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https://github.com/norandom/OpenUltraSAST.git
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
c2d9c4ad01
Eight of the ten vendored access-control rows had no named handler at all, so every one of them would have scored `missing_context` forever rather than as a detector miss. After the re-harvest nine are named and the tenth states its reason. The handler-context mode now carries the class its framework registers, multi-line decorators, and commented-out guards -- `#@token_required` above a ThreatByte handler is the entire bug. Where the registration lives in another document (connexion's `operationId`, an express router), a recipe names `context = [...]`, the harvester writes that stanza per side, and the pair materializes both files at their repository-relative paths so the entry-point mapper sees the layout the project has. `harvest_recipe` fetches every blob before the first write and the driver takes `--report`, so a failed fetch leaves a reviewed excerpt exactly as it was. Two defects the re-harvest exposed: `.mjs` was not a known suffix, so the one pair vendored as an ES module had no file target at all; and `_python_route_access` matched auth words inside decorator prose, reading `@ns.doc(description='... without proper authorization checks')` as a guard. Recorded in the hygiene artifact: nine of the ten duplicate groups sit on both sides of the split, which the repository-level split cannot see. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
39 lines
1.6 KiB
Python
39 lines
1.6 KiB
Python
# Provenance: erev0s/VAmPI update_password (vuln).
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# repo: erev0s/VAmPI
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# commit: 1713b54b601ad29582581eeda4b31fceb1319874
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# parent: 1713b54b601ad29582581eeda4b31fceb1319874
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# commit_url: https://github.com/erev0s/VAmPI/blob/1713b54b601ad29582581eeda4b31fceb1319874/api_views/users.py#L187
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# cve:
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# license: MIT
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# function: update_password
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# relpath: api_views/users.py
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# provenance: human
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# mechanism: missing_auth_guard
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# upstream_start: 179
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def update_password(username):
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request_data = request.get_json()
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resp = token_validator(request.headers.get('Authorization'))
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if "error" in resp:
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return Response(error_message_helper(resp), 401, mimetype="application/json")
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else:
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if request_data.get('password'):
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if vuln: # Unauthorized update of password of another user
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user = User.query.filter_by(username=username).first()
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if user:
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user.password = request_data.get('password')
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db.session.commit()
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else:
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return Response(error_message_helper("User Not Found"), 400, mimetype="application/json")
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else:
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user = User.query.filter_by(username=resp['sub']).first()
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user.password = request_data.get('password')
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db.session.commit()
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responseObject = {
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'status': 'success',
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'Password': 'Updated.'
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}
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return Response(json.dumps(responseObject), 204, mimetype="application/json")
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else:
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return Response(error_message_helper("Malformed Data"), 400, mimetype="application/json")
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