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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 4.8
091303c7c0
Maintainer correction: execution isn't possible for all SAST targets, and the bugs this project owns -- IDOR, missing authz, injection -- don't crash anything. Execution is the easy arbiter only for memory-safety-in-C, which is not our world. What execution provided was an independent, deterministic arbiter of whether a claim is real -- not the same LLM that made it, not a noisy vote. That arbiter can be built statically, from the code, as a program model the claim is checked against. LLM proposes; the model disposes. Same architecture, same repair of the root cause, no runnable target required. The evidence ladder becomes static and deterministic: suspicion -> model_corroborated (claim consistent with resolved dataflow / a guard its siblings carry is absent) -> model_entailed (the model alone establishes it) -> execution_confirmed (deferred tier, C memory-safety only). model_corroborated and above are deterministic -- run the checker twice, same verdict -- which removes the run-to-run noise the same way a crash would, with no K-runs and no target to build. Our IR candidate enumerator (96.6% ceiling), binding chains and obligation checker stop being prompt context and become the arbiter itself. The course: promote those assets from inputs to arbiter, delete the noise layer, make the LLM a proposer the model audits, keep the corpus as the model's calibration set (the fix diff is what the model should see), and defer execution to Clearwing for the memory-safety classes only. Build the arbiter we can build from code; adopt the one we cannot, when a class demands it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG