Task 2.3: two of the five unscorable reasons had no code path, so an unparsable
row was reported as a corpus labelling defect when the true cause was a tooling
gap. They have different owners and different fixes, and conflating them is the
dishonesty this spec exists to remove. The design's unscorable_reason is
reinstated with the parse result as an input, and a handler that arrived without
its registration is now named as missing context for the families whose bug
shape is a missing check.
Task 2.6: a verification stamped its own word for proof onto the shared evidence
level, which is not a value the project's ladder defines, and three existing
helpers raised on it. Nothing in production called it yet, so the suite stayed
green while the wiring in the next group would have broken a scan. A
verification now writes only its tag, and a caller that wants to move a claim up
the ladder goes through an explicit mapping that can only produce a level the
ladder has.
Task 2.7: the injection canary planted its row in a private in-memory database
the target could never reach, so it could not fire; the fake sandbox handed the
token back regardless of the snippet, which is why nothing noticed. It is now an
execution canary whose marker only an interpreter could write, and each template
is tested by running it for real against a vulnerable fixture and its fixed
twin. That test immediately caught a second flaw: a handler that merely echoes
its input printed the oracle token and satisfied the oracle without any
vulnerability, so an injected payload now carries a value unrelated to the token
the oracle looks for.
Also from the review: a configuration with no tools is refused instead of
producing a detector that silently reports nothing, the classifier abstains when
its fallback call fails too, and the archive docstring says which version wins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
The maintainer settled both items the group 1 review escalated.
The family that covers server-side request forgery is named untrusted
destination and also covers open redirect, because both are untrusted input
choosing where a request goes and the corpus carries 34 open-redirect rows that
would otherwise be unclassifiable. The requirement, the brief and the design
example now say so, and the approval note records the amendment.
The shipped taxonomy is flat, so no answer can earn hierarchical partial credit.
Rather than leave that as prose, two new acceptance criteria require every
agreement figure and every family figure to say it, and both report types now
carry the flag, computed from the taxonomy rather than asserted. A taxonomy that
later declares a parent flips it without any other change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
Task 2.2. The report covers the whole corpus and scores the classifier only
where a maintainer label exists. Agreement uses the classifier's first answer,
the oracle number uses the best of its answers, and the random baseline is a
uniform pick over the nine real families, so a router error is visible on its
own rather than hidden inside a detector number. Credit is hierarchical: full
for the same family, half for a parent or child, none for a lateral or
fabricated id.
When it is being measured, the classifier no longer reads the declared label it
is scored against, otherwise agreement would be the classifier reading back its
own answer sheet. With no maintainer labels in the corpus yet the report says
the reference set is empty instead of inventing a score, and every disagreement
is queued once with both answers and the deciding tier for a human to settle.
Measured on the 277 vendored pairs: tier one places 275 of them without a single
model call, only two land in unknown, and the 176 memory-safety rows resolve to
one family instead of reading as an unclassified catch-all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
Task 2.1. Tier one decides from what the repository already knows: a declared
family label, an obligation kind, a mechanism id, the rule a finding came from,
or the labeled weakness, and it never spends a model call. Tier two asks one
closed question in JSON mode with thinking disabled, and abstains when the
answer names an id outside the taxonomy or the reply's mean token
log-probability says the model was guessing. Tier three is abstention. Every
answer records which tier decided it.
Answers are multi-label and come back in taxonomy order, so two runs of the
same question compare equal. The classifier proposes and never writes a label,
and it owns validation of the labels the corpus carries, because the corpus
stores a family as an opaque string.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
