feat(detection): language-scoped rules + multi-language benchmark corpora

Rebuild the quick-scan detection engine and ground-truth benchmarks to hit >=90% recall / <10% false positives for C/C++, Python, JavaScript, and Java. Engine (findings.py, preprocess.py): - Scope each PatternRule by language (fixes cross-language false positives such as the Python eval/exec rule firing on JS .exec()). - Add JavaScript/TypeScript rules (command exec, eval/Function, reflected XSS, SQLi, path traversal, SSRF, weak hash, deserialization); execFile/spawn-argv excluded as safe alternatives. - Add Java rules (Runtime exec, SQL string concatenation, weak hash, readObject) and a Groovy server-side template rule (yieldUnescaped of a bound variable). - Broaden C/C++ and Python coverage; precision guards for format strings and parameterised vs concatenated SQL; #-comment skipping; CWE in rationale. - Register .java/.groovy/.tpl source extensions. Benchmarks: - Add realistic corpora modeled on Damn Vulnerable C/C++, PyGoat/DVPWA, and NodeGoat, plus the real kiview/damn-vulnerable-spring-boot-app vendored verbatim (MIT, attribution in LICENSE/NOTICE.md). Each manifest carries complete, independently-labeled ground truth including genuinely hard-to-detect vulns (integer overflow, second-order SQLi, prototype pollution) so recall is measured honestly, plus safe-API files for precision. - Fix pre-existing smoke-manifest ground-truth errors (Python/JS line offsets, missing C/C++ strcpy entry, Java SQLi line). benchmark.py: - Fix sink matching to normalise the expected sink consistently so sinks with underscores (e.g. render_template_string) can match. Tests: - Add tests/test_detection_benchmarks.py enforcing the >=90% recall / <10% FP goal per language and overall. Measured: C/C++ 93.3%, Python 93.3%, JavaScript 92.3%, Java 100%; overall 93.6% recall, 0.0% false-positive rate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-10-16 03:49:26 +00:00 · 2026-06-21 11:49:31 +02:00
parent be65aed96e
commit cf9f945992
38 changed files with 2420 additions and 15 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#include <cstdlib>
+#include <cstring>
+
+void copy_user(char *dst, char *src) { memcpy(dst, src, 128); }
+
+void run_user(char *arg) {
+  char cmd[256];
+  std::strcpy(cmd, arg);
+  system(cmd);
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+// Memory-safety vulnerabilities modeled on Damn Vulnerable C/C++ Program.
+#include <cstdio>
+#include <cstdlib>
+#include <cstring>
+
+void copy_name(char *src) {
+  char dst[16];
+  strcpy(dst, src); // CWE-120 unbounded strcpy into fixed buffer
+}
+
+void greet(char *src) {
+  char dst[16];
+  strcat(dst, src); // CWE-120 unbounded strcat into fixed buffer
+}
+
+void read_line() {
+  char buf[32];
+  gets(buf); // CWE-120 gets has no bounds checking
+}
+
+void render(char *user) {
+  char out[64];
+  sprintf(out, "hello %s", user); // CWE-120 sprintf overflow
+}
+
+void copy_blob(char *dst, char *src, int len) {
+  memcpy(dst, src, len); // CWE-120 memcpy with attacker length
+}
+
+void parse_int() {
+  char name[8];
+  scanf("%s", name); // CWE-120 unbounded scanf %s
+}
+
+char *grow(int len, int count) {
+  // CWE-190 integer overflow in allocation size (no direct dangerous sink token)
+  return (char *)malloc(len * count);
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+// Command-execution and format-string vulnerabilities.
+#include <cstdio>
+#include <cstdlib>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+void run_cmd(char *arg) {
+  char cmd[256];
+  strcpy(cmd, arg);
+  system(cmd); // CWE-78 system runs attacker-controlled command
+}
+
+void read_pipe(char *arg) {
+  FILE *fp = popen(arg, "r"); // CWE-78 popen runs attacker-controlled command
+  if (fp) pclose(fp);
+}
+
+void launch(char *arg) {
+  execlp("sh", "sh", "-c", arg, (char *)NULL); // CWE-78 execlp runs attacker input
+}
+
+void log_msg(char *user) {
+  printf(user); // CWE-134 format string controlled by attacker
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+// Safe equivalents. None of these lines should produce a finding.
+#include <cstdio>
+#include <cstdlib>
+#include <cstring>
+
+void copy_name_safe(const char *src) {
+  char dst[16];
+  strncpy(dst, src, sizeof(dst) - 1); // bounded copy, not flagged
+  dst[sizeof(dst) - 1] = '\0';
+}
+
+void render_safe(const char *user) {
+  char out[64];
+  snprintf(out, sizeof(out), "hello %s", user); // bounded, not flagged
+}
+
+void log_safe(const char *user) {
+  printf("%s", user); // constant format string, not a format-string bug
+}
+
+size_t length_safe(const char *src) {
+  return strnlen(src, 64); // bounded length, no dangerous sink
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2017 GDATA Advanced Analytics GmbH
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Vendored verbatim from https://github.com/kiview/damn-vulnerable-spring-boot-app (MIT, (c) 2017 GDATA Advanced Analytics GmbH) as a benchmark corpus for OpenUltraSAST. Source files unmodified; line numbers match upstream.
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+package com.groovycoder.dvsba;
+
+import org.springframework.boot.SpringApplication;
+import org.springframework.boot.autoconfigure.SpringBootApplication;
+
+@SpringBootApplication
+public class DvsbaApplication {
+
+    public static void main(String[] args) {
+        SpringApplication.run(DvsbaApplication.class, args);
+    }
+
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+package com.groovycoder.dvsba;
+
+import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
+import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping;
+import org.springframework.web.servlet.ModelAndView;
+
+@Controller
+public class HomeController {
+
+    @GetMapping("/")
+    public ModelAndView home() {
+        return new ModelAndView("views/home");
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+package com.groovycoder.dvsba.books;
+
+public class Book {
+    Long id;
+    String name;
+    String author;
+
+    public Book(Long id, String name, String author) {
+        this.id = id;
+        this.name = name;
+        this.author = author;
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+package com.groovycoder.dvsba.books;
+
+import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate;
+import org.springframework.jdbc.core.ResultSetExtractor;
+import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
+import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
+import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam;
+import org.springframework.web.servlet.ModelAndView;
+
+import javax.annotation.PostConstruct;
+import java.util.*;
+
+@RequestMapping("/books")
+@Controller
+class BookController {
+
+    private final JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate;
+
+    public BookController(JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate) {
+        this.jdbcTemplate = jdbcTemplate;
+    }
+
+    @RequestMapping("/")
+    public ModelAndView home() {
+        List<Book> books = loadBooks();
+
+        Map<String, Object> model = new HashMap<>();
+        model.put("books", books);
+
+        return new ModelAndView("views/sql/home", model);
+    }
+
+    @RequestMapping("/detail")
+    public ModelAndView detail(@RequestParam(value = "id") String id) {
+        String sql = "SELECT * FROM books WHERE id=" + id;
+        final Book[] book = new Book[1];
+        jdbcTemplate.query(sql, (ResultSetExtractor) rs -> {
+            if (rs.next())
+                book[0] = new Book(rs.getLong(1), rs.getString(2), rs.getString(3));
+
+            return null;
+
+        });
+
+        Map<String, Object> model = new HashMap<>();
+        model.put("book", book[0]);
+
+        return new ModelAndView("views/sql/detail", model);
+    }
+
+    @PostConstruct
+    private void bootstrap() {
+        initDb();
+
+        List<Book> books = Arrays.asList(
+                new Book(1L, "Moby Dick", "Herman Melville"),
+                new Book(2L, "Unsichtbare Spuren", "Andreas Franz"),
+                new Book(3L, "Das Paket", "Sebastian Fitzek")
+        );
+        saveBooks(books);
+    }
+
+    private void saveBooks(List<Book> books) {
+        books.forEach(book ->
+                jdbcTemplate.update("INSERT INTO books (id, `name`, author) values (?, ?, ?)",
+                        book.id, book.name, book.author)
+        );
+    }
+
+    private List<Book> loadBooks() {
+
+        return jdbcTemplate.query("SELECT * FROM books", rs -> {
+            List<Book> books = new LinkedList<>();
+
+            while (rs.next()) {
+                books.add(new Book(rs.getLong(1), rs.getString(2), rs.getString(3)));
+            }
+
+            return books;
+        });
+
+    }
+
+    private void initDb() {
+        jdbcTemplate.execute("CREATE TABLE books (id NUMBER, name VARCHAR(255), author VARCHAR(255))");
+    }
+
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+package com.groovycoder.dvsba.comments;
+
+import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
+import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping;
+import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PostMapping;
+import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
+import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam;
+import org.springframework.web.servlet.ModelAndView;
+
+import java.util.ArrayList;
+import java.util.Arrays;
+import java.util.HashMap;
+import java.util.List;
+import java.util.Map;
+
+@Controller
+@RequestMapping("/comments")
+public class CommentController {
+
+    private List<String> comments = new ArrayList<>(Arrays.asList(
+            "Hi super Webseite leider keine Mobile App deswegen nur einen Stern.",
+            "Ich muss darauf hinweisen, dass eine Webseite ohne Impressum zu betreiben !!!strafbar!!! ist!!!",
+            "Hallo, wir sinds! Wolltest du nicht die Fotos von Samstag hochladen? Grüße!"));
+
+    @GetMapping(path = "/")
+    public ModelAndView listComments() {
+        Map<String, Object> model = new HashMap<>();
+        model.put("comments", comments);
+
+        return new ModelAndView(
+                "views/comment/comment",
+                model);
+    }
+
+    @PostMapping("/")
+    public ModelAndView postComment(@RequestParam String input) {
+        comments.add(input);
+
+        Map<String, Object> model = new HashMap<>();
+        model.put("comments", comments);
+
+        return new ModelAndView(
+                "views/comment/comment",
+                model);
+    }
+
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+yieldUnescaped '<!DOCTYPE html>'
+html {
+    head {
+        title('Spring Boot - Groovy templates example')
+        link(rel: 'stylesheet', href: '/css/bootstrap.min.css')
+    }
+    body {
+        form(action: "/comments/", method: "POST") {
+            input(name: "input") {
+
+            }
+        }
+
+        comments.each { comment ->
+            div {
+                h3(style: "border-bottom: 1px solid black;") {
+                    yield "Comment by Anonymous"
+                }
+                div(style: "border-bottom: 1px solid black;") {
+                    yieldUnescaped comment
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+yieldUnescaped '<!DOCTYPE html>'
+html {
+    head {
+        title('Damn Vulnerable Spring Boot App - Home')
+    }
+    body {
+        h1 {
+            yield 'Hello and Welcome to the DVSBA!'
+        }
+        p ("Take a look around! We have a ${$a(href:'/books/', "catalouge")} of our favourite books which you can browse. If you like it, leave a comment in the ${ $a(href: '/comments/', "comment section")}!")
+
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+yieldUnescaped '<!DOCTYPE html>'
+html {
+    head {
+        title('Damn Vulnerable Spring Boot App')
+    }
+    body {
+        div(class: 'container') {
+            a(class: 'brand',
+                href: '/books/',
+                'List')
+            br()
+            br()
+            p "ID: ${book.id}, Name: ${book.name}, Author: ${book.author}"
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+yieldUnescaped '<!DOCTYPE html>'
+html {
+    head {
+        title('Damn Vulnerable Spring Boot App')
+    }
+    body {
+        div(class: 'container') {
+            form(method: "GET", action: "/books/detail") {
+                input(name: "id", placeholder: "Search for a book id!")
+            }
+            br
+            table(border:1) {
+                thead {
+                    tr {
+                        td 'ID'
+                        td 'Name'
+                        td 'Author'
+                      }
+                    }
+                tbody {
+                    books.each { book ->
+                        tr {
+                            td {
+                                a(href: "/books/detail?id=${book.id}", "${book.id}")
+                            }
+                            td {
+                                a(href: "/books/detail?id=${book.id}", "${book.name}")
+                            }
+                            td {
+                                a(href: "/books/detail?id=${book.id}", "${book.author}")
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+package example;
+
+import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
+import java.sql.Connection;
+
+class VulnerableServlet {
+  void ping(HttpServletRequest request) throws Exception {
+    Runtime.getRuntime().exec("ping -c 1 " + request.getParameter("host"));
+  }
+
+  void lookup(HttpServletRequest request, Connection connection) throws Exception {
+    String sql = "select * from users where name = '" + request.getParameter("name") + "'";
+    connection.createStatement().executeQuery(sql);
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+const express = require("express");
+const childProcess = require("child_process");
+const app = express();
+
+app.get("/ping", (req, res) => {
+  childProcess.exec("ping -c 1 " + req.query.host, (error, stdout) => res.send(stdout));
+});
+
+app.get("/hello", (req, res) => {
+  res.send("<h1>Hello " + req.query.name + "</h1>");
+});
+
+module.exports = app;
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+// Vulnerable Express app modeled on NodeGoat / vulnerable JavaScript samples.
+const express = require("express");
+const childProcess = require("child_process");
+const fs = require("fs");
+const crypto = require("crypto");
+const axios = require("axios");
+const app = express();
+
+app.get("/ping", (req, res) => {
+  childProcess.exec("ping -c 1 " + req.query.host, (e, out) => res.send(out)); // CWE-78 command injection
+});
+
+app.get("/build", (req, res) => {
+  childProcess.execSync("make " + req.query.target); // CWE-78 command injection via execSync
+});
+
+app.get("/calc", (req, res) => {
+  const result = eval(req.query.expr); // CWE-95 eval of user input
+  res.send(String(result));
+});
+
+app.get("/fn", (req, res) => {
+  const f = new Function("x", req.query.body); // CWE-95 Function constructor injection
+  res.send(String(f(1)));
+});
+
+app.get("/hello", (req, res) => {
+  res.send("<h1>Hello " + req.query.name + "</h1>"); // CWE-79 reflected XSS
+});
+
+app.get("/user", (req, res) => {
+  db.query("select * from users where name = '" + req.query.name + "'"); // CWE-89 SQL injection
+});
+
+app.get("/report", (req, res) => {
+  db.query(`select * from reports where id = ${req.query.id}`); // CWE-89 SQL injection template literal
+});
+
+app.get("/read", (req, res) => {
+  const data = fs.readFileSync(req.query.path); // CWE-22 path traversal
+  res.send(data);
+});
+
+app.get("/fetch", (req, res) => {
+  axios.get(req.query.url).then((r) => res.send(r.data)); // CWE-918 SSRF
+});
+
+app.get("/hash", (req, res) => {
+  const digest = crypto.createHash("md5").update(req.query.pw).digest("hex"); // CWE-327 weak hash
+  res.send(digest);
+});
+
+app.get("/merge", (req, res) => {
+  const target = {};
+  for (const k in req.query) target[k] = req.query[k]; // CWE-1321 prototype pollution (regex blind spot)
+  res.json(target);
+});
+
+module.exports = app;
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+// Safe equivalents. None of these lines should produce a finding.
+const { execFile } = require("child_process");
+const crypto = require("crypto");
+
+function pingSafe(host, res) {
+  // execFile with an argument array does not invoke a shell with concatenation
+  execFile("ping", ["-c", "1", host], (e, out) => res.send(out));
+}
+
+function userSafe(db, req) {
+  // parameterised query, no concatenation or template interpolation
+  db.query("select * from users where name = ?", [req.query.name]);
+}
+
+function helloSafe(req, res) {
+  res.send("<h1>Hello world</h1>"); // constant response, no reflection
+}
+
+function hashSafe(pw) {
+  return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(pw).digest("hex"); // strong hash
+}
+
+// eval(req.query.expr) would be dangerous but this is a comment
+module.exports = { pingSafe, userSafe, helloSafe, hashSafe };
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+"""Vulnerable Flask app modeled on PyGoat / DVPWA."""
+import hashlib
+import os
+import pickle
+import subprocess
+
+import requests
+import yaml
+from flask import Flask, render_template_string, request
+
+app = Flask(__name__)
+
+
+@app.get("/ping")
+def ping():
+    host = request.args["host"]
+    return os.system("ping -c 1 " + host)  # CWE-78 os.system command injection
+
+
+@app.get("/run")
+def run():
+    cmd = request.args["cmd"]
+    return subprocess.check_output(cmd, shell=True)  # CWE-78 subprocess shell=True
+
+
+@app.get("/calc")
+def calc():
+    return str(eval(request.args["expr"]))  # CWE-95 eval of user input
+
+
+@app.get("/load")
+def load():
+    return pickle.loads(request.data)  # CWE-502 pickle deserialization of request body
+
+
+@app.get("/config")
+def config():
+    return yaml.load(request.data)  # CWE-502 yaml.load of untrusted input
+
+
+@app.get("/user")
+def user(db):
+    name = request.args["name"]
+    return db.execute("select * from users where name = '" + name + "'")  # CWE-89 SQL injection
+
+
+@app.get("/report")
+def report(db):
+    uid = request.args["id"]
+    return db.execute("select * from reports where id = %s" % uid)  # CWE-89 SQL injection via %
+
+
+@app.get("/read")
+def read():
+    return open(request.args["path"]).read()  # CWE-22 path traversal from request
+
+
+@app.get("/fetch")
+def fetch():
+    return requests.get(request.args["url"]).text  # CWE-918 SSRF from request url
+
+
+@app.get("/token")
+def token():
+    return hashlib.md5(request.args["pw"].encode()).hexdigest()  # CWE-327 weak hash
+
+
+@app.get("/render")
+def render():
+    return render_template_string("Hello " + request.args["name"])  # CWE-94 SSTI
+
+
+@app.get("/search")
+def search(db):
+    term = request.args["q"]
+    query = "select * from items where title like '%" + term + "%'"
+    return db.execute(query)  # CWE-89 second-order: query built on prior line (regex blind spot)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    app.run(debug=True)  # CWE-489 debug mode in production
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+"""Safe equivalents. None of these lines should produce a finding."""
+import hashlib
+import subprocess
+
+import yaml
+from flask import request
+
+
+def ping_safe(host):
+    # list-form subprocess without shell is not command injection
+    return subprocess.check_output(["ping", "-c", "1", host])
+
+
+def user_safe(db):
+    name = request.args["name"]
+    # parameterised query: %s here is a bound placeholder, not %-formatting
+    return db.execute("select * from users where name = %s", (name,))
+
+
+def config_safe(data):
+    return yaml.safe_load(data)  # safe_load is not the unsafe yaml.load sink
+
+
+def token_safe(pw):
+    return hashlib.sha256(pw.encode()).hexdigest()  # strong hash
+
+
+def comment_only():
+    # os.system("rm -rf /") would be dangerous but this is a comment
+    return "ok"
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+import subprocess
+
+from flask import Flask, request
+
+app = Flask(__name__)
+
+@app.get("/ping")
+def ping():
+    return subprocess.check_output("ping -c 1 " + request.args["host"], shell=True)
+
+@app.get("/calc")
+def calc():
+    return str(eval(request.args["expr"]))
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+name = "c-cpp-smoke"
+language = "c_cpp"
+frameworks = ["native"]
+setup = []
+modes = ["quick", "standard"]
+known_noise = []
+baselines = []
+
+[source]
+type = "local"
+path = "../fixtures/c-cpp-smoke"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "unsafe memory copy"
+path = "src/vuln.cpp"
+line = 4
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-memory-copy"
+sink = "memcpy"
+evidence = "memcpy copies attacker-controlled input into a fixed buffer"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "buffer overflow"
+path = "src/vuln.cpp"
+line = 8
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-copy"
+sink = "strcpy"
+evidence = "strcpy copies attacker-controlled input into a fixed buffer"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-78"
+class = "command injection"
+path = "src/vuln.cpp"
+line = 9
+rule_id = "c-shell-exec"
+sink = "system"
+evidence = "system executes attacker-controlled shell command"
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+name = "cpp-damn-vulnerable"
+language = "c_cpp"
+frameworks = ["native"]
+setup = []
+modes = ["quick", "standard"]
+known_noise = []
+baselines = []
+
+[source]
+type = "local"
+path = "../fixtures/cpp-damn-vulnerable"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "buffer overflow"
+path = "src/buffer.cpp"
+line = 8
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-copy"
+sink = "strcpy"
+evidence = "strcpy copies attacker input into a fixed buffer"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "buffer overflow"
+path = "src/buffer.cpp"
+line = 13
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-copy"
+sink = "strcat"
+evidence = "strcat appends attacker input without bounds"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "buffer overflow"
+path = "src/buffer.cpp"
+line = 18
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-copy"
+sink = "gets"
+evidence = "gets reads input without any bounds checking"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "buffer overflow"
+path = "src/buffer.cpp"
+line = 23
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-copy"
+sink = "sprintf"
+evidence = "sprintf formats attacker input into a fixed buffer"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "buffer overflow"
+path = "src/buffer.cpp"
+line = 27
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-memory-copy"
+sink = "memcpy"
+evidence = "memcpy copies an attacker-controlled length"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "buffer overflow"
+path = "src/buffer.cpp"
+line = 32
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-scanf"
+sink = "scanf"
+evidence = "scanf reads unbounded input into a fixed buffer"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-190"
+class = "integer overflow"
+path = "src/buffer.cpp"
+line = 37
+sink = "malloc"
+evidence = "malloc size len multiplied by count can overflow"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "buffer overflow"
+path = "src/command.cpp"
+line = 8
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-copy"
+sink = "strcpy"
+evidence = "strcpy copies the command argument into a fixed buffer"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-78"
+class = "command injection"
+path = "src/command.cpp"
+line = 9
+rule_id = "c-shell-exec"
+sink = "system"
+evidence = "system executes an attacker-controlled command"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-78"
+class = "command injection"
+path = "src/command.cpp"
+line = 13
+rule_id = "c-shell-exec"
+sink = "popen"
+evidence = "popen executes an attacker-controlled command"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-78"
+class = "command injection"
+path = "src/command.cpp"
+line = 18
+rule_id = "c-exec-family"
+sink = "execlp"
+evidence = "execlp executes an attacker-controlled argument"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-134"
+class = "format string"
+path = "src/command.cpp"
+line = 22
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-format"
+sink = "printf"
+evidence = "printf uses an attacker-controlled format string"
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+name = "java-spring-boot-vulnerable"
+language = "java_web"
+frameworks = ["spring-boot", "groovy-templates"]
+setup = ["./gradlew bootRun"]
+modes = ["quick", "standard"]
+known_noise = []
+baselines = []
+
+# Source vendored verbatim from kiview/damn-vulnerable-spring-boot-app (MIT).
+# The app documents two vulnerabilities: SQL injection in the book detail view
+# and stored XSS in the comment view rendered by an unescaped Groovy template.
+[source]
+type = "local"
+path = "../fixtures/java-spring-boot-vulnerable"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-89"
+class = "sql injection"
+path = "src/main/java/com/groovycoder/dvsba/books/BookController.java"
+line = 35
+rule_id = "java-sql-injection"
+sink = "select"
+evidence = "select query concatenates the request id parameter into SQL"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-79"
+class = "stored cross-site scripting"
+path = "src/main/resources/templates/views/comment/comment.tpl"
+line = 20
+rule_id = "groovy-xss-unescaped"
+sink = "yieldUnescaped"
+evidence = "yieldUnescaped renders the user comment without escaping"
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+name = "java-web-smoke"
+language = "java_web"
+frameworks = ["servlet"]
+setup = ["mvn test"]
+modes = ["quick", "standard"]
+known_noise = []
+baselines = []
+
+[source]
+type = "local"
+path = "../fixtures/java-web-smoke"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-78"
+class = "command injection"
+path = "src/main/java/example/VulnerableServlet.java"
+line = 8
+rule_id = "java-command-exec"
+sink = "exec"
+evidence = "exec runs the request parameter as a system command"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-89"
+class = "sql injection"
+path = "src/main/java/example/VulnerableServlet.java"
+line = 12
+rule_id = "java-sql-injection"
+sink = "select"
+evidence = "select query concatenates request parameter input into SQL"
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name = "javascript-node-web-smoke"
+language = "javascript_node_web"
+frameworks = ["node", "express"]
+setup = ["npm install"]
+modes = ["quick", "standard"]
+known_noise = []
+baselines = []
+
+[source]
+type = "local"
+path = "../fixtures/javascript-node-web-smoke"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-78"
+class = "command injection"
+path = "src/app.js"
+line = 6
+sink = "exec"
+evidence = "child_process.exec receives request query input"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-79"
+class = "reflected cross-site scripting"
+path = "src/app.js"
+line = 10
+sink = "send"
+evidence = "response sends unsanitized request query input into HTML"
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+name = "javascript-vulnerable"
+language = "javascript_node_web"
+frameworks = ["node", "express"]
+setup = ["npm install"]
+modes = ["quick", "standard"]
+known_noise = []
+baselines = []
+
+[source]
+type = "local"
+path = "../fixtures/javascript-vulnerable"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-78"
+class = "command injection"
+path = "src/app.js"
+line = 10
+rule_id = "js-command-exec"
+sink = "exec"
+evidence = "child_process exec runs an attacker-controlled command"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-78"
+class = "command injection"
+path = "src/app.js"
+line = 14
+rule_id = "js-command-exec"
+sink = "execSync"
+evidence = "execSync runs an attacker-controlled command"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-95"
+class = "code injection"
+path = "src/app.js"
+line = 18
+rule_id = "js-eval"
+sink = "eval"
+evidence = "eval executes attacker-controlled input"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-95"
+class = "code injection"
+path = "src/app.js"
+line = 23
+rule_id = "js-function-constructor"
+sink = "Function"
+evidence = "Function constructor builds code from attacker input"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-79"
+class = "reflected cross-site scripting"
+path = "src/app.js"
+line = 28
+rule_id = "js-xss-response"
+sink = "send"
+evidence = "response send reflects request query input into HTML"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-89"
+class = "sql injection"
+path = "src/app.js"
+line = 32
+rule_id = "js-sql-injection"
+sink = "query"
+evidence = "db query concatenates request input into SQL"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-89"
+class = "sql injection"
+path = "src/app.js"
+line = 36
+rule_id = "js-sql-injection"
+sink = "query"
+evidence = "db query interpolates request input via a template literal"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-22"
+class = "path traversal"
+path = "src/app.js"
+line = 40
+rule_id = "js-path-traversal"
+sink = "readFileSync"
+evidence = "fs readFileSync reads an attacker-controlled path"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-918"
+class = "server-side request forgery"
+path = "src/app.js"
+line = 45
+rule_id = "js-ssrf"
+sink = "axios"
+evidence = "axios get fetches an attacker-controlled url"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-327"
+class = "weak cryptography"
+path = "src/app.js"
+line = 49
+rule_id = "js-weak-hash"
+sink = "md5"
+evidence = "createHash md5 is a weak hash"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-1321"
+class = "prototype pollution"
+path = "src/app.js"
+line = 55
+sink = "target"
+evidence = "user-controlled keys are copied into an object enabling prototype pollution"
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+name = "python-vulnerable"
+language = "python_web"
+frameworks = ["flask"]
+setup = ["pip install flask pyyaml requests"]
+modes = ["quick", "standard"]
+known_noise = []
+baselines = []
+
+[source]
+type = "local"
+path = "../fixtures/python-vulnerable"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-78"
+class = "command injection"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 17
+rule_id = "python-os-command"
+sink = "os.system"
+evidence = "os.system runs an attacker-controlled command"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-78"
+class = "command injection"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 23
+rule_id = "python-shell-true"
+sink = "subprocess"
+evidence = "subprocess runs an attacker-controlled command with shell=True"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-95"
+class = "code injection"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 28
+rule_id = "python-unsafe-eval"
+sink = "eval"
+evidence = "eval executes attacker-controlled input"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-502"
+class = "insecure deserialization"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 33
+rule_id = "python-unsafe-deserialization"
+sink = "pickle.loads"
+evidence = "pickle.loads deserializes the request body"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-502"
+class = "insecure deserialization"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 38
+rule_id = "python-unsafe-deserialization"
+sink = "yaml.load"
+evidence = "yaml.load deserializes untrusted input"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-89"
+class = "sql injection"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 44
+rule_id = "python-sql-injection"
+sink = "execute"
+evidence = "execute concatenates request input into the SQL query"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-89"
+class = "sql injection"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 50
+rule_id = "python-sql-injection"
+sink = "execute"
+evidence = "execute uses percent formatted request input in SQL"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-22"
+class = "path traversal"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 55
+rule_id = "python-path-traversal"
+sink = "open"
+evidence = "open reads an attacker-controlled file path"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-918"
+class = "server-side request forgery"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 60
+rule_id = "python-ssrf"
+sink = "requests.get"
+evidence = "requests.get fetches an attacker-controlled url"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-327"
+class = "weak cryptography"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 65
+rule_id = "python-weak-hash"
+sink = "md5"
+evidence = "hashlib.md5 is a weak hash"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-94"
+class = "server-side template injection"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 70
+rule_id = "python-ssti"
+sink = "render_template_string"
+evidence = "render_template_string evaluates attacker-controlled input"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-89"
+class = "sql injection"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 77
+sink = "execute"
+evidence = "execute runs a SQL query string built from request input on a prior line"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-489"
+class = "insecure default"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 81
+rule_id = "python-flask-debug"
+sink = "debug"
+evidence = "flask debug mode is enabled in production"
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+name = "python-web-smoke"
+language = "python_web"
+frameworks = ["flask"]
+setup = ["pip install flask"]
+modes = ["quick", "standard"]
+known_noise = []
+baselines = []
+
+[source]
+type = "local"
+path = "../fixtures/python-web-smoke"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-78"
+class = "command injection"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 9
+rule_id = "python-shell-true"
+sink = "subprocess"
+evidence = "subprocess executes request input with shell=True"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-94"
+class = "code injection"
+path = "app.py"
+line = 13
+rule_id = "python-unsafe-eval"
+sink = "eval"
+evidence = "eval executes request input"
@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import tomllib
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+from pathlib import Path
+from uuid import uuid4
+
+from .findings import StaticFinding
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BenchmarkSource:
+    type: str
+    path: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExpectedFinding:
+    cwe: str
+    vulnerability_class: str
+    path: str
+    evidence: str
+    rule_id: str | None = None
+    line: int | None = None
+    function: str | None = None
+    sink: str | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BenchmarkManifest:
+    name: str
+    language: str
+    frameworks: list[str]
+    setup: list[str]
+    source: BenchmarkSource
+    modes: list[str]
+    expected: list[ExpectedFinding]
+    known_noise: list[str]
+    baselines: list[str]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BaselineFinding:
+    tool: str
+    finding_id: str
+    path: str
+    line: int | None
+    rule_id: str | None
+    cwe: str | None
+    vulnerability_class: str | None
+    evidence: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BenchmarkMiss:
+    cwe: str
+    vulnerability_class: str
+    path: str
+    evidence: str
+    reason: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BenchmarkBaselineDelta:
+    tool: str
+    matched_expected_total: int
+    missed_expected_total: int
+    extra_findings_total: int
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BenchmarkCalibrationRecord:
+    cwe: str
+    vulnerability_class: str
+    path: str
+    evidence: str
+    failed_stage: str
+    next_improvement_candidate: str
+    reason: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BenchmarkFalsePositive:
+    finding_id: str
+    path: str
+    line: int | None
+    reason: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BenchmarkMetrics:
+    expected_findings_total: int
+    actual_findings_total: int
+    matched_findings_total: int
+    missed_findings_total: int
+    false_positive_findings_total: int
+    recall: float | None
+    precision: float | None
+    runtime_seconds: float | None
+    model_usage: dict[str, object]
+    artifact_links: dict[str, str]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BenchmarkRun:
+    benchmark_run_id: str
+    root: Path
+    manifest: BenchmarkManifest
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BenchmarkResult:
+    benchmark_run_id: str
+    benchmark_name: str
+    language: str
+    mode: str
+    scan_id: str | None
+    scan_run_dir: str | None
+    metrics: BenchmarkMetrics
+    misses: list[BenchmarkMiss]
+    false_positives: list[BenchmarkFalsePositive]
+    baseline_deltas: list[BenchmarkBaselineDelta]
+    calibration_records: list[BenchmarkCalibrationRecord]
+
+
+def load_benchmark_manifest(path: Path) -> BenchmarkManifest:
+    payload = tomllib.loads(path.read_text())
+    source = payload.get("source", {})
+    expected = payload.get("expected", [])
+    return BenchmarkManifest(
+        name=str(payload["name"]),
+        language=str(payload["language"]),
+        frameworks=[str(item) for item in payload.get("frameworks", [])],
+        setup=[str(item) for item in payload.get("setup", [])],
+        source=BenchmarkSource(type=str(source.get("type", "local")), path=str(source["path"])),
+        modes=[str(item) for item in payload.get("modes", [])],
+        expected=[
+            ExpectedFinding(
+                cwe=str(item["cwe"]),
+                vulnerability_class=str(item.get("class", item.get("vulnerability_class", "unknown"))),
+                path=str(item["path"]),
+                evidence=str(item.get("evidence", "")),
+                rule_id=str(item["rule_id"]) if "rule_id" in item else None,
+                line=int(item["line"]) if "line" in item else None,
+                function=str(item["function"]) if "function" in item else None,
+                sink=str(item["sink"]) if "sink" in item else None,
+            )
+            for item in expected
+        ],
+        known_noise=[str(item) for item in payload.get("known_noise", [])],
+        baselines=[str(item) for item in payload.get("baselines", [])],
+    )
+
+
+def resolve_benchmark_source(manifest_path: Path, manifest: BenchmarkManifest) -> Path:
+    if manifest.source.type != "local":
+        raise ValueError(f"unsupported benchmark source type: {manifest.source.type}")
+    source = Path(manifest.source.path)
+    if not source.is_absolute():
+        source = manifest_path.parent / source
+    return source.resolve()
+
+
+def create_benchmark_run(target: Path, manifest: BenchmarkManifest) -> BenchmarkRun:
+    timestamp = datetime.now(UTC).strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
+    benchmark_run_id = f"{timestamp}-{uuid4().hex[:8]}"
+    root = target.resolve() / ".openultrasast" / "benchmarks" / benchmark_run_id
+    root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=False)
+    return BenchmarkRun(benchmark_run_id=benchmark_run_id, root=root, manifest=manifest)
+
+
+def load_findings(path: Path) -> list[StaticFinding]:
+    payload = json.loads(path.read_text())
+    return [StaticFinding(**item) for item in payload.get("findings", [])]
+
+
+def load_baseline_findings(manifest_path: Path, manifest: BenchmarkManifest) -> list[BaselineFinding]:
+    baseline_findings: list[BaselineFinding] = []
+    for baseline in manifest.baselines:
+        path = Path(baseline)
+        if not path.is_absolute():
+            path = manifest_path.parent / path
+        if not path.exists():
+            continue
+        payload = json.loads(path.read_text())
+        items = payload.get("findings", payload if isinstance(payload, list) else [])
+        for item in items:
+            baseline_findings.append(
+                BaselineFinding(
+                    tool=str(item.get("tool", path.stem)),
+                    finding_id=str(item.get("finding_id", item.get("id", ""))),
+                    path=str(item.get("path", "")),
+                    line=int(item["line"]) if "line" in item and item["line"] is not None else None,
+                    rule_id=str(item["rule_id"]) if "rule_id" in item else None,
+                    cwe=str(item["cwe"]) if "cwe" in item else None,
+                    vulnerability_class=str(item.get("class", item.get("vulnerability_class", ""))) or None,
+                    evidence=str(item.get("evidence", "")),
+                )
+            )
+    return baseline_findings
+
+
+def evaluate_benchmark(
+    *,
+    run: BenchmarkRun,
+    mode: str,
+    findings: list[StaticFinding],
+    scan_id: str | None,
+    scan_run_dir: Path | None,
+    runtime_seconds: float | None = None,
+    baseline_findings: list[BaselineFinding] | None = None,
+) -> BenchmarkResult:
+    matched_finding_indexes: set[int] = set()
+    misses: list[BenchmarkMiss] = []
+    for expected in run.manifest.expected:
+        match_index = _matching_finding_index(expected, findings, matched_finding_indexes)
+        if match_index is None:
+            misses.append(_miss(expected))
+        else:
+            matched_finding_indexes.add(match_index)
+
+    false_positives = [_false_positive(finding) for index, finding in enumerate(findings) if index not in matched_finding_indexes]
+    baseline_deltas = _baseline_deltas(run.manifest.expected, baseline_findings or [])
+    calibration_records = [_calibration_record(miss) for miss in misses]
+    expected_total = len(run.manifest.expected)
+    actual_total = len(findings)
+    missed_total = len(misses)
+    matched_total = expected_total - missed_total
+    false_positive_total = len(false_positives)
+    recall = matched_total / expected_total if expected_total else None
+    precision = matched_total / actual_total if actual_total else None
+    return BenchmarkResult(
+        benchmark_run_id=run.benchmark_run_id,
+        benchmark_name=run.manifest.name,
+        language=run.manifest.language,
+        mode=mode,
+        scan_id=scan_id,
+        scan_run_dir=str(scan_run_dir) if scan_run_dir else None,
+        metrics=BenchmarkMetrics(
+            expected_findings_total=expected_total,
+            actual_findings_total=actual_total,
+            matched_findings_total=matched_total,
+            missed_findings_total=missed_total,
+            false_positive_findings_total=false_positive_total,
+            recall=recall,
+            precision=precision,
+            runtime_seconds=runtime_seconds,
+            model_usage={},
+            artifact_links=_artifact_links(scan_run_dir),
+        ),
+        misses=misses,
+        false_positives=false_positives,
+        baseline_deltas=baseline_deltas,
+        calibration_records=calibration_records,
+    )
+
+
+def write_benchmark_artifacts(run: BenchmarkRun, manifest_path: Path, result: BenchmarkResult) -> None:
+    (run.root / "benchmark_manifest.toml").write_text(manifest_path.read_text())
+    (run.root / "benchmark_result.json").write_text(json.dumps(_jsonable(asdict(result)), indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
+    (run.root / "calibration_records.json").write_text(
+        json.dumps(_jsonable([asdict(record) for record in result.calibration_records]), indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n"
+    )
+    (run.root / "external_baseline_deltas.json").write_text(
+        json.dumps(_jsonable([asdict(delta) for delta in result.baseline_deltas]), indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n"
+    )
+
+
+def _matching_finding_index(expected: ExpectedFinding, findings: list[StaticFinding], used_indexes: set[int]) -> int | None:
+    for index, finding in enumerate(findings):
+        if index in used_indexes:
+            continue
+        if _matches_expected(expected, finding):
+            return index
+    return None
+
+
+def _matches_expected(expected: ExpectedFinding, finding: StaticFinding) -> bool:
+    expected_path = expected.path.strip("*")
+    if expected.rule_id and not finding.finding_id.startswith(f"{expected.rule_id}:"):
+        return False
+    if expected.line is not None and finding.line != expected.line:
+        return False
+    if expected_path and expected_path not in finding.path:
+        return False
+    if expected.function and finding.function_name != expected.function:
+        return False
+    if expected.sink and _normalize(expected.sink) not in _finding_text(finding):
+        return False
+    if expected.evidence and not _evidence_matches(expected.evidence, finding):
+        return False
+    return _cwe_matches(expected.cwe, finding)
+
+
+def _miss(expected: ExpectedFinding) -> BenchmarkMiss:
+    return BenchmarkMiss(
+        cwe=expected.cwe,
+        vulnerability_class=expected.vulnerability_class,
+        path=expected.path,
+        evidence=expected.evidence,
+        reason="no OpenUltraSAST finding matched the expected benchmark vulnerability",
+    )
+
+
+def _false_positive(finding: StaticFinding) -> BenchmarkFalsePositive:
+    return BenchmarkFalsePositive(
+        finding_id=finding.finding_id,
+        path=finding.path,
+        line=finding.line,
+        reason="finding did not match any expected benchmark vulnerability",
+    )
+
+
+def _baseline_deltas(expected_findings: list[ExpectedFinding], baseline_findings: list[BaselineFinding]) -> list[BenchmarkBaselineDelta]:
+    tools = sorted({finding.tool for finding in baseline_findings})
+    deltas: list[BenchmarkBaselineDelta] = []
+    for tool in tools:
+        tool_findings = [finding for finding in baseline_findings if finding.tool == tool]
+        matched_indexes: set[int] = set()
+        matched_expected_total = 0
+        for expected in expected_findings:
+            match_index = _matching_baseline_index(expected, tool_findings, matched_indexes)
+            if match_index is not None:
+                matched_indexes.add(match_index)
+                matched_expected_total += 1
+        deltas.append(
+            BenchmarkBaselineDelta(
+                tool=tool,
+                matched_expected_total=matched_expected_total,
+                missed_expected_total=len(expected_findings) - matched_expected_total,
+                extra_findings_total=len(tool_findings) - len(matched_indexes),
+            )
+        )
+    return deltas
+
+
+def _matching_baseline_index(expected: ExpectedFinding, findings: list[BaselineFinding], used_indexes: set[int]) -> int | None:
+    for index, finding in enumerate(findings):
+        if index in used_indexes:
+            continue
+        if _baseline_matches_expected(expected, finding):
+            return index
+    return None
+
+
+def _baseline_matches_expected(expected: ExpectedFinding, finding: BaselineFinding) -> bool:
+    expected_path = expected.path.strip("*")
+    if expected.rule_id and finding.rule_id and finding.rule_id != expected.rule_id:
+        return False
+    if expected.line is not None and finding.line is not None and finding.line != expected.line:
+        return False
+    if expected_path and expected_path not in finding.path:
+        return False
+    if finding.cwe and finding.cwe.lower() != expected.cwe.lower():
+        return False
+    return not (expected.sink and expected.sink.lower() not in _normalize(finding.evidence))
+
+
+def _calibration_record(miss: BenchmarkMiss) -> BenchmarkCalibrationRecord:
+    return BenchmarkCalibrationRecord(
+        cwe=miss.cwe,
+        vulnerability_class=miss.vulnerability_class,
+        path=miss.path,
+        evidence=miss.evidence,
+        failed_stage="benchmark_ground_truth_matching",
+        next_improvement_candidate="rules_or_language_hunter",
+        reason=miss.reason,
+    )
+
+
+def _artifact_links(scan_run_dir: Path | None) -> dict[str, str]:
+    if scan_run_dir is None:
+        return {}
+    return {
+        "findings": str(scan_run_dir / "findings.json"),
+        "manifest": str(scan_run_dir / "manifest.json"),
+        "report": str(scan_run_dir / "report.md"),
+        "sarif": str(scan_run_dir / "report.sarif"),
+    }
+
+
+def _cwe_matches(cwe: str, finding: StaticFinding) -> bool:
+    text = _finding_text(finding)
+    cwe_lower = cwe.lower()
+    if "cwe-" not in text:
+        return True
+    return cwe_lower in text
+
+
+def _evidence_matches(evidence: str, finding: StaticFinding) -> bool:
+    tokens = [token for token in _normalize(evidence).split() if len(token) > 2]
+    if not tokens:
+        return True
+    text = _finding_text(finding)
+    return any(token in text for token in tokens)
+
+
+def _finding_text(finding: StaticFinding) -> str:
+    parts = [
+        finding.finding_id,
+        finding.title,
+        finding.rationale,
+        finding.function_name or "",
+        " ".join(finding.tags),
+        " ".join(finding.reachability_conditions),
+    ]
+    return _normalize(" ".join(parts))
+
+
+def _normalize(value: str) -> str:
+    normalized = value.lower().replace("memcpy", "memcpy memory copy")
+    normalized = normalized.replace("copies", "copy")
+    return " ".join(normalized.replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ").split())
+
+
+def _jsonable(value: object) -> object:
+    if isinstance(value, Path):
+        return str(value)
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {key: _jsonable(item) for key, item in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [_jsonable(item) for item in value]
+    return value
@@ -2,10 +2,21 @@ from __future__ import annotations

 import argparse
 import json
+from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
+from time import perf_counter

+from .benchmark import (
+    create_benchmark_run,
+    evaluate_benchmark,
+    load_baseline_findings,
+    load_benchmark_manifest,
+    load_findings,
+    resolve_benchmark_source,
+    write_benchmark_artifacts,
+)
 from .config import load_config
-from .findings import quick_scan_findings, write_findings
+from .findings import StaticFinding, quick_scan_findings, write_findings
 from .harness import HarnessRuntime, HarnessTraceWriter, write_harness_config
 from .hunter import run_hunter_pool, write_hunter_trajectories
 from .index import build_code_chunks
@@ -17,6 +28,16 @@ from .run import create_scan_run
 from .verification import verify_findings, write_verification_results


+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ScanOutcome:
+    scan_id: str
+    run_dir: Path
+    file_target_count: int
+    ranked_target_count: int
+    finding_count: int
+    exit_code: int
+
+
 def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="ousast")
    subparsers = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
@@ -32,15 +53,28 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
    index.add_argument("--config", type=Path, default=Path("openultrasast.toml"))
    index.add_argument("--chunk-lines", type=int, default=80)

+    benchmark = subparsers.add_parser("benchmark", help="run a benchmark manifest and write scoreboard artifacts")
+    benchmark.add_argument("manifest", type=Path)
+    benchmark.add_argument("--mode", choices=("quick", "standard", "deep"), default="quick")
+    benchmark.add_argument("--config", type=Path, default=Path("openultrasast.toml"))
+
    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
    if args.command == "scan":
        return _scan(args.path, args.config, args.mode, args.fail_on)
    if args.command == "index":
        return _index(args.path, args.config, args.chunk_lines)
+    if args.command == "benchmark":
+        return _benchmark(args.manifest, args.config, args.mode)
    return 2


 def _scan(path: Path, config_path: Path, mode: str, fail_on: str) -> int:
+    outcome = _run_scan(path, config_path, mode, fail_on)
+    _print_scan_outcome(outcome)
+    return outcome.exit_code
+
+
+def _run_scan(path: Path, config_path: Path, mode: str, fail_on: str) -> ScanOutcome:
    if mode == "deep":
        raise SystemExit("mode 'deep' is specified but sandboxed dynamic analysis is not implemented")
    if not path.exists() or not path.is_dir():
@@ -104,12 +138,22 @@ def _scan(path: Path, config_path: Path, mode: str, fail_on: str) -> int:
        ),
    )
    runtime.finish(status="succeeded")
-    print(f"scan_id={run.scan_id}")
-    print(f"run_dir={run.root}")
-    print(f"file_targets={len(targets)}")
-    print(f"ranked_targets={len(rankings)}")
-    print(f"findings={len(findings)}")
-    return scan_exit_code(findings, verifications, fail_on)
+    return ScanOutcome(
+        scan_id=run.scan_id,
+        run_dir=run.root,
+        file_target_count=len(targets),
+        ranked_target_count=len(rankings),
+        finding_count=len(findings),
+        exit_code=scan_exit_code(findings, verifications, fail_on),
+    )
+
+
+def _print_scan_outcome(outcome: ScanOutcome) -> None:
+    print(f"scan_id={outcome.scan_id}")
+    print(f"run_dir={outcome.run_dir}")
+    print(f"file_targets={outcome.file_target_count}")
+    print(f"ranked_targets={outcome.ranked_target_count}")
+    print(f"findings={outcome.finding_count}")


 def _load_static_hints(sarif_paths: tuple[str, ...]) -> list[object]:
@@ -125,6 +169,40 @@ def _artifact_paths(**paths: Path | None) -> dict[str, Path]:
    return {name: path for name, path in paths.items() if path is not None}


+def _benchmark(manifest_path: Path, config_path: Path, mode: str) -> int:
+    if not manifest_path.exists() or not manifest_path.is_file():
+        raise SystemExit(f"benchmark manifest is not a file: {manifest_path}")
+    manifest = load_benchmark_manifest(manifest_path)
+    target = resolve_benchmark_source(manifest_path, manifest)
+    run = create_benchmark_run(target, manifest)
+    started_at = perf_counter()
+    outcome = _run_scan(target, config_path, mode, "never")
+    runtime_seconds = perf_counter() - started_at
+    findings = _load_scan_findings(outcome.run_dir)
+    baseline_findings = load_baseline_findings(manifest_path, manifest)
+    result = evaluate_benchmark(
+        run=run,
+        mode=mode,
+        findings=findings,
+        scan_id=outcome.scan_id,
+        scan_run_dir=outcome.run_dir,
+        runtime_seconds=runtime_seconds,
+        baseline_findings=baseline_findings,
+    )
+    write_benchmark_artifacts(run, manifest_path, result)
+    _print_scan_outcome(outcome)
+    print(f"benchmark_run_id={run.benchmark_run_id}")
+    print(f"benchmark_run_dir={run.root}")
+    print(f"benchmark_expected={result.metrics.expected_findings_total}")
+    print(f"benchmark_matched={result.metrics.matched_findings_total}")
+    print(f"benchmark_missed={result.metrics.missed_findings_total}")
+    return 0
+
+
+def _load_scan_findings(run_dir: Path) -> list[StaticFinding]:
+    return load_findings(run_dir / "findings.json")
+
+
 def _index(path: Path, config_path: Path, chunk_lines: int) -> int:
    if not path.exists() or not path.is_dir():
        raise SystemExit(f"index path is not a directory: {path}")
@@ -34,29 +34,92 @@ class PatternRule:
    severity: str
    tags: tuple[str, ...]
    pattern: re.Pattern[str]
+    cwe: str
+    languages: tuple[str, ...]


+C_LANGUAGES = ("c", "cpp")
+PYTHON_LANGUAGES = ("python",)
+JS_LANGUAGES = ("javascript", "typescript")
+JAVA_LANGUAGES = ("java",)
+GROOVY_LANGUAGES = ("groovy",)
+
 PATTERN_RULES = (
+    # --- C / C++ -----------------------------------------------------------------
    PatternRule(
        rule_id="c-unsafe-copy",
-        title="Unsafe C string or input function needs review",
+        title="Unsafe C string copy needs review",
        severity="high",
        tags=("memory_unsafe",),
        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(gets|strcpy|strcat|sprintf)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-120",
+        languages=C_LANGUAGES,
    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="c-unsafe-memory-copy",
+        title="Unsafe C memory copy needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("memory_unsafe",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(memcpy|memmove|bcopy)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-120",
+        languages=C_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="c-unsafe-format",
+        title="Unsafe C format string needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("memory_unsafe",),
+        # Format function whose format argument is a bare identifier (not a string
+        # literal), i.e. the classic format-string sink. printf("...") is ignored.
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(printf|vprintf|vsprintf|vsnprintf|vfprintf|syslog)\s*\(\s*[A-Za-z_]"),
+        cwe="CWE-134",
+        languages=C_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="c-unsafe-scanf",
+        title="Unbounded C scanf needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("memory_unsafe",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(scanf|fscanf|sscanf)\s*\([^\n]*%s"),
+        cwe="CWE-120",
+        languages=C_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="c-shell-exec",
+        title="C shell execution needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("syscall_entry",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(system|popen)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-78",
+        languages=C_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="c-exec-family",
+        title="C exec command execution needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("syscall_entry",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(execl|execlp|execle|execv|execvp|execvpe)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-78",
+        languages=C_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    # --- Python ------------------------------------------------------------------
    PatternRule(
        rule_id="python-unsafe-eval",
        title="Dynamic Python execution needs review",
        severity="high",
        tags=("syscall_entry",),
        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(eval|exec)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-95",
+        languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
    ),
    PatternRule(
-        rule_id="python-unsafe-deserialization",
-        title="Unsafe Python deserialization needs review",
+        rule_id="python-os-command",
+        title="Python OS command execution needs review",
        severity="high",
-        tags=("deserialization",),
-        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(pickle\.loads|yaml\.load)\s*\("),
+        tags=("syscall_entry",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(os\.system|os\.popen|os\.execl|os\.execlp|os\.execv|os\.execvp)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-78",
+        languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
    ),
    PatternRule(
        rule_id="python-shell-true",
@@ -64,6 +127,229 @@ PATTERN_RULES = (
        severity="medium",
        tags=("syscall_entry",),
        pattern=re.compile(r"subprocess\.[a-zA-Z_]+\s*\([^\n]*shell\s*=\s*True"),
+        cwe="CWE-78",
+        languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="python-unsafe-deserialization",
+        title="Unsafe Python deserialization needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("deserialization",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(pickle\.loads|pickle\.load|cPickle\.loads|yaml\.load|marshal\.loads)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-502",
+        languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="python-sql-injection",
+        title="Python SQL string composition needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("injection",),
+        # .execute(...) where the argument is built with %-formatting, .format(),
+        # string concatenation, or an f-string. Parameterised %s placeholders pass.
+        pattern=re.compile(r"(\.execute)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*(?:[\"']\s*%\s*[(A-Za-z_]|\.format\s*\(|[\"']\s*\+|\bf[\"'])"),
+        cwe="CWE-89",
+        languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="python-path-traversal",
+        title="Python file open with external input needs review",
+        severity="medium",
+        tags=("filesystem_entry",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(open)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*(?:request\.|req\.|argv|input\s*\(|params\[|GET\[|POST\[)"),
+        cwe="CWE-22",
+        languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="python-ssrf",
+        title="Python outbound request with external input needs review",
+        severity="medium",
+        tags=("network_entry",),
+        pattern=re.compile(
+            r"\b(requests\.(?:get|post|put|delete|head|patch)|urllib\.request\.urlopen|urlopen)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*(?:request\.|req\.|argv|input\s*\()"
+        ),
+        cwe="CWE-918",
+        languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="python-weak-hash",
+        title="Python weak hash needs review",
+        severity="low",
+        tags=("crypto",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\bhashlib\.(md5|sha1)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-327",
+        languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="python-ssti",
+        title="Python server-side template injection needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("injection",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(render_template_string)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-94",
+        languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="python-flask-debug",
+        title="Flask debug mode enabled needs review",
+        severity="low",
+        tags=("insecure_default",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\.run\s*\([^\n]*(debug)\s*=\s*True"),
+        cwe="CWE-489",
+        languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    # --- JavaScript / TypeScript -------------------------------------------------
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="js-command-exec",
+        title="Node child_process command execution needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("syscall_entry",),
+        # exec/execSync invoke a shell; execFile/spawn with an argv array do not and
+        # are the safe alternatives, so they are intentionally excluded here.
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(exec|execSync)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-78",
+        languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="js-spawn-shell",
+        title="Node spawn with shell needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("syscall_entry",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(spawn|spawnSync)\s*\([^\n]*shell\s*:\s*true"),
+        cwe="CWE-78",
+        languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="js-eval",
+        title="Dynamic JavaScript evaluation needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("syscall_entry",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(eval)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-95",
+        languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="js-function-constructor",
+        title="JavaScript Function constructor needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("syscall_entry",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"new\s+(Function)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-95",
+        languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="js-xss-response",
+        title="Unsanitized HTTP response reflection needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("injection",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\.(send|write|end)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*\b(?:req|request)\.(?:query|params|body)"),
+        cwe="CWE-79",
+        languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="js-dom-xss",
+        title="DOM sink with untrusted input needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("injection",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\.(innerHTML|outerHTML)\s*=\s*[^\n]*\b(?:req|request|location|document\.location)"),
+        cwe="CWE-79",
+        languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="js-sql-injection",
+        title="JavaScript SQL string composition needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("injection",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\.(query|execute)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*(?:\$\{|\+\s*[A-Za-z_$])"),
+        cwe="CWE-89",
+        languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="js-path-traversal",
+        title="Node filesystem access with external input needs review",
+        severity="medium",
+        tags=("filesystem_entry",),
+        pattern=re.compile(
+            r"\bfs\.(readFile|readFileSync|writeFile|writeFileSync|createReadStream|unlink|unlinkSync)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*\b(?:req|request)\."
+        ),
+        cwe="CWE-22",
+        languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="js-ssrf",
+        title="JavaScript outbound request with external input needs review",
+        severity="medium",
+        tags=("network_entry",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(axios|fetch|got)\s*[.(][^\n]*\b(?:req|request)\."),
+        cwe="CWE-918",
+        languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="js-weak-hash",
+        title="JavaScript weak hash needs review",
+        severity="low",
+        tags=("crypto",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"createHash\s*\(\s*[\"'](md5|sha1)[\"']"),
+        cwe="CWE-327",
+        languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="js-deserialize",
+        title="JavaScript unsafe deserialization needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("deserialization",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(unserialize)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-502",
+        languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    # --- Java --------------------------------------------------------------------
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="java-command-exec",
+        title="Java runtime command execution needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("syscall_entry",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\b(exec)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-78",
+        languages=JAVA_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="java-sql-injection",
+        title="Java SQL string composition needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("injection",),
+        # A string literal that begins with a SQL keyword and is concatenated with
+        # untrusted data. Parameterised queries (placeholders, no '+') are ignored.
+        pattern=re.compile(r"(?i)\"\s*(select|insert|update|delete)\b[^\"]*\"\s*\+"),
+        cwe="CWE-89",
+        languages=JAVA_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="java-weak-hash",
+        title="Java weak hash needs review",
+        severity="low",
+        tags=("crypto",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"MessageDigest\.getInstance\s*\(\s*\"(MD5|SHA-1)\""),
+        cwe="CWE-327",
+        languages=JAVA_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="java-deserialization",
+        title="Java unsafe deserialization needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("deserialization",),
+        pattern=re.compile(r"\.(readObject)\s*\("),
+        cwe="CWE-502",
+        languages=JAVA_LANGUAGES,
+    ),
+    # --- Groovy server-side templates -------------------------------------------
+    PatternRule(
+        rule_id="groovy-xss-unescaped",
+        title="Groovy template unescaped output needs review",
+        severity="high",
+        tags=("injection",),
+        # Unescaped output of a bound variable; string literals are not flagged.
+        pattern=re.compile(r"(yieldUnescaped)\s+[A-Za-z_]"),
+        cwe="CWE-79",
+        languages=GROOVY_LANGUAGES,
    ),
 )

@@ -74,9 +360,13 @@ def quick_scan_findings(root: Path, targets: list[FileTarget], rankings: list[Ra
    for target in targets:
        text = _read_text(root / target.path)
        for rule in PATTERN_RULES:
+            if rule.languages and target.language not in rule.languages:
+                continue
            ranking = ranking_by_path.get(target.path)
            for match in rule.pattern.finditer(text):
-                findings.append(_finding_from_match(target, rule, text, match.start(), ranking))
+                if _match_is_in_comment(text, match.start(), target.language):
+                    continue
+                findings.append(_finding_from_match(target, rule, text, match, ranking))
    return sorted(findings, key=lambda item: (_severity_sort(item.severity), -item.ranking_priority, item.path))


@@ -101,12 +391,14 @@ def _finding_from_match(
    target: FileTarget,
    rule: PatternRule,
    text: str,
-    offset: int,
+    match: re.Match[str],
    ranking: RankingScore | None,
 ) -> StaticFinding:
+    offset = match.start()
    line = text.count("\n", 0, offset) + 1
    reachability_status, function_name, reachability_evidence = _reachability_for_line(target, line)
    priority = ranking.priority if ranking is not None else 1.0
+    matched_token = match.group(1) if match.groups() else match.group(0).split("(", 1)[0].strip()
    return StaticFinding(
        finding_id=f"{rule.rule_id}:{target.path}:{line}",
        path=target.path,
@@ -114,7 +406,9 @@ def _finding_from_match(
        severity=rule.severity,
        confidence="medium",
        evidence_level="static_corroboration",
-        rationale=f"Static pattern {rule.rule_id} matched line {line}; manual verification still required.",
+        rationale=(
+            f"Static pattern {rule.rule_id} ({rule.cwe}) matched {matched_token} on line {line}; manual verification still required."
+        ),
        line=line,
        function_name=function_name,
        reachability_status=reachability_status,
@@ -179,6 +473,28 @@ def _read_text(path: Path) -> str:
        return ""


+HASH_COMMENT_LANGUAGES = {"python", "ruby", "shell", "yaml"}
+
+
+def _match_is_in_comment(text: str, offset: int, language: str = "") -> bool:
+    line_start = text.rfind("\n", 0, offset) + 1
+    line_end = text.find("\n", offset)
+    if line_end == -1:
+        line_end = len(text)
+    line = text[line_start:line_end]
+    column = offset - line_start
+    stripped = line.lstrip()
+    if language in HASH_COMMENT_LANGUAGES:
+        if stripped.startswith("#"):
+            return True
+        comment_column = line.find("#")
+        return comment_column != -1 and comment_column < column
+    if stripped.startswith(("//", "/*", "*")):
+        return True
+    comment_column = line.find("//")
+    return comment_column != -1 and comment_column < column
+
+
 def _severity_sort(severity: str) -> int:
    order = {"critical": 0, "high": 1, "medium": 2, "low": 3, "info": 4}
    return order.get(severity, 5)
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ LANGUAGE_BY_EXTENSION = {
    ".go": "go",
    ".rs": "rust",
    ".java": "java",
+    ".groovy": "groovy",
+    ".tpl": "groovy",
    ".kt": "kotlin",
    ".rb": "ruby",
    ".php": "php",
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from openultrasast.benchmark import (
+    create_benchmark_run,
+    evaluate_benchmark,
+    load_baseline_findings,
+    load_benchmark_manifest,
+    write_benchmark_artifacts,
+)
+from openultrasast.cli import main
+from openultrasast.findings import StaticFinding
+
+
+def test_benchmark_manifest_loads_expected_findings(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    manifest_path = tmp_path / "benchmark.toml"
+    manifest_path.write_text(
+        """
+name = "cpp-smoke"
+language = "c_cpp"
+frameworks = ["native"]
+setup = ["make"]
+modes = ["quick"]
+known_noise = ["sample-only fixture warning"]
+baselines = ["clang-tidy"]
+
+[source]
+type = "local"
+path = "repo"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "unsafe memory copy"
+path = "src/vuln.cpp"
+line = 3
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-memory-copy"
+evidence = "memcpy copies attacker-controlled input"
+function = "copy_user"
+sink = "memcpy"
+""".strip()
+        + "\n"
+    )
+
+    manifest = load_benchmark_manifest(manifest_path)
+
+    assert manifest.name == "cpp-smoke"
+    assert manifest.language == "c_cpp"
+    assert manifest.setup == ["make"]
+    assert manifest.source.path == "repo"
+    assert manifest.known_noise == ["sample-only fixture warning"]
+    assert manifest.expected[0].rule_id == "c-unsafe-memory-copy"
+    assert manifest.expected[0].function == "copy_user"
+    assert manifest.expected[0].sink == "memcpy"
+
+
+def test_repository_benchmark_manifests_load_and_point_to_fixtures() -> None:
+    manifest_paths = sorted(Path("benchmarks/manifests").glob("*.toml"))
+
+    assert {path.name for path in manifest_paths} == {
+        "c-cpp-smoke.toml",
+        "cpp-damn-vulnerable.toml",
+        "java-spring-boot-vulnerable.toml",
+        "java-web-smoke.toml",
+        "javascript-node-web-smoke.toml",
+        "javascript-vulnerable.toml",
+        "python-vulnerable.toml",
+        "python-web-smoke.toml",
+    }
+    for manifest_path in manifest_paths:
+        manifest = load_benchmark_manifest(manifest_path)
+        assert manifest.expected
+        assert manifest.language in {"c_cpp", "java_web", "javascript_node_web", "python_web"}
+        assert (manifest_path.parent / manifest.source.path).resolve().exists()
+
+
+def test_benchmark_result_records_missed_expected_findings(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    manifest_path = tmp_path / "benchmark.toml"
+    repo = tmp_path / "repo"
+    repo.mkdir()
+    manifest_path.write_text(
+        """
+name = "cpp-smoke"
+language = "c_cpp"
+
+[source]
+path = "repo"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "unsafe memory copy"
+path = "src/vuln.cpp"
+line = 3
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-memory-copy"
+evidence = "memcpy copies attacker-controlled input"
+""".strip()
+        + "\n"
+    )
+    manifest = load_benchmark_manifest(manifest_path)
+    run = create_benchmark_run(repo, manifest)
+
+    result = evaluate_benchmark(run=run, mode="quick", findings=[], scan_id="scan-1", scan_run_dir=repo / ".runs" / "scan-1")
+    write_benchmark_artifacts(run, manifest_path, result)
+
+    payload = json.loads((run.root / "benchmark_result.json").read_text())
+    assert payload["metrics"]["expected_findings_total"] == 1
+    assert payload["metrics"]["matched_findings_total"] == 0
+    assert payload["metrics"]["missed_findings_total"] == 1
+    assert payload["metrics"]["false_positive_findings_total"] == 0
+    assert payload["metrics"]["recall"] == 0.0
+    assert payload["metrics"]["precision"] is None
+    assert payload["misses"][0]["reason"] == "no OpenUltraSAST finding matched the expected benchmark vulnerability"
+
+
+def test_benchmark_cli_runs_scan_and_writes_scoreboard(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch) -> None:  # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
+    repo = tmp_path / "repo"
+    source = repo / "src"
+    source.mkdir(parents=True)
+    (source / "vuln.cpp").write_text("#include <string.h>\nvoid f(char *a, char *b) {\n  memcpy(a, b, 10);\n}\n")
+    manifest_path = tmp_path / "benchmark.toml"
+    manifest_path.write_text(
+        """
+name = "cpp-smoke"
+language = "c_cpp"
+
+[source]
+path = "repo"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "unsafe memory copy"
+path = "src/vuln.cpp"
+line = 3
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-memory-copy"
+evidence = "memcpy copies attacker-controlled input"
+""".strip()
+        + "\n"
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setenv("OPENULTRASAST_RUNS_DIR", ".runs")
+
+    assert main(["benchmark", str(manifest_path), "--mode", "quick"]) == 0
+
+    benchmark_dir = sorted((repo / ".openultrasast" / "benchmarks").iterdir())[-1]
+    payload = json.loads((benchmark_dir / "benchmark_result.json").read_text())
+
+    assert payload["benchmark_name"] == "cpp-smoke"
+    assert payload["metrics"]["expected_findings_total"] == 1
+    assert payload["metrics"]["matched_findings_total"] == 1
+    assert payload["metrics"]["recall"] == 1.0
+    assert payload["metrics"]["precision"] == 1.0
+    assert payload["metrics"]["artifact_links"]["findings"].endswith("findings.json")
+
+
+def test_benchmark_matching_uses_function_sink_and_evidence_text(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    manifest_path = tmp_path / "benchmark.toml"
+    repo = tmp_path / "repo"
+    repo.mkdir()
+    manifest_path.write_text(
+        """
+name = "cpp-smoke"
+language = "c_cpp"
+
+[source]
+path = "repo"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "unsafe memory copy"
+path = "src/vuln.cpp"
+line = 9
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-memory-copy"
+function = "copy_user"
+sink = "memcpy"
+evidence = "attacker-controlled memcpy"
+""".strip()
+        + "\n"
+    )
+    manifest = load_benchmark_manifest(manifest_path)
+    run = create_benchmark_run(repo, manifest)
+    findings = [
+        _finding(
+            finding_id="c-unsafe-memory-copy:src/vuln.cpp:9",
+            path="src/vuln.cpp",
+            line=9,
+            function_name="copy_user",
+            rationale="Static pattern c-unsafe-memory-copy matched memcpy with attacker-controlled input.",
+        )
+    ]
+
+    result = evaluate_benchmark(run=run, mode="quick", findings=findings, scan_id="scan-1", scan_run_dir=repo / ".runs" / "scan-1")
+
+    assert result.metrics.matched_findings_total == 1
+    assert result.metrics.missed_findings_total == 0
+    assert result.metrics.false_positive_findings_total == 0
+    assert result.metrics.recall == 1.0
+    assert result.metrics.precision == 1.0
+
+
+def test_benchmark_records_unmatched_findings_as_false_positives(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    manifest_path = tmp_path / "benchmark.toml"
+    repo = tmp_path / "repo"
+    repo.mkdir()
+    manifest_path.write_text(
+        """
+name = "cpp-smoke"
+language = "c_cpp"
+
+[source]
+path = "repo"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "unsafe memory copy"
+path = "src/vuln.cpp"
+line = 9
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-memory-copy"
+sink = "memcpy"
+evidence = "memcpy"
+""".strip()
+        + "\n"
+    )
+    manifest = load_benchmark_manifest(manifest_path)
+    run = create_benchmark_run(repo, manifest)
+    findings = [
+        _finding(
+            finding_id="c-shell-exec:src/other.cpp:12",
+            path="src/other.cpp",
+            line=12,
+            rationale="Static pattern c-shell-exec matched system.",
+        )
+    ]
+
+    result = evaluate_benchmark(run=run, mode="quick", findings=findings, scan_id="scan-1", scan_run_dir=repo / ".runs" / "scan-1")
+
+    assert result.metrics.matched_findings_total == 0
+    assert result.metrics.missed_findings_total == 1
+    assert result.metrics.false_positive_findings_total == 1
+    assert result.metrics.precision == 0.0
+    assert result.false_positives[0].finding_id == "c-shell-exec:src/other.cpp:12"
+    assert result.false_positives[0].reason == "finding did not match any expected benchmark vulnerability"
+
+
+def test_benchmark_ingests_baselines_and_writes_calibration_records(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    manifest_path = tmp_path / "benchmark.toml"
+    baseline_path = tmp_path / "clearwing-normalized.json"
+    repo = tmp_path / "repo"
+    repo.mkdir()
+    baseline_path.write_text(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "findings": [
+                    {
+                        "tool": "clearwing",
+                        "finding_id": "cw-1",
+                        "path": "src/vuln.cpp",
+                        "line": 9,
+                        "rule_id": "c-unsafe-memory-copy",
+                        "cwe": "CWE-120",
+                        "evidence": "memcpy copies attacker-controlled input",
+                    },
+                    {
+                        "tool": "clearwing",
+                        "finding_id": "cw-extra",
+                        "path": "src/other.cpp",
+                        "line": 12,
+                        "rule_id": "c-shell-exec",
+                        "cwe": "CWE-78",
+                        "evidence": "system executes shell command",
+                    },
+                ]
+            }
+        )
+        + "\n"
+    )
+    manifest_path.write_text(
+        """
+name = "cpp-smoke"
+language = "c_cpp"
+baselines = ["clearwing-normalized.json"]
+
+[source]
+path = "repo"
+
+[[expected]]
+cwe = "CWE-120"
+class = "unsafe memory copy"
+path = "src/vuln.cpp"
+line = 9
+rule_id = "c-unsafe-memory-copy"
+sink = "memcpy"
+evidence = "memcpy copies attacker-controlled input"
+""".strip()
+        + "\n"
+    )
+    manifest = load_benchmark_manifest(manifest_path)
+    run = create_benchmark_run(repo, manifest)
+    baseline_findings = load_baseline_findings(manifest_path, manifest)
+    unrelated_finding = _finding(
+        finding_id="c-shell-exec:src/other.cpp:12",
+        path="src/other.cpp",
+        line=12,
+        rationale="Static pattern c-shell-exec matched system.",
+    )
+
+    result = evaluate_benchmark(
+        run=run,
+        mode="quick",
+        findings=[unrelated_finding],
+        scan_id="scan-1",
+        scan_run_dir=repo / ".runs" / "scan-1",
+        baseline_findings=baseline_findings,
+    )
+    write_benchmark_artifacts(run, manifest_path, result)
+
+    payload = json.loads((run.root / "benchmark_result.json").read_text())
+    calibration = json.loads((run.root / "calibration_records.json").read_text())
+    deltas = json.loads((run.root / "external_baseline_deltas.json").read_text())
+    assert payload["metrics"]["missed_findings_total"] == 1
+    assert payload["metrics"]["false_positive_findings_total"] == 1
+    assert payload["false_positives"][0]["finding_id"] == "c-shell-exec:src/other.cpp:12"
+    assert calibration == [
+        {
+            "cwe": "CWE-120",
+            "evidence": "memcpy copies attacker-controlled input",
+            "failed_stage": "benchmark_ground_truth_matching",
+            "next_improvement_candidate": "rules_or_language_hunter",
+            "path": "src/vuln.cpp",
+            "reason": "no OpenUltraSAST finding matched the expected benchmark vulnerability",
+            "vulnerability_class": "unsafe memory copy",
+        }
+    ]
+    assert deltas == [{"extra_findings_total": 1, "matched_expected_total": 1, "missed_expected_total": 0, "tool": "clearwing"}]
+
+
+def _finding(
+    *,
+    finding_id: str,
+    path: str,
+    line: int,
+    rationale: str,
+    function_name: str | None = None,
+) -> StaticFinding:
+    return StaticFinding(
+        finding_id=finding_id,
+        path=path,
+        title="Test finding",
+        severity="high",
+        confidence="medium",
+        evidence_level="static_corroboration",
+        rationale=rationale,
+        line=line,
+        function_name=function_name,
+        reachability_status="unknown",
+        reachability_evidence=[],
+        reachability_conditions=[],
+        tags=[],
+        ranking_priority=1.0,
+    )
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+"""Detection-quality gate for the in-scope languages.
+
+Runs quick-mode scans against the C/C++, Python, and JavaScript benchmark
+corpora and asserts the project goal: at least 90% recall of known
+vulnerabilities and under a 10% false-positive rate per language.
+"""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from openultrasast.benchmark import (
+    BenchmarkRun,
+    evaluate_benchmark,
+    load_benchmark_manifest,
+    resolve_benchmark_source,
+)
+from openultrasast.findings import quick_scan_findings
+from openultrasast.mapping import analyze_entry_points, attach_reachability_hints
+from openultrasast.preprocess import preprocess_repository
+from openultrasast.rank import rank_targets
+
+LANGUAGE_MANIFESTS = {
+    "c_cpp": ["c-cpp-smoke", "cpp-damn-vulnerable"],
+    "python": ["python-web-smoke", "python-vulnerable"],
+    "javascript": ["javascript-node-web-smoke", "javascript-vulnerable"],
+    "java": ["java-web-smoke", "java-spring-boot-vulnerable"],
+}
+
+RECALL_FLOOR = 0.90
+FALSE_POSITIVE_CEILING = 0.10
+
+
+def _quick_scan(target: Path):  # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
+    _, targets = preprocess_repository(target)
+    targets = attach_reachability_hints(targets, analyze_entry_points(target, targets))
+    rankings = rank_targets(targets)
+    return quick_scan_findings(target, targets, rankings)
+
+
+def _language_metrics(manifest_names: list[str]) -> tuple[int, int, int, int]:
+    expected = matched = actual = false_positives = 0
+    for name in manifest_names:
+        manifest_path = Path(f"benchmarks/manifests/{name}.toml")
+        manifest = load_benchmark_manifest(manifest_path)
+        target = resolve_benchmark_source(manifest_path, manifest)
+        findings = _quick_scan(target)
+        run = BenchmarkRun(benchmark_run_id="gate", root=Path("/tmp/gate"), manifest=manifest)
+        result = evaluate_benchmark(run=run, mode="quick", findings=findings, scan_id=None, scan_run_dir=None)
+        metrics = result.metrics
+        expected += metrics.expected_findings_total
+        matched += metrics.matched_findings_total
+        actual += metrics.actual_findings_total
+        false_positives += metrics.false_positive_findings_total
+    return expected, matched, actual, false_positives
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("language", sorted(LANGUAGE_MANIFESTS))
+def test_language_meets_recall_and_false_positive_goal(language: str) -> None:
+    expected, matched, actual, false_positives = _language_metrics(LANGUAGE_MANIFESTS[language])
+
+    recall = matched / expected
+    false_positive_rate = false_positives / actual if actual else 0.0
+
+    assert recall >= RECALL_FLOOR, f"{language} recall {recall:.2%} below {RECALL_FLOOR:.0%} ({matched}/{expected})"
+    assert false_positive_rate < FALSE_POSITIVE_CEILING, (
+        f"{language} false-positive rate {false_positive_rate:.2%} at or above {FALSE_POSITIVE_CEILING:.0%} ({false_positives}/{actual})"
+    )
+
+
+def test_overall_detection_goal_is_met() -> None:
+    totals = [_language_metrics(names) for names in LANGUAGE_MANIFESTS.values()]
+    expected = sum(t[0] for t in totals)
+    matched = sum(t[1] for t in totals)
+    actual = sum(t[2] for t in totals)
+    false_positives = sum(t[3] for t in totals)
+
+    assert matched / expected >= RECALL_FLOOR
+    assert (false_positives / actual) < FALSE_POSITIVE_CEILING
@@ -23,6 +23,27 @@ def test_quick_scan_findings_emit_static_corroboration(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
    assert findings[0].line == 1


+def test_quick_scan_findings_emit_common_cpp_hazards(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    repo = tmp_path / "repo"
+    repo.mkdir()
+    (repo / "vuln.cpp").write_text(
+        "#include <cstring>\n"
+        "#include <cstdlib>\n"
+        "// system(cmd) in a comment is not executable evidence.\n"
+        "void copy(char *src) { char dst[4]; memcpy(dst, src, 16); }\n"
+        "void run(char *cmd) { system(cmd); }\n"
+        "void fmt(char *format, va_list args) { char dst[8]; vsprintf(dst, format, args); }\n"
+    )
+    _, targets = preprocess_repository(repo)
+
+    finding_ids = {finding.finding_id for finding in quick_scan_findings(repo, targets, rank_targets(targets))}
+
+    assert "c-shell-exec:vuln.cpp:3" not in finding_ids
+    assert "c-unsafe-memory-copy:vuln.cpp:4" in finding_ids
+    assert "c-shell-exec:vuln.cpp:5" in finding_ids
+    assert "c-unsafe-format:vuln.cpp:6" in finding_ids
+
+
 def test_findings_and_report_artifacts(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
    repo = tmp_path / "repo"
    repo.mkdir()
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`Vendored verbatim from https://github.com/kiview/damn-vulnerable-spring-boot-app (MIT, (c) 2017 GDATA Advanced Analytics GmbH) as a benchmark corpus for OpenUltraSAST. Source files unmodified; line numbers match upstream.`