Files
Open_Ultra_SAST/src/openultrasast/cpg/queries/taint.sc
T
Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1 1741b6bed6 feat(model): phase 2 measured (weights v1) and carried reported by the evidence branch
budget_at_recall by a real evidence pass over every region: pmpro 391 -> 116, wpstatistics 504 -> 223,
mwwpform 513 -> 292, vampi 16 -> 16. The gate (< 50) is not met. pmpro's CVE is inside its 121 tier-4
regions; WP Statistics's and MW WP Form's are one tier low because `carried` -- stage one of the
two-stage join -- was not reported as evidence. taint.sc now reports it where a sink exists, and the
vector reads the query's answer when given.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
2026-09-11 11:47:06 +02:00

712 lines
41 KiB
Python

// Taint reachability for one flow family (model-grounded-detection Req 6.1).
//
// The question this answers is the one our flat IR could not: does an untrusted source reach the labeled sink
// *through resolved dataflow*, and is there a sanitizer on that path. `reachableByFlows` walks the PDG, so a
// value bound several statements upstream is found:
//
// cmd = request.args["cmd"] request.args["cmd"] -> cmd -> "echo " + cmd -> full
// full = "echo " + cmd
// os.system(full)
//
// That three-hop chain is exactly the one-hop limit which held our measured entailment at 2.2%.
//
// Two things here are easy to get backwards and were, first time round:
// * the sink is the call's ARGUMENTS, not the call node -- data flows into arguments;
// * `reachableByFlows` is called ON the sink WITH the source, not the other way about.
//
// Parameters (comma-separated where plural):
// cpgFile, sources, sinks, sanitizers (optional), function (optional: restrict to this method AND any
// closure lexically nested inside it -- see `nestedInLabeled`),
// parameterSources ("true" to treat the labeled function's parameters as untrusted -- see below),
// file (optional: restrict sinks to this source file),
// callDepth (optional: how many call-graph levels below the labeled method may hold a sink),
// boundedSinks (optional: sinks whose danger is a LENGTH, which a dominating bound discharges)
//
// `file` is what makes a region with no enclosing function askable at all. Without it such a region sends
// function="" and matches every sink in the repository, and the driver attributes that whole answer to
// whichever region asked. Scoping by file also stops a named function matching a same-named function in
// another module, which a corpus of one-file excerpts could never surface.
//
// Output: a fenced JSON array of {sink, sinkLine, sinkMethod, source, sanitized, length}. The fence exists
// because Joern prints a banner, pass logs and a prompt around whatever a script emits.
// BATCHED. `requests` is a JSON object of {id: {sources, sinks, sanitizers, function, parameterSources}} and
// the output is {id: [row, ...]}. One invocation answers a whole scan's questions, because the JVM start
// (~30s) dwarfs the queries themselves once the CPG is loaded -- one call per region per family put a
// ten-line file at four minutes and a thousand regions at roughly fifty hours.
//
// The single-request form is kept below it: the pair harnesses and every measurement committed so far use it,
// and changing their call shape would silently invalidate comparisons against those artifacts.
@main def exec(
cpgFile: String,
sources: String = "",
sinks: String = "",
sanitizers: String = "",
function: String = "",
file: String = "",
callDepth: String = "0",
boundedSinks: String = "",
parameterSources: String = "false",
fieldSources: String = "true",
evidenceOnly: String = "false",
hookCallbacks: String = "",
dispatchApply: String = "",
requests: String = "",
requestsFile: String = ""
) = {
importCpg(cpgFile)
// The batch arrives as a FILE. A single command-line argument is capped at 128KB on Linux and a
// repository's requests are megabytes, so passing them as `--param requests=` failed with E2BIG and the
// driver read the empty result as "no rows". `requests` is kept for the single-request forms and the tests.
val requestsJson =
if (requestsFile.nonEmpty) scala.io.Source.fromFile(requestsFile).mkString
else requests
def split(raw: String): List[String] = raw.split(",").map(_.trim).filter(_.nonEmpty).toList
// Per-family answers that do not depend on the region, kept across the whole batch.
val familyInRepoMemo = scala.collection.mutable.Map.empty[String, Boolean]
val sinkCandidatesMemo = scala.collection.mutable.Map.empty[String, List[io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.Call]]
val reachableMemo = scala.collection.mutable.Map.empty[(String, String, Int), Set[String]]
val methodSourceMemo = scala.collection.mutable.Map.empty[String, Boolean]
def rowsFor(
sourcesS: String,
sinksS: String,
sanitizersS: String,
hookCallbacksS: String,
dispatchApplyS: String,
functionS: String,
paramSrc: String,
fieldSrc: String,
evidenceS: String,
fileS: String,
depthS: String,
boundedS: String
): List[ujson.Obj] = {
// Word-boundary matching, never substring. `resolveUrl` contains `resolve`, so a bare-substring sanitizer
// test marked the VULNERABLE flow sanitized and the verdict fell back to a captured `res` that names no
// attacker input. Same bug class as the dominance query's guard matching; fixed in both.
// The boundary only applies where there IS a word character to bound: a token like `input(` ends in `(`,
// and an unconditional lookahead would make it unmatchable in `input(x)`.
def boundedPattern(token: String): java.util.regex.Pattern = {
val before = if (token.headOption.exists(c => c.isLetterOrDigit || c == '_')) "(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])" else ""
val after = if (token.lastOption.exists(c => c.isLetterOrDigit || c == '_')) "(?![A-Za-z0-9_])" else ""
java.util.regex.Pattern.compile(before + java.util.regex.Pattern.quote(token) + after)
}
def mentionsToken(code: String, tokens: List[String]): Boolean =
tokens.exists(t => boundedPattern(t).matcher(code).find())
val sourcePatterns = split(sourcesS)
val sinkNames = split(sinksS)
val sanitizerNames = split(sanitizersS)
val boundedNames = split(boundedS)
// A relational comparison against an integer literal: `len > 250`, `n <= sizeof(buf)`. Equality and null
// checks are deliberately excluded -- `if (buf)` and `p == NULL` govern whether the sink RUNS, not how
// much it copies, and counting them would discharge every guarded-against-null overflow there is.
val boundShape = java.util.regex.Pattern.compile("(?:<=|>=|<|>)\\s*[0-9]+|[0-9]+\\s*(?:<=|>=|<|>)")
val function = functionS
val parameterSources = paramSrc
// A source is any call whose code contains one of the patterns. Matching on `code` rather than a method
// name keeps `request.args["x"]` (an indexAccess over a fieldAccess) and `req.body.name` both reachable
// without a per-framework rule for each.
// Framework sources: a call whose code contains one of the patterns. Matching on `code` rather than a
// method name keeps `request.args["x"]` (an indexAccess over a fieldAccess) and `req.body.name` both
// reachable without a per-framework rule for each.
def frameworkSources = cpg.call.filter(c => sourcePatterns.exists(p => c.code.contains(p)))
// The labeled methods, and the region they lexically own. A closure defined inside the labeled function --
// the callback passed to `fs.stat`, say -- has its own synthetic method (`<lambda>0`) whose astParentFullName
// is empty, so nesting is decided by line-range containment within the same file, which is reliable.
// Resolved by name AND file when a file is given: `get_user` exists in more than one module of a real
// repository, and a corpus of one-file excerpts could never show that.
lazy val labeledMethods = {
val byName = if (function.isEmpty) List.empty else cpg.method.nameExact(function).l
if (fileS.isEmpty) byName else byName.filter(_.filename.endsWith(fileS))
}
// The methods a sink may live in. Lexical nesting alone stops at the function boundary, and a real
// injection bug rarely respects it: VAmPI's is a request parameter reaching a handler, passed to a method
// in another module, interpolated there and executed. `reachableByFlows` already follows calls; what did
// not was the QUESTION -- sinks were filtered to the labeled function's own body, so the flow had no sink
// to end at and the engine was silent.
//
// Bounded by `callDepth`, because "every method transitively reachable from an entry point" is most of a
// repository, and an unbounded question is how this becomes slow again.
val depth = scala.util.Try(depthS.toInt).getOrElse(0)
lazy val reachableMethods: Set[String] = reachableMemo.getOrElseUpdate((function, fileS, depth), computeReachable)
def computeReachable: Set[String] =
if (depth <= 0 || labeledMethods.isEmpty) Set.empty
else {
var frontier = labeledMethods.toSet
var seen = frontier.map(_.fullName)
var level = 0
while (level < depth && frontier.nonEmpty) {
val next = frontier.flatMap(_.callee.l).filterNot(m => seen.contains(m.fullName))
seen = seen ++ next.map(_.fullName)
frontier = next
level += 1
}
seen
}
// A module body spans its whole file, so line-range containment would make `<module>` the parent of every
// function in it -- and a module-scope region would then report every handler's sinks a second time. The
// module region exists to cover the code that is in NO function, so its membership is direct.
val moduleScope = function == "<module>"
def nestedInLabeled(m: io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.Method): Boolean =
if (moduleScope) m.name == function
else
labeledMethods.exists { lm =>
m.name == function || (
m.filename == lm.filename &&
m.lineNumber.getOrElse(-1) >= lm.lineNumber.getOrElse(0) &&
m.lineNumberEnd.getOrElse(-1) <= lm.lineNumberEnd.getOrElse(Int.MaxValue)
)
}
// Parameter sources: the labeled function's OWN parameters, never a nested closure's. In a function-level
// pair the function boundary IS the trust boundary -- the corpus is built so the labeled function's inputs
// are attacker-controlled -- and 39 of the injection slice's 50 pairs carry no framework token at all. Our
// flat-IR baseline counted these (`source_kinds: ["parameter"]`), so the comparison is only like-for-like
// with them on. Scoping matters as much as enabling: a callback's own parameters (`err`, `stats`) are not
// attacker input, and counting them produced flows like `res -> readFileSync` that name no real source.
// Off by default: outside a labeled function, treating every parameter as untrusted is not sound.
//
// The RECEIVER is excluded, and only because the field half below makes that safe. `$this` is a parameter
// in the CPG -- index 0 of every PHP method -- and counting it means every method that reads any field
// reaches every sink: 11 of 15 entailed findings on one PMPro class were `this -> $wpdb->...`, one of them
// surviving into 2.9.8 at a query whose every fragment is `esc_sql`-wrapped.
//
// Excluding it was TRIED FIRST and reverted, because on its own it loses CVE-2023-6559: MW WP Form's
// `_delete_files()` takes no parameters at all and its attacker-controlled path arrives as
// `$this->attachments`. Trading a verified CVE for findings merely suspected of being false is the wrong
// trade, and deleting the receiver removes the symptom by removing the evidence.
//
// With `fieldSourceNodes` below, that path is carried by the field it actually travels through, so the
// receiver no longer has to stand in for it. The order matters: this line is only correct because of the
// one after it.
def parameterNodes =
if (parameterSources != "true") Iterator.empty
else if (function.isEmpty) cpg.method.parameter.filterNot(_.name == "this").iterator
else cpg.method.nameExact(function).parameter.filterNot(_.name == "this").iterator
// The region this request is about, as a predicate on the method. Named rather than inlined because the
// field sources have to be scoped to exactly the same place as the sinks, and a second copy of these
// three branches is precisely the drift this file has been bitten by before.
def inScope(m: io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.Method): Boolean =
if (function.isEmpty) {
// A region with no enclosing function: the file IS the scope.
fileS.isEmpty || m.filename.endsWith(fileS)
} else if (depth > 0) {
// Following the call graph means leaving the region's file on purpose, so the file filter would
// contradict the point. The reachable set is the scope, and the row reports where the sink landed.
nestedInLabeled(m) || reachableMethods.contains(m.fullName)
} else {
(fileS.isEmpty || m.filename.endsWith(fileS)) && nestedInLabeled(m)
}
// ---- the field half of the two-stage join (task 5.11) ---------------------------------------------
//
// `_delete_files()` takes no parameters at all. Its attacker-controlled path arrives as a FIELD, written
// by one method and read back by another:
//
// public function __construct( ..., array $attachments = array() ) // a parameter
// $this->attachments = $attachments; // half one ends here
// protected function _delete_files()
// foreach ( $this->attachments as $file ) // half two starts here
// unlink( $file ); // CVE-2023-6559
//
// Both halves are already in the graph: parameter to assignment inside one method, field read to sink
// inside another. Only the JOIN between them is missing, and the key it joins on is the literal
// `$this->attachments`, written identically at both ends. So this is a second question asked with the
// query that already exists, not an edge a frontend has to invent.
//
// The alternative is making `$this` itself a source. That finds this CVE and eleven false positives with
// it on one PMPro class, because every method that reads any field then reaches every sink. A field name
// is the precision, and it costs one string comparison.
//
// Scoped three ways, so a field name common to every class ever written cannot become a wormhole:
// * only fields the sink scope actually READS are considered;
// * only assignments in the SAME FILE count;
// * the assignment's right-hand side must itself be reachable from a source -- which is the whole claim.
val FIELD_ACCESS = "<operator>.fieldAccess"
val ASSIGNMENT = "<operator>.assignment"
// Memoized per FIELD, not per file, because the expensive part is one flow query per candidate assignment
// and only the fields some region actually reads are worth asking about. A batch asks about one file many
// times over -- 205 requests across 41 regions of one class -- so without a memo this runs hundreds of
// times over the same assignments.
val methodsByFile = scala.collection.mutable.Map.empty[String, List[io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.Method]]
val seedsByFile = scala.collection.mutable.Map.empty[String, List[io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.CfgNode]]
val fieldTaintMemo = scala.collection.mutable.Map.empty[(String, String), Boolean]
def methodsIn(fileName: String) =
methodsByFile.getOrElseUpdate(fileName, cpg.method.filter(m => fileName.isEmpty || m.filename.endsWith(fileName)).l)
// Framework sources are untrusted wherever they appear. Parameters are untrusted only where the caller has
// said this region is an entry point -- the same contract `parameterNodes` carries, and for the same
// reason: an arbitrary helper's parameters carry whatever its caller happened to have.
def seedsIn(fileName: String) =
seedsByFile.getOrElseUpdate(
fileName, {
val methods = methodsIn(fileName)
val framework: List[io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.CfgNode] =
methods.flatMap(_.ast.isCall.filter(c => sourcePatterns.exists(p => c.code.contains(p))).l)
val params: List[io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.CfgNode] =
if (parameterSources == "true") methods.flatMap(_.parameter.l) else Nil
framework ++ params
}
)
def fieldIsTainted(fileName: String, fieldCode: String): Boolean =
fieldTaintMemo.getOrElseUpdate(
(fileName, fieldCode), {
val seeds = seedsIn(fileName)
if (seeds.isEmpty) false
else
methodsIn(fileName).flatMap(_.ast.isCall.nameExact(ASSIGNMENT).l).exists { assignment =>
val args = assignment.argument.l
args.size >= 2 && (args.head match {
case target: io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.Call
if target.name == FIELD_ACCESS && target.code.trim == fieldCode =>
// The summary must carry the SANITIZATION status of the half it summarises, not merely its
// reachability. Asking only "does a source reach this assignment" marks
// `$this->sqlQuery = "..." . esc_sql($x) . "..."` tainted, and PMPro builds most of its
// queries that way: the fixed side of its pair went from 1 finding to 13 without this,
// which is the pair no longer separating at all.
val flows = args(1).start.reachableByFlows(seeds.iterator).l
flows.exists(f => !f.elements.map(_.code).l.exists(code => mentionsToken(code, sanitizerNames)))
case _ => false
})
}
}
)
// A read of a MEMBER of a tainted object is tainted too. WP Statistics assigns the whole request to
// `$this->rest_hits` in one method and reads `$this->rest_hits->current_page_id` in another, so an exact
// code match sees two unrelated strings where the source text says one is inside the other. Every prefix
// that ends on a `->` boundary is checked, left to right.
def taintedPrefixes(code: String, fileName: String): Boolean = {
val parts = code.split("->").map(_.trim).filter(_.nonEmpty)
if (parts.length < 2) false
else (2 to parts.length).exists(n => fieldIsTainted(fileName, parts.take(n).mkString("->")))
}
// Off by request only, and defaulting to ON when the field is absent, so nothing about the shipped
// behaviour depends on a caller remembering to set it. It exists so the join can be measured against
// itself: a cost you cannot switch off is a cost you cannot attribute.
def fieldSourceNodes =
if (fieldSrc != "true") Iterator.empty
else {
val reads = cpg.call.nameExact(FIELD_ACCESS).filter(c => inScope(c.method)).l
if (reads.isEmpty) Iterator.empty else reads.filter(r => taintedPrefixes(r.code.trim, fileS)).iterator
}
// ---- the hook half of the two-stage join (task 5.11) ----------------------------------------------
//
// WP Statistics' CVE-2022-25148 has a modelled source, a modelled sink and `esc_sql` as its fix, and is
// invisible on both sides, because the only thing joining the two files is
//
// add_filter('wp_statistics_current_page', array($this, 'set_current_page')); // hits.php:43
// return apply_filters('wp_statistics_current_page', $current_page); // pages.php:105
//
// Both ends name the callback with a STRING, and php2cpg drops the callback argument entirely -- the CPG
// literally holds `add_filter("wp_statistics_current_page", )`. So the link CANNOT come from the graph at
// any price, and it arrives instead as `hookCallbacks`, read out of the source text by
// `mapping.php_hook_callbacks` where both ends are literals.
//
// The rule: an `apply_filters('H', ...)` call is a SOURCE when some callback registered for H returns
// data that an unsanitized flow reached. That is the same question as the field half, against a different
// key.
// The registry's vocabulary arrives as a FACT, never as a constant here. `apply_filters` is WordPress's
// name for this; Django signals, jQuery events and Symfony's dispatcher all have their own, and each is a
// row in a semantic fact table rather than an edit to this query.
val hookApply = split(dispatchApplyS).toSet
val hookTable: Map[String, List[String]] =
hookCallbacksS
.split(";")
.map(_.trim)
.filter(_.nonEmpty)
.flatMap { entry =>
val at = entry.indexOf(':')
if (at <= 0 || at == entry.length - 1) None else Some(entry.substring(0, at) -> entry.substring(at + 1))
}
.groupBy(_._1)
.map { case (hook, pairs) => hook -> pairs.map(_._2).toList }
def unquote(raw: String): String = {
val t = raw.trim
if (t.length >= 2 && ((t.head == '"' && t.last == '"') || (t.head == '\'' && t.last == '\''))) t.substring(1, t.length - 1) else t
}
// Half one's seeds are STRICTER than the field half's, and deliberately. A filter callback's own parameter
// is the value being filtered, not request data, and the receiver is the object -- counting either makes
// every registered callback "return tainted" and the join degenerates into the complete graph this design
// exists to refuse. Only a real framework source, or a field already shown to hold one, counts.
//
// They are NOT scoped to the requesting file, which the field half is: a hook registry is global by
// construction, `set_current_page` lives in one file and the `apply_filters` that calls it in another,
// and the query returned nothing while they were. They ARE scoped to the CALLBACK's file. The first
// version scoped them to nothing -- every field access in every method of the repository, each put through
// the field join -- and on a 637-file plugin that step alone did not finish in 270 s, for a callback whose
// sources are, by the join's own logic, the reads in its body and the assignments in its class. WP
// Statistics is the case that has to survive: the callback and `$this->rest_hits = ...` share a file,
// and only the sink is elsewhere. Task 5.13 has the numbers.
def hookSeedsOf(callback: io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.Method) = {
val framework: List[io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.CfgNode] =
callback.ast.isCall.filter(c => sourcePatterns.exists(p => c.code.contains(p))).l
val fields: List[io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.CfgNode] =
callback.ast.isCall.nameExact(FIELD_ACCESS).l.filter(r => taintedPrefixes(r.code.trim, callback.filename))
framework ++ fields
}
// Half one is asked PER ARRAY KEY, not per callback, and that distinction is the whole result.
//
// "Does an unsanitized value reach this callback's return" is true on BOTH sides of the WP Statistics
// pair, because the fix escapes two of the three members and leaves the third alone:
//
// vulnerable $tmp["id"] = $this->rest_hits->current_page_id
// fixed $tmp["id"] = esc_sql($this->rest_hits->current_page_id)
// both $tmp["search_query"] = ... unescaped, and harmless where it is used
//
// A callback-level answer flags the fixed side exactly as readily as the vulnerable one, which is a leak
// and not a detection. The key is a literal at both ends -- written `"id"` in the callback and `['id']`
// at the sink -- so it joins the same way the hook name and the field name do. Third use of one idea.
val INDEX_ACCESS = "<operator>.indexAccess"
val hookKeysMemo = scala.collection.mutable.Map.empty[String, Set[String]]
def keyOf(access: io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.Call): String =
access.argument.l.lift(1).map(a => unquote(a.code)).getOrElse("")
def taintedKeysOf(callback: String): Set[String] =
hookKeysMemo.getOrElseUpdate(
callback,
cpg.method
.nameExact(callback)
.l
.flatMap { method =>
val seeds = hookSeedsOf(method)
if (seeds.isEmpty) Nil
else
method.ast.isCall
.nameExact(ASSIGNMENT)
.l
.flatMap { assignment =>
val args = assignment.argument.l
if (args.size < 2) None
else
args.head match {
case target: io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.Call if target.name == INDEX_ACCESS =>
val key = keyOf(target)
if (key.isEmpty) None
else if (args(1).start.reachableByFlows(seeds.iterator).l.exists(f => !f.elements.l.exists(sanitizesHere)))
Some(key)
else None
case _ => None
}
}
}
.toSet
)
def hookSourceNodes =
if (hookTable.isEmpty || hookApply.isEmpty) Iterator.empty
else {
val applies = cpg.call.filter(c => hookApply.contains(c.name)).filter(c => inScope(c.method)).l
if (applies.isEmpty) Iterator.empty
else {
val keys = applies.flatMap { call =>
val hook = call.argument.l.headOption.map(a => unquote(a.code)).getOrElse("")
hookTable.getOrElse(hook, Nil).flatMap(taintedKeysOf)
}.toSet
if (keys.isEmpty) Iterator.empty
else
cpg.call
.nameExact(INDEX_ACCESS)
.filter(c => inScope(c.method))
.l
.filter(access => keys.contains(keyOf(access)))
// ...and actually derived from the filtered value, not merely sharing a key name with it.
.filter(access => access.start.reachableBy(applies.iterator).nonEmpty)
.iterator
}
}
// Materialised ONCE per request, because every one of the four is a `def` that walks the graph --
// `frameworkSources` scans every call in the repository, `hookSourceNodes` runs one `reachableBy` per
// candidate index access -- and `sourceNodes` is consumed once per SINK. A file-scope region with 346 sinks
// paid for 346 repository scans and 346 hook joins. Measured on ten real pmpro pairs at callDepth 1:
// 16.5 s per request with the hook half off, past 54 s with it on, before this; see task 5.13.
lazy val frameworkList = frameworkSources.l
lazy val parameterList = parameterNodes.toList
lazy val fieldList = fieldSourceNodes.toList
lazy val hookList = hookSourceNodes.toList
def sourceNodes = frameworkList.iterator ++ parameterList.iterator ++ fieldList.iterator ++ hookList.iterator
// WHICH KIND of source a flow started from, reported per row so the driver can tell them apart.
//
// It has to be reported rather than guessed, because by the time a row reaches Python a hook source reads
// as `$current_page["id"]` and a parameter reads as `$args` -- two identifiers, indistinguishable. The
// driver treats parameter-sourced flows as a FALLBACK it discards whenever a real modelled source is also
// present, which is right for parameters and wrong for these: on WP Statistics, seven sanitized
// `$_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]` flows displaced the unsanitized hook flow carrying CVE-2022-25148, and the
// finding disappeared between the query and the verdict.
lazy val frameworkIds = frameworkList.map(_.id).toSet
lazy val fieldIds = fieldList.map(_.id).toSet
lazy val hookIds = hookList.map(_.id).toSet
def sourceKindOf(head: Option[io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.AstNode]): String =
head match {
case Some(node) if frameworkIds.contains(node.id) => "framework"
case Some(node) if hookIds.contains(node.id) => "hook"
case Some(node) if fieldIds.contains(node.id) => "field"
case Some(_) => "parameter"
case None => ""
}
// Whether there is anything to trace from at all. Asking `reachableByFlows` with an empty source list is
// not merely wasted work: Joern answers it by logging "Attempting to determine flows from empty list of
// sources." to STDOUT, which lands between the fence markers and makes the whole batch's JSON unparseable.
// The driver then reports `query_failed` for every request in the batch, so one method with no sources
// silently costs the answers for all two hundred of the others. Excluding the receiver made that common:
// a method whose only parameter is `$this` now has none.
lazy val hasSources = sourceNodes.hasNext
// A sink call: matched by short name (`system`), by leading code (`os.system(...)`), or by resolved
// full name (`os.py:<module>.system`), so both bare and dotted forms in the spec hit.
//
// Every clause is word-BOUNDED, and the unbounded `contains` that used to end this list is why: `fgets`
// contains `gets`, so every bounded read in libpng matched the sink for the unbounded one, and all 26
// entailed findings on that repository were the same false positive -- `*argv -> fgets(buf, 256, f)`,
// which is the safe API being reported as the dangerous one. Third instance of this bug class here, after
// the sanitizer that matched `resolve` inside `resolveUrl` and the discharger that matched `user` inside
// `users`; the sink matcher had simply never been given the same treatment.
def sinkMatches(c: io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.Call, n: String): Boolean =
c.name == n || c.code.startsWith(n + "(") || mentionsToken(c.code, List(n)) || mentionsToken(c.methodFullName, List(n))
// Does THIS path element cleanse the value flowing through it?
//
// The old test asked whether a sanitizer's name appeared anywhere in the element's source text, and that
// is wrong on exactly the shape WordPress writes. WP Statistics' vulnerable query is one concatenation:
//
// "... " . (array_key_exists(...) ? "AND `uri` = '" . esc_sql($page_uri) . "'" : "")
// . "AND `id` = {$current_page['id']}"
//
// `esc_sql` cleanses `$page_uri`. It does nothing whatsoever for `$current_page['id']`, which is the
// injectable value and CVE-2022-25148 -- but both live in one expression, so the concatenation node's
// code mentions `esc_sql` and the whole flow read as sanitized. A sibling's cleansing was being credited
// to its neighbour.
//
// So the element must BE the cleansing, not merely contain a mention of one:
// * a call to the sanitizer -- by node name, or by its code opening with `name(`;
// * the sanitizer named as a string literal, which is how `array_map('esc_sql', $status)` applies it and
// is a form PMPro actually writes.
def sanitizesHere(node: io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.AstNode): Boolean = {
val code = node.code
val byName = node match {
case call: io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.Call => sanitizerNames.exists(n => call.name == n)
case _ => false
}
byName || sanitizerNames.exists(n => code.startsWith(n + "(") || code.contains("'" + n + "'") || code.contains("\"" + n + "\""))
}
// The candidate sink calls for a FAMILY do not depend on the region, and scanning every call in the graph
// for each of 2,487 requests was a large share of what made a request cost seconds -- in evidence mode,
// which asks for no dataflow at all, it alone took a query past an hour. Scanned once per sink list and
// kept for the batch; the per-request work is the scope filter over that list.
def sinkCalls =
sinkCandidatesMemo
.getOrElseUpdate(sinksS, cpg.call.filter(c => sinkNames.exists(n => sinkMatches(c, n))).l)
.filter(c => inScope(c.method))
// ---- EVIDENCE MODE: the same question without the dataflow (flow-aware-ranking, phase 0) --------------
//
// Tiering is the CPG query WITHOUT dataflow; arbitration is the query WITH it. Same graph, same facts, two
// costs. This branch answers "what is in scope" -- which sink calls, what shape they take, whether a
// cleansing call wraps THEIR argument, whether a source is local or reachable -- and returns before
// `reachableByFlows` is ever called. Milliseconds per call, where a flow costs 6.63 seconds.
//
// Every field is stated in fact-table terms, so the vector means the same thing in every language the
// graph can hold. A `summary` row is always emitted, even when there are no sinks, because "no sinks" is
// tier 0 and must be distinguishable from "the query failed".
if (evidenceS == "true") {
// Whether a method holds a modelled source, memoised by full name across the batch: the same helper
// is reachable from hundreds of regions, and re-walking its AST for each of them is what made a
// no-dataflow query take minutes. `cpg.method.filter(...)` over every method per request was the
// other half of that, replaced by a direct lookup of the reachable names.
def methodHasSource(m: io.shiftleft.codepropertygraph.generated.nodes.Method): Boolean =
methodSourceMemo.getOrElseUpdate(m.fullName, m.ast.isCall.exists(c => sourcePatterns.exists(p => c.code.contains(p))))
val sinkList = sinkCalls.l
val sourceLocal = labeledMethods.exists(methodHasSource)
val sourceNear = depth > 0 && cpg.method.fullNameExact(reachableMethods.toSeq: _*).exists(methodHasSource)
// Anywhere in the repository at all. Exact at every callDepth, and the cheapest cut there is: a family
// with no sink anywhere cannot produce a flow for any region. Memoised on the sink list, because it is
// the same answer for every request of one family and a repository-wide walk per request turned a
// milliseconds-per-pair query into minutes.
val familyInRepo = familyInRepoMemo.getOrElseUpdate(sinksS, cpg.call.exists(c => sinkNames.exists(n => sinkMatches(c, n))))
// `carried`: stage one of the two-stage join, reused as evidence (flow-aware-ranking, phase 2). A field
// read in scope whose assignment is fed by a source, or an array key a registered hook callback fills
// from one -- computed and memoised for the arbiter anyway, and the exact fact that puts
// `_delete_files()` (fed by `$this->attachments`) and `record()` (fed by a filter) where their sources
// say, instead of one tier below every region with a `$_GET` in its own body. Asked only where there
// is a sink to carry to, so the 21,000 tier-0 pairs of a plugin pay nothing for it.
val carried = sinkList.nonEmpty && familyInRepo && (fieldList.nonEmpty || hookList.nonEmpty)
val summary = ujson.Obj(
"kind" -> "summary",
"sinks" -> sinkList.size,
"sourceLocal" -> sourceLocal,
"sourceNear" -> sourceNear,
"carried" -> carried,
"familyInRepo" -> familyInRepo
)
val perSink = sinkList.map { sink =>
val realArgs = sink.argument.argumentIndexGt(0).l
ujson.Obj(
"kind" -> "sink",
"sink" -> sink.code.take(200),
"sinkLine" -> sink.lineNumber.getOrElse(-1).toString,
"sinkMethod" -> sink.method.name,
"sinkFile" -> sink.method.filename.split("/").last,
"sinkArity" -> realArgs.size,
"sinkArg0Literal" -> realArgs.headOption.map(a => a.isLiteral).getOrElse(false),
// A sanitizer of this family is an ANCESTOR of an argument in the AST -- it wraps what flows in --
// as opposed to merely appearing somewhere in the same function. This is the field a text scan
// gets wrong, and the one that would have misranked CVE-2023-23488: `esc_sql` is in that function,
// on a different statement.
"cleansedOnCall" -> sink.argument.ast.l.exists(node => sanitizesHere(node))
)
}
return summary :: perSink
}
val rows = sinkCalls.l.flatMap { sink =>
// Data flows into the arguments; asking the call node itself finds nothing.
// `call.argument` includes the RECEIVER at argumentIndex 0 (`db` in `db.execute(...)`), so counting it
// makes a one-argument interpolated call look like a two-argument bound one -- the exact inversion of the
// test. Real arguments start at index 1.
val realArgs = sink.argument.argumentIndexGt(0).l
val flows = if (hasSources) sink.argument.reachableByFlows(sourceNodes).l else Nil
// The SHAPE of the sink call, which is what distinguishes a fix from a bug when the fix is a safe form
// rather than a sanitizing call: `execute(sql, params)` binds where `execute(sql + x)` interpolates, and
// `printf("literal", x)` is safe where `printf(userFmt)` is not. The taint path is identical in both, so
// without these two fields the model entails a pair's fixed side exactly as readily as its vulnerable one.
val arity = realArgs.size
val arg0Literal = realArgs.headOption.map(a => a.isLiteral).getOrElse(false)
// Is there a bound on the data reaching this sink? Only asked of sinks whose CWE says the danger is a
// length, and the bound must mention a name the sink actually uses -- an unrelated `i < 10` loop in the
// same function discharges nothing.
//
// Scoped to the METHOD rather than to the sink's dominators, and that is deliberate. libpng guards
// `strcpy(outname+len, ".png")` with `(len = strlen(inname)) > 250`, but the check sits on an else-if
// chain whose sibling branch skips it entirely, and the protection is carried to the sink through an
// `error` flag: `++error` in the guarded branch, `if (!error)` around the copy. So the bound does NOT
// dominate the sink -- Joern is right about that -- and requiring dominance found nothing.
//
// Which is exactly why this lowers the rung instead of clearing the finding. A bound on this variable
// somewhere in this function means the graph CANNOT ENTAIL: it has not shown the copy is unguarded. It
// has not shown it is guarded either, so the judge is asked. Proving the flag-mediated case needs
// path-sensitive reasoning this arbiter does not do.
val boundedSink = boundedNames.exists(n => sink.name == n)
val argNames = sink.argument.ast.isIdentifier.name.l.distinct
val bounds =
if (!boundedSink || argNames.isEmpty) List.empty
else
sink.method.ast.isCall.code.l.filter(c =>
boundShape.matcher(c).find() && argNames.exists(a => mentionsToken(c, List(a)))
)
// ONE ROW PER EVIDENCE KEY, not per path. Every field the driver reads is a property of the sink or of
// (source kind, source, sanitized); only `length` varies per path, and the driver ranks by the shortest.
// Emitting every path was a 100x payload term: ten real requests at callDepth 3 returned 3,838 rows
// for 38 distinct keys, and a whole-repository scan would ship on the order of 130,000 rows to have
// the reporter collapse them after they were paid for. `paths` keeps the count. Task 5.13.
flows
.map { flow =>
val elements = flow.elements.map(_.code).l
val sanitized = sanitizerNames.nonEmpty && flow.elements.l.exists(node => sanitizesHere(node))
val sourceKind = sourceKindOf(flow.elements.l.headOption)
((sourceKind, elements.headOption.getOrElse("").take(200), sanitized), elements.size)
}
.groupBy(_._1)
.toList
.sortBy(_._1)
.map { case ((sourceKind, source, sanitized), paths) =>
ujson.Obj(
"sink" -> sink.code.take(200),
"sourceKind" -> sourceKind,
"sinkLine" -> sink.lineNumber.getOrElse(-1).toString,
"sinkMethod" -> sink.method.name,
// Where the sink actually is. With callDepth > 0 that need not be the region's own file, and a
// finding reported against the handler's file when the bug is in another module is unactionable.
"sinkFile" -> sink.method.filename,
"source" -> source,
"sanitized" -> sanitized,
"length" -> paths.map(_._2).min,
"paths" -> paths.size,
"sinkArity" -> arity,
"sinkArg0Literal" -> arg0Literal,
"bounded" -> bounds.nonEmpty,
"bound" -> bounds.headOption.getOrElse("").take(120),
"inLabeledScope" -> (function.isEmpty || nestedInLabeled(sink.method) || reachableMethods.contains(sink.method.fullName))
)
}
}
rows
}
println("---OUSAST-CPG-BEGIN---")
if (requestsJson.nonEmpty) {
val parsed = ujson.read(requestsJson).obj
val answers = parsed.map { case (id, req) =>
def field(name: String): String = req.obj.get(name).map(_.str).getOrElse("")
val paramSrc = req.obj.get("parameterSources").map(_.str).getOrElse("false")
val fieldSrc = req.obj.get("fieldSources").map(_.str).getOrElse("true")
val evidence = req.obj.get("evidenceOnly").map(_.str).getOrElse("false")
id -> ujson.Arr(
rowsFor(
field("sources"),
field("sinks"),
field("sanitizers"),
// Repository-wide, so the driver sends them ONCE as a top-level parameter rather than repeating
// them in every request. The per-request form is still honoured for the tests and the single
// -region path.
if (field("hookCallbacks").nonEmpty) field("hookCallbacks") else hookCallbacks,
if (field("dispatchApply").nonEmpty) field("dispatchApply") else dispatchApply,
field("function"),
paramSrc,
fieldSrc,
evidence,
field("file"),
field("callDepth"),
field("boundedSinks")
): _*
)
}
// A census of the graph, under a key no request id can collide with (ids are numbers). A frontend can
// fail every file and STILL exit 0 with a valid, empty CPG -- `joern-parse` does not even propagate the
// per-file warnings -- so "no rows" and "no graph" are indistinguishable to the driver without this.
// It rides the batch rather than costing its own invocation, because JVM startup is what this whole
// batching design exists to avoid.
val census = ujson.Arr(ujson.Obj("methods" -> cpg.method.size.toString, "files" -> cpg.file.size.toString))
println(ujson.write(ujson.Obj.from(answers.toSeq :+ ("__census__" -> census))))
} else {
println(
ujson.write(ujson.Arr(rowsFor(sources, sinks, sanitizers, hookCallbacks, dispatchApply, function, parameterSources, fieldSources, evidenceOnly, file, callDepth, boundedSinks): _*))
)
}
println("---OUSAST-CPG-END---")
}