Open_Ultra_SAST

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2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5	3ebcc6729a	fix: a body that stops mid-read is transient, and a round that dies still says so Round 5 died on `http.client.IncompleteRead(0 bytes read)` and left no record at all. Two defects, both ours. The retry classified only connection-level failures. IncompleteRead and RemoteDisconnected arrive while the body is being read, after the connection succeeded, so they are not URLError -- they escaped both the retry and the error wrapper and walked out of the round. The network is allowed to be unreliable; losing a paid round to it is not the provider's defect. And the exception path was wrapped around the stages that come after the proposal is applied, because those are the ones with something to revert. The stages before it had already spent money, and a round that leaves no record is a round nobody can account for. Every outcome is journalled now, with the exception type in the reason. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG	2026-09-07 07:37:41 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 4.8	b5e40318db	feat(hardening): Phase 15 — redaction, retry/backoff, budgets, threat-model docs Release-readiness hardening. - redaction.py (zero-dep): redact_secrets masks provider API keys, AWS/GitHub/Slack/ Google tokens, bearer tokens, URL-embedded credentials, PEM private keys, and sensitive key=value assignments. Wired into the trace writer and the markdown report (on by default), so scan artifacts never leak a credential quoted from source. - provider/openrouter.py: call_with_retry — exponential backoff on transient failures (HTTP 429/5xx, connection errors, timeouts); non-transient errors fail fast. Both the chat and embedding clients use it (max_attempts/retry_base_delay configurable). - config [hardening]: redact_secrets (default true) + max_findings (bounded-CI output cap, 0 = unlimited; truncation is severity-ordered and disclosed as a `budget` degradation). Agentic spend stays bounded by [harnessx] max_cost_usd/token_threshold. - docs/threat-model.md (trust boundaries, controls, sandbox limits) + docs/examples.md (six end-to-end walkthroughs); README "Security & hardening" section links both. - CI lint/typecheck/test/detection-gate/dagger gates already existed. tests/test_redaction.py, test_provider_retry.py, test_hardening_pipeline.py + config tests. 206 passed, 4 skipped; ruff + mypy clean; detection gate PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>	2026-06-22 20:02:34 +02:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5

3ebcc6729a

fix: a body that stops mid-read is transient, and a round that dies still says so

Round 5 died on `http.client.IncompleteRead(0 bytes read)` and left no record
at all. Two defects, both ours.

The retry classified only connection-level failures. IncompleteRead and
RemoteDisconnected arrive while the *body* is being read, after the connection
succeeded, so they are not URLError -- they escaped both the retry and the
error wrapper and walked out of the round. The network is allowed to be
unreliable; losing a paid round to it is not the provider's defect.

And the exception path was wrapped around the stages that come *after* the
proposal is applied, because those are the ones with something to revert. The
stages before it had already spent money, and a round that leaves no record is
a round nobody can account for. Every outcome is journalled now, with the
exception type in the reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG

2026-09-07 07:37:41 +02:00

Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 4.8

b5e40318db

feat(hardening): Phase 15 — redaction, retry/backoff, budgets, threat-model docs

Release-readiness hardening.

- redaction.py (zero-dep): redact_secrets masks provider API keys, AWS/GitHub/Slack/
  Google tokens, bearer tokens, URL-embedded credentials, PEM private keys, and
  sensitive key=value assignments. Wired into the trace writer and the markdown report
  (on by default), so scan artifacts never leak a credential quoted from source.
- provider/openrouter.py: call_with_retry — exponential backoff on transient failures
  (HTTP 429/5xx, connection errors, timeouts); non-transient errors fail fast. Both the
  chat and embedding clients use it (max_attempts/retry_base_delay configurable).
- config [hardening]: redact_secrets (default true) + max_findings (bounded-CI output
  cap, 0 = unlimited; truncation is severity-ordered and disclosed as a `budget`
  degradation). Agentic spend stays bounded by [harnessx] max_cost_usd/token_threshold.
- docs/threat-model.md (trust boundaries, controls, sandbox limits) + docs/examples.md
  (six end-to-end walkthroughs); README "Security & hardening" section links both.
- CI lint/typecheck/test/detection-gate/dagger gates already existed.

tests/test_redaction.py, test_provider_retry.py, test_hardening_pipeline.py + config
tests. 206 passed, 4 skipped; ruff + mypy clean; detection gate PASS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

2026-06-22 20:02:34 +02:00