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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 5.5
f4bd984fda
README: "Configuring the HarnessX agentic plane" becomes "The agentic plane (ax)" (ousast plane run|status|doctor|remember, per-task Model, budget and egress, pointer to ops/ax/README.md, one tagged retirement line); "The HarnessX self-improving cycle" becomes "The self-improving cycle", and its MetaAgent paragraph is replaced by the memory proposer (`ousast improve --memory`, provenance, train-on-test guard). The fusion panel_model/decider_model lines and the [harnessx] spend caps are gone. The README reference test now passes without its strict xfail. docs/examples.md section 6 runs the plane; docs/threat-model.md describes the per-task EgressPolicy, the usd/calls budgets and the start-request credential path. RELEASE_NOTES.md gets an Unreleased entry: HarnessX removed, the retired keys and their errors, the silent loss of the second hunter for users who set [models] hunter, and the plane as the agentic path. Dated retirement notes (2026-09-30) head the requirements, design and brief of harnessx-self-improving-rulesets, learning-harness, three-stage-scan and openrouter-sast-harness, and follow the spec table in steering/overview.md; history is unchanged. All tasks are checked, so spec.json moves to implementation-complete. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EmM1j46qgKMh3zqD1QMwEo
81 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
81 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
# Threat model & hardening
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OpenUltraSAST analyzes **untrusted code**. This document states what it trusts, what
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it does not, and the controls that keep a scan safe to run in CI and safe to share.
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## Trust boundaries
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- **Scanned code is untrusted input, never executed.** Quick and standard modes read
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source as text (regex rules, evidence ladder, optional LLM review). They never import,
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build, or run the target. Only `deep` mode would execute target-derived code, and only
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inside the sandbox below — and deep mode is not yet implemented (it exits with a clear
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message rather than running anything).
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- **The ruleset and CWE policy are trusted, governed data.** They change only through
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reviewed commits or the bounded self-improvement loop (`ousast improve`), which can
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flip rule *status* and tune score constants but can never edit pattern text or the
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authoritative 0–5 severity. See the self-improving cycle in the README.
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- **Provider credentials are the operator's.** The zero-dependency core makes no network
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calls. A local scan calls a model only for the optional `[models] hunter` tool hunter
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in standard mode. Agentic work runs on the plane (`ousast plane run`): `ousast` reads
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the variable a task's Model names (`secretKey.key`) from the operator's environment or
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`.env` and sends the key only in that task's start request, through Agent Substrate's
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router to that task's actor. It is not baked into an image or task template, and it is
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never logged or written to artifacts.
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## Controls
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### Secret redaction
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Scan artifacts can quote source that contains live credentials. `redaction.py` masks
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recognizable secret shapes (provider API keys, AWS/GitHub/Slack/Google tokens, bearer
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tokens, URL-embedded credentials, PEM private keys, and `key = value` assignments for
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sensitive names) before traces (`trace/events.jsonl`) and the markdown report are
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written. On by default; disable with `[hardening] redact_secrets = false`.
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### Plane egress
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Each plane task runs in its own actor behind Agent Substrate's egress gateway, which
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denies by default. The task's EgressPolicy (`src/openultrasast/plane/egress.py`) allows exactly three
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things: plain HTTP to the artifact receiver, and TLS passthrough to the Git hosts of the
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task's bound Workspaces and to the hosts its bound Model declares
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(`openultrasast.io/egress-hosts`). There are no wildcards, no IP addresses and no TLS
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interception. The policy is deleted with the actor.
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### Cost & CI budgets
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- **Agentic spend** is bounded per plane task by the Run's `budget: {usd, calls}`. The
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metered client refuses the next call once either ceiling is reached (the task is
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`unfinished` and resumes on a rerun with a larger budget). A usd budget on a Model
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without prices is refused rather than metered as zero, and an account or
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authentication error fails the task and starts nothing further. The standard-mode tool
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hunter is bounded by the per-tier hunter budgets.
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- **Output size** is bounded by `[hardening] max_findings` (0 = unlimited). Truncation is
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severity-ordered and disclosed as a `budget` degradation in the manifest.
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### Provider reliability
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LLM/embedding calls retry transient failures (HTTP 429/5xx, connection errors, timeouts)
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with exponential backoff; non-transient errors (e.g. 4xx, malformed JSON) fail fast.
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### Visible degradation & determinism
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When an optional capability is missing (the extra, a model, a provider key), the scan
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falls back to its deterministic equivalent and records a `degradations` entry in the
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manifest — it is never silently downgraded. Runs are reproducible: fixed config,
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artifact manifests, prompt hashes, and model identifiers are recorded.
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### MCP surface
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`ousast mcp` exposes only the ten narrow project tools. No tool runs arbitrary shell,
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Docker, or internal hunter tools, and no tool accepts a free-form command argument.
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## Sandbox limits (deep mode, when implemented)
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Dynamic analysis runs under the bounds in `[sandbox]` (`config.SandboxConfig`):
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| Control | Default |
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| network | disabled (`network = false`) |
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| workspace | read-only (`workspace_readonly = true`) |
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| memory | 2048 MB (`memory_mb`) |
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| pids | 512 (`pids_limit`) |
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| timeout | 300 s (`timeout_seconds`) |
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Dynamic probes additionally declare their network scope, log commands, and capture
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artifacts; a hardened runtime (e.g. gVisor) is used when available. Until deep mode
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ships, no target code is executed at all.
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