mirror of
https://github.com/norandom/OpenUltraSAST.git
synced 2026-10-18 12:39:28 +00:00
Marius Ciepluch
0116f9bea6
Harvest 176 isolated vuln-vs-fix functions (109 CVEs, 352 training rows) into benchmarks/pairs/vfc with provenance and a JSONL training manifest. Score the slice as an honesty dashboard (ousast pairs --slice vfc); keep the pair gate on the local fixtures only.
128 lines
3.6 KiB
C
128 lines
3.6 KiB
C
/* Provenance: openssl/openssl ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt (vuln).
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* repo: openssl/openssl
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* commit: a9af3442290e8a04706a3cd5f284ffd5b486e3f6
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* parent: a9af3442290e8a04706a3cd5f284ffd5b486e3f6
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* commit_url: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/74245170b5a64b234ac4af27c86a25ec251c8b2a
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* cve: CVE-2026-42766
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* license: Apache-2.0
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* function: ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt
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* relpath: crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
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*/
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int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
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CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int en_de)
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{
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CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
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CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
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int r = 0;
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X509_ALGOR *algtmp, *kekalg = NULL;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *kekctx = NULL;
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char name[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
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EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
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unsigned char *key = NULL;
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size_t keylen;
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const CMS_CTX *cms_ctx = ossl_cms_get0_cmsctx(cms);
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ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms);
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pwri = ri->d.pwri;
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if (pwri->pass == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NO_PASSWORD);
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return 0;
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}
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algtmp = pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
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if (!algtmp || OBJ_obj2nid(algtmp->algorithm) != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
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return 0;
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}
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kekalg = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
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algtmp->parameter);
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if (kekalg == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_ENCRYPTION_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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OBJ_obj2txt(name, sizeof(name), kekalg->algorithm, 0);
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kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(cms_ctx), name,
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ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(cms_ctx));
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if (kekcipher == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
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goto err;
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}
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kekctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
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if (kekctx == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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/* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier to set IV etc */
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if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de))
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goto err;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(kekctx, 0);
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if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(kekctx, kekalg->parameter) <= 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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algtmp = pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm;
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/* Finish password based key derivation to setup key in "ctx" */
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if (!EVP_PBE_CipherInit_ex(algtmp->algorithm,
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(char *)pwri->pass, (int)pwri->passlen,
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algtmp->parameter, kekctx, en_de,
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cms_ctx->libctx, cms_ctx->propq)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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/* Finally wrap/unwrap the key */
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if (en_de) {
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if (!kek_wrap_key(NULL, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, kekctx, cms_ctx))
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goto err;
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key = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen);
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if (key == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!kek_wrap_key(key, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, kekctx, cms_ctx))
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goto err;
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pwri->encryptedKey->data = key;
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pwri->encryptedKey->length = (int)keylen;
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} else {
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key = OPENSSL_malloc(pwri->encryptedKey->length);
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if (key == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!kek_unwrap_key(key, &keylen,
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pwri->encryptedKey->data,
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pwri->encryptedKey->length, kekctx)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_UNWRAP_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
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ec->key = key;
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ec->keylen = keylen;
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}
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r = 1;
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err:
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EVP_CIPHER_free(kekcipher);
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(kekctx);
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if (!r)
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OPENSSL_free(key);
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X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg);
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return r;
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}
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