Files
Open_Ultra_SAST/benchmarks/pairs/vfc/openssl-cve-2023-3817-dh_check/fixed.c
T
Marius Ciepluch 0116f9bea6 feat(real-world-vfc-slice): add labeled OpenSSL/Firefox/Chromium/curl pair corpus
Harvest 176 isolated vuln-vs-fix functions (109 CVEs, 352 training rows)
into benchmarks/pairs/vfc with provenance and a JSONL training manifest.
Score the slice as an honesty dashboard (ousast pairs --slice vfc);
keep the pair gate on the local fixtures only.
2026-09-04 16:45:38 +02:00

100 lines
2.8 KiB
C

/* Provenance: openssl/openssl DH_check (fixed).
* repo: openssl/openssl
* commit: 9002fd07327a91f35ba6c1307e71fa6fd4409b7f
* parent: e648db50d9a63f71cab5cb78424c2932d019a744
* commit_url: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9002fd07327a91f35ba6c1307e71fa6fd4409b7f
* cve: CVE-2023-3817
* license: Apache-2.0
* function: DH_check
* relpath: crypto/dh/dh_check.c
*/
int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
{
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
return DH_check_params(dh, ret);
#else
int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
*ret = 0;
if (nid != NID_undef)
return 1;
/* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
*ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME;
return 0;
}
if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
return 0;
ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t2 == NULL)
goto err;
if (dh->params.q != NULL) {
if (BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) > 0)
q_good = 1;
else
*ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
}
if (q_good) {
if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
else if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, dh->params.p) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
else {
/* Check g^q == 1 mod p */
if (!BN_mod_exp(t1, dh->params.g, dh->params.q, dh->params.p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_one(t1))
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
}
r = BN_check_prime(dh->params.q, ctx, NULL);
if (r < 0)
goto err;
if (!r)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME;
/* Check p == 1 mod q i.e. q divides p - 1 */
if (!BN_div(t1, t2, dh->params.p, dh->params.q, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_one(t2))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
if (dh->params.j != NULL
&& BN_cmp(dh->params.j, t1))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE;
}
r = BN_check_prime(dh->params.p, ctx, NULL);
if (r < 0)
goto err;
if (!r)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME;
else if (dh->params.q == NULL) {
if (!BN_rshift1(t1, dh->params.p))
goto err;
r = BN_check_prime(t1, ctx, NULL);
if (r < 0)
goto err;
if (!r)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME;
}
ok = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
}