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27
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5.5
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949977c7a6 |
fix(taint): an SQL escape protects only a quoted value; splice the engine's object detours
`esc_sql` and the mysql/pg `*_escape_string` functions only backslash quotes. A value
they escape is safe inside a quoted literal and nowhere else. Ultimate Member
CVE-2024-1071 is `$sortby = esc_sql(...)` built into `" ORDER BY u.{$sortby} "`, and
it read as sanitized. Sanitizer facts can now say `quoted_only`. The escape keeps its
credit unless the first string the value is built into (concat, interpolation,
addition, f-string) places it after literal text that opens no quote. With no string
built downstream, the credit stays as before. pg_escape_literal adds its own quotes
and stays a full cleanser.
Two further defects hid the same CVE:
- The engine is field-insensitive on the object. Its one path from `$this->sql_order`
went `$this` -> `$this->having` -> `esc_sql($this->having)` -> ... -> the query.
absorbedByObject cut it, and it credited an unrelated field's escape. When a path
leaves a field through the object for another field and reads the first field
again, the detour is spliced out. The later read may be on the path or inside the
sink argument where the path ends.
- The field join judged a field clean if ANY sanitizer name was on its path. It now
uses the same quote-aware check as a row. This matters because the engine's own
path to the query changed between runs: 2 of 4 identical runs chose a path via
`$wpdb->prepare`. The field join is the deterministic route.
Exploratory (retune after protocol-v1): the Ultimate Member vulnerable pin is detected
at class-member-directory-meta.php:936. The fixed pin still alerts at :945. Its fix is
an allowlist (`in_array(...) ? $v : 'ASC'`, and an `in_array` guard), which is not
modelled yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5.5
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562b670a43 |
feat(rules): Django request sources; a destination with a fixed origin is not untrusted
python.toml's sources were Flask-only, so no flow could start anywhere on a Django
project. OpenCVE's SSRF reads its URL from `form.cleaned_data`, and the scan answered
the sink file and found nothing. Added: request.GET/POST/body/COOKIES/FILES/META,
DRF's query_params, and cleaned_data.
With those sources known, OpenCVE reported three redirects that cannot leave the
site: `reverse("cves") + "?" + request.GET.urlencode()` (twice) and
`reverse(route, kwargs=...)`. Destination sink facts can now set
`prefix_fixes_origin` and `origin_anchors`. A path is cut when it enters a
concatenation, f-string or `+=` through anything other than its leftmost operand,
and that operand fixes the origin. Origin-fixing operands:
- a literal `/x`, `?` or `#`;
- a literal of the form scheme://host/;
- an anchor call;
- a variable whose every assignment fixes the origin.
A path is also cut when it passes through an anchor. `"/" + x` (//evil) and
`"https://" + host` stay reported. A Joern-gated test covers all seven shapes.
Exploratory (retune after protocol-v1): OpenCVE vulnerable and fixed pins are both
0 findings, down from 2 and 3. The SSRF itself is still missed, because the flow
crosses a registry dispatch (`REGISTRY.get(t)(extras).run()`) that the engine does
not follow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5.5
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ec3d1457fb |
fix(rules): Node vm is an eval sink; a package name is not a sink token
mongo-express CVE-2019-10758 passes the request body to vm.runInNewContext. No
injection sink named that call, so the flow was answered and missed. runInNewContext,
runInContext, runInThisContext and compileFunction are now CWE-95 sinks.
Once the file's questions completed, the fixed pin showed a second defect. Every call
on `require('mongodb-query-parser')` has that package name as its full name. The
bounded-token match treats `-` as a boundary, so the name matched the SQL sink
`query`. In a full name, `-` belongs to a package name, so it no longer separates
tokens.
Exploratory (retune after protocol-v1): mongo-express vulnerable pin now detected at
lib/bson.js:60.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5.5
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ece4473c2b |
fix(scan): a hook callback's parameters are the registry's arguments, not the request's
The core-hook-argument class from the second PMPro adjudication: pmpro_membership_history_profile_fields($user) on `edit_user_profile` was a route entry, so its parameters were attacker input -- and $user is the WP_User WordPress loaded; its ID became an SQL injection. A callback registered in a string-keyed registry is handed its arguments by the matching apply call, not by the request. The mapper now records the registration call on the entry (`registered_by`), regions carry it, and the dispatch fact says which registrations DO hand a callback request-borne arguments (`request_arguments`; WordPress: add_shortcode, whose $atts are post content). Every other registered callback keeps its call depth but its parameters stop being sources; request data that reaches an apply call's arguments is still followed by the hook half of the taint query. REST routes are not registry entries and keep the parameter rule. Controls: the fact field is validated against `register`; a hook callback is not input, a shortcode and a plain route are. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5.5
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7b8ff3cf44 |
fix(taint): a filter returns its value argument; a source is the access, not a call around it
The apply_filters class from the second PMPro adjudication (2 of 3
remaining false positives): `apply_filters('pmpro_random_code', $code,
$this)` returned whatever $this carried, and a report's `$type` reached SQL
only as an extra filter argument. Two causes, both fixed generally:
- The dispatch fact now says what an apply call RETURNS: `returns` names
the calls whose result is the dispatched value and `value_arg` its
position (WordPress: apply_filters/apply_filters_ref_array return
argument 2; do_action returns nothing). A path through such a call must
ENTER by that argument -- the first of the run of the call's arguments
before it, because the engine hops between sibling arguments
($_GET["c"] -> md5("x") -> apply_filters). Loaded and validated as data;
the query knows no framework.
- A call was a source when the pattern appeared anywhere in its text, so
`apply_filters(..., $_GET["c"])` and `sanitize_text_field($_POST[..])`
were sources themselves -- the "a token matches the thing it names"
invariant. A call is now a source when the pattern names its callee,
receiver or the access it is; the inner access stays a source.
Controls: dispatch facts load/validate; a real-Joern case with request
data as filter context (quiet) and as the filtered value (found). 1,453
host and 18 query tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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2c5fba55ef |
fix(semantic-facts): reach the deserialization form WordPress actually writes
Across four WordPress plugins and 1,164 PHP files there is exactly one deserialization site, and
it is spelled maybe_unserialize. The bare token never reached it, and correctly so: the sink
matcher is word-bounded and the character before unserialize inside maybe_unserialize is a word
character. A token a repository never spells is a family that can never answer, which is what the
2026-09-19 census recorded for this one. maybe_unserialize is a real entry point rather than a
safe wrapper: it calls unserialize whenever the string looks serialized.
Also adds the prototype control. That family had never established anything on any subject, and
its only census report was the word `set` inside a comment. No repository available to this
project contains the mechanism: the only first-party matches on the Node subject are
app.set("view engine", "html") and its sibling, Express settings whose arguments are literals. So
the control demonstrates what the family can do, on a merge of the request body into an object,
and asserts the Express setting is not reported alongside it.
Corrects the PHP record under task 13.2. joernio/joern#6281, this project's own report, is a PHP
`global` inside a closure producing a node with two AST parents, which made the dataflow overlay
throw and cost the whole graph. It was filed against 4.0.623 and fixed by #6270 in v4.0.625,
which the image has pinned since before any measurement recorded here. Verified today on the real
trigger rather than on a transcription of the repro: PMPro's includes/fields.php, the file the
original bisection found, builds and applies the default overlays cleanly on 4.0.625 and on
4.0.631 alike. What remains under that task is a runtime failure and must not be re-diagnosed as
the graph bug.
1,417 tests pass, eighteen skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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e6bdac46e2 |
fix(access-control): decide the sibling scope, and see identity a destructuring spelled away
Two of NodeGoat's three corroborated claims were correct code. `const { userId } = req.session`
lowers to a temporary and then a field read, so nothing in the graph spells session.userId by the
time the value reaches dao.getByUserId(userId, ...), and the constraint the handler really applies
was invisible.
The arbiter now walks back three hops over the method's own assignments from the names the
operation is GIVEN, and req.session joins the identity sources. The token is only safe because of
that requirement: what discharges an object-level obligation is that the value passed to the
operation comes from the authenticated context, not that a session is mentioned nearby. A handler
that reads the session for logging and keys its query on a path parameter is the bug this family
exists for, and it stays unguarded.
Two exclusions the measurement forced, each caught by a page whose whole purpose is the leak it
demonstrates.
- A callback is not a constraint. Taking identifiers from the whole argument subtree credited
NodeGoat's memo listing with a discharge, because memosDAO.getAllMemos((err, docs) => ... userId
...) reads every memo in the collection and only RENDERS the session's user. Method references
are excluded from the argument names.
- An assignment is not a dominating guard. The session read dominates the query, so that clause
credited it instead and the memo listing went quiet again. An assignment is a read of the
authenticated context, not a check applied to it, so operator calls are excluded there -- the
same exclusion the sink matcher needed. The leak stays reported.
On NodeGoat displayContributions and displayProfile go silent, the allocations insecure direct
object reference, both benefits pages and the memo listing stay, and the login and signup handlers
become honestly unguarded rather than accidentally cleared by a callback's text. Six corroborated
where there were seven, and a better six. VAmPI is unchanged at two entailed findings.
The sibling scope is decided by measurement and kept at the file. On NodeGoat the region's own
file entails two handlers, both public routes and both false, and no true defect at all. Every
handler in the application entails six: four true, and the same two public routes. Both scopes
carry the same false positives, because neither can tell a public route from a protected one --
a semantic question that is already the corroborated band's residual. With the carried rung capped
the scope changes no verdict, only the witness, so widening it would buy a repository-wide walk
per question and no precision. A public-route discriminator would change that; the file scope is
not what holds this family back.
1,415 tests pass, sixteen skipped; thirteen Joern-gated query tests pass in the image.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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c0427e6ceb |
feat(access-control): model the collection read, by argument shape rather than by name
NodeGoat's documented insecure direct object reference reads with allocationsCol.find(searchCriteria()), and `find` was absent from an operation table holding findOne, findById, findAll and findByPk. The obligation was missing at the commonest read there is, so that defect raised nothing at any point in the pipeline. It was absent for a good reason, and the reason is the argument, not the name. Measured on wp-statistics, a WordPress plugin that ships jQuery: its assets hold 88 calls named find, of which 70 pass a jQuery selector, 13 pass a predicate to Array.prototype.find and 5 pass a selector built at run time by a template literal or a concatenation. None is a collection read. So the obligation is claimed only where the first argument has the shape of a query document. The operation fact states which argument with query_document_arg, and the arbiter that can see argument shapes decides it: no arguments at all, an object literal, or a builder call are claimed; a method reference, a literal, an operator call and a bare identifier are not. Each exclusion is one of the measured classes above rather than a guess. Zero of those 88 calls became an obligated operation, and the zero is measured rather than empty: the same run's census reports 60 files and 4,552 methods, and the files holding those calls are in it. On NodeGoat all three find calls are collection reads and all three are claimed, which raises the obligation at four more handlers -- the allocations handler that takes userId from req.params on an authenticated route, the benefits pages whose isAdmin guard is commented out in the route table, and the memo listing. Seven of fifteen handlers now reach a verdict, all corroborated, none reported without a judge, and the census is unchanged on both subjects. A bare identifier is deliberately not claimed: col.find(query) and arr.find(pred) are the same shape and neither repository measured holds one, so this is a stated false negative rather than an unmeasured false-positive risk. 1,415 tests pass, sixteen skipped; twelve Joern-gated query tests pass in the image. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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f31ef862a7 |
fix(output-encoding): ask about the server half, and say what the family cannot decide
The census recorded this family completing 44 questions on a Node application and finding
nothing, which is what a client-only vocabulary must do there: all six declared sinks were DOM
sinks. NodeGoat's cross-site scripting is server-side.
Decision: the family asks about a value reaching a rendering call, and states in its own
declaration that it cannot decide template-mediated escaping. Whether res.render is safe depends
on the engine's autoescape setting and on the template's markup, neither of which is at the
call, so res.render is not a sink and the family's limits field says so. A new CWE-79 sink
covers res.write, res.end, res.send and the response.* spellings; res.json stays out because an
application/json body is not a document.
Template auto-escaping is claimed where its evidence is, as a configuration defect:
swig.setDefaults, nunjucks.configure and marked.setOptions are security settings now.
It establishes a finding: app/routes/research.js:25, model_entailed,
`req.query.url + req.query.symbol -> res.write(body)`. The handler fetches a URL the caller
chooses and writes the response body into a text/html response, so the document served from
this origin is the attacker's. The record states how coarse the step is: the path from url to
body runs through the client's callback parameter, which the graph treats as reachable from the
call's arguments, so the conclusion rests on the call's semantics rather than on what the graph
established. Five of seven families now establish findings.
Four defects were found on the way, three of them false positives this change would otherwise
have shipped.
- The permissive-value set was shared across every setting, while a boolean's polarity belongs
to the setting: true leaves the door open in cors({origin: true}) and closes it in
swig.setDefaults({autoescape: true}). Adding the template engines would have reported the fix
as the defect on the line that offers it. ConfigSpec now carries per-setting values, and
Jinja2's Environment moved out of Python's shared list for the same latent reason.
- config.sc matched a dotted setting on its trailing segment alone, so marked.setOptions would
have claimed an editor's setOptions. dominance.sc already required the qualifier.
- taint.sc asked its flow query of every argument including the receiver at index 0. On a
response sink the receiver is the response object, so res.end() -- which takes no data -- was
reported exactly like the res.write(body) two lines above it. Flows now use the real
arguments, as arity already did.
- The arbiter sorted a file's settings by line number as TEXT, so line 126 preceded line 78 and
which setting a file reported depended on the spelling of its line numbers.
Template escaping disabled at server.js:135 is detected, measured model_entailed against the
real query and the real arbiter, and still not reported: the arbiter returns one verdict per
question and that file has an earlier permissive setting. Task 14.6 carries it rather than
hiding it.
1,415 tests pass, thirteen skipped; nine Joern-gated query tests pass in the image.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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57f5a3f0dc |
fix(semantic-facts): give untrusted destination the clients a Node server calls
The family census recorded this family completing 44 questions on NodeGoat, finding the open redirect, and having no way to ask about the repository's documented SSRF: needle.get on a query-string URL at app/routes/research.js:16. A thin vocabulary is a silent false negative. One data change, no query change. The declared set now covers axios, got, needle, request, superagent, unirest, undici and fetch as bare module tokens, plus http.get, http.request, https.get and https.request dotted. Bare is the documented call form of each module and covers its verb methods too, since a token matches word-bounded against the callee and axios is bounded inside axios.get; axios.get and axios.post are dropped as subsumed rather than unwanted. http and https stay dotted because their namespace also holds createServer, and a bare token would have claimed every server a repository starts. The request is now reported at app/routes/research.js:16, model_entailed, witness `req.query.url + req.query.symbol -> needle.get(url, ...)`. This family goes from one finding to two on NodeGoat, every other family is unchanged, and 299 of 299 questions still complete. Measured on that graph, needle matches exactly one call and the eleven other clients match none in first-party or vendored code, so NodeGoat shows the gap closing and cannot show those clients' noise. A control asserts both halves. A handler calling axios.get with a literal and needle.get with req.query.url reports the tainted client alone, and it reads the shipped vocabulary rather than a copy, so removing the client fails it. The CWE-601 redirect entry is untouched: a Location-header redirect is value-shaped and stays outside what this family asks. 1,411 tests pass, eleven skipped; seven Joern-gated query tests pass in the image. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius Ciepluch
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6ba2b06353 | feat(pre-push-safety-net): exclude vendor inputs and partition frontend coverage | ||
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1
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b821ac6e4e |
feat(facts): the [[layout]] fact -- vendored trees are out, test paths are not product
Two decisions the maintainer made, as rows rather than constants. A vendored tree (vendor/, node_modules/, third_party/) is somebody else's unit: out of the targets in preprocess and out of the graph through the frontend's --exclude, which the scan hands to the backend because the CPG seam imports only the standard library. A test path (tests/, test-*.php, *Test.php) stays in scope -- a test that reaches a sink still names the sink -- but its regions are not shipped and order after the product's. Measured before the row: 207 of WP Statistics's 357 PHP files were vendored, and 14 of the 67 regions ahead of MW WP Form's CVE were test files. The position benchmark applies both, so it measures the order the scan spends. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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9cce5a3181 |
feat(cpg): give the files a frontend refuses a CPG of their own
A dropped file is dropped from the ONLY graph there is, so every question
about it has no answer -- which is how a 637-file plugin became a scan of
nothing. But those files build perfectly well alone: the failure is
per-invocation, not per-file. So a file the main build refuses is excluded
from it, given a second CPG, and both are queried with rows concatenated per
request id.
pmpro two-file slice before: cpg_empty, 0 findings
after: 18 entailed incl. CVE-2023-23488 at :936,
reported with cpg_sharded
What this does NOT buy is a flow that crosses the shard boundary: a source in
the excluded file whose sink is in the rest of the tree is invisible to every
question asked, and no merging of results recovers it. That is why the split
is REPORTED rather than quietly served as if it were whole.
The excluded-file tree is symlinks at the original relative paths. A region
asks about `classes/class.memberorder.php` and the queries match a filename by
suffix, so a flattened copy would cheerfully answer about a file nobody asked
about.
Reports gain "What could not be analysed", rendering cpg_sharded, cpg_empty,
files_unparsed, query_failed and budget_exhausted in the reader's terms. A
degradation is a fact about coverage, not a warning to file away: silence in
the coverage table means "no fact table covered this", and silence about an
empty or split graph means something else entirely.
Also removes the WordPress vocabulary from the query, which was the other half
of this request. `apply_filters` was a hardcoded Set in taint.sc and
`add_action|add_filter|add_shortcode` a hardcoded alternation in mapping.py.
Both are now a `[[dispatch]]` fact:
[[dispatch]]
id = "wordpress_hooks"
register = ["add_action", "add_filter", "add_shortcode"]
apply = ["apply_filters", ..., "do_action", ...]
The shape is general -- a registry keyed by a string literal at both ends, as
Django signals, jQuery events and Symfony's dispatcher all are -- so a second
framework is a row in a TOML rather than an edit to a query. `dispatch_apply`
is empty for every language that declares none, and the hook half then does
nothing at all rather than looking for names that mean nothing there.
848 tests pass; gates byte-identical. wpstatistics 3/2 with the CVE at :225 on
the vulnerable side only, mwwpform 1/0, pmpro 18/1, VAmPI 4 unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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922ed84053 |
feat(repos): a WordPress plugin with a verified CVE, and the WordPress DB API
contributor-scan 5.1's detection half. Paid Memberships Pro 2.9.7 pinned at
1a900be3, carrying CVE-2023-23488 -- unauthenticated SQL injection through
the `code` parameter of the /pmpro/v1/order REST route.
**Verified in the code, not taken from the advisory.** At this commit
classes/class.memberorder.php:936 reads
$id = $wpdb->get_var("SELECT id FROM $wpdb->pmpro_membership_orders
WHERE code = '" . $code . "' LIMIT 1");
and tag 2.9.8 replaces it with `$wpdb->prepare( "... code = %s ...", $code )`.
637 PHP files and 117k lines, so it is also the first PHP checkout large
enough to say anything about an envelope.
**WordPress never calls mysqli; it goes through $wpdb**, so the facts could
not have found this. Added qualified: `$wpdb->get_var`, `->get_results`,
`->get_row`, `->get_col`, `->query`, `->replace`. Qualified because a bare
`get_var` or `query` matches any method of that name anywhere -- the
generic-name trap that made `query.get` match every `.get(` in a repository
this morning. `->insert`, `->update` and `->delete` are deliberately absent:
they take arrays and WordPress prepares them itself.
**And the thing that nearly went wrong.** The obvious next step when
writing PHP facts is to add WordPress's sanitizers -- sanitize_text_field,
esc_html, esc_attr. Doing so would have made this CVE invisible, because
its handler calls `sanitize_text_field( $params['code'] )` and then
concatenates the result into a query. sanitize_text_field is a real
sanitizer that does nothing whatsoever about SQL injection.
`TaintSpec.sanitizers` is one flat list per language whose comment states
the assumption outright -- "a sanitizer that breaks one flow breaks it
whatever the sink's family" -- and PHP falsifies it. So only SQL-specific
cleansers are listed, which leaves XSS under-sanitized instead, and the
real fix is recorded as task 5.6: a discharge counts for the obligation it
discharges. That is task 2.6's finding arriving in the taint family, where
the dominance arbiter already reads kind from the facts and the taint spec
has no equivalent.
The end-to-end scan of this checkout is not yet reported: the first run
returned 1577 regions with 0 scanned, and the CPG builds standalone at
4.3MB with no errors, so the two do not yet agree. Numbers when they do.
Gates byte-identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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af7e33ef3e |
feat(reports): say what was looked for, and what cannot be decided
contributor-scan 2.16, implementing the approved Req 5.6. `c/memory` scored zero true positives across 89k lines of C and three distinct classes of false one, for a structural reason: it models string CALLS and libpng overflows through arithmetic. The task allowed retiring the family. Kept, scoped and stated instead -- `strcpy` misuse is real in plenty of C and the family earns its place for that. Retiring it would have removed the disclosure along with the coverage, leaving a C scan silent for a reason nobody could read. **Its own description was the quiet-failure risk.** It claimed "bounds, lifetime, arithmetic", which is exactly what it does not decide. It now names the APIs it models, and a new `limits` field in families.toml says what it cannot: an overflow expressed as an index, a pointer offset, or a memcpy whose size is computed -- which is how most real C overflows are written, and how every one of libpng's is. A limit recorded in a fact table nobody reads is no better than silence, so the report renders it. **What was analysed** lists every family offered to a region whether or not it found anything, because a family that ran and reported nothing is the case a reader is most likely to misread, and it states plainly that silence means no fact table covered the code rather than that the code is safe. The counts are derived from the fact tables the arbiter actually used, so they cannot drift from what the engine looked for; only the limit sentence is authored, because "cannot decide an overflow expressed as an index" is a statement about an abstraction and no table can produce it. A C scan that finds nothing now says: | c | `memory` | 121 | 9 | **`memory` (c)** — Models CALLS, not arithmetic... Gates byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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61811512a8 |
feat(facts): PHP semantic facts, validated against a real PHP CPG
contributor-scan 5.1, the first step toward the v0.1 WordPress target. Written against a PHP CPG rather than against PHP source, because the two do not look alike. Verified with joern-parse 4.0.623 / php2cpg on a probe: $_GET["name"] -> call `<operator>.indexAccess`, CODE $_GET["name"] mysqli_query($conn, $sql) -> call NAMED mysqli_query echo $_GET["msg"] -> call NAMED echo So sources match on code and sinks match on name, and every entry the probe did not exercise is marked unverified in the file -- `include` and `require` among them, which is PHP's most characteristic path bug and the first thing to check on a real checkout. Five families derive (injection, output_encoding, path, deserialization, untrusted_destination) with no sink that is its own sanitizer -- asserted by a test, because that bug class has now appeared three times in three matchers. `php` is added to the region model's languages, without which the facts would have reached nothing. The arbiter decides 4 of 4 on the probe: the SQL concat entails, its `mysqli_real_escape_string` twin drops to corroborated, `echo` XSS entails and `system` command injection entails. **A whole scan finds 2 of those 3, and the gap is the finding.** PHP files yield FILE-LEVEL regions because no PHP entry points are mapped, and the taint arbiter returns one verdict per region per family -- so a file-level region reports at most one injection finding however many it holds. `system` won on flow length and the SQL injection went unreported. That is the mirror image of task 2.9: that one is many regions collapsing to one site, this is many sites collapsing to one verdict, and it bites hardest exactly where PHP needs it not to, since a WordPress file is large and has no decorator for the mapper to find. Recorded as task 5.4 with WordPress's registration model (add_action, add_filter, admin-ajax, REST routes), which the mapper already handles in principle for other frameworks. A 13-line probe is not a WordPress result. What is established is that the seam works end to end for PHP; everything about scale and coverage is unmeasured, and there are still zero PHP pairs in a corpus of 263 python, 351 c_cpp, 47 javascript and 49 java. Gates byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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950a4c7ac4 |
fix(corpus): the three silent config pairs were a settings gap, not corpus defects
I was wrong, and the correction matters more than the fix. I reported these three pairs as corpus defects on a similarity measure -- 23%, 45%, 53% -- and said no settings table could make them split. That threshold came from the OWASP minimal-fix analysis and does not apply to this slice. The vibe-py corpus pairs a vulnerable function with a DIFFERENT, SAFE function from the same repository; low similarity is the design, not a defect. djangoat-views-user-view sits at 36% and dsvpwa-handlers-do-bdr at 34%, and both score pair_correct. Reading the actual code instead of the metric shows what the settings table was missing: aiohttp's Application(debug=True) and RedisStorage(httponly=False). Adding them, two of the three now split -- vuln model_entailed, fixed silent: dvpwa-app-init Application(debug = True, middlewares = [...]) dvpwa-middlewares RedisStorage(app['redis'], httponly = False) The third, dsvpwa-dsvpwa-main, stays silent for the reason predicted before the change: its setting is an argparse default (--ssl defaulting to 0), which is a CLI default rather than a security-setting call and is not reachable by this arbiter. One weakness this exposes and does not fix: permissive_values is a flat list of literals with no keyword association, so it holds both True and False. debug=True is dangerous while httponly=True is safe, and the model cannot currently tell them apart. It happens not to bite on these pairs; it is a real limit of the fact schema and worth naming. 734 passing, gates byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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db3db6056d |
feat(model-grounded-detection): widen the settings table, wire the weak-algorithm arm
Two things, and a finding that says neither fixes the pairs that prompted them.
The settings table was Flask/FastAPI-shaped (CORS, set_cookie, app.run) while
the corpus contains aiohttp and Django applications, so three config_secrets
pairs contained no modelled security setting at all. Added aiohttp's
session_setup and cookie storages and Django's SECURE_* / DEBUG settings: 8
calls to 24.
And config_secrets spans three abstractions while only one was wired -- a
permissive setting VALUE. Weak algorithm CHOICE (CWE-326/327) is a different
thing: the danger is the algorithm NAMED, not a flag left open. Its data has
been sitting on the sink facts as `weak_literals` since before this feature and
nothing read it. Both abstractions read the same literal, so the arm is small:
hashlib.new("md5") is now entailed and hashlib.new("sha256") is not.
The finding: the three silent config pairs are CORPUS DEFECTS, not model gaps.
Measured similarity 23%, 45% and 53% -- dsvpwa-dsvpwa-main pairs `def main()`
against `def run(self, handler)`, a different function entirely. No settings
table can make those split, and it is worth saying so rather than letting the
work imply otherwise. The table gap was real and worth closing on its own
merits; it just is not why those pairs are silent.
734 passing, mypy/ruff clean, gates byte-identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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fcb12e116a |
feat(model-grounded-detection): Java web sinks, and the post-closure-fix ceiling
Java shipped with injection, deserialization and crypto sinks only, so the path and output_encoding families had nothing routing to them by CWE and any Java pair in either was unreadable -- the gap hutool-cve-2018-17297 reported as "no path spec for java". Adds the JDK filesystem entry points, the servlet response writers, the outbound/redirect APIs, and the ESAPI / canonical-path sanitizers the OWASP suite itself uses. Documented APIs, provenance per entry. Post-closure-fix ceiling: 41.3% entailed (38/92) and 26.1% distinguished, up from 39.1% / 23.9%. path went 0/8 to 1/8 with its first distinguished pair; injection 29->31 entailed and 18->19 distinguished. Two points -- real, and the mechanism is understood, but the remaining gaps are data rather than machinery. Carrying a correction: the measurement harness routed config_secrets through TAINT rather than the constant-abstraction arm, so its 0/10 in this artifact measures the wrong arbiter and did so in both full runs. The harness is fixed; that family's real number is the earlier targeted re-measure, and this artifact's config row should not be read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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d651455d23 |
fix(model-grounded-detection): closure scoping, and the three bugs it uncovered
The group-4 finding: JavaScript is callback-heavy, so the method containing a
sink routinely is not the labeled function. `fs.readFileSync` inside the
callback passed to `fs.stat` has enclosing method `<lambda>0`, and filtering on
`sinkMethod == function` dropped it -- the whole path family measured 0/8.
Scope is now decided by line-range containment within the same file
(astParentFullName is empty for lambdas, so nesting is not readable there), and
reported as `inLabeledScope`; the Python side trusts that flag and keeps the
name comparison only as a fallback, so an engine that cannot report scope never
has its sinks silently treated as scoped. Parameter sources stay bound to the
labeled function's OWN parameters -- a callback's `err`/`stats` are not
attacker input.
Fixing the scope exposed three further bugs, each of which would have raised
the number while making the answer untrue:
* Shortest-flow-wins picked the wrong witness. With closures in scope the
same sink has flows from `req.url...` (10 steps, the vulnerability), `res`
(3) and `this` (7). A flow whose source matches the source model now
outranks a shorter one from a bare captured name; shortest still breaks
ties, so the order stays total and the verdict deterministic.
* The JS fact file had NO sanitizers at all, so no JavaScript fix of any
family could ever be recognised. Added the documented path-normalisation
and HTML-escaping APIs, with provenance.
* Adding them regressed the witness, because `resolveUrl` CONTAINS `resolve`
and the substring test marked the vulnerable flow sanitized. This is the
same bug class already fixed in dominance.sc and not carried across -- the
exact fix-the-instance-miss-the-class failure. taint.sc now matches on word
boundaries too.
And the principled rule the fix turns on: parameter sources are a FALLBACK,
never an override. When a modelled source reaches the sink, those flows are the
evidence; otherwise a captured `res` reaching a sanitized sink reports the fix
as still vulnerable on a flow that names no attacker input.
Also recorded: req.url was NOT wrong as a diagnosis, it was untestable in
isolation -- the scoping bug masked it. Both were needed. On the pair that
motivated all of this:
vuln model_entailed req.url.split('?')[0] -> readFileSync(possibleFilename)
fixed model_corroborated same flow, sanitized by path.normalize
distinguished: true
700 passing, mypy/ruff clean, gates byte-identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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fec67253f3 |
feat(model-grounded-detection): 4.1 guard dominance, 4.2 the missing sink facts
4.1 is the arbiter for the class no crash oracle reaches. An access-control bug
is the ABSENCE of a guard: no flow to follow, no crash to reproduce. What the
model can establish is a consistency violation -- an obligated operation no
discharging guard governs, in a file where its siblings are governed by one.
"Governed" turned out not to be one relation, and asking pure CFG dominance of
the operation gets two of three shapes wrong. Measured against the real engine:
identity constraint the guard is INSIDE the operation's arguments
filter_by(owner_id = current_user.id)
identity branch abort(403).controlledBy == [note.owner_id != current_user.id]
-- the check runs AFTER the fetch, so it never dominates
the operation, but it controls whether the value escapes
dominating guard a discharger-naming call that dominates the operation
That is why the query uses controlledBy rather than dominatedBy for shape 2.
Two bugs found by running it, both the same class as the sanitizer bug in group
2 -- part of a fact flattened, the part carrying the signal dropped:
* dominance_specs used only `calls` and `decorators`, omitting
identity_sources (current_user, request.user) and constraint_params
(owner_id, user_id) -- which is how an identity constraint is actually
written. The arbiter reported "no guard" on handlers that plainly had one.
request_sources and permissive_values stay excluded: they describe the
vulnerable shape, and including them would let the arbiter read a bug as
its own fix.
* matching operations by code containment yielded four or five desugared rows
per operation (the bare `tmp1.filter_by` receiver among them, carrying none
of the guards the real call has), so a guarded operation could be flagged.
Matching is by call name now.
Live, deterministic, zero model calls:
leaky -> model_entailed no discharging guard, while 2 sibling handlers are guarded
edit_note -> no finding (ownership check controls the denial)
list_notes -> no finding (identity constraint in the query)
4.2 authors the sink facts the go/no-go measured as its largest miss class (11
of 23): Django ORM raw SQL, and the four families that previously had no fact
routing to them by CWE at all -- path, output_encoding, untrusted_destination,
prototype. Each entry is a documented dangerous API of the named library with
its provenance recorded inline, and rule_ids left empty because a sink fact is
not a detection rule. Flagged for maintainer review as data, given the standing
"no LLM-authored patterns" constraint. The exact-set assertion written in task
1.1 to hold this gap open is updated rather than deleted, so it still fails if a
family ever loses its seed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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289648338c |
feat(learning-harness): closed family taxonomy with a verifier per family
Task 1.1. Ten families are the only key that routes work and scores a pair; CWE ids and mechanism ids are attributes reached through a family. Each family names what can confirm a claim in it: a sandbox canary for injection, file path and deserialization, static corroboration for access control, nothing for the rest. The unknown family carries the mechanisms that span families and the weaknesses this project deliberately does not target, so a declined row is visible instead of silently unresolved. Every labeled corpus weakness resolves, no weakness id is claimed twice, and every mechanism in the closed vocabulary belongs to exactly one family. Open redirect joins server-side request forgery under one untrusted-destination family because both are untrusted input choosing a request destination; that places 34 real rows instead of discarding them. The relation lookup answers same, parent-child, lateral or fabricated, and abstention earns no partial credit: unknown against a real family is lateral. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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8e26dfd1e2 |
feat(authorization-obligations): group sibling handlers and find consistency anomalies
Task 2.2. Handlers on the same resource under the same module are siblings; when at least min_siblings of them discharge an obligation and one does not, that one is the anomaly and the discharging siblings are its evidence (Req 3.2). A set with fewer members than the minimum is under-populated and never reported (Req 3.3). A public route among authenticated siblings is a missing path guard with the mapper's access classification as evidence (Req 3.4). The sibling key is the module path without its suffix, so two same-named files in different directories are never merged. Witness validity (an identity constraint counts only when it binds the authenticated context) is one helper shared by operations, siblings and the checker. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1
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f44dd2c512 |
feat(authorization-obligations): obligated operations and dischargers as closed facts
Task 1.1 (Req 1.1-1.5).
- semantic/obligations/facts.py: closed OPERATION_KINDS, DISCHARGER_KINDS
and PROVENANCE_KINDS; OperationFact and DischargerFact (calls,
decorators, identity sources, constraint params, request sources,
permissive values); load_obligation_facts rejects unknown kinds and
fields by name; per-language scoping.
- ruleset/obligations/{python,javascript,typescript}.toml beside (never
inside) the flow facts directory. Protected reads and writes are
discharged by an identity constraint or an ownership check; a path
guard discharges privileged actions only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
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Marius Ciepluch
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1ae41eea19 |
feat(propose-adjudicate-prove): overlay adjudicates inventory before prove
Regex inventory stays the proposer. MAP attaches promote/demote/unadjudicated/coverage from intra-file taint (tree-sitter when a grammar parses, Python ast as last resort). Deep sandboxes promotions only, ordered by the existing heuristic ranker plus optional OpenRouter mechanism recall. The SAST pair slice scores overlay outcomes; the stage-1 detection gate and local pair gate stay inventory-only. |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 4.8
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2d7ef48e52 |
feat(benchmark): Phase 2 (task 4) — actionable per-rule signals, ledger, FP knob
Complete Phase 2: make benchmark output drive per-rule improvement, wire the
loop-owned ledger, and turn a confirmed false positive into a score knob. Zero
new dependencies; detection stays byte-identical (recall 44/47 = 93.6%, FP 0%)
and the 90/10 gate holds.
- Per-rule attribution (4.1): BenchmarkMiss/BenchmarkFalsePositive carry rule_id;
BenchmarkMetrics.per_rule aggregates matched/missed/false_positives per rule.
- Recommendation delta (4.2): evaluate_benchmark emits RuleRecommendation
(keep/shadow/loosen) written to rule_policy_delta.json; the inert
next_improvement_candidate stub is now rule-aware ("rule:<id>" or
"language_hunter").
- Loop ledger (4.3): cli loads the ruleset with the rule_policy.json overlay
(empty -> byte-identical; an entry overlays a rule's status/floors at load);
read_rule_ledger/write_rule_ledger added for the evolve loop. A disabled rule
in the ledger no longer fires (covered by an integration test).
- FP -> reachability knob (4.4): a confirmed false-positive learning lowers a
finding's effective reachability multiplier in the score
(fp_reachability_overrides + scoring reachability_override) instead of deleting
the rule, so recall stays high while the score stops over-penalizing.
93 tests pass; ruff + mypy clean. Spec tasks 4.1-4.4 checked off — Phase 2
(Core: rules-as-data + benchmark signals) is complete. The loop-driven decision
to apply ledger flips remains the gated evolve loop (Phase 3/4).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 4.8
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444d8c9490 |
feat(ruleset): Phase 2 (task 3) — rules as governed data, severity from policy
Externalize detection rules to versioned TOML and remove rule-local severity, so rules detect and the central CWE policy decides severity — fixing "rules too influential / not centrally managed". Zero-dependency; detection is byte-identical (benchmark recall 44/47 = 93.6%, FP 0% unchanged) and the 90/10 gate holds. - RulesetStore (ruleset/store.py + ruleset/<lang>/rules.toml): PatternRule as data (rule_id, title, languages, cwe, tags, pattern, status, min_evidence_level, precision_estimate, version) with NO severity; load_ruleset (sorted, with optional rule_policy.json ledger overlay) and a stdlib TOML write_ruleset. The 32 rules were generated from the prior PATTERN_RULES with a verified exact round-trip (pattern/cwe/languages/tags/title). - findings.py: drop the hardcoded PatternRule class + PATTERN_RULES tuple; load the default ruleset from TOML; quick_scan_findings(root, targets, rankings, ruleset, policy) resolves each finding's severity from policy via resolve_severity (SEVERITY_LABEL maps 0-5 -> string) and tags findings with their rule status. - Three-status volume control: StaticFinding gains status (default "enabled"); disabled rules never fire; shadow findings are partitioned out of the report and score in the CLI (written to shadow_findings.json) — no shadow rules by default. - Emission floors (RulesetConfig.min_emit_priority / min_emit_precision, default 0.0 = emit all) replace "every match is a finding". - CLI loads the ruleset as a stage and uses it for the fail-loud policy check, detection, hunter pool, and the score CWE map. Wheel ships the ruleset TOML. 85 tests pass; ruff + mypy clean. Spec tasks 3.1-3.4 checked off. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |