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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
c2d9c4ad01
Eight of the ten vendored access-control rows had no named handler at all, so every one of them would have scored `missing_context` forever rather than as a detector miss. After the re-harvest nine are named and the tenth states its reason. The handler-context mode now carries the class its framework registers, multi-line decorators, and commented-out guards -- `#@token_required` above a ThreatByte handler is the entire bug. Where the registration lives in another document (connexion's `operationId`, an express router), a recipe names `context = [...]`, the harvester writes that stanza per side, and the pair materializes both files at their repository-relative paths so the entry-point mapper sees the layout the project has. `harvest_recipe` fetches every blob before the first write and the driver takes `--report`, so a failed fetch leaves a reviewed excerpt exactly as it was. Two defects the re-harvest exposed: `.mjs` was not a known suffix, so the one pair vendored as an ES module had no file target at all; and `_python_route_access` matched auth words inside decorator prose, reading `@ns.doc(description='... without proper authorization checks')` as a guard. Recorded in the hygiene artifact: nine of the ten duplicate groups sit on both sides of the split, which the repository-level split cannot see. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
38 lines
1.6 KiB
Python
38 lines
1.6 KiB
Python
# Provenance: anotherik/ThreatByte delete (vuln).
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# repo: anotherik/ThreatByte
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# commit: c4db46f72586c4ecb65859051ea037018dbf0e5e
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# parent: c4db46f72586c4ecb65859051ea037018dbf0e5e
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# commit_url: https://github.com/anotherik/ThreatByte/blob/c4db46f72586c4ecb65859051ea037018dbf0e5e/server/api/v1/api_v1.py#L223
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# cve:
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# license: MIT
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# function: delete
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# relpath: server/api/v1/api_v1.py
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# provenance: human
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# mechanism: missing_auth_guard
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# upstream_start: 215
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@ns.route('/delete-user/<int:user_id>')
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@ns.doc(description='Delete a user from the database without proper authorization checks. '
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'This endpoint represents a Broken Function Level Authorization vulnerability.',
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responses={200: ('User successfully deleted', delete_model),
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404: ('User not found', error_model)})
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class UserDelete(Resource):
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#@token_required
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#def delete(self, current_user, user_id):
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def delete(self, user_id):
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"""
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Delete a user from the application.
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"""
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with get_db_connection() as conn:
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cursor = conn.cursor()
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cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
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user = cursor.fetchone()
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if user:
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cursor.execute("DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
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conn.commit()
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response = make_response(jsonify({'message': 'User deleted successfully'}), 200)
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return response
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else:
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response = make_response(jsonify({'error': 'User not found'}), 404)
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return response
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