7 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Marius Ciepluch	7e3b3bbc8b	docs(pre-push-safety-net): record approved design and implementation plan	2026-09-12 18:27:14 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5	bccc89be52	docs(specs): approve the group-2 amendments, generate finding-feedback-loop requirements ... **Amendments approved and folded into the numbered requirements** rather than left as a proposal appended to the file: - Req 5.5 — a report proportionate to the evidence behind a finding. A rule whose only evidence is a text match is summarised past a stated number of sites; a finding a proposer reasoned about keeps its detail whatever its rung; nothing leaves findings.json, which is the record a baseline is compared against. - Req 5.6 — a family that cannot decide a class states the limit, and no scan presents an absence of findings as evidence of absence. - Req 4.6 — at least one pinned checkout carries a vulnerability a family can decide in principle, so a scan producing nothing is distinguishable from an engine that cannot see. Each carries the evidence that produced it, and the amendment record keeps what group 2 confirmed rather than changed: Req 8's overfitting warning earned its place twice, Req 3.3's honesty counters made an invisible failure visible, and Req 11.2's gates held through all nine defect fixes. Req 5.5 is half implemented. Task 2.11 made pattern matches proportionate; task 2.17 now carries the model layer's own suspicion band, which is 38 of vampi's 60 findings and is an enumerated candidate the graph could NOT decide with a judge's opinion attached -- a pattern match with an opinion, not a reasoned claim, and weaker evidence than the obligations checker's structural output. **finding-feedback-loop requirements generated**, seven of them: a dismissal file the developer owns and the tool never writes, rejecting one without a reason because a suppression list without reasons is a graveyard nobody can audit; a counter-example ledger whose entries are runnable regression cases, grouped by shared cause so a recurring bug is visible as one; a model that proposes a cause into a review queue and decides nothing, validated by reverting the three known matcher fixes and measuring what it recovers; dismissals plus a recipe's known vulnerabilities as one split evaluation set with the holdout unread and asserted; evolution scoped to the judge and residual questions with the fact tables off limits to any automated means; an adoption that reports what it traded and reverts itself when net-negative; and the loop inheriting the corpus blind spot, so its evidence base is repositories and it states how few it has. Phase: requirements, generated, not approved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG	2026-09-09 13:40:45 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5	72932ed879	docs(specs): group 2 feedback as amendments, and lift out what was never specified ... Following the Kiro workflow rather than continuing to write tasks. **A workflow error, corrected.** Two task groups -- a counter-example ledger, and per-repository evolutionary prompting so developers can commit dismissals and evolve the harness -- were appended to contributor-scan's tasks.md on 2026-09-09 without passing requirements or design. They are not refinements of scan integration; they are a different feature, and writing them as tasks skipped the two phases that decide whether a feature is shaped right. They are lifted to .kiro/specs/finding-feedback-loop/, at brief, unapproved. That brief states the boundary the design turns on: an optimiser may evolve the QUESTION (the judge and residual prompts, which are how we ask) and never the FACTS (tables, rulesets, the declared policy file, which are what we claim). The closed-loop leak measured on 2026-09-05 is why -- five of eleven candidate shapes were taught by the holdout pairs they then recovered, reporting a -0.059 holdout Youden as +0.059. It also states the acceptance test for the model's role: revert the three matcher fixes and see whether the grouping rediscovers the known causes. **Three requirements amendments, drafted and unapproved**, at the end of contributor-scan/requirements.md: - Req 5 should state what a report may repeat. libpng emitted 198 findings and nothing in the spec forbade it. Task 2.11 fixed pattern noise; the model layer's own suspicion band is still 38 of vampi's 60, and it is the same epistemic class -- an enumerated candidate the graph could not decide and an LLM affirmed. - A family that cannot decide a class must say so. c/memory scored zero true positives on 89k lines of C for a structural reason, and a silent scan reads as a clean bill of health. Worse than noise because it is quiet, and the one failure mode the rung ladder does not already guard. - Req 4.1 is satisfied by a checkout that cannot demonstrate detection at all -- libpng's CVE is out of family and no version of it can be otherwise. It should require one that can. And what group 2 confirmed rather than changed: Req 8's overfitting warning stopped a rule being extended until one repository was clean and forced the access-control work onto pairs nobody tuned against; Req 3.3's honesty counters are what made a budget stopping free work visible at all; and Req 11.2's byte-identical gates held through all nine defect fixes, which says from the other side that the corpus could not have caught any of them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG	2026-09-09 13:36:33 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5	8663c1a5b3	feat(contributor-scan): 1.1 regions from entry points, 1.2 the repository driver ... Pair scoring could rely on a labelled function; a contributor cannot supply one -- which code is risky is the question they are asking. Regions now come from entry points, with a file-level fallback that says it is one, and each carries only the families its shape and language admit. Ranking uses what EntryPointRecord already decided (access_level, trust_boundary) rather than a second opinion computed from the same evidence. A family is offered only where its arbiter could answer: access_control needs a handler, so a library file with no entry point is not asked about obligations it has no siblings to be inconsistent with. The driver makes the two costs that were free at pair scale explicit. ONE CPG per repository, reused across regions -- a build is 5-30s on a forty-line excerpt and per-region builds would make this unusable. And a budget that is a TOTAL for the run rather than the enumerator's per-region cap of eight, spent highest-rank-first, with whatever it does not reach counted into regions_unjudged. A tool that silently analyses a tenth of a repository and reports a clean result is worse than one that says what it skipped. Two flaws the tests caught, both mine and both about ownership: the budget counted calls by reading a client's own usage log, so it silently never tripped for a client that keeps none -- the driver now counts its own spend through a wrapper; and the driver trusted its caller to have sorted, when the order the budget is spent in belongs to whoever holds the budget. The third was worse and only surfaced because a test failed for the right reason: the driver passed candidates=() and never enumerated, so a repository scan would have reported only what the arbiters establish unaided and never populated the suspicion band -- which supplied 15 of 26 findings in the pair measurement. It enumerates now. Sibling audit (Req 8.5) done before writing: family routing lives in exactly one production place, pipeline._arbitrate, dispatching on spec type. regions_for returns family names and the driver resolves specs, so that stays true. 750 passing, mypy clean over 96 files, gates byte-identical, zero orphans. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG	2026-09-09 07:28:30 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5	4e4681f162	docs(contributor-scan): design and tasks -- wire it, then measure on a real repo ... Requirements approved, design and tasks generated. 47 criteria, all traced; 13 tasks in 6 groups. The design is deliberately conservative. The model layer joins as ONE STAGE INSIDE MAP, beside the obligations checker it most resembles -- which already takes entry points, produces findings and merges them. Findings are added, never substituted; the pattern and overlay paths keep working; a machine without Joern scans exactly as it does today. Nothing here is allowed to make the tool worse for someone who does not have the engine. Two decisions carry the most weight. One CPG per scan rather than per region: a build is 5-30s on an excerpt and is the dominant cost at repository scale, so per-region builds would make this unusable. And one total budget rather than the enumerator's per-region cap of eight, which is meaningless across thousands of regions; the budget is spent highest-rank-first and whatever it does not reach is counted and reported, never silently truncated. Task 2.2 is a go/no-go and comes before shipping: the first scan of a pinned known-vulnerable checkout is a measurement nobody has taken, and if one CPG per repository proves infeasible the region and budget design changes shape. Better to learn that before groups 3-6 are built on it. Group 5 (corpus) is last on purpose. The binding constraint today is reachability, not corpus size -- 198 of 238 OWASP pairs went unvendored because volume without readability makes every number worse. The task preamble carries the predecessor's two hard-won habits: audit sibling paths in the same commit as any routing or matching change (five bugs shared that shape, each caught by a measurement rather than a check), and run the whole CI list rather than the parts one remembers (CI was red for a session because `ruff check` passing was taken as evidence for `ruff format --check`). Not approved for implementation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG	2026-09-09 07:17:20 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5	14ca0a96ce	docs(contributor-scan): requirements, including the corpus asks I first missed ... 10 requirements, 46 criteria. A NEW spec rather than an amendment to model-grounded-detection, which is complete and closed. Req 1-8 cover the gap that prompted it: the model layer has zero production callers, so ousast scan must use it (1), regions must come from entry points rather than a labelled function (2), ranking and budget must work at repository scale where the enumerator's per-region cap of eight is meaningless (3), the performance envelope must be measured on a real checkout (4), output must be actionable (5), packaging must be built and verified rather than merely defined (6), the two deferred decisions must close (7), and the honesty disciplines carry forward (8). Req 9 and 10 were added after the maintainer asked whether their requests had been captured. They had not been -- I folded the corpus asks implicitly into "run against a known-vulnerable repository", which is not the same thing. Now explicit: a PHP/WordPress slice (php2cpg works once an interpreter is present, which the image provides, and plugin CVEs are overwhelmingly the families the model arbitrates well); real-world C library CVEs -- libpng, image libraries, OpenSSH, libpam, kernel modules -- gated on the memory decision, because until it closes they would join 173 pairs already idle; more vibe-code pairs, since that slice is where the stated audience works and it is only 35 pairs; and regression tuning over a pinned large-repository baseline, which is the thing pair scoring structurally cannot see. Req 9.4 carries today's lesson: verify on a sample that the model can READ a slice before vendoring it. The OWASP harvest found 238 pairs and vendored 40 for exactly that reason. Not approved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG	2026-09-08 19:42:53 +02:00
Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5	41266ce472	docs(contributor-scan): brief -- the model layer is complete and unshipped ... Asked what the spec state was and whether anything was forgotten. It was, and it is the largest thing outstanding: model-grounded-detection is 16/16 tasks complete and its arbiter measures 86.7% pair-correct at 6.7% leak, but the model layer has ZERO production callers. `ousast scan` still runs preprocess -> map -> overlay -> obligations -> regress -> report and touches none of it. Every number quoted today came from a measurement harness in a scratch directory. That is a scope gap in the predecessor spec rather than a slip in executing it: there was never a task saying "make this reachable", and its Req 11.2 (gates stay byte-identical) is satisfied PRECISELY BECAUSE nothing is wired. The spec is complete and the feature is unshipped, both at once. A new spec rather than an amendment, because the predecessor is coherent and closed -- it built an arbiter and measured it -- while this is a different question: making it something a developer runs on a repository they are about to contribute to. What it covers, in the order it bites: scan integration; whole-repo scanning (entry-point region selection, ranking across thousands of candidates, a budget policy -- the enumerator caps at 8 per region, meaningless at repo scale -- and a performance envelope never measured); running against a known-vulnerable checkout, since the 176 real-world CVE pairs are single-function excerpts that exercise none of it; the deferred memory decision, with 173 of those pairs idle behind a stub tier; and retiring evidence_level. It also records what was built outside any spec: the pipeline itself, the ops work (one image, compose, shell wrappers, pyinfra -- with the Docker image never actually built), and the corpus additions. And it carries the known limits forward rather than losing them: the flat permissive_values list that cannot tell debug=True from httponly=True, interprocedural resolution as the most repeated miss cause, and the five bugs that shared one shape -- a taint-specific assumption applied to every family, each caught by a measurement rather than a check. Not approved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG	2026-09-08 19:40:38 +02:00