Ran the humanizer rules over 79 prose files in the active specs (brief,
design, requirements, research and narrative docs). Removed em dashes,
significance inflation, forced rule-of-three, bold-label list items and
filler. Skipped tasks.md checklists and the retired specs (harnessx-*,
openrouter-sast-harness, unseen-repo-evaluation).
Every number, path, command, hash and identifier was preserved: checked
each file against HEAD for drift in numbers, inline code and code fences,
zero drift across all 79 files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Legacy inventory 2, the six STATUS NOTE items (the archive README row landed with the R2 commit).
ai-service-plane: 11 of 11 tasks checked, spec.json phase set to implementation-complete as 5b96199
did for four other specs. contributor-scan: dated note in requirements.md -- paused since 2026-09-23,
27 of 51 tasks, v1.2.0-alpha.1 NO-GO, remaining tasks wait on pre-push M2/M3. finding-feedback-loop:
dated note -- dormant, design unapproved since 2026-09-09, depends on the paused spec. The steering
overview's spec table carries the same three states, its leftover 2026-09-09 module-count line is
removed and the collected-test count is the measured 2,023. docs/memory-and-detection.md names the
archive path of model_sinks, the one stale script name left in docs after 067adb9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
**Amendments approved and folded into the numbered requirements** rather
than left as a proposal appended to the file:
- Req 5.5 — a report proportionate to the evidence behind a finding. A
rule whose only evidence is a text match is summarised past a stated
number of sites; a finding a proposer reasoned about keeps its detail
whatever its rung; nothing leaves findings.json, which is the record a
baseline is compared against.
- Req 5.6 — a family that cannot decide a class states the limit, and no
scan presents an absence of findings as evidence of absence.
- Req 4.6 — at least one pinned checkout carries a vulnerability a family
can decide in principle, so a scan producing nothing is distinguishable
from an engine that cannot see.
Each carries the evidence that produced it, and the amendment record keeps
what group 2 confirmed rather than changed: Req 8's overfitting warning
earned its place twice, Req 3.3's honesty counters made an invisible
failure visible, and Req 11.2's gates held through all nine defect fixes.
Req 5.5 is half implemented. Task 2.11 made pattern matches proportionate;
task 2.17 now carries the model layer's own suspicion band, which is 38 of
vampi's 60 findings and is an enumerated candidate the graph could NOT
decide with a judge's opinion attached -- a pattern match with an opinion,
not a reasoned claim, and weaker evidence than the obligations checker's
structural output.
**finding-feedback-loop requirements generated**, seven of them: a
dismissal file the developer owns and the tool never writes, rejecting one
without a reason because a suppression list without reasons is a graveyard
nobody can audit; a counter-example ledger whose entries are runnable
regression cases, grouped by shared cause so a recurring bug is visible as
one; a model that proposes a cause into a review queue and decides nothing,
validated by reverting the three known matcher fixes and measuring what it
recovers; dismissals plus a recipe's known vulnerabilities as one split
evaluation set with the holdout unread and asserted; evolution scoped to
the judge and residual questions with the fact tables off limits to any
automated means; an adoption that reports what it traded and reverts itself
when net-negative; and the loop inheriting the corpus blind spot, so its
evidence base is repositories and it states how few it has.
Phase: requirements, generated, not approved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
Following the Kiro workflow rather than continuing to write tasks.
**A workflow error, corrected.** Two task groups -- a counter-example
ledger, and per-repository evolutionary prompting so developers can commit
dismissals and evolve the harness -- were appended to contributor-scan's
tasks.md on 2026-09-09 without passing requirements or design. They are not
refinements of scan integration; they are a different feature, and writing
them as tasks skipped the two phases that decide whether a feature is
shaped right. They are lifted to .kiro/specs/finding-feedback-loop/, at
brief, unapproved.
That brief states the boundary the design turns on: an optimiser may evolve
the QUESTION (the judge and residual prompts, which are how we ask) and
never the FACTS (tables, rulesets, the declared policy file, which are what
we claim). The closed-loop leak measured on 2026-09-05 is why -- five of
eleven candidate shapes were taught by the holdout pairs they then
recovered, reporting a -0.059 holdout Youden as +0.059. It also states the
acceptance test for the model's role: revert the three matcher fixes and
see whether the grouping rediscovers the known causes.
**Three requirements amendments, drafted and unapproved**, at the end of
contributor-scan/requirements.md:
- Req 5 should state what a report may repeat. libpng emitted 198 findings
and nothing in the spec forbade it. Task 2.11 fixed pattern noise; the
model layer's own suspicion band is still 38 of vampi's 60, and it is the
same epistemic class -- an enumerated candidate the graph could not
decide and an LLM affirmed.
- A family that cannot decide a class must say so. c/memory scored zero
true positives on 89k lines of C for a structural reason, and a silent
scan reads as a clean bill of health. Worse than noise because it is
quiet, and the one failure mode the rung ladder does not already guard.
- Req 4.1 is satisfied by a checkout that cannot demonstrate detection at
all -- libpng's CVE is out of family and no version of it can be
otherwise. It should require one that can.
And what group 2 confirmed rather than changed: Req 8's overfitting warning
stopped a rule being extended until one repository was clean and forced the
access-control work onto pairs nobody tuned against; Req 3.3's honesty
counters are what made a budget stopping free work visible at all; and Req
11.2's byte-identical gates held through all nine defect fixes, which says
from the other side that the corpus could not have caught any of them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
10 requirements, 46 criteria. A NEW spec rather than an amendment to
model-grounded-detection, which is complete and closed.
Req 1-8 cover the gap that prompted it: the model layer has zero production
callers, so ousast scan must use it (1), regions must come from entry points
rather than a labelled function (2), ranking and budget must work at repository
scale where the enumerator's per-region cap of eight is meaningless (3), the
performance envelope must be measured on a real checkout (4), output must be
actionable (5), packaging must be built and verified rather than merely defined
(6), the two deferred decisions must close (7), and the honesty disciplines
carry forward (8).
Req 9 and 10 were added after the maintainer asked whether their requests had
been captured. They had not been -- I folded the corpus asks implicitly into
"run against a known-vulnerable repository", which is not the same thing. Now
explicit: a PHP/WordPress slice (php2cpg works once an interpreter is present,
which the image provides, and plugin CVEs are overwhelmingly the families the
model arbitrates well); real-world C library CVEs -- libpng, image libraries,
OpenSSH, libpam, kernel modules -- gated on the memory decision, because until
it closes they would join 173 pairs already idle; more vibe-code pairs, since
that slice is where the stated audience works and it is only 35 pairs; and
regression tuning over a pinned large-repository baseline, which is the thing
pair scoring structurally cannot see.
Req 9.4 carries today's lesson: verify on a sample that the model can READ a
slice before vendoring it. The OWASP harvest found 238 pairs and vendored 40
for exactly that reason.
Not approved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
