Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
c2d9c4ad01
Eight of the ten vendored access-control rows had no named handler at all, so every one of them would have scored `missing_context` forever rather than as a detector miss. After the re-harvest nine are named and the tenth states its reason. The handler-context mode now carries the class its framework registers, multi-line decorators, and commented-out guards -- `#@token_required` above a ThreatByte handler is the entire bug. Where the registration lives in another document (connexion's `operationId`, an express router), a recipe names `context = [...]`, the harvester writes that stanza per side, and the pair materializes both files at their repository-relative paths so the entry-point mapper sees the layout the project has. `harvest_recipe` fetches every blob before the first write and the driver takes `--report`, so a failed fetch leaves a reviewed excerpt exactly as it was. Two defects the re-harvest exposed: `.mjs` was not a known suffix, so the one pair vendored as an ES module had no file target at all; and `_python_route_access` matched auth words inside decorator prose, reading `@ns.doc(description='... without proper authorization checks')` as a guard. Recorded in the hygiene artifact: nine of the ten duplicate groups sit on both sides of the split, which the repository-level split cannot see. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
agent-vfc slice
Security-fix commits carrying an AI coding agent co-author trailer or generation marker
(Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, Devin), in JavaScript, TypeScript, or Python.
provenance = "agent". Only repositories with a stated license are vendored; fixes in
unlicensed repositories are vendored = false pointer rows (build_recipes.py --from ... --pointers,
function label derived from the cached excerpt) scored by ousast pairs --slice agent-vfc --pointers.
Review checklist (Req 5.3)
A recipe with reviewer = "pending" loads at review_tier = "title": scored and reported by pairs; the improve loop's
profile gate uses only seeded and reviewed pairs (Req 9.3, task 8.2). Setting reviewer to your name promotes it to reviewed. Before doing so:
- The parent excerpt really contains the vulnerability the title claims (not a refactor).
- One mechanism from
benchmarks/pairs/mechanisms.tomlexplains it; adjustmechanismandcwe. - The fixed excerpt removes it and the change is inside the vendored function.
- No secret, token, or personal data is in either excerpt (run the redaction check).
- The license header is present and matches the repository license.
Rebuild: python benchmarks/pairs/agent-vfc/build_recipes.py --search /tmp/agents.jsonl then
--from /tmp/agents.jsonl, harvest.py --slice agent-vfc --all --fetch, catalog_gen.py --slice agent-vfc.