Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
OpenUltraSAST
v1.2.0-alpha.1 (Python package 1.2.0a1), state as of 2026-10-02. An experimental static
security analyser. The pre-push safety net is NO-GO for rollout: no hook capability is
enabled and no independent population has passed the qualification gates (see
docs/evaluation.md). See the release notes.
OpenUltraSAST separates what it can prove from what it merely suspects, and says which is which. A scan combines language-scoped pattern rules, a semantic overlay, a Joern-based taint engine and optional model calls; every finding carries the evidence that earned its place, and a scan that could not look at something records that as a degradation instead of reporting a clean result.
ousast is the interface. Model-driven work over whole repositories runs on a separate
agentic plane (google/ax), and a learned decision engine that weighs all the signals is in
development; neither is needed for a scan.
Install and quickstart
uv sync --group dev
# Deterministic scan, no model calls
uv run ousast scan /path/to/repo --mode quick
# CI: exit 1 on any evidence-verified finding
uv run ousast scan . --mode quick --fail-on verified
The core install depends only on PyYAML. Optional extras: semantic (tree-sitter grammars
for the overlay) and s3 (the plane's memory store on an S3-compatible bucket, boto3).
For standard and deep scans, use the Docker image, which ships Joern (with php-cli for
the PHP frontend) next to the tool. Source the shell wrapper once and ousast runs in the
container with your directory mounted read-only:
source /path/to/OpenUltraSAST/ops/shell/ousast.sh # PowerShell: ops/shell/ousast.ps1
ousast scan . --mode standard
Details, including a pinned host install of Joern, are in ops/README.md.
Every run writes auditable artifacts under <target>/.openultrasast/runs/<scan-id>/:
manifest.json, findings.json, verification.json, score.json, report.md,
report.sarif and trace/events.jsonl, plus the stage artifacts of the mode.
Scan modes
| Mode | What runs | Needs |
|---|---|---|
quick |
Language-scoped pattern rules, entry-point reachability hints, ranking, verification, scoring. Deterministic and reproducible. | nothing |
standard |
quick plus the MAP stage: complexity map, semantic overlay, authorization obligations, and the model layer, which builds one Joern code property graph per repository and decides taint, guard-dominance and configuration questions on it. An LLM is asked only the residual question the graph cannot settle (a suspicion); [models] hunter adds the tool hunter. |
Joern for the model layer (else a cpg_unavailable degradation); a provider key for the LLM parts (else they are skipped and recorded) |
deep |
The MAP stage of standard plus REGRESS: promoted candidates are loaded by a small snippet inside a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only source, non-root, memory/pid/time limits) and get a triggerable / not_triggerable / ... verdict. |
a working docker (else a sandbox_unavailable degradation) |
--fail-on never|findings|verified|worth-fixing sets the exit code: findings fails on any
reported finding, verified on any evidence-verified one, worth-fixing on a deep-mode
verdict that is worth fixing. --config openultrasast.toml loads settings.
Detection coverage (quick rules)
Rules run only against files of their language. The bundled ruleset lives in
src/openultrasast/ruleset/<language>/rules.toml:
| Language | Classes (CWE) |
|---|---|
| C / C++ | stack buffer overflow (121), format string (134), command injection (78) |
| Python | command injection (78), code injection (95), SSTI (94), deserialization (502), SQLi (89), path traversal (22), SSRF (918), weak hash (327), insecure default (489) |
| JavaScript / TS | command injection (78), code injection (95), XSS (79), SQLi (89), path traversal (22), SSRF (918), weak hash (327), deserialization (502) |
| Java + Groovy templates | command injection (78), SQLi (89), weak hash (327), deserialization (502), unescaped template XSS (79) |
| PHP | SQLi (89), command injection (78), file inclusion (98), path (22), open redirect (601), SSRF (918); code eval (95), unserialize (502) and echo XSS (79) ship as shadow rules |
The detection gate (uv run python -m openultrasast.gate, also tests/test_detection_benchmarks.py)
enforces the project goal of at least 90% recall and under 10% false positives per language
on the bundled corpora in benchmarks/manifests/. Its output on this tree:
| Language | Recall | False-positive rate |
|---|---|---|
| C / C++ | 93.3% (14/15) | 0.0% |
| Python | 93.3% (14/15) | 0.0% |
| JavaScript | 92.3% (12/13) | 0.0% |
| Java | 100% (4/4) | 0.0% |
| Overall | 93.6% (44/47) | 0.0% |
These corpora are cheat-sheet fixtures modelled on deliberately vulnerable applications. They show that a rule change did not break a known detection; they are not a recall estimate on real code. Real-code results are in docs/evaluation.md.
PHP is not in the gate, and its numbers are in-sample only. The PHP rules were written and
tightened while looking at the development corpus they were measured on
(benchmarks/measurements/2026-09-30-php-quick-rules/measurement.json): 13 of 14 expected
findings on the php-vulnerable fixture with no false positive, 2 false positives on
php-benign, and per-rule precision lower bounds from 0.03 to 1.0 on the real pins. Treat
them as development numbers, not as a holdout result.
Framework knowledge is optional. Rule and taint-fact entries that know a framework or
library (WordPress, Flask, Django, Express, Spring, ...) carry a framework or library tag
naming a row of src/openultrasast/ruleset/frameworks.toml. The loaders take priors=
("all", the default and today's behaviour; "off", language-level knowledge only; or a set
of ids), so their contribution can be measured and switched off.
Pre-push checks (experimental)
ousast pre-push analyses the commits a git push would publish, or an explicit
--base/--head pair, and compares the head against its base so that only new or worsened
defects are candidates. --mode advisory (the default) never blocks; --mode blocking and
--incomplete-coverage block opt into enforcement. The artifact must be written outside the
analysed repository.
uv run ousast pre-push /path/to/repo --base BASE --head HEAD \
--artifact /outside/the/repo/result.json
The default capability registry is empty, so no normal alert is emitted today; every
candidate stays diagnostic in the artifact. Installation into a repository's hooks
(ops/install-pre-push), caching and the optional witness model are documented in
ops/README.md.
Model providers and keys
Keys live in .env in the working directory (gitignored, never committed):
DEEPSEEK_API_KEY=... # every LLM call: model layer, tool hunter, plane tasks
OPENROUTER_API_KEY=... # only OpenAI embeddings (openai/text-embedding-3-small)
The project uses DeepSeek (deepseek-flash) for LLM calls and OpenRouter only for embeddings.
Set DEEPSEEK_API_KEY: without it, chat calls fall back to OpenRouter when that key is set.
.env never overrides a variable already exported in your shell. A stale
export DEEPSEEK_API_KEY=... in your profile wins over the .env file silently; unset it
when a key change in .env seems to have no effect.
Benchmarks and pair evaluation
# Score the scan against a ground-truth manifest
uv run ousast benchmark benchmarks/manifests/python-vulnerable.toml --mode quick
# Vulnerable-vs-fixed pairs: fire on the vulnerable side, stay silent on the fix
uv run ousast pairs
uv run ousast pairs --slice sast # OWASP Benchmark + Juliet
uv run ousast pairs --slice vibe-py --pointers # also fetch non-vendored pointer pairs (network)
uv run python -m openultrasast.pair_gate # CI: local pairs must all pass
Each benchmark run writes .openultrasast/benchmarks/<id>/ (benchmark_result.json,
calibration_records.json with every miss, external_baseline_deltas.json). The pair
catalogs live in benchmarks/pairs/.
Self-improvement
ousast improve runs a bounded loop over the governed ruleset: benchmark, propose edits to
rule status and score constants only, validate, re-benchmark, and accept a round only if
recall stays at least 90%, false positives under 10%, the project score does not regress and
no matched finding is lost. Accepted rounds land in
<target>/.openultrasast/calibration/rule_policy.json, which the next scan of that target loads.
uv run ousast improve benchmarks/manifests/java-spring-boot-vulnerable.toml --dry-run
uv run ousast improve benchmarks/manifests/java-spring-boot-vulnerable.toml --dry-run --memory
With --memory, proposals also come from the rows plane runs stored (see below), through the
same validator and gate; rows from holdout pairs, from the gated manifest's own cases and from
any --qualify-population are dropped first. Details:
docs/architecture.md.
The agentic plane (maintainers)
Model work over whole repositories runs as a Run manifest on google/ax
over Agent Substrate (a kind cluster on the maintainer's host), one isolated actor per task.
Each task binds its own Model and its own usd/calls budget, egress is deny-by-default per
task, and the provider key travels only in the task's start request.
uv run ousast plane doctor # kind, Agent Substrate, ax controller, runner image
uv run ousast plane run plane/runs/validation-46.yaml # a rerun skips tasks already done
uv run ousast plane status validation-46 # per-task status and token attribution
uv run ousast plane remember validation-46 # ingest the run's rows into the memory store
ousast plane workspaces, alerts-engine and harvest generate Runs and inputs. Bring-up,
the task catalogue, the memory store (OUSAST_MEMORY) and the checklist for moving the plane
to another Kubernetes cluster are in ops/ax/README.md.
HarnessX, the earlier optional agentic extra, was retired 2026-09-30, and a leftover
[harnessx]section (retired 2026-09-30) is ignored with one warning.[models] verifier,[fusion] panel_modeland[fusion] decider_modelfail with a message naming the plane replacement. The LLM judge and the LLM fusion panels were retired with it; fusion is deterministic. See RELEASE_NOTES.md.
Decision engine (in development, not adopted)
A learned decision engine is being built to replace hand-tuned detection edits: each instrument (quick rules, the Joern engine, model sink classification, verify passes, repository facts) produces signals, never verdicts, and a compiled AI classifier with local memory turns them into a calibrated probability per candidate with BLOCK and ADVISORY operating points. No scan, pre-push or report uses it yet. Status and the first measured slice: docs/decision-engine.md.
Agent integrations
An agent that can run shell commands needs nothing but the CLI. For
OpenCode there are optional project skills in .opencode/skills/:
openultrasast-scan, openultrasast-triage and openultrasast-fix-audit.
ousast mcp runs a narrow MCP server over stdio (newline-delimited JSON-RPC) with ten tools:
openultrasast.scan, status, findings, get_finding, evidence, artifacts,
benchmark, explain, propose_patch (degrades visibly) and export_report. No tool runs a
shell, Docker or a free-form command.
{ "command": "uv", "args": ["run", "ousast", "mcp"] }
The
kiro-*skills,AGENTS.mdand.kiro/are the maintainer's development tooling and can be ignored by users.
Further reading
Documentation site with flow diagrams (docs/, mkdocs.yml): uv sync --extra docs && uv run mkdocs serve.
- docs/architecture.md: the scan pipeline, evidence ladder, CWE policy and project score, and the self-improving loops.
- docs/evaluation.md: independent populations, the qualification gates, pair corpora and the plane increment results.
- docs/decision-engine.md: the learned decision engine.
- docs/threat-model.md: trust boundaries, sandbox and hardening.
- docs/examples.md: end-to-end walkthroughs.
Development
uv run pytest # tests, incl. the 90/10 detection gate
uv run ruff check . # lint
uv run ruff format --check . # format
uv run mypy src/openultrasast # types
uv run python -m openultrasast.gate # standalone detection gate
uv run python -m openultrasast.pair_gate # local vuln-vs-fix pairs
uv run python dagger/ci.py # containerized CI pipeline
Maintainer commands not covered above: ousast repos (pinned known-vulnerable checkouts),
ousast model candidates (what the candidate enumerator can reach) and ousast learn
(the decision engine's data; see docs/decision-engine.md).