Open_Ultra_SAST/tests/test_model_taint.py

"""model-grounded-detection task 2.2: the taint verdict, and what separates entailed from corroborated.

An `ENTAILED` verdict is the static analogue of a reproduced crash: the CPG establishes the flow on its own and
the LLM's assertion is no longer load-bearing. `CORROBORATED` means a path exists but a sanitizer may break it,
so the judgement of sufficiency is the LLM's residual — checked against the graph, never averaged over runs.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

from pathlib import Path


def _cpg(rows: list[dict[str, object]]):  # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
    from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult

    return CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=lambda query, params: rows)


def _spec():  # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
    from openultrasast.model.specs import TaintSpec

    return TaintSpec(
        family="injection",
        language="python",
        sources=("request.args",),
        sinks=("os.system", "execute"),
        sanitizers=("escape", "quote"),
    )


def test_an_unsanitized_source_to_sink_path_is_entailed() -> None:
    from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [
        {"sink": "os.system(cmd)", "sinkLine": "4", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['x']", "sanitized": False, "length": 3}
    ]
    answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
    assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
    assert answer.family == "injection"
    assert "request.args" in answer.witness and "os.system" in answer.witness, "the witness names the flow it found"


def test_a_path_through_a_sanitizer_is_corroborated_not_entailed() -> None:
    """The model saw the flow but cannot judge whether the sanitizer is sufficient. That residual is the LLM's."""
    from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [{"sink": "execute(q)", "sinkLine": "9", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['q']", "sanitized": True, "length": 4}]
    answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
    assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.CORROBORATED


def test_no_path_yields_no_verdict_so_the_caller_reports_suspicion() -> None:
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    assert verdict(_cpg([]), _spec(), function="run") is None


def test_a_query_that_failed_is_not_read_as_an_absence_of_flow() -> None:
    """`None` from the engine means "could not decide", which is not the same as "no path" — Req 4.3."""
    from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    broken = CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=lambda query, params: None)
    assert verdict(broken, _spec(), function="run") is None


def test_the_verdict_is_restricted_to_the_labeled_function() -> None:
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [
        {
            "sink": "os.system(x)",
            "sinkLine": "40",
            "sinkMethod": "elsewhere",
            "source": "request.args['x']",
            "sanitized": False,
            "length": 2,
        }
    ]
    assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run") is None, "a flow in another function does not judge this one"


def test_the_shortest_unsanitized_flow_wins_and_the_sequence_is_deterministic() -> None:
    """Req 6.4: two runs over one CPG give an identical verdict sequence, so there is nothing to average."""
    from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [
        {"sink": "os.system(a)", "sinkLine": "7", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['b']", "sanitized": True, "length": 9},
        {"sink": "os.system(a)", "sinkLine": "7", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['a']", "sanitized": False, "length": 2},
    ]
    first = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
    second = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
    assert first == second
    assert first is not None and first.rung is Rung.ENTAILED and "request.args['a']" in first.witness


def test_the_spec_drives_the_query_parameters() -> None:
    """The security modelling is ours; the traversal is the engine's. The spec is what crosses the seam."""
    from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    seen: dict[str, object] = {}

    def run(query: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> object:
        seen["query"] = query
        seen.update(params)
        return []

    verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run")
    assert seen["query"] == "taint"
    assert seen["sources"] == ("request.args",)
    assert seen["sinks"] == ("os.system", "execute")
    assert seen["sanitizers"] == ("escape", "quote")
    assert seen["function"] == "run"


# --- the safe-shape test (task 2.3 finding) ------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Taint reachability alone does not distinguish a parameterised fix from an interpolated bug: the flow
# `request.args["name"] -> name -> execute` exists on BOTH sides of the canonical SQL pair.
#
#     vuln   db.execute("select ... '" + name + "'")      one argument, interpolated
#     fixed  db.execute("select ... = %s", (name,))       two arguments, bound
#
# What separates them is the SHAPE of the sink call, which is exactly what `TaintSpec.safe_shape_sinks`
# preserves. Without this test the model entails both sides and arbitrates nothing.


def _shape_spec():  # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
    from openultrasast.model.specs import TaintSpec

    return TaintSpec(
        family="injection",
        language="python",
        sources=("request.args",),
        sinks=("execute",),
        sanitizers=(),
        safe_shape_sinks=("execute",),
    )


def test_a_parameterised_sink_call_is_not_a_vulnerability_even_though_the_flow_reaches_it() -> None:
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [
        {
            "sink": 'db.execute("select ... = %s", (name,))',
            "sinkLine": "5",
            "sinkMethod": "run",
            "source": "request.args['name']",
            "sanitized": False,
            "length": 4,
            "sinkArity": 2,
            "sinkArg0Literal": True,
        }
    ]
    assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run") is None, "a bound query is the fix, not the bug"


def test_an_interpolated_sink_call_of_the_same_name_is_entailed() -> None:
    from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [
        {
            "sink": 'db.execute("select ... \'" + name + "\'")',
            "sinkLine": "5",
            "sinkMethod": "run",
            "source": "request.args['name']",
            "sanitized": False,
            "length": 4,
            "sinkArity": 1,
            "sinkArg0Literal": False,
        }
    ]
    answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run")
    assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED


def test_the_shape_test_only_applies_to_sinks_declared_safe_in_that_shape() -> None:
    """`os.system(x)` with one argument is not "safe because it has one argument" -- the rule is per sink."""
    from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [
        {
            "sink": "os.system(full)",
            "sinkLine": "7",
            "sinkMethod": "run",
            "source": "request.args['cmd']",
            "sanitized": False,
            "length": 5,
            "sinkArity": 1,
            "sinkArg0Literal": False,
        }
    ]
    answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")  # os.system is not in safe_shape_sinks
    assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED


def test_a_row_without_shape_fields_is_judged_on_the_flow_alone() -> None:
    """Older rows, or an engine that could not report arity, must not be silently treated as safe."""
    from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [{"sink": "db.execute(q)", "sinkLine": "5", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['n']", "sanitized": False, "length": 3}]
    answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run")
    assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED


def test_parameter_sources_are_opt_in_and_reach_the_query() -> None:
    """A function-level pair's parameters are its trust boundary; a whole repository's are not.

    39 of the 50 injection pairs carry no framework source token at all — their untrusted input arrives as a
    function parameter — and the flat-IR baseline this feature is measured against counted those as sources.
    So the flag must exist and must default to off.
    """
    from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    seen: dict[str, object] = {}

    def run(query: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> object:
        seen.update(params)
        return []

    verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("c.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run")
    assert seen["parameterSources"] == "false", "treating every parameter as untrusted is not the default"
    verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("c.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run", parameter_sources=True)
    assert seen["parameterSources"] == "true"


# --- closure scoping (group 4 finding) -----------------------------------------------------------------
#
# JavaScript is callback-heavy, so the method containing a sink routinely is not the labeled function:
#
#     function requestListener(req, res) {          // labeled
#         fs.stat(possibleFilename, function(err, stats) {
#             fs.readFileSync(possibleFilename)     // sink, enclosing method is <lambda>0
#         })
#     }
#
# Filtering on `sinkMethod == function` dropped every such sink -- the whole `path` family measured 0/8.
# The query now decides scope by line-range containment and reports it; the Python side trusts that flag and
# keeps the name comparison only as a fallback for rows that carry no flag.


def test_a_sink_in_a_nested_closure_is_in_scope_when_the_query_says_so() -> None:
    from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [
        {
            "sink": "fs.readFileSync(possibleFilename)",
            "sinkLine": "6",
            "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
            "source": "req",
            "sanitized": False,
            "length": 4,
            "inLabeledScope": True,
        }
    ]
    answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener")
    assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
    assert "<lambda>0" not in answer.witness, "the witness names the flow, not the synthetic closure name"


def test_a_sink_in_an_unrelated_function_stays_out_of_scope() -> None:
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [
        {
            "sink": "fs.readFileSync('/etc/' + name)",
            "sinkLine": "11",
            "sinkMethod": "unrelated",
            "source": "name",
            "sanitized": False,
            "length": 2,
            "inLabeledScope": False,
        }
    ]
    assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener") is None


def test_rows_without_the_scope_flag_fall_back_to_the_method_name() -> None:
    """A row from an engine that cannot report scope must not silently become in-scope."""
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [
        {"sink": "os.system(x)", "sinkLine": "9", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0", "source": "request.args['x']", "sanitized": False, "length": 2}
    ]
    assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run") is None


def test_a_flow_from_a_real_source_outranks_a_shorter_one_from_a_bare_parameter() -> None:
    """Shortest-wins alone picks the wrong witness once closures are in scope.

    In the angular-http-server shape the closure yields three unsanitized flows to one sink:
    `req.url.split('?')[0]` (11 steps, the actual vulnerability), `res` (3 steps) and `this` (7). Shortest
    would report `res -> fs.readFileSync(...)`, which names no attacker input and is simply untrue. A flow
    whose source matches the spec's source model outranks one from a bare captured name; shortest still
    breaks ties, so the order stays total and the verdict deterministic.
    """
    from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [
        {
            "sink": "fs.readFileSync(p)",
            "sinkLine": "6",
            "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
            "source": "res",
            "sanitized": False,
            "length": 3,
            "inLabeledScope": True,
        },
        {
            "sink": "fs.readFileSync(p)",
            "sinkLine": "6",
            "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
            "source": "this",
            "sanitized": False,
            "length": 7,
            "inLabeledScope": True,
        },
        {
            "sink": "fs.readFileSync(p)",
            "sinkLine": "6",
            "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
            "source": "request.args['f']",
            "sanitized": False,
            "length": 11,
            "inLabeledScope": True,
        },
    ]
    answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener")
    assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
    assert "request.args['f']" in answer.witness, f"witness named no real source: {answer.witness}"
    assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener") == answer  # still deterministic


def test_a_modelled_source_flow_decides_even_when_a_parameter_flow_is_unsanitized() -> None:
    """Parameter sources are a fallback, never an override.

    On the fixed angular-http-server side the real flow `req.url -> ... -> readFileSync` IS sanitized by
    path.normalize, but the captured `res` parameter also reaches the sink unsanitized. Judging on the union
    reports the fix as still vulnerable, on the strength of a flow that names no attacker input. When any
    modelled source reaches the sink, those flows are the evidence and the bare-parameter ones are ignored.
    """
    from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [
        {
            "sink": "fs.readFileSync(safe)",
            "sinkLine": "41",
            "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
            "source": "res",
            "sanitized": False,
            "length": 3,
            "inLabeledScope": True,
        },
        {
            "sink": "fs.readFileSync(safe)",
            "sinkLine": "41",
            "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
            "source": "request.args['f']",
            "sanitized": True,
            "length": 22,
            "inLabeledScope": True,
        },
    ]
    answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener")
    assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.CORROBORATED, "a sanitized real flow is not an entailment"
    assert "request.args['f']" in answer.witness


def test_parameter_flows_still_decide_when_no_modelled_source_reaches_the_sink() -> None:
    from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
    from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict

    rows = [
        {
            "sink": "os.system(cmd)",
            "sinkLine": "4",
            "sinkMethod": "run",
            "source": "username",
            "sanitized": False,
            "length": 2,
            "inLabeledScope": True,
        }
    ]
    answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
    assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED


def test_a_region_scopes_its_question_to_its_own_file() -> None:
    """A region with no enclosing function must not be answered with the whole repository.

    Sending `function=""` unscoped matched every hit in the tree and the driver attributed all of it to
    whichever region asked: one permissive literal in app.py became eight identical entailed findings in
    eight files that do not contain it.
    """
    from openultrasast.model.config_value import request_params as config_params
    from openultrasast.model.specs import config_specs, taint_specs
    from openultrasast.model.taint import request_params as taint_params

    taint = taint_params(taint_specs(language="python")["injection"], function="", file="models/user_model.py")
    config = config_params(config_specs(language="python")["config_secrets"], function="", file="config.py")

    assert taint["file"] == "models/user_model.py"
    assert config["file"] == "config.py"
    # The pair path stays unscoped, so the committed pair measurements remain reproducible.
    assert taint_params(taint_specs(language="python")["injection"], function="run")["file"] == ""