Commit Graph
8 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5.5 98fa4ec8cd feat(learn): metered embeddings and the cache (decision-engine 6.2)
plane/models/openrouter-embedding.yaml: openai/text-embedding-3-small via
OpenRouter (embeddings only), input_per_m 0.02, cache/output 0, egress
openrouter.ai; `openrouter` joins the provider extensions.

plane/budget.py MeteredEmbeddingClient: prompt_tokens priced from the
Model manifest, usd/calls ceilings stop the next call, a priced call that
reports no tokens raises UnmeteredUsage (a silent zero is an instrument
failure). OpenRouterEmbeddingClient keeps one usage row per call
(parse_embedding_payload); its api key is out of repr.

learn/embeddings.py + `ousast learn memory embed`: excerpts embedded in
batches into embeddings/<model-slug>/<excerpt_sha>.json (float32 base64),
cached by content hash so a rerun makes no call; the declared dimension is
checked; --dry-run estimates tokens and cost without a call; a paid run
needs --budget-usd and exits 3 (unfinished) at its ceiling. Not run against
the provider: the store embedding waits for its budget go-ahead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
2026-10-01 09:56:52 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5.5 8794884a64 fix(hunter): bound every tool result; show the provider's reason for an HTTP error
FUXA failed every hunt with HTTP 400, and neither run could say why. The client
discarded the response body. With the body shown, the reason was "This model's
maximum context length...": FUXA ships minified bundles whose single lines run to
megabytes, and grep_repo returned a matched line whole.

- grep_repo and find_refs quote a matched line (240 characters), never the whole
  line.
- Every tool result is capped at 16 x max_chars, with a truncation marker.
- OpenRouterChatClient errors carry the provider's response body (first 500
  characters). That would also have exposed the rejected model id in one call
  instead of eighteen days.

After the fix, FUXA candidates verify normally at $0.004-0.013 each. A test covers
the megabyte-line case.

verify_sinks.py: skip futures cancelled at the spend ceiling instead of reading
them (the run crashed with CancelledError).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
2026-09-28 20:15:14 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5 3ebcc6729a fix: a body that stops mid-read is transient, and a round that dies still says so
Round 5 died on `http.client.IncompleteRead(0 bytes read)` and left no record
at all. Two defects, both ours.

The retry classified only connection-level failures. IncompleteRead and
RemoteDisconnected arrive while the *body* is being read, after the connection
succeeded, so they are not URLError -- they escaped both the retry and the
error wrapper and walked out of the round. The network is allowed to be
unreliable; losing a paid round to it is not the provider's defect.

And the exception path was wrapped around the stages that come *after* the
proposal is applied, because those are the ones with something to revert. The
stages before it had already spent money, and a round that leaves no record is
a round nobody can account for. Every outcome is journalled now, with the
exception type in the reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
2026-09-07 07:37:41 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5 944df86d12 feat(learning-harness): chat endpoint independent of embeddings, with the DeepSeek adapter
Task 1.2. Detectors, the classifier's model tier, the proposer and the judge
resolve one chat endpoint: an explicit override first, then the scripted client
flag, then an endpoint named in the config, then DeepSeek, then OpenRouter.
Prove-order retrieval keeps its own embedding endpoint untouched, because the
chat provider we default to offers none.

The adapter handles the provider's documented quirks: thinking is on by default
there and silently ignores temperature, so it is disabled explicitly; the
reasoning field is kept on the reply for the caller to replay across tool turns;
JSON mode has no schema and occasionally returns empty content, so one retry is
built in, never a loop; token log-probabilities are requested only when the
caller wants them, and their mean is what lets the classifier abstain.

Cost comes from the provider's own usage fields, cache hits priced separately,
and a model with no recorded price reports no cost rather than a made-up one.
The endpoint record deliberately holds no key, so it is safe to journal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
2026-09-06 09:10:19 +02:00
Marius Ciepluch a916e2d173 feat(three-stage-scan): attach tool hunter to map hotspots 2026-09-04 00:04:36 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 4.8 b5e40318db feat(hardening): Phase 15 — redaction, retry/backoff, budgets, threat-model docs
Release-readiness hardening.

- redaction.py (zero-dep): redact_secrets masks provider API keys, AWS/GitHub/Slack/
  Google tokens, bearer tokens, URL-embedded credentials, PEM private keys, and
  sensitive key=value assignments. Wired into the trace writer and the markdown report
  (on by default), so scan artifacts never leak a credential quoted from source.
- provider/openrouter.py: call_with_retry — exponential backoff on transient failures
  (HTTP 429/5xx, connection errors, timeouts); non-transient errors fail fast. Both the
  chat and embedding clients use it (max_attempts/retry_base_delay configurable).
- config [hardening]: redact_secrets (default true) + max_findings (bounded-CI output
  cap, 0 = unlimited; truncation is severity-ordered and disclosed as a `budget`
  degradation). Agentic spend stays bounded by [harnessx] max_cost_usd/token_threshold.
- docs/threat-model.md (trust boundaries, controls, sandbox limits) + docs/examples.md
  (six end-to-end walkthroughs); README "Security & hardening" section links both.
- CI lint/typecheck/test/detection-gate/dagger gates already existed.

tests/test_redaction.py, test_provider_retry.py, test_hardening_pipeline.py + config
tests. 206 passed, 4 skipped; ruff + mypy clean; detection gate PASS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-06-22 20:02:34 +02:00
Marius Ciepluch 1e6c1f4436 ci: add quality gates and release workflows 2026-06-18 10:06:21 +02:00
Marius Ciepluch e7df721d16 feat(scan): add initial SAST pipeline 2026-06-17 21:13:51 +02:00