Off every active line (PATHFINDER-2026-10-13/03-unified-proposal.md, cuts). Deleted: the four hunter tools no caller enables (read_definition, entry_points, flows, obligations) with their schemas and dispatch, the dead mapping branch of find_refs; 20 functions whose only caller was one test (mapping task records, compute_ranking_metrics, build_quick_hunter_prompt, validate_evidence_transition, should_fuse, harness processors, rank_targets_with_model, model/report slice rendering, taxonomy hierarchical/related, config_value.verdict, taint.verdict, roles.load_roles, features.language_of and build_for_scan, folds.leave_one_*, features.recorded_case, search BatchExecutor and the three __main__ shims, delivery.put_input); the receiver delivery mode of the plane. push_inputs.py moved to benchmarks/push. memory.purge stays: the live-S3 test cleanup uses it. Net: 2,730 lines deleted, 207 added. 473 targeted tests passed; 3,282 tests collect. breadth.toml records the removals. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
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Memory and detection
This page shows how the system's memory is meant to improve decisions on code it has not seen. It
describes the design of the learned decision engine (src/openultrasast/learn/).
The engine is in development and not adopted. No scan, pre-push check or report uses it today. Every user-facing decision is still the deterministic one described in Scanning and Architecture. The engine's commands and status are on Decision engine. The store itself is on Memory.
From instruments to a decision
flowchart TD
inst["Instruments: quick rules, Joern engine, verify passes and agree, model roles, repo facts"] --> feat["Feature record per candidate: path, function, family"]
feat --> prof["Input profile v1: engine and function length withheld"]
lab["Labels from ground truth: pairs, populations v1/v2, advisory fixes, adjudications"] --> ex["Example rows in memory: label + features + excerpt"]
prof --> ret["Retrieval: signal profile, then code embeddings"]
ex --> ret
ret --> bnd{"Evaluation boundary"}
bnd --> prog["Compiled AI classifier: instruction, demonstrations, up to 6 examples, candidate"]
prog --> score["Score s: mean over k samples"]
score --> cal["Platt calibration, cross-fitted on held-out repositories"]
cal --> op{"Operating point"}
op -- "calibration holds and precision reachable" --> block["BLOCK"]
op -- "otherwise" --> adv["ADVISORY"]
The plane task uses learn/features.py to build candidate feature records from delivered artifacts.
Integration into scan and pre-push is still ahead.
1. Instruments produce signals, not verdicts
Each instrument contributes one block to a candidate's feature record (learn/schema.py,
INSTRUMENTS). The blocks are:
language;quick(quick rules);engine(the Joern model layer);facts(repo facts, such as callers and function span);source;entry_points;roles(model source, sink and sanitizer roles);delta;verifyandagree(the plane's verify passes and their agreement);model_sinks(the archived stage-1 classifier,benchmarks/archive/model_sinks.py). Its logic now lives inplane/tasks/roles.py.
A candidate is (path, function, family) of one repository and pin. At least one instrument must have
emitted a signal of that family there (learn/features.py).
An instrument may not run, may have no coverage, or may fail. It then records that state (none,
failed, not_applicable), never a zero. So "silent" and "did not look" stay distinguishable. No
instrument decides alone.
Why profile v1 withholds the engine and function length. A leak audit found that both separate the
vulnerable and fixed sides of a pair by construction (ousast learn audit-leaks,
benchmarks/measurements/2026-10-01-decision-engine-leak-audit/):
- a fix removes a sink;
- a guard lengthens the function.
That holds on the pair corpus, not on unseen code. So INPUT_PROFILES["v1"] drops the engine block
and facts.function_lines from prompts and from the retrieval distance.
2. Labels come from ground truth only
ousast learn labels (learn/labels.py) reads only the sources on a fail-closed allow-list
(learn/sources.toml). The sources are population-v1, population-v2, dev-php (reviewed recipe
sites), pairs, advisory-fixes, adjudications and assumed_benign. A file the list does not name
is refused before it is opened. The reserved population v3 is excluded unread.
- Positives are declared sites and the vulnerable side of a fix.
- Negatives are two kinds:
- the same function on the fixed side, where the fix changed it;
- recorded
False/FPadjudications.
- A vulnerable-pin candidate matching no site is unlabelled, never negative.
- Assumed benign (maintainer decision 2026-09-30) covers ordinary non-security commits of the
training repositories. Each is at least 90 days from any fix. No later security commit touches the
same files.
- They are their own source with weight 0.5, conditional on a signal at the tip and none at the base.
- They are reported separately, never merged with verified negatives.
- Plane verdicts are features, not labels. "Agreed", "rejected" or "disputed" is the output of the
verify instrument. It enters the record as the
verifyandagreeblocks. Using it as a label would teach the engine to reproduce the plane, mistakes included. So "rejected by the plane" is never a negative (learn/labels.py: "A plane verdict ... is never a label").
ousast learn memory build joins each label with the candidate's feature record and an excerpt of
its function. It stores one example row (no rationale) plus the excerpt blob.
3. Retrieval of similar labelled cases
learn/retrieve.py uses no model. It works in three steps:
- Signal profile. It computes a Gower distance (a distance for mixed-type features) over the allow-listed features of the active profile, per instrument block. Missing values are explicit: a different state counts as distance 1. The nearest 40 examples of the candidate's family go on. So do the nearest 40 of other families.
- Code embeddings. It re-ranks by cosine over the excerpts' embeddings. The embeddings come from
OpenAI
text-embedding-3-smallthrough OpenRouter (1,536 dimensions, cached by excerpt hash). The formula isr = 0.5 (1 - D) + 0.5 cos. Without the candidate's vector, the retrieval uses signals only. - Balance. It picks six examples:
- at most half per label;
- at most 2 per repository group;
- at most 2 contrast examples from other families.
The evaluation boundary. eligible() is the only way an example enters a prompt. This holds for
retrieved examples and compiled demonstrations alike. An eligible example is never:
- from the candidate's own repository group;
- from a group the fold evaluates;
- from the held-out source or framework;
- a near-duplicate of the candidate (cosine >= 0.98), outside deployment.
The program repeats the check on the ids it actually rendered, before any call.
4. The AI classifier, compiled
The classifier lives in learn/program.py and learn/compile.py. It is DSPy-style (DSPy is a
framework that compiles prompts from examples) and built in-house.
The prompt has this order:
- the instruction plus the compiled demonstrations. This prefix is identical for every candidate, so the provider's prefix cache hits;
- the retrieved examples;
- the candidate's excerpt, signals, roles and family.
The model (deepseek-flash) answers vulnerable, not_vulnerable or unsure. It adds a confidence
and a rationale. The rationale must cite a line of the code. The model is sampled k times. The score
s is the mean over samples. A majority unsure can never BLOCK.
Compilation bootstraps demonstrations and searches instructions on a compile split of repository groups.
A pre-registered balanced Brier score scores it (learn/compile.toml). The program is stored as
programs/<id>.json.
5. Calibration and the two operating points
learn/calibrate.py applies Platt scaling (a logistic map from score to probability) to s. It is
cross-fitted, so no map is checked on the fold it was fitted on.
Calibration holds when the slope interval contains 1, the intercept interval contains 0 and ECE (expected calibration error) <= 0.05.
BLOCK is offered only when calibration holds and a fold reaches the required precision. Otherwise the engine offers ADVISORY only.
What the first slice measured
Record: benchmarks/measurements/2026-10-01-decision-engine-injection-slice/record.json (counts
only). The setup:
- family injection;
- memory of 724 static examples from all families;
- input profile v1;
- framework priors off;
- out-of-repository evaluation: compile split never evaluated, outer grouped 5-fold, calibration cross-fitted, operating points nested;
- 95% repository-cluster bootstrap intervals.
The slice's spend is on Token ergonomics. It was $0.003215 per candidate at evaluation, k = 5, and its replay cost $0.
| Measure | Value | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Candidates | 110 in 29 repository groups, 58 positive | the positive share is 58/110 = 0.53 |
AUC of the score s |
0.74 (0.65 - 0.85) | the score ranks a vulnerable candidate above a non-vulnerable one about three times in four: there is ranking signal |
| ADVISORY | recall 0.90 (0.82 - 0.97), precision 0.54 (0.44 - 0.65) | precision is at the positive share (0.53), so at this threshold ADVISORY is not discriminating: it flags nearly as indiscriminately as flagging everything would |
| BLOCK | not offered | calibration does not hold (ECE 0.064 > 0.05), and every outer fold reported precision_unreachable |
The engine is not adopted. A second slice (2026-10-02) evaluated the six evaluable families the same way (Decision engine). The results: pooled AUC 0.77 to 0.96 per family, within-pair AUC 0.72 to 0.93, BLOCK offered for none. Re-run agreement was below 0.9 for three families.
Still ahead:
- leave-one-source-out and leave-one-framework-out;
- integration into scan and pre-push;
- the one-time check on population v3.