Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1 b3b47ad757 feat(corpus-seeded-mechanisms): the mechanisms lever runs from ousast improve
Review rounds 3-5 remediations (Req 5, 7).

- ousast improve resolves candidates from the target's calibration dir,
  then the working directory's (where `mechanisms export` writes), and
  admits into <target>/.openultrasast/calibration/mechanisms.jsonl,
  where a scan of that target reads; --mechanism-candidates,
  --mechanism-store, --no-mechanisms; --dry-run redirects the store to
  scratch; accepted rounds print admit/retract <id>.
- run_improvement threads the store paths; RoundOutcome carries the
  mechanism edits; reverted mechanism keys are blocked outright; a
  no-gain admission is rejected as mechanism_no_gain; a retraction may
  name an admitted record that left the candidate set.
- leave-one-out forwards variant-search degradations and pins the
  containment and label rules; mechanisms export defaults to the
  candidates file so it never re-admits a tombstone.
- design §Lever rewritten to the implemented gate; README and docs show
  export -> improve -> scan.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
2026-09-05 15:35:08 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1 3c36f13e03 feat(pair-corpus-honesty): LLM-generated Real-Vuln repos and unlicensed agent fixes as pointer pairs
Task 8.4 (Req 10.6, 5.1).

- harvest.merge_recipes appends recipes by name and never rewrites
  existing rows.
- vibe-py/build_recipes.py --pointers: the 40 LLM-generated repositories
  without a license become vendored = false rows (80 pairs, agent,
  seeded) appended to recipes.toml; unlicensed human repos stay skipped.
- agent-vfc/build_recipes.py --from ... --pointers [--cache]: unlicensed
  agent-authored fixes become title-tier pointer rows whose function
  label is derived from the cached excerpt (30 added from a fresh
  662-candidate search); TOML booleans rendered correctly.
- catalogs regenerated: vibe-py 115 rows (35 vendored + 80 pointer),
  agent-vfc 59 (29 + 30); no excerpt is vendored for any pointer row.
- `pairs --slice vibe-py --pointers` scores both provenances (human 35,
  agent 80); the default run skips 80 pairs with pointer_pair_skipped;
  suite and gates unchanged. README/docs name the nightly command.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
2026-09-05 10:45:43 +02:00
Marius Ciepluch 1ae41eea19 feat(propose-adjudicate-prove): overlay adjudicates inventory before prove
Regex inventory stays the proposer. MAP attaches promote/demote/unadjudicated/coverage
from intra-file taint (tree-sitter when a grammar parses, Python ast as last resort).
Deep sandboxes promotions only, ordered by the existing heuristic ranker plus optional
OpenRouter mechanism recall. The SAST pair slice scores overlay outcomes; the stage-1
detection gate and local pair gate stay inventory-only.
2026-09-04 13:57:33 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 4.8 b5e40318db feat(hardening): Phase 15 — redaction, retry/backoff, budgets, threat-model docs
Release-readiness hardening.

- redaction.py (zero-dep): redact_secrets masks provider API keys, AWS/GitHub/Slack/
  Google tokens, bearer tokens, URL-embedded credentials, PEM private keys, and
  sensitive key=value assignments. Wired into the trace writer and the markdown report
  (on by default), so scan artifacts never leak a credential quoted from source.
- provider/openrouter.py: call_with_retry — exponential backoff on transient failures
  (HTTP 429/5xx, connection errors, timeouts); non-transient errors fail fast. Both the
  chat and embedding clients use it (max_attempts/retry_base_delay configurable).
- config [hardening]: redact_secrets (default true) + max_findings (bounded-CI output
  cap, 0 = unlimited; truncation is severity-ordered and disclosed as a `budget`
  degradation). Agentic spend stays bounded by [harnessx] max_cost_usd/token_threshold.
- docs/threat-model.md (trust boundaries, controls, sandbox limits) + docs/examples.md
  (six end-to-end walkthroughs); README "Security & hardening" section links both.
- CI lint/typecheck/test/detection-gate/dagger gates already existed.

tests/test_redaction.py, test_provider_retry.py, test_hardening_pipeline.py + config
tests. 206 passed, 4 skipped; ruff + mypy clean; detection gate PASS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-06-22 20:02:34 +02:00