mirror of
https://github.com/norandom/OpenUltraSAST.git
synced 2026-10-18 12:39:28 +00:00
Marius Ciepluch
0116f9bea6
Harvest 176 isolated vuln-vs-fix functions (109 CVEs, 352 training rows) into benchmarks/pairs/vfc with provenance and a JSONL training manifest. Score the slice as an honesty dashboard (ousast pairs --slice vfc); keep the pair gate on the local fixtures only.
67 lines
2.1 KiB
C
67 lines
2.1 KiB
C
/* Provenance: openssl/openssl kek_unwrap_key (vuln).
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* repo: openssl/openssl
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* commit: 97f6b621f7af2c4c4e162c75045a6e12a8fdf8d9
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* parent: 97f6b621f7af2c4c4e162c75045a6e12a8fdf8d9
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* commit_url: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/51d1800e95283a8beec85152e35e3634dab8dd82
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* cve: CVE-2026-9076
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* license: Apache-2.0
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* function: kek_unwrap_key
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* relpath: crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
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*/
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static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
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{
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int blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ctx);
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unsigned char *tmp;
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int outl, rv = 0;
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if (blocklen <= 0)
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return 0;
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if (inlen < 2 * (size_t)blocklen) {
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/* too small */
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return 0;
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}
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if (inlen > INT_MAX || inlen % blocklen) {
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/* Invalid size */
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return 0;
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}
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if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen)) == NULL)
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return 0;
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/* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */
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if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl,
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in + inlen - 2 * blocklen, blocklen * 2)
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/*
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* Do a decrypt of last decrypted block to set IV to correct value
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* output it to start of buffer so we don't corrupt decrypted block
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* this works because buffer is at least two block lengths long.
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*/
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|| !EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl,
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tmp + inlen - blocklen, blocklen)
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/* Can now decrypt first n - 1 blocks */
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|| !EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, in, (int)(inlen - blocklen))
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/* Reset IV to original value */
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|| !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
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/* Decrypt again */
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|| !EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, tmp, (int)inlen))
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goto err;
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/* Check check bytes */
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if (((tmp[1] ^ tmp[4]) & (tmp[2] ^ tmp[5]) & (tmp[3] ^ tmp[6])) != 0xff) {
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/* Check byte failure */
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goto err;
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}
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if (inlen < 4 + (size_t)tmp[0]) {
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/* Invalid length value */
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goto err;
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}
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*outlen = (size_t)tmp[0];
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memcpy(out, tmp + 4, *outlen);
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rv = 1;
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err:
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OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, inlen);
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return rv;
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}
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