# Closed family taxonomy (learning-harness, Req 1). A family is the ONLY key that routes work and
# scores a pair; CWE ids and mechanism ids are attributes looked up through a family and are never
# keys themselves. `verifier` says what can confirm a claim in this family: a canary oracle in the
# sandbox, static corroboration from another checker, or nothing (the claim stays a suspicion).
# `unknown` carries the generic mechanisms and the deliberately out-of-scope weaknesses, so a row we
# have considered and declined is visible instead of silently unresolved. Bump `version` on any change.
version = "1"

[[family]]
id = "injection"
description = "Untrusted input reaches an interpreter: SQL, OS command, code, expression or server-side template."
cwes = ["CWE-77", "CWE-78", "CWE-88", "CWE-89", "CWE-90", "CWE-91", "CWE-94", "CWE-95", "CWE-564", "CWE-917", "CWE-943", "CWE-1336"]
mechanisms = []
verifier = "canary"

[[family]]
id = "path"
description = "Untrusted input reaches a filesystem path: traversal, unsafe join, file inclusion."
cwes = ["CWE-22", "CWE-23", "CWE-36", "CWE-73", "CWE-98", "CWE-99"]
mechanisms = ["path_join_user_input"]
verifier = "canary"

[[family]]
id = "deserialization"
description = "Untrusted data is deserialized into objects the process then trusts."
cwes = ["CWE-502"]
mechanisms = []
verifier = "canary"

[[family]]
id = "access_control"
description = "An operation on a protected resource is reached without the guard or ownership constraint its siblings carry."
cwes = ["CWE-284", "CWE-285", "CWE-306", "CWE-425", "CWE-566", "CWE-639", "CWE-862", "CWE-863", "CWE-1220"]
mechanisms = [
    "identity_from_request_body",
    "missing_auth_guard",
    "unconstrained_protected_read",
    "unconstrained_protected_write",
    "unguarded_privileged_action",
]
verifier = "static"

[[family]]
id = "output_encoding"
description = "Untrusted data reaches a rendered document or a header without encoding: cross-site scripting, response splitting."
cwes = ["CWE-79", "CWE-80", "CWE-83", "CWE-113", "CWE-116"]
mechanisms = []
verifier = "none"
limits = """Models a value reaching a rendering CALL -- a DOM sink, or a response body written directly. It cannot decide template-mediated escaping, which is the commonest shape a server-rendered application has: whether `res.render` is safe depends on the template engine's autoescape configuration and on the template's own markup, neither of which is at the call. That setting is claimed instead as a configuration defect, where a permissive literal can be read: `swig.setDefaults`, `nunjucks.configure` and Jinja2's `Environment` are security settings in the obligation facts, and turning escaping off is reported by config_secrets. Response splitting (CWE-113) is claimed by no sink here at all, because modern Node rejects a newline in a header value and the claim would be about an engine this project does not model. A scan of a server-rendered application that reports nothing from this family has established that no tainted value reached a modelled rendering call, and nothing about whether its templates escape."""

[[family]]
id = "untrusted_destination"
description = "Untrusted input controls where a request or a redirect goes: server-side request forgery and open redirect."
cwes = ["CWE-441", "CWE-601", "CWE-611", "CWE-918"]
mechanisms = []
verifier = "none"

[[family]]
id = "prototype"
description = "Untrusted keys reach an object merge or attribute assignment and change behaviour other code relies on."
cwes = ["CWE-471", "CWE-915", "CWE-1321"]
mechanisms = ["prototype_pollution"]
verifier = "none"

[[family]]
id = "config_secrets"
description = "A security setting ships permissive or a credential ships in the artifact: CORS, debug, cookie flags, weak crypto, hardcoded secrets."
cwes = [
    "CWE-16",
    "CWE-215",
    "CWE-259",
    "CWE-311",
    "CWE-312",
    "CWE-315",
    "CWE-326",
    "CWE-327",
    "CWE-346",
    "CWE-489",
    "CWE-522",
    "CWE-614",
    "CWE-798",
    "CWE-942",
    "CWE-1004",
]
mechanisms = ["config_sink_weak_literal", "permissive_default", "secret_in_client"]
verifier = "none"

[[family]]
id = "memory"
description = "Misuse of unbounded string and format APIs in C and C++: a tainted value reaching gets, strcpy, strcat, sprintf or a non-literal format string."
limits = """Models CALLS, not arithmetic. It cannot decide an overflow expressed as an index, a pointer offset, or a memcpy whose size is computed -- which is how most real C overflows are written, and how every one of libpng's is. A scan of C code that reports nothing from this family has established that no tainted value reached a modelled string API, and nothing at all about its buffer arithmetic."""
cwes = [
    "CWE-119",
    "CWE-120",
    "CWE-121",
    "CWE-122",
    "CWE-125",
    "CWE-126",
    "CWE-131",
    "CWE-134",
    "CWE-190",
    "CWE-191",
    "CWE-401",
    "CWE-415",
    "CWE-416",
    "CWE-476",
    "CWE-680",
    "CWE-770",
    "CWE-787",
    "CWE-843",
]
mechanisms = [
    "fixed_buffer_capacity",
    "null_deref_unguarded",
    "signed_size_operand",
    "type_confusion",
    "uaf",
    "unchecked_alloc_size",
    "unchecked_length_copy",
]
verifier = "none"

[[family]]
id = "unknown"
description = "No family admitted: a mechanism that spans families, or a weakness this project deliberately does not target."
cwes = ["CWE-20", "CWE-835"]
mechanisms = ["container_taint", "cross_artifact", "other", "redos", "source_reaches_sink", "validation_strength"]
verifier = "none"