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Marius CiepluchandClaude Opus 4.8
b5e40318db
Release-readiness hardening. - redaction.py (zero-dep): redact_secrets masks provider API keys, AWS/GitHub/Slack/ Google tokens, bearer tokens, URL-embedded credentials, PEM private keys, and sensitive key=value assignments. Wired into the trace writer and the markdown report (on by default), so scan artifacts never leak a credential quoted from source. - provider/openrouter.py: call_with_retry — exponential backoff on transient failures (HTTP 429/5xx, connection errors, timeouts); non-transient errors fail fast. Both the chat and embedding clients use it (max_attempts/retry_base_delay configurable). - config [hardening]: redact_secrets (default true) + max_findings (bounded-CI output cap, 0 = unlimited; truncation is severity-ordered and disclosed as a `budget` degradation). Agentic spend stays bounded by [harnessx] max_cost_usd/token_threshold. - docs/threat-model.md (trust boundaries, controls, sandbox limits) + docs/examples.md (six end-to-end walkthroughs); README "Security & hardening" section links both. - CI lint/typecheck/test/detection-gate/dagger gates already existed. tests/test_redaction.py, test_provider_retry.py, test_hardening_pipeline.py + config tests. 206 passed, 4 skipped; ruff + mypy clean; detection gate PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
67 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
67 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
# Threat model & hardening
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OpenUltraSAST analyzes **untrusted code**. This document states what it trusts, what
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it does not, and the controls that keep a scan safe to run in CI and safe to share.
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## Trust boundaries
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- **Scanned code is untrusted input, never executed.** Quick and standard modes read
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source as text (regex rules, evidence ladder, optional LLM review). They never import,
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build, or run the target. Only `deep` mode would execute target-derived code, and only
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inside the sandbox below — and deep mode is not yet implemented (it exits with a clear
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message rather than running anything).
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- **The ruleset and CWE policy are trusted, governed data.** They change only through
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reviewed commits or the bounded self-improvement loop (`ousast improve`), which can
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flip rule *status* and tune score constants but can never edit pattern text or the
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authoritative 0–5 severity. See the self-improving cycle in the README.
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- **Provider credentials are the operator's.** The zero-dependency core makes no network
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calls. The optional HarnessX agentic plane sends source excerpts to the configured LLM
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provider only when a model is set in `[models]`; keys are read from the provider's
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standard env var (`OPENAI_API_KEY` / `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`), never written to artifacts.
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## Controls
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### Secret redaction
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Scan artifacts can quote source that contains live credentials. `redaction.py` masks
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recognizable secret shapes (provider API keys, AWS/GitHub/Slack/Google tokens, bearer
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tokens, URL-embedded credentials, PEM private keys, and `key = value` assignments for
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sensitive names) before traces (`trace/events.jsonl`) and the markdown report are
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written. On by default; disable with `[hardening] redact_secrets = false`.
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### Cost & CI budgets
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- **Agentic spend** is bounded per task by `[harnessx] max_cost_usd` and
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`token_threshold` (enforced inside the HarnessX run loop) and by the per-tier hunter
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budgets.
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- **Output size** is bounded by `[hardening] max_findings` (0 = unlimited). Truncation is
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severity-ordered and disclosed as a `budget` degradation in the manifest.
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### Provider reliability
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LLM/embedding calls retry transient failures (HTTP 429/5xx, connection errors, timeouts)
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with exponential backoff; non-transient errors (e.g. 4xx, malformed JSON) fail fast.
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### Visible degradation & determinism
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When an optional capability is missing (the extra, a model, a provider key), the scan
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falls back to its deterministic equivalent and records a `degradations` entry in the
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manifest — it is never silently downgraded. Runs are reproducible: fixed config,
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artifact manifests, prompt hashes, and model identifiers are recorded.
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### MCP surface
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`ousast mcp` exposes only the ten narrow project tools. No tool runs arbitrary shell,
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Docker, or internal hunter tools, and no tool accepts a free-form command argument.
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## Sandbox limits (deep mode, when implemented)
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Dynamic analysis runs under the bounds in `[sandbox]` (`config.SandboxConfig`):
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| Control | Default |
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|---|---|
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| network | disabled (`network = false`) |
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| workspace | read-only (`workspace_readonly = true`) |
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| memory | 2048 MB (`memory_mb`) |
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| pids | 512 (`pids_limit`) |
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| timeout | 300 s (`timeout_seconds`) |
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Dynamic probes additionally declare their network scope, log commands, and capture
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artifacts; a hardened runtime (e.g. gVisor) is used when available. Until deep mode
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ships, no target code is executed at all.
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