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The group-4 finding: JavaScript is callback-heavy, so the method containing a
sink routinely is not the labeled function. `fs.readFileSync` inside the
callback passed to `fs.stat` has enclosing method `<lambda>0`, and filtering on
`sinkMethod == function` dropped it -- the whole path family measured 0/8.
Scope is now decided by line-range containment within the same file
(astParentFullName is empty for lambdas, so nesting is not readable there), and
reported as `inLabeledScope`; the Python side trusts that flag and keeps the
name comparison only as a fallback, so an engine that cannot report scope never
has its sinks silently treated as scoped. Parameter sources stay bound to the
labeled function's OWN parameters -- a callback's `err`/`stats` are not
attacker input.
Fixing the scope exposed three further bugs, each of which would have raised
the number while making the answer untrue:
* Shortest-flow-wins picked the wrong witness. With closures in scope the
same sink has flows from `req.url...` (10 steps, the vulnerability), `res`
(3) and `this` (7). A flow whose source matches the source model now
outranks a shorter one from a bare captured name; shortest still breaks
ties, so the order stays total and the verdict deterministic.
* The JS fact file had NO sanitizers at all, so no JavaScript fix of any
family could ever be recognised. Added the documented path-normalisation
and HTML-escaping APIs, with provenance.
* Adding them regressed the witness, because `resolveUrl` CONTAINS `resolve`
and the substring test marked the vulnerable flow sanitized. This is the
same bug class already fixed in dominance.sc and not carried across -- the
exact fix-the-instance-miss-the-class failure. taint.sc now matches on word
boundaries too.
And the principled rule the fix turns on: parameter sources are a FALLBACK,
never an override. When a modelled source reaches the sink, those flows are the
evidence; otherwise a captured `res` reaching a sanitized sink reports the fix
as still vulnerable on a flow that names no attacker input.
Also recorded: req.url was NOT wrong as a diagnosis, it was untestable in
isolation -- the scoping bug masked it. Both were needed. On the pair that
motivated all of this:
vuln model_entailed req.url.split('?')[0] -> readFileSync(possibleFilename)
fixed model_corroborated same flow, sanitized by path.normalize
distinguished: true
700 passing, mypy/ruff clean, gates byte-identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T7XD7x5KonMdmGRkp63EQG
312 lines
14 KiB
Python
312 lines
14 KiB
Python
"""model-grounded-detection task 2.2: the taint verdict, and what separates entailed from corroborated.
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An `ENTAILED` verdict is the static analogue of a reproduced crash: the CPG establishes the flow on its own and
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the LLM's assertion is no longer load-bearing. `CORROBORATED` means a path exists but a sanitizer may break it,
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so the judgement of sufficiency is the LLM's residual — checked against the graph, never averaged over runs.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from pathlib import Path
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def _cpg(rows: list[dict[str, object]]): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
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from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
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return CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=lambda query, params: rows)
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def _spec(): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
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from openultrasast.model.specs import TaintSpec
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return TaintSpec(
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family="injection",
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language="python",
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sources=("request.args",),
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sinks=("os.system", "execute"),
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sanitizers=("escape", "quote"),
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)
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def test_an_unsanitized_source_to_sink_path_is_entailed() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{"sink": "os.system(cmd)", "sinkLine": "4", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['x']", "sanitized": False, "length": 3}
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]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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assert answer.family == "injection"
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assert "request.args" in answer.witness and "os.system" in answer.witness, "the witness names the flow it found"
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def test_a_path_through_a_sanitizer_is_corroborated_not_entailed() -> None:
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"""The model saw the flow but cannot judge whether the sanitizer is sufficient. That residual is the LLM's."""
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [{"sink": "execute(q)", "sinkLine": "9", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['q']", "sanitized": True, "length": 4}]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.CORROBORATED
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def test_no_path_yields_no_verdict_so_the_caller_reports_suspicion() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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assert verdict(_cpg([]), _spec(), function="run") is None
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def test_a_query_that_failed_is_not_read_as_an_absence_of_flow() -> None:
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"""`None` from the engine means "could not decide", which is not the same as "no path" — Req 4.3."""
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from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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broken = CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=lambda query, params: None)
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assert verdict(broken, _spec(), function="run") is None
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def test_the_verdict_is_restricted_to_the_labeled_function() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{
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"sink": "os.system(x)", "sinkLine": "40", "sinkMethod": "elsewhere",
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"source": "request.args['x']", "sanitized": False, "length": 2,
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}
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]
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assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run") is None, "a flow in another function does not judge this one"
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def test_the_shortest_unsanitized_flow_wins_and_the_sequence_is_deterministic() -> None:
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"""Req 6.4: two runs over one CPG give an identical verdict sequence, so there is nothing to average."""
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{"sink": "os.system(a)", "sinkLine": "7", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['b']", "sanitized": True, "length": 9},
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{"sink": "os.system(a)", "sinkLine": "7", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['a']", "sanitized": False, "length": 2},
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]
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first = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
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second = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
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assert first == second
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assert first is not None and first.rung is Rung.ENTAILED and "request.args['a']" in first.witness
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def test_the_spec_drives_the_query_parameters() -> None:
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"""The security modelling is ours; the traversal is the engine's. The spec is what crosses the seam."""
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from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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seen: dict[str, object] = {}
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def run(query: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> object:
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seen["query"] = query
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seen.update(params)
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return []
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verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("cpg.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run")
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assert seen["query"] == "taint"
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assert seen["sources"] == ("request.args",)
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assert seen["sinks"] == ("os.system", "execute")
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assert seen["sanitizers"] == ("escape", "quote")
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assert seen["function"] == "run"
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# --- the safe-shape test (task 2.3 finding) ------------------------------------------------------------
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#
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# Taint reachability alone does not distinguish a parameterised fix from an interpolated bug: the flow
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# `request.args["name"] -> name -> execute` exists on BOTH sides of the canonical SQL pair.
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#
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# vuln db.execute("select ... '" + name + "'") one argument, interpolated
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# fixed db.execute("select ... = %s", (name,)) two arguments, bound
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#
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# What separates them is the SHAPE of the sink call, which is exactly what `TaintSpec.safe_shape_sinks`
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# preserves. Without this test the model entails both sides and arbitrates nothing.
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def _shape_spec(): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
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from openultrasast.model.specs import TaintSpec
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return TaintSpec(
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family="injection",
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language="python",
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sources=("request.args",),
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sinks=("execute",),
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sanitizers=(),
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safe_shape_sinks=("execute",),
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)
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def test_a_parameterised_sink_call_is_not_a_vulnerability_even_though_the_flow_reaches_it() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [{
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"sink": 'db.execute("select ... = %s", (name,))', "sinkLine": "5", "sinkMethod": "run",
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"source": "request.args['name']", "sanitized": False, "length": 4, "sinkArity": 2, "sinkArg0Literal": True,
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}]
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assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run") is None, "a bound query is the fix, not the bug"
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def test_an_interpolated_sink_call_of_the_same_name_is_entailed() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [{
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"sink": 'db.execute("select ... \'" + name + "\'")', "sinkLine": "5", "sinkMethod": "run",
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"source": "request.args['name']", "sanitized": False, "length": 4, "sinkArity": 1, "sinkArg0Literal": False,
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}]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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def test_the_shape_test_only_applies_to_sinks_declared_safe_in_that_shape() -> None:
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"""`os.system(x)` with one argument is not "safe because it has one argument" -- the rule is per sink."""
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [{
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"sink": "os.system(full)", "sinkLine": "7", "sinkMethod": "run",
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"source": "request.args['cmd']", "sanitized": False, "length": 5, "sinkArity": 1, "sinkArg0Literal": False,
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}]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run") # os.system is not in safe_shape_sinks
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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def test_a_row_without_shape_fields_is_judged_on_the_flow_alone() -> None:
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"""Older rows, or an engine that could not report arity, must not be silently treated as safe."""
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [{"sink": "db.execute(q)", "sinkLine": "5", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "request.args['n']",
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"sanitized": False, "length": 3}]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _shape_spec(), function="run")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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def test_parameter_sources_are_opt_in_and_reach_the_query() -> None:
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"""A function-level pair's parameters are its trust boundary; a whole repository's are not.
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39 of the 50 injection pairs carry no framework source token at all — their untrusted input arrives as a
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function parameter — and the flat-IR baseline this feature is measured against counted those as sources.
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So the flag must exist and must default to off.
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"""
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from openultrasast.cpg.backend import CpgResult
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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seen: dict[str, object] = {}
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def run(query: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> object:
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seen.update(params)
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return []
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verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("c.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run")
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assert seen["parameterSources"] == "false", "treating every parameter as untrusted is not the default"
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verdict(CpgResult(cpg_path=Path("c.bin"), run=run), _spec(), function="run", parameter_sources=True)
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assert seen["parameterSources"] == "true"
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# --- closure scoping (group 4 finding) -----------------------------------------------------------------
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#
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# JavaScript is callback-heavy, so the method containing a sink routinely is not the labeled function:
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#
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# function requestListener(req, res) { // labeled
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# fs.stat(possibleFilename, function(err, stats) {
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# fs.readFileSync(possibleFilename) // sink, enclosing method is <lambda>0
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# })
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# }
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#
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# Filtering on `sinkMethod == function` dropped every such sink -- the whole `path` family measured 0/8.
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# The query now decides scope by line-range containment and reports it; the Python side trusts that flag and
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# keeps the name comparison only as a fallback for rows that carry no flag.
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def test_a_sink_in_a_nested_closure_is_in_scope_when_the_query_says_so() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [{
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"sink": "fs.readFileSync(possibleFilename)", "sinkLine": "6", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
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"source": "req", "sanitized": False, "length": 4, "inLabeledScope": True,
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}]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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assert "<lambda>0" not in answer.witness, "the witness names the flow, not the synthetic closure name"
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def test_a_sink_in_an_unrelated_function_stays_out_of_scope() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [{
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"sink": "fs.readFileSync('/etc/' + name)", "sinkLine": "11", "sinkMethod": "unrelated",
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"source": "name", "sanitized": False, "length": 2, "inLabeledScope": False,
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}]
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assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener") is None
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def test_rows_without_the_scope_flag_fall_back_to_the_method_name() -> None:
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"""A row from an engine that cannot report scope must not silently become in-scope."""
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [{"sink": "os.system(x)", "sinkLine": "9", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
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"source": "request.args['x']", "sanitized": False, "length": 2}]
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assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run") is None
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def test_a_flow_from_a_real_source_outranks_a_shorter_one_from_a_bare_parameter() -> None:
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"""Shortest-wins alone picks the wrong witness once closures are in scope.
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In the angular-http-server shape the closure yields three unsanitized flows to one sink:
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`req.url.split('?')[0]` (11 steps, the actual vulnerability), `res` (3 steps) and `this` (7). Shortest
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would report `res -> fs.readFileSync(...)`, which names no attacker input and is simply untrue. A flow
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whose source matches the spec's source model outranks one from a bare captured name; shortest still
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breaks ties, so the order stays total and the verdict deterministic.
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"""
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{"sink": "fs.readFileSync(p)", "sinkLine": "6", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0", "source": "res",
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"sanitized": False, "length": 3, "inLabeledScope": True},
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{"sink": "fs.readFileSync(p)", "sinkLine": "6", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0", "source": "this",
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"sanitized": False, "length": 7, "inLabeledScope": True},
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{"sink": "fs.readFileSync(p)", "sinkLine": "6", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
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"source": "request.args['f']", "sanitized": False, "length": 11, "inLabeledScope": True},
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]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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assert "request.args['f']" in answer.witness, f"witness named no real source: {answer.witness}"
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assert verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener") == answer # still deterministic
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def test_a_modelled_source_flow_decides_even_when_a_parameter_flow_is_unsanitized() -> None:
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"""Parameter sources are a fallback, never an override.
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On the fixed angular-http-server side the real flow `req.url -> ... -> readFileSync` IS sanitized by
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path.normalize, but the captured `res` parameter also reaches the sink unsanitized. Judging on the union
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reports the fix as still vulnerable, on the strength of a flow that names no attacker input. When any
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modelled source reaches the sink, those flows are the evidence and the bare-parameter ones are ignored.
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"""
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [
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{"sink": "fs.readFileSync(safe)", "sinkLine": "41", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0", "source": "res",
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"sanitized": False, "length": 3, "inLabeledScope": True},
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{"sink": "fs.readFileSync(safe)", "sinkLine": "41", "sinkMethod": "<lambda>0",
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"source": "request.args['f']", "sanitized": True, "length": 22, "inLabeledScope": True},
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]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="requestListener")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.CORROBORATED, "a sanitized real flow is not an entailment"
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assert "request.args['f']" in answer.witness
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def test_parameter_flows_still_decide_when_no_modelled_source_reaches_the_sink() -> None:
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from openultrasast.model.ladder import Rung
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from openultrasast.model.taint import verdict
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rows = [{"sink": "os.system(cmd)", "sinkLine": "4", "sinkMethod": "run", "source": "username",
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"sanitized": False, "length": 2, "inLabeledScope": True}]
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answer = verdict(_cpg(rows), _spec(), function="run")
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assert answer is not None and answer.rung is Rung.ENTAILED
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