded in summary.json.
tests/test_plane_repo_facts.py: a three-file tree with a tests/ file, a
vendored file, a node_modules bundle and a dot-directory; cross-file callers
with line and enclosing function, same-file and declaration lines excluded,
the 40 cap, byte-identical second run, resume that recomputes only the
missing unit, a crash that leaves `failed` with the unit counts and resumes
to `done`, and the declaration patterns per language.
The two new modules are registered as spec-owned in the module audit (their
importer, the runner, lands in task 3) and the audit manifest is regenerated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Add openultrasast.plane.manifests: frozen dataclasses and loaders for ax's
Task, Workspace and Model kinds (ax.io/v1alpha1, ax's fields only) and the
Run kind (openultrasast.io/v1alpha1: tasks, dependsOn, inputs, outputs,
budget, serialize). Every violation raises ManifestError naming the kind,
metadata.name and field path: unknown fields at any depth, wrong apiVersion
or kind, a provider outside google/anthropic unless deepseek is declared via
the openultrasast.io/provider-extension annotation, a Run with a dependency
cycle, an input naming no task, and a Run task naming no loaded Task.
load_manifests reads multi-document YAML files and indexes by kind and name.
PyYAML becomes the one declared core dependency; the two zero-dependency
guards now pin exactly that, and the module audit registers the plane
package under the ai-service-plane spec.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
MeteredClient wraps a ChatClient, sums the provider's usage rows per call,
prices them from a Model manifest's parameters (cache-hit, input, output per
million), and raises BudgetExhausted before a call once the usd or calls
ceiling is reached. A 401/402 or "Insufficient Balance" failure becomes
AccountError with the provider's message. An unpriced model reports usd None,
never zero, and refuses a usd budget; summary() gives the spend block of a
task's summary.json.
The two plane modules are registered as spec-owned in the module audit (their
consumers land in tasks 3-4) and the audit manifest is regenerated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Token efficiency, measured on 180 verified pgAdmin candidates: stage 2 costs
$0.0139 per candidate, 90% of the spend, because the conversation is re-sent on
every turn and grows with each tool result.
- Context files now precede the question in the hunter's first message. DeepSeek
bills a cached prefix at 1/30 of a fresh one, by prefix; with the question first,
every candidate asked about the same file (about 5 per file) broke the prefix on
its first line and paid for the file again. A test pins the order.
- The verifier runs each candidate at 3 steps and repeats it once at 6 only when
the hunt spent every step on tool calls without a verdict. On the seven declared
v2 sites, 3 steps found 5 and 8 steps found 6; most candidates conclude in 3.
- Per-candidate token usage (prompt, cached, completion, calls) and escalation
are recorded, and each case reports its cache share, so the next efficiency
decision is made on numbers.
Validation on the 180 pgAdmin candidates plus the 22 known sites (about $1)
waits for account credit: DeepSeek returns 402 at the moment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
FUXA failed every hunt with HTTP 400, and neither run could say why. The client
discarded the response body. With the body shown, the reason was "This model's
maximum context length...": FUXA ships minified bundles whose single lines run to
megabytes, and grep_repo returned a matched line whole.
- grep_repo and find_refs quote a matched line (240 characters), never the whole
line.
- Every tool result is capped at 16 x max_chars, with a truncation marker.
- OpenRouterChatClient errors carry the provider's response body (first 500
characters). That would also have exposed the rejected model id in one call
instead of eighteen days.
After the fix, FUXA candidates verify normally at $0.004-0.013 each. A test covers
the megabyte-line case.
verify_sinks.py: skip futures cancelled at the spend ceiling instead of reading
them (the run crashed with CancelledError).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
The final-answer turn requested the provider's JSON mode with the tools still
attached. DeepSeek (deepseek-flash) then answered with the format itself
(`{"type": "json_object"}`), wrapped the array (`{"type": "json_object",
"value": [...]}`), or emitted its tool-call markup as text. A hunt that had found
the vulnerability reported nothing.
Measured on the v2 sink verifier with the declared vulnerable functions: 0 of 7
confirmed in JSON mode, 5 of 7 asked plainly (6 of 7 at 8 steps). The model named
Medplum's actual redirect-URI prefix-match bug, LMDeploy's redirect bypass of
_is_safe_url, and ContextForge's unsandboxed Jinja2.
The final turn is now plain text without tools. The parser also reads a
`{"value": [...]}` wrapper. Two tests that pinned JSON mode now pin the plain
turn, and a new test reproduces the wrapped answer.
Invalidates as measurements: the hunter experiment on v2 (c4a0bd8) and the first
sink-verifier run. Both used this turn.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Each grep_repo and find_refs call re-enumerated the tree (walk, ignore rules,
vendored checks) and re-read every file. The v2 sink verifier spent almost three
hours on its first case (pgAdmin, about 1,800 files) at 108% CPU with one open
connection. It was CPU-bound in these tools, not waiting on the model.
Source lines are now memoised per root, keyed by path and modification time. A hit
is re-validated file by file, because an edit inside a subdirectory does not touch
the root's mtime; a test covers one enumeration and a detected edit.
verify_sinks.py now runs candidates in worker processes, not threads, and appends
each candidate's result to a per-case log, so a stopped run resumes where it left
off. GoPay: 12 candidates in 14 s, the real site found.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
This is the deciding experiment of the strategy review, fixed before any v2 pin is
hunted.
- Hunter: the unchanged tool hunter (default prompt, tools and 4 steps) on
deepseek-flash.
- Scope: the ranker's top 20 regions for the case family, in four hunts. The model
never sees the fix diff or the declared sites.
- Families: a fixed keyword table maps the model's family to the protocol's three.
- Scoring: exactly protocol v2's scorer.
- Cost: a hard $10 ceiling.
hunt.py runs it and scores it (--score). A pilot on a v1 development case
(mongo-express) found the vulnerability at lib/bson.js:60, at $0.031 per pin,
alongside a lot of speculative noise.
Transport fix found by the pilot: the DeepSeek endpoint the hunter builds was
unpriced, so the cost meter read $0.00 for any number of calls. It is now priced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Every model call has failed since 2026-09-10 (83ab533):
- The default detector and judge model was `deepseek-v4.1-flash`, the product name.
The API rejects it with HTTP 400 ("The supported API model names are
deepseek-flash, deepseek-v4-pro"). The judge and pipeline record an endpoint
failure as a degradation, never a verdict, so nothing failed loudly.
- `tool_hunter.resolve_hunter_client` resolved OpenRouter only. In this project
DeepSeek is the chat provider and the OpenRouter key is scoped to embeddings, so
the hunter could not reach a chat model at all; the call came back 401.
The defaults are now `deepseek-flash` (priced). The hunter resolves DeepSeek first
when its key is set, and OpenRouter stays as the explicit or fallback route.
Verified live: plain completion and a tool call through both the endpoint resolver
and the hunter client.
Not affected: the independent evaluations (finding_dump runs with
max_model_calls=0) and the 2026-09-06 hunter measurement, which predates the id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
v1 was evaluated and then used to retune the analyzer. A retune can only be
qualified on a population that did not inform it.
The candidates came from web research alone (research-2026-09-26.md):
- advisories were taken newest-first per language under fixed criteria, never by
how easy they look;
- 261 advisories were examined and 224 rejected, each with a reason;
- every SHA pair was verified through the GitHub API;
- no clone and no scan.
The maintainer selected the rule-based "balanced" set: 5 Python, 6 JS/TS, and 6 PHP
of which 4 are WordPress plugins; 10 injection, 6 destination and 1 config.
Each case declares the advisory's sink sites before any scan, for protocol v2.
freeze.py takes --population and writes freeze-vN.json. The reservation tests now
cover every population-v*.toml.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
This reverts commit cc885f0. It failed the acceptance bar set before the run (each
recall pin within +2 findings, completion unchanged):
- WP Statistics: 16 -> 31.
- PMPro: 16 -> 26, and completion 378/382 -> 103/382. Six prior findings were lost
to the budget; CVE line 936 survived.
- YesWiki: completion 2798 -> 1968, still not detected.
Two causes:
- Cost: wrapper confirmation runs a flow query per parameter of every sink-bearing
method, repeated at each engine start of a portioned scan.
- Precision: a helper whose parameter reaches a sink under its own escaping (for
example `getMemberOrderByPayPalToken(sanitize_text_field(...))`) is not a sink
for its caller.
Doing this properly needs summaries that carry the wrapper's internal
sanitisation, computed once per scan, not per request batch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
This is the second attempt at the YesWiki shape: SQL run through
`$this->dbService->query($query)`, whose body is the `mysqli_query` the facts name,
through a receiver the frontend cannot type. The first attempt was reverted in
c7e3a05.
A method is now a wrapper for a parameter only when the engine's own dataflow
inside the method carries that parameter to a fact sink's argument, on a plausible
path that no cleansing or guard discharges. The guard rails:
- one level only;
- nothing under a bundled library tree (lib/, vendor/, node_modules/, ...);
- a name counts only if every project method with that name is a wrapper;
- wrappers are asked in the flow pass only, never in the evidence pass, so no
region's selection or pruning changes;
- at a wrapper call, only the confirmed argument is asked.
Three Joern-gated tests cover the direct shape (reported), a literal, an
intval-casting helper and a level-2 feeder (not reported), a harmless same-named
method, and a wrapper inside lib/. Each fails when its rule is removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
This reverts commit 54c9dfc. The recall-pin check (p16) showed a large precision
and completion regression, although every recall target survived:
- MW WP Form: 3 -> 60 findings. Form-field renderers became sinks.
- WP Statistics: 16 -> 40.
- PMPro: 16 -> 65, 20 of them inside bundled Braintree/Stripe code. Completion fell
to 390 of 1189 questions, because wrappers made many more regions look
sink-bearing.
- YesWiki: completion fell from 2798/2807 to 216/2807.
The structural summary was too loose. Any identifier in a sink argument counted as
fed by a parameter if any assignment anywhere in the method mentioned it, with no
order or dominance. It also ignored vendored library code and cascaded three
levels by name. A redesign needs dataflow-confirmed, level-limited summaries that
leave the question count alone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Real code rarely calls the driver where it builds the query. YesWiki builds its
INSERT in `FormManager::create($data)` and runs it through
`$this->dbService->query($query)`, whose body is the `mysqli_query` the facts name.
The only sink the facts knew sat in a helper that no request reached directly.
A method whose parameter feeds a family sink is now a sink for that argument,
reported at the call site. The summary is structural, to stay cheap and
deterministic. It is not a flow query per parameter, which would repeat at every
engine start of a portioned scan. The parameter must reach the sink call's
argument directly or through at most two local assignments, with at least one
occurrence outside every cleansing call. It iterates up to three levels, so a
wrapper of a wrapper counts.
Calls resolve by name, because an injected receiver has no type the frontend can
see. A name therefore counts only if every project method with that name is a
wrapper. At a wrapper call, only the summarised arguments are asked.
Two Joern-gated tests cover:
- a request value into a second-level wrapper, reported at the controller's call;
- direct use, a literal, and an `intval`-casting helper, which are not wrappers;
- a harmless same-named method, which disqualifies the name.
Both fail with their part removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Reading /proc/<pid>/stat for a process that is reaped during the read raises
ProcessLookupError (ESRCH), not FileNotFoundError. The previous race fix caught only
the latter, so the hanging-process-group test failed twice today under full-suite
load. It passed alone. The disappearance is exactly what the test asserts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
p14 showed PMPro's functions.php:906 discharged by `elseif (in_array('E', $levels))`.
That checks whether a constant is in `$levels`; it says nothing about `$levels`. The
guard counted a carried variable in any argument. Only argument 1, the tested value
(`in_array`'s needle, the URL given to `url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme`), is
validated now. The allowlist test gains the haystack shape as a reported control.
The test fails when any argument counts.
The other p14 removals were right: WP Statistics export_data x2
(`if (!in_array($table, $allow_tbl)) $table = false;`) and PMPro memberorder.php:1633.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Ultimate Member's fixed pin kept one alert. The fix writes
`$this->sql_order = " ORDER BY u.{$sortby} "` inside
`elseif (in_array($sortby, $allowed, true))`, and after the if/elseif chain it
passes the field through `apply_filters(...)` into a second assignment. The guard
was judged only at the flow's final node, which is outside the branch.
A guard is now also judged at every point where the path stores the value (an
assignment target). A value stored while the check held carries the check forward,
because the rest of the path derives from that store. A mere read inside a branch
is not a candidate: the engine lists uses in branches the flow does not depend on.
The Joern-gated test gains the shape and its control: the same store in the
unguarded else branch, through the same filter, is still reported. The test fails
when only the end is judged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Three of the four fixed-side alerts left in the independent population had one
cause: the fix was a check, and checks were not modelled.
- wger's fix is `url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme`: `if not ...(next_url):
next_url = reverse(..)` and `if next_url and ...(next_url): return redirect`.
- Ultimate Member's fix is an allowlist: `in_array(strtoupper($order), [...],
true) ? $order : 'ASC'` and `elseif (in_array($sortby, $allowed, true))`.
(The fourth, Signal K, is `assertAllowedHost`, a project-local function. It is not
covered.)
Sanitizer facts can now say `guard = true`. A guard is a check, never a cleansing
call on a path. A flow is discharged only when a guard tests a variable the path
carries, and the flow is in one of these places:
- inside the branch whose condition requires the check. The guard may be combined
with `&&` only;
- past a failure test, a single `!` combined with `||` only, whose branch exits
(return, exit, die, wp_die, throw) or overwrites the value, and whose condition
dominates the flow's end;
- through a ternary whose condition requires the check, where the other arm cannot
carry the value. The engine can enter through the condition's own copy of the
value, which never becomes the result.
Facts: `in_array` (PHP) and Django's `url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme` /
`is_safe_url` (Python). A row now consults guards even when a request lists no
sanitizers.
Two Joern-gated tests cover the discharged shapes and, as controls, an unguarded
redirect, a guard on a different variable, a failure that is only logged, the
unguarded else branch, and the ternary arm the check does not select. Both tests
fail without the guard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
The enumeration dropped every `!` line and matched with fnmatch, whose `*` crosses
`/`. YesWiki's `tools/*` followed by `!tools/bazar` therefore removed all 583 PHP
files under tools/, the vulnerable FormManager.php among them. The scan read 243 of
803 files, completed 1128 of 1128 questions and looked clean: a zero from an unread
tree.
Rules now follow git:
- the last matching rule wins, and `!` re-includes;
- `*` and `?` stay inside one path component, and `**` crosses components;
- a rule with an inner `/` is anchored to the root;
- a trailing `/` matches directories only;
- nothing under an ignored directory can be re-included.
In a work tree, a tracked file is never ignored, because `.gitignore` describes what
the repository does not hold.
The test uses `git check-ignore` as the oracle on 16 paths covering negation,
anchoring, depth, directory-only and `**`. It also covers a git-archive export with
no .git, and a tracked file under an ignored directory. All three tests fail on the
old reader.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
Two defects found by the cause-B rescan of the independent population (exploratory,
a retune after protocol-v1):
- `typescript_property_support_unvalidated` still reached the whole repository.
YesWiki is a PHP application that ships a few `.ts` files, and all 1,128 of its PHP
questions were unresolved. The limit is now owned by the TypeScript partition. A
TypeScript project (Mockoon, Signal K) is unchanged.
- `isSourceCall`, and the method-level "reads a source" heuristics, matched source
patterns as substrings. Flask's `request.get` therefore claimed Django's
`request.get_host()`. wger's fix passes that host to
`url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme`, and both fixed functions were reported as open
redirects from it. Patterns are now matched as bounded tokens, like sinks and
sanitizers. wger's vulnerable-pin detections rest on `request.GET`, which still
matches.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
This extends dbcb230 to the remaining graph-integrity gaps. In the independent
evaluation these gaps were repository-wide:
- alerta: one symlink, `alerta/app.wsgi`, which is not even source, made 261 of 261
questions unresolved.
- wger and Signal K: a language no frontend reads did the same.
- YesWiki: unparsed files did the same.
Now:
- the partition build records the paths a symlink boundary skipped (a directory
ends in `/`) and the languages no frontend reads;
- `files_unparsed` carries its full paths;
- the scan demotes only questions about an owned path or under an owned directory,
and only questions in an owned language.
Every gap stays in the report as a boundary. A gap that names nothing keeps its
partition-wide or repository-wide reach. Tier-0 pruning stays off, as before.
The tests that pinned repository-wide reach now assert ownership. The one about a
vendor exclusion masking an integrity failure keeps its intent, using a census gap
that names no file.
Retune after protocol-v1; exploratory only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
