Task 2.3: two of the five unscorable reasons had no code path, so an unparsable
row was reported as a corpus labelling defect when the true cause was a tooling
gap. They have different owners and different fixes, and conflating them is the
dishonesty this spec exists to remove. The design's unscorable_reason is
reinstated with the parse result as an input, and a handler that arrived without
its registration is now named as missing context for the families whose bug
shape is a missing check.
Task 2.6: a verification stamped its own word for proof onto the shared evidence
level, which is not a value the project's ladder defines, and three existing
helpers raised on it. Nothing in production called it yet, so the suite stayed
green while the wiring in the next group would have broken a scan. A
verification now writes only its tag, and a caller that wants to move a claim up
the ladder goes through an explicit mapping that can only produce a level the
ladder has.
Task 2.7: the injection canary planted its row in a private in-memory database
the target could never reach, so it could not fire; the fake sandbox handed the
token back regardless of the snippet, which is why nothing noticed. It is now an
execution canary whose marker only an interpreter could write, and each template
is tested by running it for real against a vulnerable fixture and its fixed
twin. That test immediately caught a second flaw: a handler that merely echoes
its input printed the oracle token and satisfied the oracle without any
vulnerability, so an injected payload now carries a value unrelated to the token
the oracle looks for.
Also from the review: a configuration with no tools is refused instead of
producing a detector that silently reports nothing, the classifier abstains when
its fallback call fails too, and the archive docstring says which version wins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
Task 2.7. A canary is how a family says the vulnerability fired. Injection
plants a row in an in-memory database that only an unconstrained query returns,
file path plants a file under the scratch mount that only a traversal reaches,
and deserialization plants an object that only an unsafe load reconstructs. Each
prints its token on that path and no other, and the token is derived from the
claim, so one family's oracle can never answer for another and one claim's
canary can never answer for the next. A snippet that cannot reach the function
prints nothing, which is a suspicion rather than a proof.
Every template passes the existing snippet safety check before it can run, and
the candidate is always imported from the read-only source mount.
Nothing reaches proven on a machine's say-so alone. A second, independent
judgement reads the snippet and what the sandbox printed and either confirms or
drops the claim back to corroboration; a judge that cannot answer never promotes
anything. The judge is told the claim and the output, never the answer key.
Templates and oracle code live in the package, outside every directory a round
may write.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
