mirror of
https://github.com/norandom/OpenUltraSAST.git
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contributor-scan 5.4. Both halves, and the second found a frontend blocker.
**One verdict per region was right for a pair and wrong for a file.** A
pair is one labelled function with one bug, so one answer is correct. A
region spanning a PHP file is not: the probe's SQL injection on line 5 and
command injection on line 13 produced ONE injection verdict, `system` won
it on flow length, and the SQL injection went unreported by construction
rather than by any failure of the analysis.
`taint.verdicts()` now returns one verdict per distinct sink site,
strongest first, and its first element is exactly what `verdict()`
returns -- so the pair path and every committed measurement resting on it
are unchanged, and the gates are byte-identical. Both entry points share
`_usable_flows` so neither can drift from the other.
php probe 2 of 3 -> 3 of 3
vampi 6 entailed, unchanged, now with lines on access-control
findings from task 2.7 (users.py:187, books.py:51 -- the two
documented BOLAs at their exact lines)
libpng 1 -> 2 entailed; the second was hidden by the collapse.
Neither is validated and both are in contrib/.
**WordPress registers handlers rather than decorating them, and the hook
name is the declaration.** `wp_ajax_nopriv_*` is WordPress saying
logged-out callers reach this, so it is public; `wp_ajax_*` fires only for
logged-in ones; `permission_callback => __return_true` declares a REST
route open. That is the declared-provenance signal task 2.8 needs,
arriving from a second framework. Plus every top-level PHP function as its
own region, without which a file is one region however many functions it
holds: 1 file-level region became 10 function-scoped ones.
**And a blocker, recorded as 5.5.** php2cpg emits a CPG containing only
ONE PHP file, the last alphabetically. Reproduced twice on independent
samples; both files parse cleanly under `php -l` and under PHP-Parser
directly, and joern-parse reports success either way. php2cpg logs "Found
warning in PHP-Parser JSON output" naming the survivor, and that warning is
PHP-Parser's own `====> File X:` banner appearing in what php2cpg expects
to be pure JSON.
Not isolated yet: this machine has no PHP interpreter, so php2cpg was
driven through a container shim. The banner comes from PHP-Parser rather
than the shim, which makes a shim-only cause unlikely but not excluded, and
rerunning with the native php-cli in the shipped image is the first step.
It blocks WordPress outright -- a plugin is many files, and a scan that
silently covers one of them and reports success is the quiet failure Req
5.6 was approved for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
502 lines
20 KiB
Python
502 lines
20 KiB
Python
"""model-grounded-detection task 2.2: the taint verdict, and what separates entailed from corroborated.
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An `ENTAILED` verdict is the static analogue of a reproduced crash: the CPG establishes the flow on its own and
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the LLM's assertion is no longer load-bearing. `CORROBORATED` means a path exists but a sanitizer may break it,
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so the judgement of sufficiency is the LLM's residual — checked against the graph, never averaged over runs.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from pathlib import Path
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def _cpg(rows: list[dict[str, object]]): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
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from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
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return CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=lambda query, params: rows)
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def _spec(): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
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from openultrasast.model.specs import TaintSpec
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return TaintSpec(
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family="injection",
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language="python",
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sources=("request.args",),
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sinks=("os.system", "execute"),
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sanitizers=("escape", "quote"),
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)
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def test_an_unsanitized_source_to_sink_path_is_entailed() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{"sink": "os.system(cmd)", "sinkLine": "4", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['x']", "sanitized": False, "length": 3}
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]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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assert answer.family == "injection"
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assert "request.args" in answer.witness and "os.system" in answer.witness, "the witness names the flow it found"
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def test_a_path_through_a_sanitizer_is_corroborated_not_entailed() -> None:
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"""The model saw the flow but cannot judge whether the sanitizer is sufficient. That residual is the LLM's."""
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [{"sink": "execute(q)", "sinkLine": "9", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['q']", "sanitized": True, "length": 4}]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.CORROBORATED
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def test_no_path_yields_no_verdict_so_the_caller_reports_suspicion() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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assert verdict(_cpg([]), _spec(), function="run") is None
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def test_a_query_that_failed_is_not_read_as_an_absence_of_flow() -> None:
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"""`None` from the engine means "could not decide", which is not the same as "no path" — Req 4.3."""
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from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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broken = CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=lambda query, params: None)
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assert verdict(broken, _spec(), function="run") is None
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def test_the_verdict_is_restricted_to_the_labeled_function() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{
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"sink": "os.system(x)",
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"sinkLine": "40",
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"sinkMethod": "elsewhere",
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"source": "request.args['x']",
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"sanitized": False,
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"length": 2,
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}
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]
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assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run") is None, "a flow in another function does not judge this one"
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def test_the_shortest_unsanitized_flow_wins_and_the_sequence_is_deterministic() -> None:
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"""Req 6.4: two runs over one CPG give an identical verdict sequence, so there is nothing to average."""
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{"sink": "os.system(a)", "sinkLine": "7", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['b']", "sanitized": True, "length": 9},
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{"sink": "os.system(a)", "sinkLine": "7", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['a']", "sanitized": False, "length": 2},
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]
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first = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
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second = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
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assert first == second
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assert first is not None and first.rung is Rung.ENTAILED and "request.args['a']" in first.witness
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def test_the_spec_drives_the_query_parameters() -> None:
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"""The security modelling is ours; the traversal is the engine's. The spec is what crosses the seam."""
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from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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seen: dict[str, object] = {}
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def run(query: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> object:
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seen["query"] = query
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seen.update(params)
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return []
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verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run")
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assert seen["query"] == "taint"
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assert seen["sources"] == ("request.args",)
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assert seen["sinks"] == ("os.system", "execute")
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assert seen["sanitizers"] == ("escape", "quote")
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assert seen["function"] == "run"
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# --- the safe-shape test (task 2.3 finding) ------------------------------------------------------------
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#
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# Taint reachability alone does not distinguish a parameterised fix from an interpolated bug: the flow
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# `request.args["name"] -> name -> execute` exists on BOTH sides of the canonical SQL pair.
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#
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# vuln db.execute("select ... '" + name + "'") one argument, interpolated
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# fixed db.execute("select ... = %s", (name,)) two arguments, bound
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#
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# What separates them is the SHAPE of the sink call, which is exactly what `TaintSpec.safe_shape_sinks`
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# preserves. Without this test the model entails both sides and arbitrates nothing.
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def _shape_spec(): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
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from openultrasast.model.specs import TaintSpec
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return TaintSpec(
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family="injection",
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language="python",
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sources=("request.args",),
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sinks=("execute",),
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sanitizers=(),
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safe_shape_sinks=("execute",),
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)
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def test_a_parameterised_sink_call_is_not_a_vulnerability_even_though_the_flow_reaches_it() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{
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"sink": 'db.execute("select ... = %s", (name,))',
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"sinkLine": "5",
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"sinkMethod": "run",
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"source": "request.args['name']",
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"sanitized": False,
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"length": 4,
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"sinkArity": 2,
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"sinkArg0Literal": True,
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}
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]
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assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run") is None, "a bound query is the fix, not the bug"
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def test_an_interpolated_sink_call_of_the_same_name_is_entailed() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{
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"sink": 'db.execute("select ... \'" + name + "\'")',
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"sinkLine": "5",
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"sinkMethod": "run",
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"source": "request.args['name']",
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"sanitized": False,
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"length": 4,
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"sinkArity": 1,
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"sinkArg0Literal": False,
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}
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]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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def test_the_shape_test_only_applies_to_sinks_declared_safe_in_that_shape() -> None:
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"""`os.system(x)` with one argument is not "safe because it has one argument" -- the rule is per sink."""
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{
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"sink": "os.system(full)",
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"sinkLine": "7",
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"sinkMethod": "run",
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"source": "request.args['cmd']",
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"sanitized": False,
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"length": 5,
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"sinkArity": 1,
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"sinkArg0Literal": False,
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}
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]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run") # os.system is not in safe_shape_sinks
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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def test_a_row_without_shape_fields_is_judged_on_the_flow_alone() -> None:
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"""Older rows, or an engine that could not report arity, must not be silently treated as safe."""
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [{"sink": "db.execute(q)", "sinkLine": "5", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['n']", "sanitized": False, "length": 3}]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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def test_parameter_sources_are_opt_in_and_reach_the_query() -> None:
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"""A function-level pair's parameters are its trust boundary; a whole repository's are not.
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39 of the 50 injection pairs carry no framework source token at all — their untrusted input arrives as a
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function parameter — and the flat-IR baseline this feature is measured against counted those as sources.
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So the flag must exist and must default to off.
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"""
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from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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seen: dict[str, object] = {}
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def run(query: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> object:
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seen.update(params)
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return []
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verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("c.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run")
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assert seen["parameterSources"] == "false", "treating every parameter as untrusted is not the default"
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verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("c.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run", parameter_sources=True)
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assert seen["parameterSources"] == "true"
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# --- closure scoping (group 4 finding) -----------------------------------------------------------------
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#
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# JavaScript is callback-heavy, so the method containing a sink routinely is not the labeled function:
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#
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# function requestListener(req, res) { // labeled
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# fs.stat(possibleFilename, function(err, stats) {
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# fs.readFileSync(possibleFilename) // sink, enclosing method is <lambda>0
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# })
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# }
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#
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# Filtering on `sinkMethod == function` dropped every such sink -- the whole `path` family measured 0/8.
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# The query now decides scope by line-range containment and reports it; the Python side trusts that flag and
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# keeps the name comparison only as a fallback for rows that carry no flag.
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def test_a_sink_in_a_nested_closure_is_in_scope_when_the_query_says_so() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{
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"sink": "fs.readFileSync(possibleFilename)",
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"sinkLine": "6",
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"sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
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"source": "req",
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"sanitized": False,
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"length": 4,
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"inLabeledScope": True,
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}
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]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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assert "<lambda>0" not in answer.witness, "the witness names the flow, not the synthetic closure name"
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def test_a_sink_in_an_unrelated_function_stays_out_of_scope() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{
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"sink": "fs.readFileSync('/etc/' + name)",
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"sinkLine": "11",
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"sinkMethod": "unrelated",
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"source": "name",
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"sanitized": False,
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"length": 2,
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"inLabeledScope": False,
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}
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]
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assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener") is None
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def test_rows_without_the_scope_flag_fall_back_to_the_method_name() -> None:
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"""A row from an engine that cannot report scope must not silently become in-scope."""
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{"sink": "os.system(x)", "sinkLine": "9", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0", "source": "request.args['x']", "sanitized": False, "length": 2}
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]
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assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run") is None
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def test_a_flow_from_a_real_source_outranks_a_shorter_one_from_a_bare_parameter() -> None:
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"""Shortest-wins alone picks the wrong witness once closures are in scope.
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In the angular-http-server shape the closure yields three unsanitized flows to one sink:
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`req.url.split('?')[0]` (11 steps, the actual vulnerability), `res` (3 steps) and `this` (7). Shortest
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would report `res -> fs.readFileSync(...)`, which names no attacker input and is simply untrue. A flow
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whose source matches the spec's source model outranks one from a bare captured name; shortest still
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breaks ties, so the order stays total and the verdict deterministic.
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"""
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{
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"sink": "fs.readFileSync(p)",
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"sinkLine": "6",
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"sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
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"source": "res",
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"sanitized": False,
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"length": 3,
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"inLabeledScope": True,
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},
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{
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"sink": "fs.readFileSync(p)",
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"sinkLine": "6",
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"sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
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"source": "this",
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"sanitized": False,
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"length": 7,
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"inLabeledScope": True,
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},
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{
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"sink": "fs.readFileSync(p)",
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"sinkLine": "6",
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"sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
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"source": "request.args['f']",
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"sanitized": False,
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"length": 11,
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"inLabeledScope": True,
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},
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]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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assert "request.args['f']" in answer.witness, f"witness named no real source: {answer.witness}"
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assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener") == answer # still deterministic
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def test_a_modelled_source_flow_decides_even_when_a_parameter_flow_is_unsanitized() -> None:
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"""Parameter sources are a fallback, never an override.
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On the fixed angular-http-server side the real flow `req.url -> ... -> readFileSync` IS sanitized by
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path.normalize, but the captured `res` parameter also reaches the sink unsanitized. Judging on the union
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reports the fix as still vulnerable, on the strength of a flow that names no attacker input. When any
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modelled source reaches the sink, those flows are the evidence and the bare-parameter ones are ignored.
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"""
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{
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"sink": "fs.readFileSync(safe)",
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"sinkLine": "41",
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"sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
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"source": "res",
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"sanitized": False,
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"length": 3,
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"inLabeledScope": True,
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},
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{
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"sink": "fs.readFileSync(safe)",
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"sinkLine": "41",
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"sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
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"source": "request.args['f']",
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"sanitized": True,
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"length": 22,
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"inLabeledScope": True,
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},
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]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.CORROBORATED, "a sanitized real flow is not an entailment"
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assert "request.args['f']" in answer.witness
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def test_parameter_flows_still_decide_when_no_modelled_source_reaches_the_sink() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{
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"sink": "os.system(cmd)",
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"sinkLine": "4",
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"sinkMethod": "run",
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"source": "username",
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"sanitized": False,
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"length": 2,
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"inLabeledScope": True,
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}
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]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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def test_a_region_scopes_its_question_to_its_own_file() -> None:
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"""A region with no enclosing function must not be answered with the whole repository.
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Sending `function=""` unscoped matched every hit in the tree and the driver attributed all of it to
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whichever region asked: one permissive literal in app.py became eight identical entailed findings in
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eight files that do not contain it.
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"""
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from openultrasast.model.config_value import request_params as config_params
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from openultrasast.model.specs import config_specs, taint_specs
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from openultrasast.model.taint import request_params as taint_params
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taint = taint_params(taint_specs(language="python")["injection"], function="", file="models/user_model.py")
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config = config_params(config_specs(language="python")["config_secrets"], function="", file="config.py")
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assert taint["file"] == "models/user_model.py"
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assert config["file"] == "config.py"
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# The pair path stays unscoped, so the committed pair measurements remain reproducible.
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assert taint_params(taint_specs(language="python")["injection"], function="run")["file"] == ""
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def _bounded_rows(bounded: bool): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
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return [
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{
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"sink": 'strcpy(outname+len, ".png")',
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"sinkLine": "374",
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"sinkMethod": "main",
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"sinkFile": "contrib/gregbook/wpng.c",
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"source": "*argv",
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"sanitized": False,
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"length": 6,
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"sinkArity": 2,
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"sinkArg0Literal": False,
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"inLabeledScope": True,
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"bounded": bounded,
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"bound": "(len = strlen(inname)) > 250" if bounded else "",
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}
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]
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def test_a_bound_that_governs_the_sink_lowers_the_rung() -> None:
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"""contributor-scan 2.12. libpng's `strcpy(outname+len, ".png")` is governed by `len > 250` against a
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char[256]. Entailing it is a claim the code contradicts -- but a bound is not proof either, since
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off-by-one is how they fail, so the judge is asked rather than the site silenced."""
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from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.specs import taint_specs
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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spec = taint_specs(language="c")["memory"]
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assert "strcpy" in spec.bounded_sinks, "a CWE-121 sink is dischargeable by a bound"
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governed = verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("c.bin"), run=lambda q, p: _bounded_rows(True)), spec, function="main")
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ungoverned = verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("c.bin"), run=lambda q, p: _bounded_rows(False)), spec, function="main")
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assert governed is not None and governed.rung is Rung.CORROBORATED
|
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assert "governed by" in governed.witness, "the witness names the bound it found"
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assert ungoverned is not None and ungoverned.rung is Rung.ENTAILED, "an unguarded copy is still the finding"
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def test_only_a_length_sink_can_be_discharged_by_a_bound() -> None:
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"""A `len > 10` check does not make an SQL injection safe. The CWE decides, and CWE-121 is C-only."""
|
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from openultrasast.model.specs import taint_specs
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|
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assert not taint_specs(language="python")["injection"].bounded_sinks
|
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assert not taint_specs(language="c")["injection"].bounded_sinks
|
|
assert taint_specs(language="c")["memory"].bounded_sinks
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def test_a_region_reports_every_sink_site_not_just_the_strongest() -> None:
|
|
"""contributor-scan 5.4. One verdict per region was right for a pair and wrong for a region spanning a
|
|
file: a PHP file with SQL injection on one line and command injection on another got ONE injection
|
|
verdict, and `system` won it on flow length, so the SQL injection went unreported by construction."""
|
|
from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
|
|
from openultrasast.model.specs import taint_specs
|
|
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict, verdicts
|
|
|
|
def row(sink, line, length): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
|
|
return {
|
|
"sink": sink,
|
|
"sinkLine": str(line),
|
|
"sinkMethod": "handler",
|
|
"sinkFile": "app.php",
|
|
"source": '$_GET["x"]',
|
|
"sanitized": False,
|
|
"length": length,
|
|
"sinkArity": 2,
|
|
"sinkArg0Literal": False,
|
|
"inLabeledScope": True,
|
|
"bounded": False,
|
|
"bound": "",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rows = [row("mysqli_query($c, $sql)", 6, 5), row("system($cmd)", 13, 1)]
|
|
cpg = CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("c.bin"), run=lambda q, p: rows)
|
|
spec = taint_specs(language="php")["injection"]
|
|
|
|
every = verdicts(cpg, spec, function="", file="app.php")
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|
|
|
assert len(every) == 2, "two sink sites are two findings"
|
|
assert {v.location for v in every} == {"app.php:6:handler", "app.php:13:handler"}
|
|
# The pair path is unchanged: the strongest is still what `verdict` returns.
|
|
assert every[0].location == verdict(cpg, spec, function="", file="app.php").location
|