Tasks 1.2, 2.1-2.5 and 6.2 (pair-side filters).
- pairs.py: coverage with a source counts as detection and as leak;
function-scoped matching by line-range containment from the vulnerable
side's parse (unresolvable labels are counted loss, never silent
misses); exact or alias sink matching; weak CWE-only labels never match;
side-by-side inventory/overlay/hunter scorers; per_profile,
per_mechanism, achievable, known_limit and loss payload; loader rejects
unknown mechanism/provenance/split and reserved or missing function
labels on harvested slices; candidate rulesets thread through for the
improve loop.
- overlay.py: OverlayRecord.function (additive) filled from the shared
naming helper in one parse; benchmark.py: ExpectedFinding.mechanism.
- cli pairs: --slice over every slice, --profile, --split, --hunter,
--hunter-model.
- catalogs migrated to the new schema (provenance, split, function,
mechanism, known_limit for owasp-java-hash); baseline recorded in the
spec notes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
Tasks 1.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4 and the data half of 5.3.
- mechanisms.toml: closed vocabulary v1 (20 ids) every expected row cites.
- vibe-py: 35 Real-Vuln-Benchmark pairs (Apache-2.0), human provenance only
because the LLM-generated repositories carry no license (escalated).
- vfc-js: 17 Node fix-commit pairs harvested upstream (MIT/Apache-2.0),
SecBench.js itself is not vendored (no license); sinks derived on 13/17.
- agent-vfc: 29 agent-trailer fixes as catalog-candidates.toml plus
REVIEW.md; the loaded catalog stays empty until a human reviews them.
- datasets.toml and README document every slice and its review status.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
Tasks 3.3 and 4.1.
- vfc curl and openssl-cve-2021-3449 excerpts re-harvested through the
shared library: whole functions with upstream_start headers, the
vendored key redacted code-safely, no truncated bodies.
- vfc/recipes.toml carries mode, fix_path and function anchors;
training/manifest.jsonl regenerated.
- Juliet CWE-121 strcpy pair gets its buffer declarations back so the
vulnerable side is a real overflow again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
Tasks 3.1, 3.2 (harvest library) and the Scorer-owned naming helper.
- semantic/functions.py: one source of function names for scorer, overlay
and catalog generator (declarator wins over parser name; JS/TS bare-param
arrows and undeclared methods are <anon>; C++ Class::method resolves to
its unqualified tail; Perl sub; statements never name).
- benchmarks/pairs/harvest.py: shared library with name / line_range /
hunk / enclosing modes, comment-blind masking (triple-quote aware),
upstream_start headers, code-safe quoted-only redaction.
- benchmarks/pairs/catalog_gen.py: derive function labels and sinks from
the declarator at the mapped sink location, CWE-family sink tokens,
--prune with refusal when nothing derived, fails loud without the
package; vfc/harvest.py and vfc/generate_catalog.py become shims.
- tests/test_pair_harvest.py replaces test_vfc_harvest.py.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
Harvest 176 isolated vuln-vs-fix functions (109 CVEs, 352 training rows)
into benchmarks/pairs/vfc with provenance and a JSONL training manifest.
Score the slice as an honesty dashboard (ousast pairs --slice vfc);
keep the pair gate on the local fixtures only.
Regex inventory stays the proposer. MAP attaches promote/demote/unadjudicated/coverage
from intra-file taint (tree-sitter when a grammar parses, Python ast as last resort).
Deep sandboxes promotions only, ordered by the existing heuristic ranker plus optional
OpenRouter mechanism recall. The SAST pair slice scores overlay outcomes; the stage-1
detection gate and local pair gate stay inventory-only.
Rebuild the quick-scan detection engine and ground-truth benchmarks to hit
>=90% recall / <10% false positives for C/C++, Python, JavaScript, and Java.
Engine (findings.py, preprocess.py):
- Scope each PatternRule by language (fixes cross-language false positives such
as the Python eval/exec rule firing on JS .exec()).
- Add JavaScript/TypeScript rules (command exec, eval/Function, reflected XSS,
SQLi, path traversal, SSRF, weak hash, deserialization); execFile/spawn-argv
excluded as safe alternatives.
- Add Java rules (Runtime exec, SQL string concatenation, weak hash, readObject)
and a Groovy server-side template rule (yieldUnescaped of a bound variable).
- Broaden C/C++ and Python coverage; precision guards for format strings and
parameterised vs concatenated SQL; #-comment skipping; CWE in rationale.
- Register .java/.groovy/.tpl source extensions.
Benchmarks:
- Add realistic corpora modeled on Damn Vulnerable C/C++, PyGoat/DVPWA, and
NodeGoat, plus the real kiview/damn-vulnerable-spring-boot-app vendored
verbatim (MIT, attribution in LICENSE/NOTICE.md). Each manifest carries
complete, independently-labeled ground truth including genuinely
hard-to-detect vulns (integer overflow, second-order SQLi, prototype
pollution) so recall is measured honestly, plus safe-API files for precision.
- Fix pre-existing smoke-manifest ground-truth errors (Python/JS line offsets,
missing C/C++ strcpy entry, Java SQLi line).
benchmark.py:
- Fix sink matching to normalise the expected sink consistently so sinks with
underscores (e.g. render_template_string) can match.
Tests:
- Add tests/test_detection_benchmarks.py enforcing the >=90% recall / <10% FP
goal per language and overall.
Measured: C/C++ 93.3%, Python 93.3%, JavaScript 92.3%, Java 100%;
overall 93.6% recall, 0.0% false-positive rate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
