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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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1c9d7f501f |
docs(status): record that PHP reaches its declared target
Detection is not transfer, and the status says so: the comparison run is what decides M3. But the target that task 13.2 could not reach for months is now found, and the reason is worth keeping where the next reader will see it -- nothing about detection changed, the population became affordable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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5b7288aa58 |
spec(pre-push-safety-net): amend the sequence and declare the shippable scope
Four decisions, recorded after the family detection census and the PHP correction. They change sequence and declared scope; they change no acceptance threshold and no owner boundary. Close M3 at a scale whose questions complete, before anything else. The not-established PHP record came from two instrument defects rather than from the analyser, and bounded to 25 and 100 regions PMPro completes with no timeout and establishes a true-positive SQL injection. Tasks 13.3 and 13.4 carry the replay and the question-completion gap, the second because admission reads outcomes and M4 measures completion at 95 percent. Reserve the untouched M4 population now, in parallel. M4 already permits preparation before the frozen candidate exists and it is the longest lead-time item on the path. Task 15.1. M2 is the only engineering item left and cannot be scoped away: a changed-code transaction spends its whole budget in the build, and meeting the latency gate by analysing less is explicitly not the same result. Declare the v1 advisory scope as the families whose claims can be ADMITTED, which requires the entailed rung: injection, untrusted destination and configuration. Access control is excluded because on an application that splits route from data access the obligation is carried and a carried obligation corroborates by design, so the family would ship as silence. Task 15.2. The risk the amendment does not remove is stated with it: every number so far comes from subjects used to build the analyser, one week of examining two of them surfaced seven false positives, and the first independent evaluation should be expected to fail. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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1f51c82b51 |
fix(census): stop hiding findings behind a question-outcome count, and correct the PHP record
PHP is not silent. Paid Memberships Pro establishes findings, including a true positive, and this project's own instrument is why it looked otherwise. The census harness ordered its verdict on completion before findings, so a family with eighteen findings and no completed question reported "asked but no question completed". Findings are now checked first: a question-outcome count is bookkeeping and cannot hide the thing being censused. NodeGoat and VAmPI were never affected, because they complete every question and their verdicts reached the findings check. The scan summary now also carries the total findings and the outcome status counts, so the two numbers can be seen disagreeing instead of one silently winning. The second mistake was mine rather than the harness's: only the 500-region runs had been looked at, which are the ones that time out. What PHP actually detects on PMPro. At 25 regions, 19 findings in seven minutes with no timeout; at 100 regions, 43 findings in twelve minutes with no timeout. Among them adminpages/ discountcodes.php:749, where sanitize_text_field($_REQUEST["s"]) reaches $wpdb->get_results($sqlQuery, OBJECT) through `$sqlQuery .= "WHERE code LIKE '%$s%' "` with no prepare. That is the class of CVE-2023-23488, which php.toml's own comment names as the reason those WordPress sanitizers are kept out of the sanitizer list. The prediction and the measurement agree. The precision cost beside it is measured too: output encoding reports eighteen findings at 25 regions and the three sampled are all properly escaped, two with esc_attr and one coerced with intval. Those escapers are absent from a sanitizer list that is flat across families, because none of them stops SQL injection. Keeping the injection finding costs this family its precision. The scale limit is roughly one to two seconds per question. 25 and 100 regions complete cleanly; 500 regions asks 2,526 questions, needs more than the 1,800-second ceiling and is killed. Four things are measured NOT to be the problem: the malformed-CPG bug (fixed in 4.0.625, verified on the real trigger file), the dataflow overlay (42 s on the full 637-file graph), the engine version (4.0.625 and 4.0.631 indistinguishable), and the bundled Stripe, Braintree and Twocheckout SDKs under includes/lib that the vendored list does not cover -- that was my hypothesis for the cost and the overlay measures 42 s with them and 37 s without, so it is refuted. What remains is bookkeeping, not detection: questions_completed is zero in every PHP run including the ones that find things, with cross_partition_semantics_unresolved and partition_file_census_incomplete present throughout. The admission policy reads those outcomes. 1,417 tests pass, eighteen skipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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99abe12062 |
measure(php): quantify what remains once the malformed-CPG bug is excluded
The graph bug is fixed and was never what these runs were hitting. joernio/joern#6281, this project's own report, is a PHP `global` inside a closure giving a node two AST parents, which made the dataflow overlay throw and cost the whole graph. Filed against 4.0.623, fixed by #6270 in v4.0.625, which the image has pinned since before any measurement recorded under task 13.2. Verified today on the real trigger rather than a transcription of the repro, which does not reproduce: PMPro's includes/fields.php builds and applies the default overlays cleanly on 4.0.625 and on 4.0.631, files=2 methods=158, no ReachingDefPass assertion. What remains is runtime. A taint batch of 2,526 questions over the 673-file checkout does not complete in thirty minutes. Raising the query ceiling six-fold, from 300 to 1,800 seconds, changed nothing but how long the failure took: query time went from 363 s to 1,874 s, and zero questions completed in both. The eight-way split retry did not rescue it either, finishing its parts in about three minutes against a deadline with 3,300 seconds still on it, which is worth its own look. The engine pin stays at 4.0.625. An image on 4.0.631, today's release, was built and measured and is indistinguishable on this subject: 627.7 s against 619.1 s, 363.4 s against 367.3 s of query time, zero completed in both. There is no demonstrated benefit to weigh against re-verifying every JavaScript and Python measurement on a new engine. Should that change, the bump is three values rather than a port: the upstream AstGenRunner.scala is byte-identical in 4.0.631 and its patch anchor still appears exactly once, so only the jar path, the jar checksum and the source URL tag move. Both are recorded. Also closes task 14.5. Neither prototype pollution nor deserialization has a subject that can answer, each for its own reason. Deserialization's mechanism exists on exactly one available subject and that subject cannot be queried at all. Prototype pollution has no available subject containing the mechanism, so its ability to answer is established on a control instead. 1,417 tests pass, eighteen skipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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3bd844055c |
fix(config): report every permissive setting in a file, not the first one
NodeGoat's server.js configures a permissive session at line 78 and disables template
auto-escaping at line 135, both inside the same function. The arbiter returned one verdict per
question, so the escaping defect that task 14.3 added was detected on every run and reported on
none: which of two real defects a contributor saw depended on where in the file it sat.
Configuration now returns one verdict per setting whose value the model could read. The pipeline
already emitted one finding per entailed answer, so this arbiter was the only place still folding
them to one.
Three boundaries are drawn rather than assumed.
- A setting whose value is COMPUTED stays one verdict per region. That band is a question for the
judge rather than a finding, and returning every undecided setting would multiply model calls
for claims the graph did not establish.
- A call carrying two permissive literals is one finding. cors({origin: true, credentials: true})
is one misconfiguration, not two.
- Config verdicts now carry a path:line:function location. Without one they shared the region's
identity and the deduplicator kept a single finding, so the plural answer collapsed straight
back to one. That is the same gap dominance carried until its findings stopped arriving with no
line at all.
Dominance is left answering once per region, and that is settled rather than pending: its claim is
that a region contradicts itself, so the region is the unit and a second verdict would restate the
same inconsistency. The pipeline now says so where it used to call this a known gap.
Measured: NodeGoat's config_secrets goes from one finding to two, server.js:78 for the session and
server.js:135 for the disabled escaping, with the applied marked.setOptions fix between them
staying silent. VAmPI is unchanged and no other family moved.
1,417 tests pass, seventeen skipped; thirteen Joern-gated query tests pass in the image.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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e6bdac46e2 |
fix(access-control): decide the sibling scope, and see identity a destructuring spelled away
Two of NodeGoat's three corroborated claims were correct code. `const { userId } = req.session`
lowers to a temporary and then a field read, so nothing in the graph spells session.userId by the
time the value reaches dao.getByUserId(userId, ...), and the constraint the handler really applies
was invisible.
The arbiter now walks back three hops over the method's own assignments from the names the
operation is GIVEN, and req.session joins the identity sources. The token is only safe because of
that requirement: what discharges an object-level obligation is that the value passed to the
operation comes from the authenticated context, not that a session is mentioned nearby. A handler
that reads the session for logging and keys its query on a path parameter is the bug this family
exists for, and it stays unguarded.
Two exclusions the measurement forced, each caught by a page whose whole purpose is the leak it
demonstrates.
- A callback is not a constraint. Taking identifiers from the whole argument subtree credited
NodeGoat's memo listing with a discharge, because memosDAO.getAllMemos((err, docs) => ... userId
...) reads every memo in the collection and only RENDERS the session's user. Method references
are excluded from the argument names.
- An assignment is not a dominating guard. The session read dominates the query, so that clause
credited it instead and the memo listing went quiet again. An assignment is a read of the
authenticated context, not a check applied to it, so operator calls are excluded there -- the
same exclusion the sink matcher needed. The leak stays reported.
On NodeGoat displayContributions and displayProfile go silent, the allocations insecure direct
object reference, both benefits pages and the memo listing stay, and the login and signup handlers
become honestly unguarded rather than accidentally cleared by a callback's text. Six corroborated
where there were seven, and a better six. VAmPI is unchanged at two entailed findings.
The sibling scope is decided by measurement and kept at the file. On NodeGoat the region's own
file entails two handlers, both public routes and both false, and no true defect at all. Every
handler in the application entails six: four true, and the same two public routes. Both scopes
carry the same false positives, because neither can tell a public route from a protected one --
a semantic question that is already the corroborated band's residual. With the carried rung capped
the scope changes no verdict, only the witness, so widening it would buy a repository-wide walk
per question and no precision. A public-route discriminator would change that; the file scope is
not what holds this family back.
1,415 tests pass, sixteen skipped; thirteen Joern-gated query tests pass in the image.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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c0427e6ceb |
feat(access-control): model the collection read, by argument shape rather than by name
NodeGoat's documented insecure direct object reference reads with allocationsCol.find(searchCriteria()), and `find` was absent from an operation table holding findOne, findById, findAll and findByPk. The obligation was missing at the commonest read there is, so that defect raised nothing at any point in the pipeline. It was absent for a good reason, and the reason is the argument, not the name. Measured on wp-statistics, a WordPress plugin that ships jQuery: its assets hold 88 calls named find, of which 70 pass a jQuery selector, 13 pass a predicate to Array.prototype.find and 5 pass a selector built at run time by a template literal or a concatenation. None is a collection read. So the obligation is claimed only where the first argument has the shape of a query document. The operation fact states which argument with query_document_arg, and the arbiter that can see argument shapes decides it: no arguments at all, an object literal, or a builder call are claimed; a method reference, a literal, an operator call and a bare identifier are not. Each exclusion is one of the measured classes above rather than a guess. Zero of those 88 calls became an obligated operation, and the zero is measured rather than empty: the same run's census reports 60 files and 4,552 methods, and the files holding those calls are in it. On NodeGoat all three find calls are collection reads and all three are claimed, which raises the obligation at four more handlers -- the allocations handler that takes userId from req.params on an authenticated route, the benefits pages whose isAdmin guard is commented out in the route table, and the memo listing. Seven of fifteen handlers now reach a verdict, all corroborated, none reported without a judge, and the census is unchanged on both subjects. A bare identifier is deliberately not claimed: col.find(query) and arr.find(pred) are the same shape and neither repository measured holds one, so this is a stated false negative rather than an unmeasured false-positive risk. 1,415 tests pass, sixteen skipped; twelve Joern-gated query tests pass in the image. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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102a21fc4e |
feat(access-control): carry the obligation across the route-and-DAO split
The census measured this family completing 35 questions on NodeGoat with no obligation raised anywhere: every modelled data operation lives in app/data/*-dao.js, none in a route handler file, and operations were scoped to the region's own file. The family had nothing to be right or wrong about. The obligation now follows the one named call the handler writes, out of the region's file and no further. How it is followed is the point. jssrc2cpg does not resolve allocationsDAO.getByUserIdAndThreshold(...) to the DAO body: the callee is an external stub with no code. That stub's fullName records where the member was written, so the implementation is reached by the graph's own provenance rather than by a repository-wide name guess, which is the false positive the file scope was closed against. A control asserts it: a third module defining a member of the same name that nothing imports is not attributed. A row is attributed to the region's DECLARED function, which is what lets a question about displayAllocations match a graph that holds a <lambda>. A carried row is also checked for a guard at the CALL, because that is where a handler establishes who is asking. The method holding a carried operation joins the question's context scope, so the module holding the query cannot change under a claim that depends on it without the change being attributed. The witness names both sites and the finding is located at the call, which is the line a contributor changed. A carried obligation corroborates, it does not entail, and that was measured rather than assumed. Entailing it reported handleSignup, which looks a user up by name to check the name is free during registration and is public by design, because two authenticated siblings in the same file pass req.session.userId into the same module. The entailed rung's justification is that one FILE contradicts itself, same file and same trust context; carried, the compared operations live in a data-access module that handlers of different trust contexts share. The corroborated band already asks the right residual: does this operation require a check, or is the route legitimately public? Measured on NodeGoat: 15 handlers asked, obligations raised at zero before and six now, three reaching a verdict, all corroborated, none reported without a judge. VAmPI unchanged at two entailed findings, because it keeps handler and query in one file and carries nothing. What this does not reach is recorded, not implied. NodeGoat's documented insecure direct object reference still raises nothing, because its module reads with allocationsCol.find(...) and find is not a modelled operation: Array.prototype.find and jQuery's .find are everywhere, so it needs an argument-shape discriminator and its own measurement (task 14.8). Two of the three corroborated claims are correct code whose identity read a destructuring spelled away, and the cross-file contradiction that would entail the real defect needs a sibling-scope decision (task 14.7). 1,415 tests pass, fifteen skipped; eleven Joern-gated query tests pass in the image. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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f31ef862a7 |
fix(output-encoding): ask about the server half, and say what the family cannot decide
The census recorded this family completing 44 questions on a Node application and finding
nothing, which is what a client-only vocabulary must do there: all six declared sinks were DOM
sinks. NodeGoat's cross-site scripting is server-side.
Decision: the family asks about a value reaching a rendering call, and states in its own
declaration that it cannot decide template-mediated escaping. Whether res.render is safe depends
on the engine's autoescape setting and on the template's markup, neither of which is at the
call, so res.render is not a sink and the family's limits field says so. A new CWE-79 sink
covers res.write, res.end, res.send and the response.* spellings; res.json stays out because an
application/json body is not a document.
Template auto-escaping is claimed where its evidence is, as a configuration defect:
swig.setDefaults, nunjucks.configure and marked.setOptions are security settings now.
It establishes a finding: app/routes/research.js:25, model_entailed,
`req.query.url + req.query.symbol -> res.write(body)`. The handler fetches a URL the caller
chooses and writes the response body into a text/html response, so the document served from
this origin is the attacker's. The record states how coarse the step is: the path from url to
body runs through the client's callback parameter, which the graph treats as reachable from the
call's arguments, so the conclusion rests on the call's semantics rather than on what the graph
established. Five of seven families now establish findings.
Four defects were found on the way, three of them false positives this change would otherwise
have shipped.
- The permissive-value set was shared across every setting, while a boolean's polarity belongs
to the setting: true leaves the door open in cors({origin: true}) and closes it in
swig.setDefaults({autoescape: true}). Adding the template engines would have reported the fix
as the defect on the line that offers it. ConfigSpec now carries per-setting values, and
Jinja2's Environment moved out of Python's shared list for the same latent reason.
- config.sc matched a dotted setting on its trailing segment alone, so marked.setOptions would
have claimed an editor's setOptions. dominance.sc already required the qualifier.
- taint.sc asked its flow query of every argument including the receiver at index 0. On a
response sink the receiver is the response object, so res.end() -- which takes no data -- was
reported exactly like the res.write(body) two lines above it. Flows now use the real
arguments, as arity already did.
- The arbiter sorted a file's settings by line number as TEXT, so line 126 preceded line 78 and
which setting a file reported depended on the spelling of its line numbers.
Template escaping disabled at server.js:135 is detected, measured model_entailed against the
real query and the real arbiter, and still not reported: the arbiter returns one verdict per
question and that file has an earlier permissive setting. Task 14.6 carries it rather than
hiding it.
1,415 tests pass, thirteen skipped; nine Joern-gated query tests pass in the image.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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57f5a3f0dc |
fix(semantic-facts): give untrusted destination the clients a Node server calls
The family census recorded this family completing 44 questions on NodeGoat, finding the open redirect, and having no way to ask about the repository's documented SSRF: needle.get on a query-string URL at app/routes/research.js:16. A thin vocabulary is a silent false negative. One data change, no query change. The declared set now covers axios, got, needle, request, superagent, unirest, undici and fetch as bare module tokens, plus http.get, http.request, https.get and https.request dotted. Bare is the documented call form of each module and covers its verb methods too, since a token matches word-bounded against the callee and axios is bounded inside axios.get; axios.get and axios.post are dropped as subsumed rather than unwanted. http and https stay dotted because their namespace also holds createServer, and a bare token would have claimed every server a repository starts. The request is now reported at app/routes/research.js:16, model_entailed, witness `req.query.url + req.query.symbol -> needle.get(url, ...)`. This family goes from one finding to two on NodeGoat, every other family is unchanged, and 299 of 299 questions still complete. Measured on that graph, needle matches exactly one call and the eleven other clients match none in first-party or vendored code, so NodeGoat shows the gap closing and cannot show those clients' noise. A control asserts both halves. A handler calling axios.get with a literal and needle.get with req.query.url reports the tainted client alone, and it reads the shipped vocabulary rather than a copy, so removing the client fails it. The CWE-601 redirect entry is untouched: a Location-header redirect is value-shaped and stays outside what this family asks. 1,411 tests pass, eleven skipped; seven Joern-gated query tests pass in the image. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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4e2619e248 |
feat(pre-push-safety-net): census the declared families and fix a sink matched in a comment
Seven vulnerability families are declared and two had been proven. The census asks each of them, on whole checkouts of NodeGoat and VAmPI, whether it establishes anything at all, and reports a family that answered and found nothing separately from one that was never asked. Four establish findings: injection, access_control, config_secrets and untrusted_destination. Output encoding, path, prototype and deserialization establish nothing on either subject. All 299 NodeGoat and 35 VAmPI questions completed, so the silences are answers. Three of those silences are diagnosed gaps, not clean code. NodeGoat's documented SSRF calls needle.get, which the sink vocabulary does not hold. Its XSS is server-rendered, and output encoding declares only DOM sinks, so no question it can ask could have found it. Its two access-control defects raise no obligation at all: measured with the real dominance query, every modelled data operation lives in app/data/*-dao.js and none in a route handler file, while the family scopes operations to the region's own file. Tasks 14.2 to 14.5 carry each gap; none is fixed here. The census also found a false positive and it is fixed. NodeGoat's only prototype report was the word `set` inside `// set these up in case we have an error case`: the matched node is the <operator>.assignment holding the entire 1,000-character signup handler, and sinkMatches searched a node's whole text. It now confines the text clause to the callee and excludes operator nodes. Fourth instance of this bug class after fgets/gets, resolve/resolveUrl and user/users. Measured on NodeGoat's non-vendor calls, injection sinks fall 28 to 3, prototype 13 to 2 and untrusted destination 26 to 7, with no true positive lost; req.query had been an injection sink because `query` is word-bounded inside it. Witnesses now name the sink call rather than the assignment that contained it. 1,411 tests pass, ten skipped; the six Joern-gated query tests pass in the image, including a new one that fails on the shape this fixed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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fc5dc453b6 |
test(ranker): every question now completes on the real case (M1b 12.4)
Measured after scoping a registration-only region to its file. M1a, before group 12 0 of 436 head questions completed after per-family context 298 of 436 after region attribution 299 of 299, and 299 of 299 on the base The count falls from 436 to 299 because the mis-attributed function-scoped regions in a route-registration module are gone, replaced by file-scoped questions the graph can answer. Nothing is unresolved on either revision. Detections are unchanged: the vulnerable revision is still new with operation_absent_from_comparable_base, the fixed twin analyzed and quiet, the unchanged revision not a regression. What remains is recorded limits rather than failures: 210 bounded-reachability boundaries, each owned by the question that reported it, and one vendor exclusion. Neither blocks a comparison. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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ca2c3a8b5f |
test(contributor-scan): record the group 12 end state (M1b 12.1-12.3)
Final verification of the three security capability fixes on the pinned revisions. head questions completed 205 -> 298 of 436 base questions completed 436 of 436 access control completed 0 -> 52 context_projection_unavailable 116 -> 0 context_scope_empty 138 -> 0 Every remaining unresolved question now reports context_function_unresolved and names the function its file does not define, so nothing is unresolved for a reason the tool could not explain. That is a region-attribution question for the ranker, not a limit of what the engine can establish. Detections are unchanged: the vulnerable revision is still new with operation_absent_from_comparable_base and every verdict entry holds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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57d6ddcbba |
test(pre-push-safety-net): record the M1b exit run (task 10.9)
All three pinned NodeGoat revisions replayed through the production rules with exact pins and reopened source receipts. The vulnerable revision reports all three sites new with operation_absent_from_comparable_base, and admission now rejects on capability_unavailable alone: dependency_unresolved is gone, which verifies 10.7 on real data since those gaps belonged to unrelated questions. The fixed twin is analyzed and quiet with three base-only findings. The unchanged revision reports all three sites unchanged with base locations resolved to the same lines. Every finding carries its question, the engine-reported method and its witness. The head census is the complete 44 files and all 436 base questions complete. Zero admitted defects on every revision. All five vetoes M1a recorded are repaired, plus two the repairs exposed. What remains is recorded rather than repaired: 231 head questions still report an incomplete change context from families whose queries export none, which did not block this case and whose families stay experimental, and the vendor exclusion and correspondence ambiguity remain reported as the limits they are. M1b is not yet verified. The milestone also asks for a developer-readable finding carrying a supported security consequence and a concrete repair direction, and both are owned by an evaluated capability declaration that is deliberately empty. Writing that text without a declaration is what admission exists to prevent, so task 10.10 renders it through an explicitly experimental declaration with eligibility still disabled. Runtime, independent qualification and rollout all remain NO-GO. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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b8b46f1c19 |
test(pre-push-safety-net): record the M1b production comparison on NodeGoat
Rerunning the three pinned revisions after tasks 10.1-10.6 shows the production comparison classifying all of them with no lifting, and agreeing exactly with the recorded view. That agreement is the point: the vetoes M1a recorded were repaired rather than bypassed. The vulnerable revision is new with operation_absent_from_comparable_base, and the three eval witnesses at contributions.js lines 32 to 34 are attributed to the change that introduced them. The fixed twin is analyzed and quiet with three base-only findings. The unchanged revision is unchanged. In M1a every one of the 436 questions was demoted on both sides and production reported witness_identity_unresolved on every finding. All three artifacts still report finding_status none with zero admitted defects. Admission rejects on capability_unavailable, the deliberate eligibility gate, and on dependency_unresolved, which the rerun exposed as coarse plumbing: the runner passes every coverage reason as every candidate's dependency gaps. That is now task 10.7, ahead of M4, since it would block admission forever once capabilities qualify. It is not a comparison failure and not an M1b exit blocker. Three comparisons on one inspected teaching repository under a development budget. No capability enabled, no alert emitted, no latency claim. Runtime, independent qualification and rollout all remain NO-GO. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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86980d8aa0 |
feat(pre-push-safety-net): measure M1b step 1 and record the inventory prerequisite
Rerunning the three NodeGoat revisions after tasks 10.1-10.3 shows the recorded view now classifies the case: the vulnerable revision reaches new with operation_absent_from_comparable_base, and the unchanged revision reaches unchanged with its base location resolved to the same lines. Both previously stopped at operation_correspondence_unresolved and witness_identity_unresolved. The rerun also caught a defect in the repair itself: the new novelty reason was missing from the admission allowlist, so admission rejected the candidate as change_unsupported. Fixed with a control. The production path is still blocked by the last two vetoes, and the measurement shows neither can be scoped or relaxed as the plan described. A taint answer reports traced flows, so an absent row means either that the operation does not exist in the base or that no traced flow reached it. dynamic_external_or_depth_context_unresolved exists to stop the second being read as the first, and removing it would turn a wrong absence into a wrong new finding. It is also computed over every in-scope method, so on any real Express application it is always true and can never be discharged, which is why the tool reports nothing on real projects. The resolution is new evidence rather than a relaxed rule: export the operations the query actually enumerated, separately from the flows it traced, so absence is established from the inventory while a traced-flow claim still requires complete reachability. That is now task 10.4, ahead of the two vetoes it unblocks, and it adds no detector, alias resolver or second source IR. 1,348 tests passed, nine skipped. No capability enabled; rollout stays NO-GO. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5
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3224884d8f |
feat(pre-push-safety-net): record admission vetoes and meet M1a on NodeGoat
Add group 9 to the approved task plan as the bounded owner amendment release milestone M1a requires, implement the task-local recorded-veto evaluation flag, and run the three pinned NodeGoat revisions under it. The flag re-runs the production comparison and admission over a lifted copy of the same evidence and records each veto instead of applying it. Recognized completeness vetoes are lifted and logged; failures never are, because silence from a failure is not a quiet fixed twin. It is off by default, accepted only on explicit base/head replay, refused in Git stdin mode, labels every payload it produces, and admits no defect even when a lifted candidate otherwise would. M1a outcome, inside its one-week box and with expectations frozen on disk first: the three entailed <lambda>2 witnesses are present at contributions.js 32-34; the fixed twin was genuinely analyzed and quiet, answering its target question with zero rows and no deadline reason while the same findings appear as base-only; the unchanged revision was analyzed and recorded unchanged. The kill criterion did not trigger. Five vetoes fired and were recorded. M1a also corrected the diagnosis: with all five lifted the detection still stops at operation_correspondence_unresolved, because a newly introduced operation sits on a changed line and has no base anchor. The unchanged revision resolves its base location on the same lines and classifies as unchanged, which isolates correspondence as the mechanism. That fifth veto was not in the earlier four-veto diagnosis and is now M1b's central repair. Diagnosis only. No defect admitted, no capability enabled, no gate changed, no latency claim; the 900-second development budget cannot measure the hook gate. Rollout and task 8.3 remain NO-GO. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius CiepluchandClaude Fable 5.1
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8b66d5cb75 |
spec(pre-push-safety-net): record M1–M5 release milestones and split M1 into M1a/M1b
Add release-milestones.md as the executable outcome contract: prove one useful Node detection, make it fast, verify PHP/Python transfer, qualify on untouched cases, then enable a narrow advisory rollout. Link it from the roadmap, safety-net steering, requirements, tasks, status and spec.json. Split M1 after review. The raw NodeGoat <lambda>2 witness already exists in the 2026-09-14 post-census bundle; four admission vetoes discard it. M1a runs the vulnerable/fixed/unchanged revisions under a task-local experimental flag that records each veto instead of applying it, with a one-week box and a kill criterion if the fixed twin is not quiet. M1b repairs only the vetoes that fired and reruns through production rules. Existing approvals and thresholds unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo |
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Marius Ciepluch
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1ad472c68d | test(release): measure repaired reuse and local Joern lifecycle | ||
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Marius Ciepluch
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04f888019b | release: prepare v1.2.0-alpha.1 and record rollout blockers |