docs(contributor-scan): brief -- the model layer is complete and unshipped

Asked what the spec state was and whether anything was forgotten. It was, and
it is the largest thing outstanding: model-grounded-detection is 16/16 tasks
complete and its arbiter measures 86.7% pair-correct at 6.7% leak, but the
model layer has ZERO production callers. `ousast scan` still runs
preprocess -> map -> overlay -> obligations -> regress -> report and touches
none of it. Every number quoted today came from a measurement harness in a
scratch directory.

That is a scope gap in the predecessor spec rather than a slip in executing it:
there was never a task saying "make this reachable", and its Req 11.2 (gates
stay byte-identical) is satisfied PRECISELY BECAUSE nothing is wired. The spec
is complete and the feature is unshipped, both at once.

A new spec rather than an amendment, because the predecessor is coherent and
closed -- it built an arbiter and measured it -- while this is a different
question: making it something a developer runs on a repository they are about
to contribute to.

What it covers, in the order it bites: scan integration; whole-repo scanning
(entry-point region selection, ranking across thousands of candidates, a budget
policy -- the enumerator caps at 8 per region, meaningless at repo scale -- and
a performance envelope never measured); running against a known-vulnerable
checkout, since the 176 real-world CVE pairs are single-function excerpts that
exercise none of it; the deferred memory decision, with 173 of those pairs idle
behind a stub tier; and retiring evidence_level.

It also records what was built outside any spec: the pipeline itself, the ops
work (one image, compose, shell wrappers, pyinfra -- with the Docker image
never actually built), and the corpus additions.

And it carries the known limits forward rather than losing them: the flat
permissive_values list that cannot tell debug=True from httponly=True,
interprocedural resolution as the most repeated miss cause, and the five bugs
that shared one shape -- a taint-specific assumption applied to every family,
each caught by a measurement rather than a check.

Not approved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
This commit is contained in:
Marius Ciepluch
2026-09-08 19:40:38 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
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# Brief: contributor-scan — make the model layer a tool someone runs
**Status:** brief only, unapproved. Successor to `model-grounded-detection`, which is complete (16/16 tasks)
and is not reopened by this.
## The gap this exists to close
`model-grounded-detection` built and measured an arbiter. It works: 41.3% of the corpus reaches
`model_entailed` against the flat IR's 2.2%, and the wired pipeline scores 86.7% pair-correct at 6.7% leak
against the LLM hunter's 76.7% / 12.3%, at a fifth of the model calls and ~100× cheaper.
**And none of it is reachable by a user.** `ousast scan` still runs
`preprocess → map → overlay → obligations → regress → report` and touches the model layer nowhere;
`model/pipeline`, `judge`, `config_value`, `report`, `calibrate` and `execution` have zero production callers
outside `model/`. Every number quoted above came from a measurement harness in a scratch directory.
That is a scope gap in the predecessor spec, not an oversight in its execution: it had no task saying *make
this reachable*, and its Req 11.2 (the gates stay byte-identical) is satisfied precisely **because** nothing
is wired. The spec is complete and the feature is unshipped, both at once.
## What the goal actually is
> "a real world tool that helps developers when they want to contribute"
That reframes the work. A contributor does not have a labelled function and a known weakness class — they
have a repository they are about to touch and a question about what is risky in it. Everything measured so
far is function-level pairs: a labelled function, a declared family, a known target. None of it exercises the
questions a whole repository asks.
## What is missing, in the order it bites
1. **Scan integration.** Wire `model/pipeline` into `ousast scan` so a finding with a rung reaches a report.
Without this nothing else matters.
2. **Whole-repo scanning.** Region selection from entry points instead of a labelled function; ranking across
thousands of candidates rather than one; a budget policy (the enumerator caps at 8 candidates per region,
which is meaningless at repo scale); and the performance envelope — a CPG build on a 100k-line tree, not a
40-line excerpt. **This has never been run.**
3. **A known-vulnerable repository as the target.** The 176 real-world CVE pairs already in the corpus are
single-function excerpts and do not exercise any of the above. Running against a real checkout — curl,
libpng, a WordPress plugin — is the only way to find what breaks at scale.
4. **The memory decision.** 173 of those 176 pairs are `memory` family, routed to a deferred execution tier
that is a stub. Either adopt Clearwing for them or scope C memory-safety out explicitly. Right now it is
neither, and a sixth of the corpus sits idle.
5. **Retire `evidence_level`.** It duplicates `rung` in intent; noted as a follow-up in group 3 and never
tracked.
## Already built and unrecorded
These were delivered during `model-grounded-detection` without being in any spec. They belong here so the
record is not scattered:
- **The pipeline itself** (`model/pipeline.py`) — Req 8 existed, task 3.2 built `judge()`, and nothing ever
said to connect an enumerator to it. Built, tested, measured, unspecified.
- **Ops** — a single image carrying tool and engine, a compose file with read-only target and tmpfs scratch,
bash/zsh/PowerShell wrappers that make the container invisible, and a pyinfra deploy for host installs.
The Docker path is written and syntax-validated but **the image has never been built**.
- **Corpus** — the `owasp` slice (40 validated xss pairs; `output_encoding` went from 1 pair to 41) and
authored sink/sanitizer facts for Java and JavaScript.
## Known limits to carry forward
- `permissive_values` is a flat literal list with no keyword association, so it holds both `True` and `False`.
`debug=True` is dangerous where `httponly=True` is safe and the model cannot tell them apart.
- Interprocedural resolution is the most repeated miss cause across every experiment: OWASP's helper classes,
`angular-http-server`'s `resolveUrl`. Joern supports it; our queries may not be configured for it.
- Five bugs in `model-grounded-detection` shared one shape — a taint-specific assumption applied to every
family, each found by a measurement rather than a check. Any new family-specific path should be audited for
siblings before it is measured, not after.
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{
"feature_name": "contributor-scan",
"created_at": "2026-09-08T20:00:00Z",
"updated_at": "2026-09-08T20:00:00Z",
"language": "en",
"phase": "brief",
"approvals": {
"requirements": {
"generated": false,
"approved": false
},
"design": {
"generated": false,
"approved": false
},
"tasks": {
"generated": false,
"approved": false
}
},
"ready_for_implementation": false,
"depends_on": [
"model-grounded-detection"
],
"approval_note": "2026-09-08 brief drafted after the maintainer asked what the spec state was and whether anything was forgotten. It was: model-grounded-detection is 16/16 complete and its arbiter is measured at 86.7% pair-correct / 6.7% leak, but the model layer has ZERO production callers -- ousast scan does not use it, so the feature is complete and unshipped at once. That is a scope gap in the predecessor (it had no task saying 'make this reachable', and its byte-identical-gates requirement is satisfied precisely because nothing is wired). This spec covers scan integration, whole-repo scanning against known vulnerable repositories, the deferred memory-family decision, and records the pipeline, ops and corpus work delivered outside any spec. Not approved; requirements not generated."
}