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Open_Ultra_SAST/tests/test_model_taint.py
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5 e127e430ed feat(model-grounded-detection): parameter sources, so the measurement is like-for-like
Only 11 of the 50 injection pairs contain a framework source token at all. The
other 39 receive untrusted input as a FUNCTION PARAMETER, because SVEN-style
pairs are function-level extractions:

    def add_user(username, password):
        os.system("useradd ... -p " + encPass + " " + username)

A framework-anchored source model finds nothing there, which caps entailment on
this slice near 22% by construction -- a property of the source model, not of
the engine. More to the point, the flat-IR baseline this feature is measured
against already counted these (source_kinds: ["parameter"]), so a run without
them is not comparable to the 2.2% it is supposed to beat.

The flag is opt-in and off by default, because the two settings are right in
different places: in a function-level pair the function boundary IS the trust
boundary, while across a whole repository most parameters carry internal
values and treating them all as untrusted is not sound. The corpus harness
opts in; a repository scan does not.

On the pair that exposed this the model now resolves both flows, including one
through an intermediate binding:
    username -> os.system(...)                       2 steps
    password -> crypt.crypt(...) -> encPass -> ...   7 steps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
2026-09-08 12:56:13 +02:00

207 lines
8.9 KiB
Python

"""model-grounded-detection task 2.2: the taint verdict, and what separates entailed from corroborated.
An `ENTAILED` verdict is the static analogue of a reproduced crash: the CPG establishes the flow on its own and
the LLM's assertion is no longer load-bearing. `CORROBORATED` means a path exists but a sanitizer may break it,
so the judgement of sufficiency is the LLM's residual — checked against the graph, never averaged over runs.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from pathlib import Path
def _cpg(rows: list[dict[str, object]]): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
return CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=lambda query, params: rows)
def _spec(): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
from openultrasast.model.specs import TaintSpec
return TaintSpec(
family="injection",
language="python",
sources=("request.args",),
sinks=("os.system", "execute"),
sanitizers=("escape", "quote"),
)
def test_an_unsanitized_source_to_sink_path_is_entailed() -> None:
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [
{"sink": "os.system(cmd)", "sinkLine": "4", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['x']", "sanitized": False, "length": 3}
]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
assert answer.family == "injection"
assert "request.args" in answer.witness and "os.system" in answer.witness, "the witness names the flow it found"
def test_a_path_through_a_sanitizer_is_corroborated_not_entailed() -> None:
"""The model saw the flow but cannot judge whether the sanitizer is sufficient. That residual is the LLM's."""
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{"sink": "execute(q)", "sinkLine": "9", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['q']", "sanitized": True, "length": 4}]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.CORROBORATED
def test_no_path_yields_no_verdict_so_the_caller_reports_suspicion() -> None:
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
assert verdict(_cpg([]), _spec(), function="run") is None
def test_a_query_that_failed_is_not_read_as_an_absence_of_flow() -> None:
"""`None` from the engine means "could not decide", which is not the same as "no path" — Req 4.3."""
from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
broken = CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=lambda query, params: None)
assert verdict(broken, _spec(), function="run") is None
def test_the_verdict_is_restricted_to_the_labeled_function() -> None:
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [
{
"sink": "os.system(x)", "sinkLine": "40", "sinkMethod": "elsewhere",
"source": "request.args['x']", "sanitized": False, "length": 2,
}
]
assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run") is None, "a flow in another function does not judge this one"
def test_the_shortest_unsanitized_flow_wins_and_the_sequence_is_deterministic() -> None:
"""Req 6.4: two runs over one CPG give an identical verdict sequence, so there is nothing to average."""
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [
{"sink": "os.system(a)", "sinkLine": "7", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['b']", "sanitized": True, "length": 9},
{"sink": "os.system(a)", "sinkLine": "7", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['a']", "sanitized": False, "length": 2},
]
first = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
second = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
assert first == second
assert first is not None and first.rung is Rung.ENTAILED and "request.args['a']" in first.witness
def test_the_spec_drives_the_query_parameters() -> None:
"""The security modelling is ours; the traversal is the engine's. The spec is what crosses the seam."""
from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
seen: dict[str, object] = {}
def run(query: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> object:
seen["query"] = query
seen.update(params)
return []
verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run")
assert seen["query"] == "taint"
assert seen["sources"] == ("request.args",)
assert seen["sinks"] == ("os.system", "execute")
assert seen["sanitizers"] == ("escape", "quote")
assert seen["function"] == "run"
# --- the safe-shape test (task 2.3 finding) ------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Taint reachability alone does not distinguish a parameterised fix from an interpolated bug: the flow
# `request.args["name"] -> name -> execute` exists on BOTH sides of the canonical SQL pair.
#
# vuln db.execute("select ... '" + name + "'") one argument, interpolated
# fixed db.execute("select ... = %s", (name,)) two arguments, bound
#
# What separates them is the SHAPE of the sink call, which is exactly what `TaintSpec.safe_shape_sinks`
# preserves. Without this test the model entails both sides and arbitrates nothing.
def _shape_spec(): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
from openultrasast.model.specs import TaintSpec
return TaintSpec(
family="injection",
language="python",
sources=("request.args",),
sinks=("execute",),
sanitizers=(),
safe_shape_sinks=("execute",),
)
def test_a_parameterised_sink_call_is_not_a_vulnerability_even_though_the_flow_reaches_it() -> None:
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{
"sink": 'db.execute("select ... = %s", (name,))', "sinkLine": "5", "sinkMethod": "run",
"source": "request.args['name']", "sanitized": False, "length": 4, "sinkArity": 2, "sinkArg0Literal": True,
}]
assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run") is None, "a bound query is the fix, not the bug"
def test_an_interpolated_sink_call_of_the_same_name_is_entailed() -> None:
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{
"sink": 'db.execute("select ... \'" + name + "\'")', "sinkLine": "5", "sinkMethod": "run",
"source": "request.args['name']", "sanitized": False, "length": 4, "sinkArity": 1, "sinkArg0Literal": False,
}]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run")
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
def test_the_shape_test_only_applies_to_sinks_declared_safe_in_that_shape() -> None:
"""`os.system(x)` with one argument is not "safe because it has one argument" -- the rule is per sink."""
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{
"sink": "os.system(full)", "sinkLine": "7", "sinkMethod": "run",
"source": "request.args['cmd']", "sanitized": False, "length": 5, "sinkArity": 1, "sinkArg0Literal": False,
}]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run") # os.system is not in safe_shape_sinks
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
def test_a_row_without_shape_fields_is_judged_on_the_flow_alone() -> None:
"""Older rows, or an engine that could not report arity, must not be silently treated as safe."""
from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
rows = [{"sink": "db.execute(q)", "sinkLine": "5", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['n']",
"sanitized": False, "length": 3}]
answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run")
assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
def test_parameter_sources_are_opt_in_and_reach_the_query() -> None:
"""A function-level pair's parameters are its trust boundary; a whole repository's are not.
39 of the 50 injection pairs carry no framework source token at all — their untrusted input arrives as a
function parameter — and the flat-IR baseline this feature is measured against counted those as sources.
So the flag must exist and must default to off.
"""
from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
seen: dict[str, object] = {}
def run(query: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> object:
seen.update(params)
return []
verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("c.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run")
assert seen["parameterSources"] == "false", "treating every parameter as untrusted is not the default"
verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("c.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run", parameter_sources=True)
assert seen["parameterSources"] == "true"