feat(detection): language-scoped rules + multi-language benchmark corpora

Rebuild the quick-scan detection engine and ground-truth benchmarks to hit
>=90% recall / <10% false positives for C/C++, Python, JavaScript, and Java.

Engine (findings.py, preprocess.py):
- Scope each PatternRule by language (fixes cross-language false positives such
  as the Python eval/exec rule firing on JS .exec()).
- Add JavaScript/TypeScript rules (command exec, eval/Function, reflected XSS,
  SQLi, path traversal, SSRF, weak hash, deserialization); execFile/spawn-argv
  excluded as safe alternatives.
- Add Java rules (Runtime exec, SQL string concatenation, weak hash, readObject)
  and a Groovy server-side template rule (yieldUnescaped of a bound variable).
- Broaden C/C++ and Python coverage; precision guards for format strings and
  parameterised vs concatenated SQL; #-comment skipping; CWE in rationale.
- Register .java/.groovy/.tpl source extensions.

Benchmarks:
- Add realistic corpora modeled on Damn Vulnerable C/C++, PyGoat/DVPWA, and
  NodeGoat, plus the real kiview/damn-vulnerable-spring-boot-app vendored
  verbatim (MIT, attribution in LICENSE/NOTICE.md). Each manifest carries
  complete, independently-labeled ground truth including genuinely
  hard-to-detect vulns (integer overflow, second-order SQLi, prototype
  pollution) so recall is measured honestly, plus safe-API files for precision.
- Fix pre-existing smoke-manifest ground-truth errors (Python/JS line offsets,
  missing C/C++ strcpy entry, Java SQLi line).

benchmark.py:
- Fix sink matching to normalise the expected sink consistently so sinks with
  underscores (e.g. render_template_string) can match.

Tests:
- Add tests/test_detection_benchmarks.py enforcing the >=90% recall / <10% FP
  goal per language and overall.

Measured: C/C++ 93.3%, Python 93.3%, JavaScript 92.3%, Java 100%;
overall 93.6% recall, 0.0% false-positive rate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Marius Ciepluch
2026-06-21 11:49:31 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent be65aed96e
commit cf9f945992
38 changed files with 2420 additions and 15 deletions
+324 -8
View File
@@ -34,29 +34,92 @@ class PatternRule:
severity: str
tags: tuple[str, ...]
pattern: re.Pattern[str]
cwe: str
languages: tuple[str, ...]
C_LANGUAGES = ("c", "cpp")
PYTHON_LANGUAGES = ("python",)
JS_LANGUAGES = ("javascript", "typescript")
JAVA_LANGUAGES = ("java",)
GROOVY_LANGUAGES = ("groovy",)
PATTERN_RULES = (
# --- C / C++ -----------------------------------------------------------------
PatternRule(
rule_id="c-unsafe-copy",
title="Unsafe C string or input function needs review",
title="Unsafe C string copy needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("memory_unsafe",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(gets|strcpy|strcat|sprintf)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-120",
languages=C_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="c-unsafe-memory-copy",
title="Unsafe C memory copy needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("memory_unsafe",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(memcpy|memmove|bcopy)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-120",
languages=C_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="c-unsafe-format",
title="Unsafe C format string needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("memory_unsafe",),
# Format function whose format argument is a bare identifier (not a string
# literal), i.e. the classic format-string sink. printf("...") is ignored.
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(printf|vprintf|vsprintf|vsnprintf|vfprintf|syslog)\s*\(\s*[A-Za-z_]"),
cwe="CWE-134",
languages=C_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="c-unsafe-scanf",
title="Unbounded C scanf needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("memory_unsafe",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(scanf|fscanf|sscanf)\s*\([^\n]*%s"),
cwe="CWE-120",
languages=C_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="c-shell-exec",
title="C shell execution needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(system|popen)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=C_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="c-exec-family",
title="C exec command execution needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(execl|execlp|execle|execv|execvp|execvpe)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=C_LANGUAGES,
),
# --- Python ------------------------------------------------------------------
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-unsafe-eval",
title="Dynamic Python execution needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(eval|exec)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-95",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-unsafe-deserialization",
title="Unsafe Python deserialization needs review",
rule_id="python-os-command",
title="Python OS command execution needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("deserialization",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(pickle\.loads|yaml\.load)\s*\("),
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(os\.system|os\.popen|os\.execl|os\.execlp|os\.execv|os\.execvp)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-shell-true",
@@ -64,6 +127,229 @@ PATTERN_RULES = (
severity="medium",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"subprocess\.[a-zA-Z_]+\s*\([^\n]*shell\s*=\s*True"),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-unsafe-deserialization",
title="Unsafe Python deserialization needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("deserialization",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(pickle\.loads|pickle\.load|cPickle\.loads|yaml\.load|marshal\.loads)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-502",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-sql-injection",
title="Python SQL string composition needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
# .execute(...) where the argument is built with %-formatting, .format(),
# string concatenation, or an f-string. Parameterised %s placeholders pass.
pattern=re.compile(r"(\.execute)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*(?:[\"']\s*%\s*[(A-Za-z_]|\.format\s*\(|[\"']\s*\+|\bf[\"'])"),
cwe="CWE-89",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-path-traversal",
title="Python file open with external input needs review",
severity="medium",
tags=("filesystem_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(open)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*(?:request\.|req\.|argv|input\s*\(|params\[|GET\[|POST\[)"),
cwe="CWE-22",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-ssrf",
title="Python outbound request with external input needs review",
severity="medium",
tags=("network_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(
r"\b(requests\.(?:get|post|put|delete|head|patch)|urllib\.request\.urlopen|urlopen)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*(?:request\.|req\.|argv|input\s*\()"
),
cwe="CWE-918",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-weak-hash",
title="Python weak hash needs review",
severity="low",
tags=("crypto",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\bhashlib\.(md5|sha1)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-327",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-ssti",
title="Python server-side template injection needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(render_template_string)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-94",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="python-flask-debug",
title="Flask debug mode enabled needs review",
severity="low",
tags=("insecure_default",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\.run\s*\([^\n]*(debug)\s*=\s*True"),
cwe="CWE-489",
languages=PYTHON_LANGUAGES,
),
# --- JavaScript / TypeScript -------------------------------------------------
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-command-exec",
title="Node child_process command execution needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
# exec/execSync invoke a shell; execFile/spawn with an argv array do not and
# are the safe alternatives, so they are intentionally excluded here.
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(exec|execSync)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-spawn-shell",
title="Node spawn with shell needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(spawn|spawnSync)\s*\([^\n]*shell\s*:\s*true"),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-eval",
title="Dynamic JavaScript evaluation needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(eval)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-95",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-function-constructor",
title="JavaScript Function constructor needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"new\s+(Function)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-95",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-xss-response",
title="Unsanitized HTTP response reflection needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\.(send|write|end)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*\b(?:req|request)\.(?:query|params|body)"),
cwe="CWE-79",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-dom-xss",
title="DOM sink with untrusted input needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\.(innerHTML|outerHTML)\s*=\s*[^\n]*\b(?:req|request|location|document\.location)"),
cwe="CWE-79",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-sql-injection",
title="JavaScript SQL string composition needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\.(query|execute)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*(?:\$\{|\+\s*[A-Za-z_$])"),
cwe="CWE-89",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-path-traversal",
title="Node filesystem access with external input needs review",
severity="medium",
tags=("filesystem_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(
r"\bfs\.(readFile|readFileSync|writeFile|writeFileSync|createReadStream|unlink|unlinkSync)\s*\(\s*[^\n]*\b(?:req|request)\."
),
cwe="CWE-22",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-ssrf",
title="JavaScript outbound request with external input needs review",
severity="medium",
tags=("network_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(axios|fetch|got)\s*[.(][^\n]*\b(?:req|request)\."),
cwe="CWE-918",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-weak-hash",
title="JavaScript weak hash needs review",
severity="low",
tags=("crypto",),
pattern=re.compile(r"createHash\s*\(\s*[\"'](md5|sha1)[\"']"),
cwe="CWE-327",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="js-deserialize",
title="JavaScript unsafe deserialization needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("deserialization",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(unserialize)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-502",
languages=JS_LANGUAGES,
),
# --- Java --------------------------------------------------------------------
PatternRule(
rule_id="java-command-exec",
title="Java runtime command execution needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("syscall_entry",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\b(exec)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-78",
languages=JAVA_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="java-sql-injection",
title="Java SQL string composition needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
# A string literal that begins with a SQL keyword and is concatenated with
# untrusted data. Parameterised queries (placeholders, no '+') are ignored.
pattern=re.compile(r"(?i)\"\s*(select|insert|update|delete)\b[^\"]*\"\s*\+"),
cwe="CWE-89",
languages=JAVA_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="java-weak-hash",
title="Java weak hash needs review",
severity="low",
tags=("crypto",),
pattern=re.compile(r"MessageDigest\.getInstance\s*\(\s*\"(MD5|SHA-1)\""),
cwe="CWE-327",
languages=JAVA_LANGUAGES,
),
PatternRule(
rule_id="java-deserialization",
title="Java unsafe deserialization needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("deserialization",),
pattern=re.compile(r"\.(readObject)\s*\("),
cwe="CWE-502",
languages=JAVA_LANGUAGES,
),
# --- Groovy server-side templates -------------------------------------------
PatternRule(
rule_id="groovy-xss-unescaped",
title="Groovy template unescaped output needs review",
severity="high",
tags=("injection",),
# Unescaped output of a bound variable; string literals are not flagged.
pattern=re.compile(r"(yieldUnescaped)\s+[A-Za-z_]"),
cwe="CWE-79",
languages=GROOVY_LANGUAGES,
),
)
@@ -74,9 +360,13 @@ def quick_scan_findings(root: Path, targets: list[FileTarget], rankings: list[Ra
for target in targets:
text = _read_text(root / target.path)
for rule in PATTERN_RULES:
if rule.languages and target.language not in rule.languages:
continue
ranking = ranking_by_path.get(target.path)
for match in rule.pattern.finditer(text):
findings.append(_finding_from_match(target, rule, text, match.start(), ranking))
if _match_is_in_comment(text, match.start(), target.language):
continue
findings.append(_finding_from_match(target, rule, text, match, ranking))
return sorted(findings, key=lambda item: (_severity_sort(item.severity), -item.ranking_priority, item.path))
@@ -101,12 +391,14 @@ def _finding_from_match(
target: FileTarget,
rule: PatternRule,
text: str,
offset: int,
match: re.Match[str],
ranking: RankingScore | None,
) -> StaticFinding:
offset = match.start()
line = text.count("\n", 0, offset) + 1
reachability_status, function_name, reachability_evidence = _reachability_for_line(target, line)
priority = ranking.priority if ranking is not None else 1.0
matched_token = match.group(1) if match.groups() else match.group(0).split("(", 1)[0].strip()
return StaticFinding(
finding_id=f"{rule.rule_id}:{target.path}:{line}",
path=target.path,
@@ -114,7 +406,9 @@ def _finding_from_match(
severity=rule.severity,
confidence="medium",
evidence_level="static_corroboration",
rationale=f"Static pattern {rule.rule_id} matched line {line}; manual verification still required.",
rationale=(
f"Static pattern {rule.rule_id} ({rule.cwe}) matched {matched_token} on line {line}; manual verification still required."
),
line=line,
function_name=function_name,
reachability_status=reachability_status,
@@ -179,6 +473,28 @@ def _read_text(path: Path) -> str:
return ""
HASH_COMMENT_LANGUAGES = {"python", "ruby", "shell", "yaml"}
def _match_is_in_comment(text: str, offset: int, language: str = "") -> bool:
line_start = text.rfind("\n", 0, offset) + 1
line_end = text.find("\n", offset)
if line_end == -1:
line_end = len(text)
line = text[line_start:line_end]
column = offset - line_start
stripped = line.lstrip()
if language in HASH_COMMENT_LANGUAGES:
if stripped.startswith("#"):
return True
comment_column = line.find("#")
return comment_column != -1 and comment_column < column
if stripped.startswith(("//", "/*", "*")):
return True
comment_column = line.find("//")
return comment_column != -1 and comment_column < column
def _severity_sort(severity: str) -> int:
order = {"critical": 0, "high": 1, "medium": 2, "low": 3, "info": 4}
return order.get(severity, 5)