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https://github.com/norandom/OpenUltraSAST.git
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
c2d9c4ad01
Eight of the ten vendored access-control rows had no named handler at all, so every one of them would have scored `missing_context` forever rather than as a detector miss. After the re-harvest nine are named and the tenth states its reason. The handler-context mode now carries the class its framework registers, multi-line decorators, and commented-out guards -- `#@token_required` above a ThreatByte handler is the entire bug. Where the registration lives in another document (connexion's `operationId`, an express router), a recipe names `context = [...]`, the harvester writes that stanza per side, and the pair materializes both files at their repository-relative paths so the entry-point mapper sees the layout the project has. `harvest_recipe` fetches every blob before the first write and the driver takes `--report`, so a failed fetch leaves a reviewed excerpt exactly as it was. Two defects the re-harvest exposed: `.mjs` was not a known suffix, so the one pair vendored as an ES module had no file target at all; and `_python_route_access` matched auth words inside decorator prose, reading `@ns.doc(description='... without proper authorization checks')` as a guard. Recorded in the hygiene artifact: nine of the ten duplicate groups sit on both sides of the split, which the repository-level split cannot see. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
56 lines
2.1 KiB
Python
56 lines
2.1 KiB
Python
# Provenance: anotherik/ThreatByte delete (fixed).
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# repo: anotherik/ThreatByte
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# commit: c4db46f72586c4ecb65859051ea037018dbf0e5e
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# parent: c4db46f72586c4ecb65859051ea037018dbf0e5e
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# commit_url: https://github.com/anotherik/ThreatByte/blob/c4db46f72586c4ecb65859051ea037018dbf0e5e/server/api/v1/api_v1.py#L223
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# cve:
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# license: MIT
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# function: delete
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# relpath: server/api/v1/api_v1.py
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# provenance: human
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# mechanism: missing_auth_guard
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# upstream_start: 103
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@ns.route('/login')
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class UserLogin(Resource):
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@ns.expect(login_model)
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@ns.response(200, 'Login successful', login_response_model)
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@ns.response(400, 'Please provide username and password')
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@ns.response(401, 'Invalid username or password')
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@ns.response(405, 'Method not allowed')
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def post(self):
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"""
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Handles user login.
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"""
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data = request.get_json() # Get data from request body
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username = data.get('username')
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password = data.get('password')
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if not username or not password:
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return {'error': 'Please provide username and password'}, 400
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with get_db_connection() as conn:
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cursor = conn.cursor()
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query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ? OR email = ?"
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cursor.execute(query, (username, username))
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user = cursor.fetchone()
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if user and user['password'] == custom_hash(password):
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# Generate JWT
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token = jwt.encode({
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'username': username,
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'exp': datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(hours=24) # Token expires in 24 hours
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}, Config.SECRET_KEY, algorithm='HS256')
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# Update last_login timestamp
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with get_db_connection() as conn:
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cursor = conn.cursor()
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cursor.execute("UPDATE users SET last_login = ? WHERE username = ?", (datetime.datetime.now(), username))
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conn.commit()
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return {'message': 'Login successful', 'token': token}, 200
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else:
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return {'error': 'Invalid username or password'}, 401
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